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ABSTRACT 
 
THE RETURN OF PARTICIPATORY SCRIPTURAL HERMENEUTICS IN 
EVANGELICALISM: AN AUGUSTINIAN PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION 
 
 
 
By 
Joshua D. Hill 
December 2016 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Janie Harden Fritz 
Using a philosophy of communication approach adapted from St. Augustine’s 
rhetorical theory, I propose the recovery of Augustinian scriptural hermeneutics to 
meet the hermeneutical crisis in current Evangelicalism. Evangelical identity is 
centered on scripturally mediated belief and mission that ties together its 
ecumenical coalition, but its hermeneutic principles were co-opted by modernism 
and have now become further embattled by the turn away from modernism to 
philosophical hermeneutic approaches. Augustine’s hermeneutical principles of 
charity, hermeneutical humility through responsiveness to the Word, and the 
social/communal action of lived hermeneutics are explained in terms of 
Augustine’s pre-modern cosmology of “participation” and are clarified by 
comparison with the hermeneutic theories of Gadamer, Ricoeur, and their 
v 
Evangelical respondents. Fulfilling its philosophy of communication emphasis, 
this project concludes with a conceptual sketch of Evangelical interpretation as 
practiced through Augustinian participatory hermeneutics. 
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1 
Chapter 1  
Introduction: Hermeneutics in the Historical Moment of Evangelicalism 
 
This project takes an Augustinian philosophy of communication interpretive approach to 
the current problem of biblical hermeneutics that has taxed the confidence in both the 
interpretive praxis and communicative identity of the Evangelical coalitional community. 
Bypassing the long-traveled Christian rhetorical focus on homiletics, this project applies 
philosophy of communication to hermeneutics as the other main rhetorical concern of 
Evangelical “people of the book.” After setting out the complexities and history of the crisis in 
Evangelical biblical hermeneutics, this project explains and proposes the recovery of 
Augustinian participation (an early Christian view of the cosmos), interpretation, and social 
dynamics to provide linguistic-conceptual resources by which to meet that crisis. These 
Augustinian philosophical resources are developed in the context of Evangelical conversations 
about philosophical hermeneutics and Augustine for current biblical hermeneutics and 
ecclesiology. After developing these conceptual tools from an Augustinian philosophy of 
communication, the project concludes with a rhetorical turn, proposing a socially embodied 
praxis of scripture reading as one solution to the Evangelical hermeneutical problem.   
Telling the historical narrative of how Evangelical hermeneutics has interacted with the 
broader hermeneutic tradition—under the prevailing Evangelical identity markers of unity 
through mission and shared biblical reading practices1—this chapter sets the parameters of the 
larger project, defines the hermeneutical problem within its rhetorical context, clarifies the 
interpretive approach, and defends the appropriation of Augustine’s hermeneutic and social 
theory in the move towards a new Evangelical hermeneutical praxis.   
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The Problem of Evangelical Hermeneutics 
As Robert Bellah et al. have noted, the Christian church in the United States has been 
radically compromised in its ability to communicate to itself, its members, and the culture at 
large its mission/telos and rule of life, an indictment that holds for the significant Christian 
subculture of Evangelicals.2 From their origins in biblical communal narratives, Bellah says that 
American churches have largely shifted to being gathering places (“lifestyle enclaves”) for 
people operating according to “expressive” and “instrumental” concepts of individual meaning.3 
According to Evangelical historian Mark Noll, Evangelicals in particular have “lost all sense of 
history” and have “ignored their own tradition’s resources” in their 20th century cultural 
transformation into a fideistic and pragmatic political powerhouse, and historian Molly Worthen 
argues that the root of this Evangelical “anti-intellectualism” stems from their community’s 
“deep disagreement over what the Bible means,” as seen in their contradictory hermeneutic that 
joins fideistic presuppositionalism and Enlightenment textual rationalism.4  
The shift from an earlier Evangelical community for which the scriptures permeated 
community and mission (constituting the background) to a 20th century movement organized 
largely around the defense of a bible very much in the foreground was the result of a 
combination of factors—sociological, theological, and historical—but the most telling blow was 
to the practice of an evangelical biblical hermeneutics that, though undertheorized and imperfect, 
had enabled many earlier Evangelicals to be both historically responsive and scripturally 
focused, both socially constructive and an instrument of social critique.5 To use the bible as 
scripture was to submit to it as the voice of God, authoritative for life and practice, even when it 
stands over against one’s preferences, community ethos, or culture, whereas the focus on the 
bible as bible was to stand over it as an authoritative interpreter, finding materials with which to 
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justify one’s own position or attack another’s position.6 Hermeneutic responsiveness to the bible 
as scripture was not the only mode of engagement with the book—in large part because of the 
pressures to use the bible as a weapon of defense and polemic in the post-Reformation milieu.7 
But the continually outward and otherward direction of Evangelical missions provided a 
perpetual check on hermeneutic ossification and a return to hermeneutic responsiveness.8  
Over the first part of the 20th century, though, even as “foreign” missions proceeded 
apace, American evangelicalism adopted a strong modernistic hermeneutic because of the 
intensification of its polemics with an encroaching secular society and educational structure.9 
This shift moved Evangelicalism from a pragmatic and ecumenical hermeneutic centered in the 
gospel to a hermeneutic focused on comprehensive objectivity and the policing of the boundaries 
of orthodoxy. Since the 1970s, this loss of a missional narrative core has been recognized and 
addressed to some degree through the recent resurgence in Evangelical “missional” language and 
theorizing,10 which seeks to reconstitute Evangelical churches around some central “missional” 
concept. However, there is a diversity of rhetorical grounds within the “missional” movement 
and a significant range of Evangelical thought and practice still unaffected by even those 
solutions. This situation highlights a number of unanswered—and sometimes unasked—
questions in Evangelical rhetorical practice.11 In Evangelical academic circles, the hermeneutics 
problem has been more clearly framed, but no more satisfactorily solved, as Brevard Childs 
summarizes in his Foreword to the initial volume of the Scripture & Hermeneutics Series, 
scholarly volumes organized to address this problem: 
For at least a decade it has become commonplace to speak of a crisis in biblical 
interpretation. Most everyone engaged in the study of the Bible is fully aware that the 
enterprise has run into real difficulty. The present crisis has been described in different 
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ways: methodological impasse, conflicting private agenda, loss of clear direction, 
extreme fragmentation, unbridgeable diversity, and even a deep sense of resignation.12 
Therefore, while the aspect of mission in Evangelical identity moves relentlessly forward, the 
question of unity and of the aspect of shared biblical foundations weighs heavily on the 
movement, putting to the question its future vitality.   
As a project within the purview of philosophy of communication, this investigation is 
particularly focused on questions in real historical communities that require real rhetorical 
responses. The stated “community” is the evangelical one, and the issue is the crisis in biblical 
hermeneutics in evangelicalism (its too-successful replacing of its orthopraxical hermeneutic 
foundations with a modernistic textual epistemology that is now collapsing) that demands a 
rhetorical response in both its theoretical and its social aspects.  
The designation “evangelical,” however, is a problematic one. It has been suggested by 
some that the label “Evangelical Christian” is “meaningless,”13 and that evangelical 
hermeneutics is a contradiction in terms.14 These criticisms are understandable, especially since 
the term “Evangelical” does not reference one group bounded by a single communal history, 
longstanding non-negotiable institutions, and an official identifying liturgy. These difficulties, 
and more, notwithstanding, I argue that both evangelicalism and evangelical hermeneutics 
identify real communities, practices, institutions, and actions. They constitute a MacIntyrian 
tradition that is modified and contested from within,15 and thus these terms function as more than 
purely analytic sociological labels. To understand the tensions within and foibles of the current 
evangelical community and its hermeneutics—and thus define its current horizon with regard to 
its past—we must follow, briefly, the torturous history of evangelicalism and evangelical 
hermeneutics.  
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Gabriel Facke identifies six different types of evangelicals,16 and George Marsden labels 
Evangelicalism a coalitional movement involving many different Christian denominations, both 
before and after the Fundamentalist/Modernist wars of the early 20th century.17 The “evangelical” 
“trans-denominational” identity, therefore, could be described first with the “basic beliefs of the 
old nineteenth-century evangelical consensus”: 
(1) the Reformation doctrine of the final authority of the Bible, (2) the real historical 
character of God’s saving work recorded in Scripture, (3) salvation to eternal life based 
on the redemptive work of Christ, (4) the importance of evangelism and missions, and (5) 
the importance of a spiritually transformed life.18 
This early Evangelicalism arose as a social phenomenon about the same time that biblical 
hermeneutics in academic circles began shifting to a historical-critical perspective—in Legaspi’s 
serendipitous title, “the death of scripture and the rise of biblical studies.” The social 
phenomenon was initiated by the revivals of the First Great Awakening (1730-1755), following 
the Moravian revival of 1727, which put more stress on conversion experience than on people’s 
religious adherence to specific doctrinal creeds or liturgies. With leaders who were pronouncedly 
Arminian (the Wesleys) and Calvinist (George Whitefield; Jonathan Edwards), the movement 
largely transcended those theological tensions to present an ecumenical proof of God’s 
evangelical work beyond the bounds of any one confession. The social phenomenon of 
evangelicalism continued and became even more ecumenical in the Second Great Awakening in 
the United States (1802-1835).19 The specter of continental Deism and Atheism, on the one hand, 
and the expectation of the incoming of the millennial Kingdom of God, on the other hand, set the 
stage for an ecumenical evangelical explosion,20 encouraged by the numbers coming to faith 
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under preaching that emphasized even more strongly the importance of personal decision and the 
experience of conversion.21  
 These religious experiences specifically called into question both rationalist skepticism of 
the bible from French Enlightenment thinkers and the Deistic emphasis on God’s non-
interference in human affairs. Thus Jonathan Edwards, while still influenced by Enlightenment 
thought, could write his treatise Religious Affections to critique a philosophy of interpretation 
closed to the activity of God, and Timothy Dwight, president of Yale, could initiate revival on 
that campus through public lectures that exposed the presuppositions of Enlightenment 
skepticism.22 That is, while “reason” was commencing its reign over the Continent (in 
hermeneutics through a mathematical application of philology against all dogma), its impact in 
America and England was mitigated by the renewal of the experience of the mission of the 
gospel, along with a greater social tolerance for denominational pluralism.    
The 19th century emphasis on evangelism and social action, on what was seen as the eve 
of Christ’s return, continued through the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, but 
millennial hopes slowly disintegrated after their high point in the abolition of slavery, hurt by the 
secularization of politics and education, the prevalence of corruption, and the disintegration of 
the social undergirding of evangelical life through urbanization and industrial revolution.23 As 
George Marsden argues, the American Revolution had fused, for politically pragmatic purposes, 
orthodox Christian communities with rationalist republicans who looked to the ancient Roman 
republic for their charter. This fused national character was the motive for and product of 
American universities through most of the 19th century, training leaders for both Christian 
service and rational service to the American republic.  
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During the latter half of the 19th century, however, the evangelical response to their local 
world began to be defensive, reacting to the continuing influence of Continental historicism and 
rationalism, the advent of Darwinism,24 and the seeming unification of the world without 
Christ—through globalizing markets, technological advances in transportation and 
communication, and an abnormally long period in the West with no significant internecine 
wars.25 With many American universities adopting the system and presuppositions of the 
German system, which was also the home of higher criticism of the bible, the late 19th century 
witnessed the movement of many Evangelicals toward separate bible colleges, creating a split 
between the academically respectable but no longer orthodox universities and the disreputably 
dogmatic but pious bible colleges.26 This separatist move became most fully expressed in the 
subset of Evangelicals called Fundamentalists, a group that briefly spoke for the larger 
evangelical community during their last major public engagement, the Scopes trial, but then 
withdrew from the public sphere.27  
Thus, the waning of evangelical dominance in American politics, society, and culture 
influenced evangelical hermeneutics in two key ways: first, institutionally, evangelicals-turned-
fundamentalists separated from the larger public conversations, leading to a narrowing of 
hermeneutic interests and retrenching of evangelical social groups;28 second, from these bastions, 
evangelical-fundamentalists adopted the dominant culture’s rationalism of language and 
epistemology to recast hermeneutics as a primarily apologetic enterprise. “These self-proclaimed 
critics of modernity actually fell under the spell of modernity,” Dan Stiver says, summarizing 
this paradoxical move. He says that 
conservatives labored to lay down an impregnable foundation of historical and 
propositional verities that could rival the positivistic foundations of the natural sciences, 
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which were growing in prestige … the scientific and evangelical worlds both strove to 
live up to a notion of science and faith that looked more like Descartes and Locke than 
the Deuteronomist and Luke.29  
Apologetics before this point had not been a stranger to evangelical hermeneutics, as, for 
example, Dwight’s broadsides against French Enlightenment thought at Yale demonstrate.30 
However, the academic and scientific forces newly arrayed against the bible, along with the 
sociological upheavals of industrial modernity, seemed to provoke a survivor mentality in 
evangelical biblical hermeneutics, and with that survivor mentality,31 a narrowing of the cultural 
and educational tools used in hermeneutics and apologetics.  
Possibly as a result of the seeming slide into cultural darkness, a new end-times theology, 
pre-millennial dispensationalism, gained the ascendency, encouraged and promoted through the 
popular evangelist D. L. Moody and the best-selling Scofield study bible.32 Pre-millennial 
dispensationalism not only did its best imitation of a serious textual science, building a minutely 
detailed and comprehensive eschatology from a systematic study of scripture as an ahistorical 
and intrinsically unified work,33 but it also provided an explanation to its constituents of the 
contemporary cultural slide into degradation and apostasy. Instead of teaching that the church 
was to usher in the millennium through the gospel and the amelioration of social ills, as had the 
previously dominant eschatology, pre-millennial dispensationalism taught that after a certain 
period of chronological time (carefully calculated from the book of Daniel), there would be a 
great falling away from Christ, with the morality of the world growing progressively worse, until 
Christ “raptured” his church out of the world and then returned in glory to exact vengeance on a 
fully depraved world. When the World Wars destroyed liberal Christians’ dream of a millennium 
of Western Christian idealism, therefore, dispensationalists were confirmed in their conclusions; 
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when the state of Israel was created as a Zionist haven at the end of World War II, 
dispensationalists were delighted, for that event also fit their system.34 Their biblical hermeneutic 
was apparently paying dividends, and the foreordained terrible state of the world was both a spur 
to more intense evangelization and a convenient explanation for the lack of positive impact the 
gospel was having on society.35 With the same theological stroke, evangelism was intensified 
and emptied of much of its content, especially its social content of the kingdom of God.  
Thus, evangelicalism had started as an ecumenical movement through a renewed 
emphasis on personal conversion. While the bible was being subjected to analysis and critique by 
18th and 19th century academics, the mass of evangelicals of that era continued to read the bible 
as scripture—that is, as a both historical and spiritually discerned word to be obeyed, with a 
particular emphasis on evangelism, or “mission” as it is now called. Faced with the philosophical 
and sociological challenges of the late 19th century, however, especially the institutionalization 
of rationalist biblical hermeneutics, evangelical leaders and institutions adapted more and more 
their aims, methods, and language to those of their opponents. Conservative evangelicals adopted 
the language, methods, and assumptions of positivistic science, which was (and still is) the 
culturally recognized language of certainty and truth. This scientific hermeneutic, presupposing a 
Cartesian subject/object split, was the tool used to find the one-and-only-one meaning of the text 
which would equal the state of reality if properly interpreted. With a tool of presumably such 
precision and with the dangerous encroachment of end-time apostasy, the biblical hermeneutics 
of fundamentalist evangelicals no longer sought ecumenism, which could lead to a fatal watering 
down of the gospel. Not surprisingly, the history of some sectors of Evangelicalism has been a 
history of church and denominational splits, featuring the rise of the fiercely independent local 
church under the oracular headship of an “anointed” pastor-teacher.36  
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From this milieu, neo-evangelicalism re-emerged from fundamentalism in the 1950’s, 
rejecting the defensive and separatist attitude of fundamentalism.37 Its emergence was the result 
of what amounted to a marketing campaign put together by several prominent Christian 
leaders,38 a campaign that featured the enterprising publishing gambit of Christianity Today, a 
handful of evangelical seminaries, associations, and journals, and the renewed hope of a gospel-
centered movement through the Crusades of Billy Graham.39 Despite the top-down organization 
of the renewed Evangelical movement, by 1976, the “Year of the Evangelical,” “the socialization 
and sense of identification among divergent evangelical groups ha[d] been so complete within 
this institutional complex that … scholars [were] compelled to invent a nomenclature for the rest 
of the established Protestant denominations.”40 Moreover, as Noll says, these “modern 
conservative evangelicals are the lineal descendents of … earlier movements” that emphasize the 
possibility and authority of popular interpretation of the bible fused with a salvific paradigm of 
personal and societal transformation.41 Perhaps aided sociologically by the pressures of the Cold 
War, the foundation for the coalescing of a significant Evangelical identity was certainly 
prepared by the way Evangelical leaders retained Fundamentalist apologetics and hermeneutics 
while seeking to re-engage politics and social issues in a positive way.  
As long as the broader culture still operated on the basis of a modernistic Cartesian 
epistemology, scientistic Evangelical evangelism and apologetics could prosper and engage the 
world without too much internal tension, but once the linguistic turn in philosophy started to 
work its way through the other academic disciplines and into popular culture in the 1960s and 
70s, bringing the “foundationalist and objectivist assumptions of science, philosophy, and 
theology … [under] heavy attack,”42 the uneasy truce between evangelicals and the rest of 
American culture came to an end. At this point, “evangelical” became again a highly politicized 
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term, and the policing of the borders of its identity, like with fundamentalism before it, became 
important. What identity boundaries could be created for a movement that encompassed 
believers and denominations of a wide range of theological convictions and practices?43 As 
Gerald Sheppard argues, what Evangelicals had retained from their Fundamentalist forebears 
became the core again of their identity, but instead of a list of fundamental doctrines, the 
Evangelicals gathered around a hermeneutic process tied to a specific perspective on the biblical 
text. He says that “the official language of social identification, over against other so-called ‘non-
evangelical’ institutions, was and continues to be the language of biblical hermeneutics.”44  
As a religious movement birthed into the sociological patterns of the modern age, the 
institutional boundaries of evangelicalism have been strongly tied to print and literacy, and thus 
to publishing and education institutions. Evangelical hermeneutical practice is, to a significant 
degree, maintained and supported through evangelical journals, bible reference material, 
apologetics books and seminars, seminaries, and lay educational programs, many of them in 
para-church organizations.45 Evangelicals are self-confessedly and proudly people of the book, 
an identity filtered through the individualistic and highly literate culture of the late 19th century, 
as seen in Princeton theologian Charles Hodge’s description of biblical interpretation:  
The fact that all the true people of God in every age and in every part of the Church, in 
the exercise of their private judgment, in accordance with the simple rules [of 
interpretation] above stated, agree as to the meaning of Scripture in all things necessary 
either in faith or practice, is a decisive proof of the perspicuity of the bible, and of the 
safety of allowing the people the enjoyment of the divine right of private judgment.46 
Having grown up in the center of this identity in its late 20th century manifestation,47 I can attest 
that “evangelical” is a formidable identity that protects and promotes certain goods, binds 
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individuals into communities, and gives meaning and direction to a wide range of individual and 
shared actions—all centered on accessible and traditional readings of scripture.48 
However, while Evangelicals began to defend again, in the 1970s, their underlying 
identity vis-à-vis the bible, they discovered a further tension brought about through the other side 
of their identity, viz., their openness to and engagement in the world.49 The world of 
hermeneutics had moved on from philology, authorial intention, and correspondence, with 
philosophical hermeneutics making its presence felt in every discipline by the late 1960’s.50 In 
biblical studies, this influence manifested first through the “literary turn” in the 1970’s, which 
excited some Evangelical scholars while alarming others.51 Though understandably missed by 
outsiders to Evangelicalism, the community of evangelical interpreters attempted a balance 
between the need for a clear-cut definitional identity—through a traditional and bounded 
hermeneutics—and the need to respect their own internal diversity and the diverse interpretive 
demands of missions.52 Politically and organizationally, the 1977 Statement on Biblical 
Inerrancy and the 1982 Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics tried to set terms for Evangelical 
identity that would provide accountability tools that would be powerful and easy to use,53 but the 
evangelical community of scholars was already significantly “postcritical … encyclopedic … 
fiercely pluralist,”54 motivated in part to keep biblical interpretation accessible and relevant to 
“the priesthood of all believers”55 and peoples of other cultures receiving the bible for the first 
time. This balancing act, especially as recorded in the 1982 Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics 
(Statement), was not entirely successful as an evangelical “consensus” but was, as Iain Provan 
points out, rather “a patchwork of compromises between different views.”56 
The Statement is structured as twenty-five “Articles” which each contain an affirmation 
and a denial, along with an explanation, of some issue the participants felt was essential to the 
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identity of Evangelical hermeneutics, though as Provan notes, the Statement “is less interested in 
helping us read well … than it is in ensuring that the historicity of these texts is safeguarded.”57 
That is, the Statement is still more a defensive than a constructive program of interpretation. Key 
tensions visible in the document, especially as some articles are read alongside others, are  
1) the placing of meaning in the author’s intention (Articles VII, XV) vs. beyond the 
author’s intention (Article XVIII);58  
2) rejecting the separation of meaning from the form of the biblical words (Articles II, 
XV) while upholding the separation and restating of meaning in translation (Articles XI, XII);59  
3) the upholding of a necessary level of grammatical-historical and genre knowledge 
(Articles XIII, XV, XVI, XX) while also arguing for the perspicuity of scripture to the 
“priesthood of all believers” (Article XXIV);  
4) defending one single and fixed meaning of a text (Articles VI, VII) while conceding so 
much possible human error in interpreting it that confidence in a specific interpretation has no 
strong warrant (Articles VIII, X, XIII, XIX, XXIII);60  
5) similarly, locating the fixed meaning of the text in the realm of scientific (if 
inaccessible) science while identifying application as the site for broad and varied interpretation 
based in a personal or social horizon (Articles VI, VII, IX), which protects biblical interpretation 
from subjectivism in theory while allowing it in practical action;  
6) acknowledging the Holy Spirit’s role in the broader hermeneutical process, but 
keeping the Spirit’s role in application and obedience rather than in the interpretation of the text 
itself (Articles IV, V, XV);  
7) both denying (Article VI) and emphasizing (Article XXIII) that salvation through 
Christ is the focus and thus the hermeneutical key of the scriptures;  
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8) warning of accepting alien presuppositions as philosophical foundations of biblical 
interpretation (such as evolutionism and Marxism; Article XIX) while leaving unexamined their 
own modernistic presuppositions that may be similarly alien; and  
9) acknowledging cultural factors in the creation and reception of the bible (Article XII), 
which is especially important in the bible’s use in missions, but explicitly rejecting the 
Gadamarian notion of a “fusion of horizons” as descriptive of God’s word come down into 
specific cultural embodiment (Articles VIII, IX)—specifically, Geisler explains that “the reader’s 
understanding has no hermeneutically definitive role.”61  
This characterization of hermeneutics as a “fusion of horizons” is also specifically 
rejected by Robertson McQuilkin and Bradford Mullen,62 rehashing the Statement interpretive 
debate in a 1997 Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society article and unwittingly 
demonstrating that the tensions inherent in the Statement had not been resolved over the fifteen 
intervening years. In a misreading of Gadamer presented under the label “postmodernism,” 
McQuilkin and Mullen complain, “We are constantly reminded that the intent of the Bible 
authors, not to mention the intent of God, is forever out of reach because of the limitations of 
human language, the blinding effect of preunderstanding, and the cultural encapsulation of the 
text.”63 Though the authors acknowledge diversity in the camp of Evangelical hermeneutic 
theory,64 they categorically reject the positions that make meaning an event of understanding 
between interpreter and text rather than as fixed linguistic meaning corresponding to the factual 
description of the real world. Moving into polemical language, they say,  
To deny the possibility of words corresponding to reality is ultimately an attack on the 
nature and activity of God. … the correspondence between words (language meaning) 
and reality is essential to the nature of God and of human beings made in his image. This 
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connection between revelation in understandable words and the nature of God and of 
humankind is a major theme.65 
However, the establishment of the one fixed meaning of this inspired text is portrayed by these 
Evangelical scholars as a more difficult matter, leading, practically, to a pulling back from the 
“absolute truth” of the scriptures even as that truth is being defended: “We claim not only that 
there is not a precise and exhaustive correspondence between every word and its referent but also 
that there is not always an exact correspondence between our personal interpretation of Biblical 
words and ultimate reality. Far from it.”66 The further problem of cross-cultural communication 
of the bible, from the authors’ own experience in contextualizing the gospel in Japan, magnifies 
the tension implicit in the 1982 Statement.67 Though their personal interpretation of the absolute 
truth of the scriptures is fallible, by their own admission, it still must bear the weight of judging 
how the “meanings” thus derived from scripture should translate into a radically different 
culture. Analyzing the similar contradictions in the 1982 Statement, Provan correctly diagnoses 
the problem as one of the underlying philosophical foundations of current Evangelical 
hermeneutics: “It is at this point that the reader of the Bible begins to wonder how far the Bible 
itself is truly guiding the principles of interpretation being advocated in the Statement, and how 
far other factors are far more determinative.”68 Noll agrees, describing the complex historical 
mixture of modernistic and anti-modernistic philosophies undergirding Evangelical perspectives 
on the bible.69 In his work, he notes the “striking absence of a secure theological framework for 
the [Evangelical] study of scripture,” and he calls for a systematic and “discerning” engagement 
with general hermeneutical theory to promote a constructive and coherent “self-understanding” 
of Evangelical hermeneutics.70 This, it seems to me, is a neo-Augustinian call to raid the 
treasure-houses of our current academic Egypt.   
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Sociologically and institutionally, therefore, the attempted balancing act (between 
different Evangelical positions and different missional “goods” to which Evangelical identity is 
committed) was only partly successful as it tried to shepherd the next generation of evangelicals 
into a unified fold. It was more successful with evangelicals who continued in the older dominant 
epistemology of modernism, though it also supported the rising proponents of presuppositional 
apologetics popularized by Francis Schaeffer, one of the key figures in these Evangelical 
conferences. The contention of this project is that the modernistic epistemology at the root of the 
scientific textual criticism that has served as the foundation for Evangelical hermeneutics since 
the late 19th century is,71 in many ways, an alien influence whose continued presence in current 
Evangelical hermeneutics needs to be repaired through the resources of the longer Evangelical 
and Christian traditions. Taking up Noll’s language, I argue that Evangelicals need to be more 
clear and self-aware about their antimodernism,72 not in its reactionary mode but in its longer 
history of philosophical resources and faith-embedded practices. That is, Evangelicals need to 
engage in a philosophy of communication that not only examines critically the “wisdom of this 
world” that has infused their rhetorical and hermeneutical approaches but also seeks constructive 
conceptual solutions from the traditional sources of Christian renewal: the Spirit, the scriptures, 
and the witness of the churches.  
The current evangelical movement is my particular focus. While expressly ecumenical73 
in its conception, this evangelicalism is still, as we have seen, largely tied by training and 
temperament to the modernistic biblical interpretation of fundamentalism, a hermeneutic that is 
built for apologia and separation rather than constructive coalition-building or unity. The 
movement also shares the conundrum of fundamentalism in how to practice its hermeneutic vis-
à-vis the secular academic community to secure both adherence to the faith and respectability in 
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academic circles.74 The big tent of evangelicalism is torn between its ecumenical identity in a 
missional hermeneutic and its separatist identity in a Cartesian scientific hermeneutic, and torn 
especially because the nature of the internal disagreements over the tradition has not been 
acknowledged and addressed in a constructive way. Where disagreements within the tradition 
have been made public, it has normally been in the polemical mode, using polarizing labels like 
“postmodernism,” as exemplified by McQuilkin and Mullan. Historically, evangelicalism has 
been a trans-denominational, trans-institutional tradition that has centered its identity in a shared 
approach to biblical hermeneutics, but the modernistic version of that approach to biblical 
hermeneutics is not only no longer philosophically viable but also at odds with the other 
Evangelical identity markers of unity and mission through the gospel. Metaphorically, 
Evangelicals have been building castles with defensive ramparts instead of an Ark ready to take 
multitudes on a journey through the waters of faith, sailing to the future “city which has 
foundations, whose builder and maker is God.”75 Further intensifying this crisis, the lack of a 
coherent, constructive paradigm of interpretation sends thoughtful Evangelicals either toward a 
reactionary adherence to modernist interpretation, as an article of blind “faith,” or toward a 
relativistic, emotive interpretation scheme that is usually labeled “postmodern.”76 Even further, 
Western social disintegration, emotivist attitudes, and the isolation and distraction engendered by 
our current media ecology have combined to significantly weaken the basic biblical literacy and 
culture of ecclesial institutional support that supported constructive evangelicalism in the 19th 
century.77 Therefore, the Evangelical hermeneutical crisis is multifaceted, tied to its history, 
philosophical grounding, social identity, and institutional practices.  
Is there still hope to “strengthen that which remains,” recapturing and re-sourcing 
evangelical identity through a renewed biblical hermeneutics? Since evangelical churches, 
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educational institutions, and individuals have a fair degree of autonomy and a stated openness to 
engagement with the culture, it may be possible for a different conception and practice of biblical 
hermeneutics to work its way through the evangelical network, even, as Noll suggests, from an 
engagement with the broader tradition of largely secular hermeneutics. This openness to 
engagement with other Christian traditions and with the “general revelation” in secular culture 
invites philosophy of communication approaches to Evangelical hermeneutics and rhetoric. A 
faithful approach to philosophy of communication can provide the Evangelical tradition with 
appropriate resources for both self-critique of its current philosophical positioning and 
constructive re-sourcing from the longer Christian tradition.   
The Hermeneutic Historical Moment 
In the background of this history of Evangelicalism and its biblical hermeneutics is the 
seismic shift in hermeneutics more generally in the 20th century. In the last fifty years, 
hermeneutics has shifted from a historical-critical methodology, grounded in modernistic 
epistemology, to a more responsive act of inviting disclosure within the limited horizons of 
particular interpreters located within specific relationships to the facticity of the world, a 
philosophical hermeneutics introduced by Martin Heidegger and adapted by Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur to texts.78 Reading hermeneutics as an integral aspect of rhetoric is a 
theoretical move both ancient and recent. For this pairing, I look not only to Augustine’s 
rhetorical treatise De Doctrina Christiana, which spends the first three books on interpretation 
and the last on speaking, but also to the renewed attention to the interpenetration of rhetoric, 
philosophy, and hermeneutics after the Heideggerian linguistic turn in philosophy.79 
Richard Palmer, in his classic Hermeneutics, sets this more recent shift within the broader 
history of hermeneutics, which originated in “rules, methods, or theory” governing the exegesis 
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of different special forms of text, especially the bible. After the Protestant Reformation, such 
manuals of interpretational principles proliferated,80 though the practical focus was on the right 
reading of the hidden meaning of the scriptures so as to sustain and strengthen the interpreting 
faith community. In the 18th century, however, the historical-critical method of philology 
channeled the classical and historical learning of the Renaissance into the rationalistic paradigm 
of the Enlightenment, not only leading to scholars interpreting the scriptures as any other book 
but also shifting the telos of bible interpretation from sustenance of the faith community to the 
“discovery” and justification of the “universal” truths deduced by Enlightenment rationality. 
“And at least from the Enlightenment to the present,” Palmer says, “biblical methods of research 
have been inseparably connected with philology.”81  
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) did provide a critique of philology’s “aggregate of 
rules” and distortions of the text, seeking to create instead a coherent science of “understanding” 
that would transcend narrow disciplinary boundaries, a goal that his biographer and disciple 
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) furthered in his embedding of hermeneutics as the “core discipline 
which could serve as the foundation for all the Geisteswissenschaften,” the human arts and 
sciences.82 However, this humanistic counterpoint in the understanding of hermeneutics was still 
under the shadow of a Cartesian focus on the disinterested study of the objective text from a 
God-like subject position, using philological principles and laws in the spirit of the Newtonian 
natural sciences.  
This brief history of general hermeneutics before the 20th century leads us to an 
examination of the shift which birthed philosophical hermeneutics and a discussion of the major 
metaphors of the work of Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Speech Act Theory that have gained the 
attention of Evangelical hermeneutical scholars. These themes from philosophical hermeneutics 
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and philosophy of language have not only crossed over into the Evangelical conversation but 
they also provide entry points for the theory of Augustine.  
Making the turn away from the ground of modernism, Heidegger’s phenomenological 
project in Being and Time (1927) returned hermeneutics to an ontological fact of human being—
interpretation is what humans are, not just what they do. The world, in Heidegger’s thought, is 
not passively waiting to be interpreted but rather imprints on humans “thrown” into the world the 
preconditions of their understanding and the facticity of objects and events that demand 
attention. Like the ancient Greeks, to which Heidegger was looking in his own investigation of 
Being, interpretation is a matter of participating in the world, not an extraction or imposition of 
meaning from a subject position.83 Gadamer systematized and applied this basic hermeneutic 
insight to texts, specifically critiquing the modern emphasis on “method” and, in its place, 
describing a dialectical encounter between text and interpreter that brings together their two 
“horizons” into a meaning-event that is linguistic to the core.84 Paul Ricoeur was even more 
focused on the details of the text itself, especially religious and literary texts with equivocal 
symbols that, while holding the symbolic resources of a rich history of thought essential to 
humane social life, are increasingly undercut and hollowed out by a hermeneutics of suspicion, 
on the one hand (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud), and a shallow correspondence theory of language on 
the other.85 Philosophical hermeneutics thus redefined and broadened hermeneutics, as Palmer 
narrates, though he says that if the scope of hermeneutics is broadened to include implicit as well 
as explicit theories of interpretation, the field is impossibly broad and diverse.86 Palmer’s 
investigation provides us the broad sweep of approaches to texts, especially the philological, the 
human arts focus, and philosophical hermeneutics.  
21 
Influenced by the later Wittgenstein, the Speech Act Theory articulated first by J. L. 
Austin and John Searle has taken the linguisticality of human sociality and the problems of 
interpretation in another direction. Austin noticed that most language use was not directed 
toward reference but rather toward action in a social context—that is, language performs certain 
actions that make public certain social expectations, intentions, and commitments. Examples of 
such actions are requesting, promising, and declaring.87 The point of these performatives is social 
coordination, not the faithful representation of the world through language. Searle, picking up 
where Austin left off, noted that even assertions, which purport to describe the world, are 
performatives, and he added also the analytical questions of direction of fit and “institutional 
facts.”88 As Richard S. Briggs explains, direction of fit asks whether the illocutionary act is one 
that attempts to fit the word to the world (e.g., assertions), the world to the word (e.g., requests, 
promises), the word and world to each other at the same time (e.g., “I declare you man and 
wife”), or neither direction (e.g., phatic or expressive speech). Institutional facts, embedded in 
what Searle called the “background,” are those socially embedded scripts, prototypes, and 
background narratives which provide the context for interpreting the “illocutionary force” of any 
particular utterance. The meaning of such an utterance is not a world-descriptive proposition but 
an implied social action, understood only against the background of a linguistic community, or in 
Wittgenstein’s terms, a specific “language game.”89 Briggs warns that Speech Act Theory is not 
meant to be a universal theory of language, but it has proved to be a powerful and fecund 
description of much that happens in “ordinary language.”90 Applied to texts by Michael 
Goldberg, it adds another layer of complexity to the interpretation of a text, asking not only what 
the text means in itself but also what social actions the author(s) were performing vis-à-vis their 
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readers,91 and thus what social obligations are laid upon the readers through a right reading of the 
text.  
These philosophical strands of hermeneutics function concurrently in this historical 
moment, challenging Evangelical positions that prefer to practice rules of textual interpretation 
without examining closely the philosophies underlying those rules. This challenge is especially 
strong since “philosophy today is already focused on language [and] is then already, in a sense, 
hermeneutics.”92 Given this current state of the field, how might Evangelical hermeneutics meet 
Palmer’s challenge to find a path that is both faithful and “creatively hermeneutical”?93  
This is a question that has been clarified and narrowed for the Evangelical academic 
community, specifically, by Noll. He profiles two basic types of Evangelical biblical scholar, 
“critical anti-critics” and “believing critics.” The first group undertakes biblical scholarship 
purely for the sake of defending the bible from its critics; the second group “find[s] insight as 
well as error in the larger world of biblical scholarship” and has a broader sense of what 
questions are allowed in listening to the bible.94   
Nicholas Wolterstorff—one such “believing critic”—has engaged this challenge of 
creativity, positioning his theory of divine discourse as speech acts within the context of other 
hermeneutic theories. Referencing the hermeneutical inroads made by Schleiermacher, 
Wolterstorff identifies the prominent German tradition of the 19th century as “authorial-
intention” hermeneutics, in which the goal was to understand the text by reconstructing the mind 
of the author who gave expression to his/her thought.95 Reacting against the historicism and 
psychologism of authorial-intention hermeneutics, the New Critics of the early 20th century 
argued for the centrality of the text itself, whose unity and craftsmanship enabled meaning 
through close reading of the textual parts in relation to one another, a hermeneutical theory 
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Wolterstorff calls “textual-sense interpretation.” This approach was not overturned but recast in 
complex ways by philosophical hermeneutics, which said not only that “the interpreting self is 
always an anticipating self whose anticipations are formed by tradition” but also that the 
meaning of the text has “ontological status” as an “ideal entity.”96  
These “ideal entity” meanings are not subjective mental states or merely sentences, but 
rather abstract entities that Wolterstorff says “can be believed and asserted” and that are “either 
true or false.”97 Wolterstorff argues that Gadamer operated with this ontology of the text, quoting 
him as follows: “A text is not to be understood as an expression of life but with respect to what it 
says. Writing is the abstract ideality of language. Hence the meaning of something written is 
fundamentally identifiable and repeatable.” Ricoeur also recognizes this ontology of meaning as 
something identifiable “by different individuals at different times as being one and the same … I 
agree with its main presupposition concerning the objectivity of meaning in general.”98 While 
Wolterstorff agrees with Derrida that literary texts might not be as tightly unified as New Critics 
would claim, he defends meanings as ideal entities, noting that even deconstructive 
“performance” interpretation is “limited” by the language of the text. Building on the way 
philosophical hermeneutics has modified the textual-sense tradition, Wolterstorff argues for “that 
mode of interpretation that … all of us employ most of the time,” the discernment of the 
“illocutionary act” embedded in the discourse, regardless of the author’s intended meaning. This 
“authorial-discourse interpretation” is Wolterstorff’s suggestion for how Speech Act Theory 
might be woven into the hermeneutical debate, and he applies it further to biblical 
interpretation.99  
Toward the interpretation of the scriptures, Wolterstorff argues for what he calls “double-
agency discourse,” where an agent delivers a speech act on behalf of someone else, a speech act 
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phenomenon which “enables us to understand Scripture as the manifestation of God speaking by 
way of human beings speaking,”100 “literally” speaking as opposed to other divine acts such as 
the inspiration of scripture.101 A double hermeneutic is then opened up: “first one interprets these 
writings so as to discern the human discourse of which they are the trace; then, and only then, 
does one move on to interpret for what God said by way of this human discourse.”102 It seems 
that the first level of interpretation is still focused on the textual sense, using the best historical 
and grammatical knowledge that comes to hand, but the second level of interpretation is what 
Wolterstorff calls “dogmatic.” By that, he means that it starts from “distinctly theological 
convictions,” owned as one’s Gadamarian horizons. But in contradistinction to Gadamer, 
Wolterstorff says that our horizon is not just a preunderstood meaning but a preunderstood 
character of the divine Author, and that our understanding of that Author is not gained only from 
the text or our religious tradition but also from our knowledge of God outside the text.103  
This perhaps mystical opening for knowledge of God beyond the loop of tradition cracks 
the closed circuit of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical circle. Thus, instead of part and whole 
endlessly informing one another only through texts, traditions, and attention to those artifacts on 
the temporal plane, a divinely infused cycle of part and whole turns interpretation into an upward 
spiral in which growth in the knowledge of God and the study of the book of God increasingly 
clarify one another.104  
By this move, Wolterstorff hopes to explain how biblical hermeneutics constitutes a 
dialectic between what the text of the bible said to its original recipients then and what it says to 
its readers now, with the same author speaking from his self-consistent character. However, what 
is not clear in Wolterstorff’s answer is whether all scripture at all times is the mode of God 
“speaking,” or whether the original revelation was divine speech to its original recipient. Like 
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medieval exegetes, Wolterstorff recognizes that there are possibly more meanings embedded in 
the text than the ones that might have been the original illocution to the original audience, but 
where his explanatory language turns theological, he pulls back. Also, his nod toward inherited 
theological traditions and knowledge of the divine author do nothing to shake the image of the 
individual Christian reading and interpreting the bible. Further on, we will see how Augustine’s 
hermeneutical theory might interact with this current set of Evangelical hermeneutic metaphors.  
Dan Stiver also uses Speech Act Theory, combining it with his reading of Ricoeur to 
better understand the interaction of the historical world behind the text with the literary world of 
the text and the world in front of the text, the meaning to which it points its readers. Stiver 
characterizes the attitude of modernistic biblical interpretation as either/or:  
If one cannot attain pure objectivity [modernism says], the only alternative is relativism. 
… In biblical studies, the attempt to find an integration between the configuring activity 
of the imagination and the work of the historian looks impossible and elicits its own kind 
of religious and scholarly anxiety.105  
Bringing in the work of Ricoeur to try to find such an integrative space, Stiver summarizes 
Ricoeur’s description of engagement with text from primary naïveté to a “postcritical naïveté.” 
We come to texts first with our hidden presuppositions, “not in control of the text,” “grasped by 
the text,” intuiting a meaning that is as much a “hunch” as anything else. We proceed to a second 
level of critical theory, or theology, by which we interact dialectically with our primary 
experience of the text but, as a boat on an ocean of meaning (his “principle of plenitude”106), 
without fully circumscribing the meaning of the text. “Theology and philosophy cannot live by 
themselves,” Stiver summarizes from Ricoeur, “but are given ‘food for thought’ by primary 
experiences and the more primary language of symbol, metaphor, and narrative.”107 In this way, 
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philosophy of communication can be seen to be a dialectic between the conceptual frameworks 
of philosophers or theologians and its embodied application within a real community of 
discourse, a description commensurate with Arnett’s approach.108  
Applying Ricoeur’s work to biblical hermeneutics, Lewis Mudge says that an integrative 
interpreting community therefore “need[s] the texts of Scripture to activate the questions, to 
generate the experience,” which means not to demystify the scriptures for modern sensibilities 
but rather, quoting Ricoeur, to “restore this interval of interrogation in which the question can 
have meaning.”109 This is the turn in interpretation—going further than Gadamer according to 
Stiver—where Ricoeur locates “postcritical naïveté,” the interpreter no longer in control of 
meaning through a Cartesian cogito but neither without actionable understanding.110  
In terms of the scriptures, this might look like a return to a practice of living under the 
scriptures after engaging in historical-critical-literary dialectic with the scriptures. While the 
critical dialectic might force readers to see different aspects of the scriptures than they had 
noticed before, yet a return to a submission to the text is the only way, first, that the scriptures 
rather than the interpreter is a “guide for faith and practice” and, second, that the interpreter can 
again be open to challenge from further exposures to the text. To stand in judgment over the text 
is no longer to be in subjection to the text or its divine author.111 After further explaining these 
three steps in terms of Ricoeur’s three steps of mimesis—the third like Gadamer’s “fusion of 
horizons”—Stiver points out that application is an unavoidable return to a (postcritical) naïveté, 
not a separate and optional step beyond hermeneutics. Quoting Ricoeur, he says, “We are not 
allowed to exclude the final act of personal commitment from the whole of objective and 
explanatory procedures which mediate it.”112   
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Ricoeur’s view of mimesis—an Aristotelian disclosive sense rather than a Platonic sense 
of a poor copy—means that he “conceives of texts as offering to us possible worlds in which we 
might live.”113 Though Ricoeur was not opposed to the historicity of the scriptures, seeing them 
with Hans Frei as “history-like,” he did not limit the transformative power of the scriptures to 
their reference value to historical or scientific considerations (which, likewise, are texts requiring 
interpretation). “The debt to the past [such as the “resurrection of Christ”] must be paid off, but 
the larger debt is to the configuration of a redemptive world in which we are called to live,” in 
Ricoeur’s thought, and this frames his view of the complementarity of literary and historical 
approaches to the text.114  
How does one go about pursuing this dialectical literary understanding of the biblical 
text, coming out on the other side as a wiser naïf? Mudge takes Ricoeur’s thought toward an 
affirmation of the symbolic function of the language of myth, and the need for a richer and 
broader encounter with the language of the biblical text itself, lest by paraphrase and clarification 
we further distance ourselves from the available meanings of the biblical text. Mudge synthesizes 
Ricoeur’s diagnosis of our “linguistic impoverishment” as follows:  
It is the message we cannot hear, because our linguistic impoverishment has deprived us 
of the possibility of articulating such realities as radical evil or grace-empowered hope. 
Symbolic, metaphorical, mythological language gives us the capacity to bring 
experiences of a certain kind to awareness, thereby creating the basis for reflective 
reasoning.115  
Complementing Ricoeur’s call for richer linguistic encounter with the gospels, Stiver suggests 
Speech-Act Theory as a related critical tool to relate the historical reference and the 
transformative call of the text. While historical reference is important in Speech-Act Theory, the 
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historical conditions function as “representative conditions” within which the illocutionary 
actions of the text are set. As backdrop, the descriptive historical conditions “arise from the story 
and are not imposed on the story.” Their purpose is to support our understanding of the 
challenging and complex speech-act of the text, “provid[ing] a way of placing the figurative and 
historical aspects of the Gospels in a productive relationship to one another.” Stiver sees 
Ricoeur’s theory of mimesis and the hermeneutical progression from naïveté to naïveté as 
“enable[ing] us to see clearly that history and fiction [i.e. literary figuration] can be interwoven 
in the Gospels,” but Speech-Act Theory “enables us to see much more clearly how they are 
interwoven.”116 While the connection between Ricoeur’s literary phenomenology and Speech-
Act Theory would profit from more clear development, Stiver’s work, like that of Wolterstorff in 
bringing together Gadamer and Speech-Act Theory, demonstrates some of the directions that 
some Evangelical scholars are taking in their approach to the Evangelical hermeneutical crisis.   
The importance of these Evangelical scholarly engagements with philosophical 
hermeneutic traditions is that the Evangelical movement tends toward polarization, either 
claiming modernistic textual science as a fundamental Christian doctrine or pursuing relevance 
and authenticity through an uncritical “postmodern” approach to social dynamics, hermeneutics, 
and rhetoric, which slides into sheer emotivism.117 Knowing the needs of their fearful but under-
educated Evangelical audiences, Merold Westphal and James K. A. Smith have also made a 
point of examining “postmodern” philosophies in the light of Christian revelation. Westphal has 
undertaken his project to ask how postmodern philosophers can edify the church as secular 
prophetic voices,118 since Evangelicals tend to kill their own prophets, closing ranks against 
critiques that cast them in a bad light or threaten their control of their institutions.119 Smith has 
addressed the polarized attitude of Evangelicalism even more directly, titling his books with 
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questions such as Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida to 
Church.120  
In agreement with these scholars, I argue that the demands of an Evangelically 
appropriate scriptural hermeneutic reach beyond objectivism or subjectivism in approaching the 
text of the bible. The question of how best to ground hermeneutics for the Evangelical 
community, then, demands an investigation into the philosophical resources of communication 
that would not only be acceptable within the horizon of the Evangelical tradition but also provide 
a reasonably “good faith” answer to the hermeneutical questions and cautions put forward by the 
philosophical hermeneutic tradition, the project called for by Noll.121 “Philosophical ideas, rather 
like words themselves,” Briggs says, are “best seen as tools to unlock certain problems.”122  
This project of seeking philosophical conceptual resources to meet a communication 
challenge or question facing a real community in the current historical moment, pragmatically 
and appropriately, fits the interpretive approach of philosophy of communication as articulated 
by Arnett.123 As will be explained further below, this project utilizes a philosophy of 
communication framework and grounds the fusion of the two horizons of philosophical 
hermeneutics and Evangelical missional identity in a reading of Saint Augustine’s scripture-
centered hermeneutics.  
Hermeneutics and the Problem of Community 
Another question that the crisis in Evangelical hermeneutics brings to the fore is one of 
the inter-relatedness of hermeneutics and community, specifically the importance of the faith-
community, both in its particular, local, institutional role in interpreting (and being interpreted 
by) scripture124 and in its historical, textual, liturgical identity that creates a horizon for 
interpretation in both self-reflexive and habituated ways.125 That is, the interpreting community 
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is always both a local concrete particularity and a trans-historical “social imaginary” set in 
memories, habits, and texts;126 this intersection of the present and the past of the community 
operates within a hermeneutic “tradition,” in the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, when it hosts 
not only “a coherent movement of thought” but also one in which adherents “become aware of it 
and of its direction and in self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and to carry its 
enquiries forward.”127  
The question for Evangelical hermeneutics is whether and how it constitutes a historical 
tradition that is coherent across the broad scope of its adherents and that is rationally “self-
aware” in its internal conflicts over biblical interpretation. More specifically still, the question is 
to what degree Evangelical communities and their hermeneutic tradition are shot through with 
the malaise of Western individualism itself, which leans against such MacIntyrian 
traditionedness. While some Evangelical approaches to biblical interpretation utilize trending 
philosophical and theological tools without, apparently, any “metarhetorical” structure or any 
awareness of the tradition(s) that inform their thought in conflicting or incommensurate ways,128 
other Evangelical scholars approach the hermeneutical crisis from the grand stories of such 
traditions as told by such philosophers as MacIntyre and Taylor.  
MacIntyre’s analysis has been an important voice for several reasons. First, MacIntyre’s 
language of tradition—of a historically grounded, discursively negotiated narrative constituted in 
social institutions and pointed towards some telos (a “good,” similar to an Augustinian 
“peace”)—seems to speak to the felt need in Evangelical ecclesiology for identifying a shape to 
the interpreting church other than a Hobbsian contractual agglomeration of atomized individuals, 
the shape which the American church has absorbed from the culture of modern democracy. 
Evangelical theologians such as Jonathan Wilson have sought to appropriate MacIntyre’s 
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thought for the church,129 and philosophically-grounded ecumenical movements such as Radical 
Orthodoxy have taken MacIntyre’s concept of human narrativity as their starting point.130  
Second, MacIntyre speaks specifically to the stresses, pressures, and wrong turns of an 
individualistic modernity that has tried to cast off its narrative traditions of communal practical 
reasoning while retaining the fiction of society. Liberal modern society, modeled on the free 
market logic of capitalism, locates rationality within the decisions of the individual, which are 
based on individual orderings of “preferences.” Thus any “good” toward which modern society 
drives is not a guiding substantive narrative but an amorphous goal that is itself an ephemeral 
product of continual “bargaining.” Since moral reasoning, MacIntyre says, is reconstituted by its 
end, modern moral reasoning is configured merely to maintain the procedural structures that 
promote bargaining from individual preference.131 This general cultural situation has not left 
Evangelical identity and hermeneutics untouched, as Bellah, et al., demonstrate in their 
rearticulation of MacIntyre’s philosophical analysis within a more explicitly historical and 
sociological vein. Their identification of the moral grammar of individualism and its ascendancy 
over the remaining cultural echoes of community is given particular detail in their portrayal of 
the religion of the lone individual, the “Sheilaism” of Sheila.132 The reduction of scriptural 
interpretation to the individual free of the constraints of community, tradition, or a shared telos 
is, I argue, an untenable acquiescence of Evangelicalism to liberal modern culture. However, 
alternative forms of communal scriptural interpretation, despite the work of John Howard Yoder, 
Stanley Haurwas, and others,133 have not successfully engaged the dominant Evangelical culture. 
Also, some alternative forms of community that have fired the imaginations of younger 
Evangelicals, such as New Monasticism, have not been sufficiently grounded in a constructive 
Christian philosophy of communication.   
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Third, MacIntyre’s metaphor of narrativity and its inherent critique of the rationality of 
modernism gets at the heart of the current crisis in hermeneutics, providing a way forward 
through community that is barred to radically postmodern (radically individualized) approaches 
to hermeneutics. Similar to Augustine, MacIntyre shows that a community’s rationality and its 
virtues shift depending on the specific narrative and “peace” upon which that community is 
founded—one’s hermeneutics are thus guided by the narrative of one’s community, tied up with 
the history of that community, and partially inscribed in the practices of that community, 
continually folding the past into the present of the community of memory through rhetoric.134 
This picture of the community of memory does not plumb the depths of creational memory that, 
to Augustine, grounds temporal social memory in the eternal Word, but it does describe, similar 
to Augustine, how communities think and act directionally together on the temporal plane. While 
MacIntyre’s focus on the tradition and the community has been criticized as leading towards 
relativism,135 it is an important counterpoint to a hermeneutics of certainty that glosses over both 
the particular “horizons” of human interpreters and the limitations on humans’ ability to 
understand even themselves.  
MacIntyre’s analysis of historically mediated narrativity and (using Taylor’s term) the 
“cross-pressures” exerted by different narrative strands on modern people, who are generally 
unaware of the source of these internal and social tensions, is also a theme taken up at length by 
Charles Taylor, though with a difference. Taylor’s metaphor of the “social imaginary,” the set of 
socially and historically inherited prototypes, expectations, and “goods”136—the world as it is 
“felt” more than as it is consciously rationally thought137—has also been tagged as an important 
resource for Evangelical hermeneutical practice, specifically by Kent Eilers and James K. A. 
Smith.138  
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Taylor’s Augustine, and his philosophical vision more generally, is more open to 
correctives from the individual inward vision than is MacIntyre’s traditioned rationality, with 
Taylor’s sympathies confessedly with the Romantics, but he still takes the influence of history, 
language, and culture on hermeneutics very seriously.139 In Sources of the Self, Taylor traces the 
evolution of the self through its inward turn in Augustine, its rationalization in Descartes, the 
beginnings of its focus on the immanent goods of this world through the Protestant expansion of 
the sacred to all secular domains, the unmooring of this immanent focus through Deism and 
Enlightenment skepticism, the Romantic recovery of mystery and self-depth through irrational 
nature, and the current synthesis of instrumental and Romantic expressive elements in the self of 
“authenticity.” Significantly influenced by Hegel,140 Taylor sees the mental prototypes of the 
current age as a complex sedimentation of past ideas and debates, now filtered primarily through 
the individual, but not without the ever-present influence of the language, ideas, and moods of 
the society. He says, “The self exists only within what I call ‘webs of interlocution.’… The full 
definition of someone’s identity thus usually involves not only his stand on moral and spiritual 
matters but also some reference to a defining community.”141  
In A Secular Age, Taylor covers in even more historical depth the story of the change in 
the conditions of belief, defining secularity as the age in which, while strong belief is still 
possible, the default atmosphere is one of uncertainty and an individual quest for meaning. In 
both of these books, and in his slim volume The Ethics of Authenticity, Taylor is interested in 
drawing attention to the problem of “inarticulacy” which attends the obscuring of the historical 
and social “background conditions” for our current assumptions, desires, and motivating 
metaphors. Part of the rationale for his voluminous historical storytelling is to recover language, 
ideas, and historical moods that are, on the one hand, alien to our current mentality but are, on 
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the other hand, part of the “webs of interlocution” that tell us who we are, where we come from, 
and perhaps where we are going. While I disagree with Taylor’s acquiescence to an 
individualized conception of religious life in this “secular age,”142 I see his attention to the 
impact of “falling off of [religious] practice” and the resulting loss of “traditional religious 
languages” and his portrait of the current individualized religious sensibility as an important 
backdrop143 against which to reimagine communal practices of biblical religious language as an 
essential aspect of hermeneutics.  
This question—explored differently by Taylor and MacIntyre—of how constrained one is 
to the horizons one inherits—culturally, educationally, historically, experientially—is in many 
ways the central conundrum of philosophical hermeneutics, and the unacknowledged elephant in 
the corner of modernistic hermeneutics.144 If hermeneutics is not merely a universal set of rules 
through which de-contextualized individuals extract the meaning from the biblical text but is 
rather a shared reading dialogue by always-already traditioned people whose attention to the text 
is significantly affected by the goals and norms they inherit, as their “social imaginary,” from the 
several communities and historical matrix of which they are a part, the nature of the community 
controls the possibilities of its hermeneutics.  
It is on this question that Augustine’s thought on the interpreting community of the 
Church is important in two interlocking ways. First, his understanding of the way any 
community builds habits of thought and habits of interpretation together, sharing a “peace” that 
reinforces itself through shared confession and action, helps define the basic human social 
context within which the special social context of the church is set. Second, Augustine provides a 
complex picture of the nature of the church community, including its promise through the larger 
spiritual community of the city of God and its remaining constraints as still mixed, socially and 
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spiritually, with the city of the world. It is in his nuanced description of that promise of a 
heavenly aspect to community, and thus interpretive grace, that Augustine can provide the 
Evangelical church the piece of the hermeneutical puzzle that is still missing in MacIntyre, 
Taylor, and philosophical hermeneutics more generally—that is, the pre-modern Christian vision 
of the cosmos as “participating” in God, generally, and the church participating in Christ, 
specifically, through the mediation of the narrative drama of the scriptures. 
The felt need for a community with a more robustly shared narrative has provided much 
of the impetus for the Evangelical “missional” movement. Moreover, the advent of alternative 
Christian communities with corresponding alternative biblical hermeneutics supports the 
argument that there is a rhetorical exigence in this historical moment for not only abstractly 
conceptual but also rhetorically practical solutions, a philosophy of communication approach to 
the conjoined problem of the Evangelical interpreting community and its hermeneutical 
practices. How these centripetal forces can make their difficult headway against the centrifugal 
forces of Protestant individualism—especially as exacerbated by the general social disintegration 
of community and the abdication of relational communication for technological independence—
would be one of the central problematics for any proposal to repair and re-source Evangelical 
hermeneutics. Again, it is Augustine’s philosophical resources to which this project will turn in 
order to articulate one particular grounded approach to the intersection of social/community 
theory and hermeneutics. Augustine’s philosophy of communication offers the conceptual 
language and models that can offer Evangelical hermeneutics a return to the type of ecumenical, 
one-another communication in the scriptures that is, I argue, the movement’s birthright.  
 
 
36 
Hermeneutics and the Problem of Being 
A final large-scale issue that is bound up with the problem of Evangelical hermeneutics is 
the horizon of modernity within which the church finds itself “thrown,” specifically the 
“flattening” of distinctions and levels of being which reduces the revelation of God to a text on 
the plane of Being145 and reduces the sociality of the church to just a species of the genus of 
human social communication. This process was begun with the introduction of the concept of 
immanence by the late medieval scholastics Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, who 
“conceived of ‘God and His effect which is identical with His Being’ as an immanent activity—
an activity that is limited, however, to the activity of understanding.”146 This new separation and 
opposition between immanent and transcendent explanations of phenomena was recast by 
Spinoza into his mystical materialism in which God and Nature are two faces for the same 
reality, but it was then separated categorically by Kant to establish the limits of speculative 
reason and focus rationality on practical reason in the immanent sphere. Though the transcendent 
had a renaissance in the form of Hegel’s ideal Spirit, the progression of scientific and market 
rationality eventually reduced the scope of transcendence to individual existential experience.147  
The current state of this debate within modernism hovers around the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze, who tries to explain the felt phenomenon of transcendence through recourse to the 
opacity and complexity of layers of immanent experience,148 but as Taylor points out, people 
who give themselves over to meaning as an immanent phenomenon eventually find themselves 
asking, “Is that all there is?,” no longer comfortable with the flatness of even philosophically 
corrugated immanence.149 This drift away from immanence can be seen philosophically, if not 
personally, in the move of neo-Enlightenment philosopher Jürgen Habermas to admit the value 
of specifically religious influences in the secular public sphere for their “motivational” 
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resources.150 The problem with the immanent frame has also recently been elucidated by John 
Milbank, et al., who also tell the story of the modern age from this turn, when the study of God 
was brought down to the same level as the study of Being.151  
Before, everything on the plane of Being could be studied according to its order, but that 
order also participated in the revelation and intervention of a higher order, that of the divine 
being, which could be recognized and joined, but not controlled or fully comprehended. After the 
advent of modern metaphysics, however, the knowledge of God was to be studied and 
systematized comprehensively just like any other science,152 a move which eventually led to the 
scriptures being less the word of God to be obeyed and more the data to be systematized into an 
abstract and comprehensive knowledge about God. Because living religious communities are 
always faced with the question of practical reasoning, “What do I do?,” however, there were 
significant counter-forces to the reduction of scripture to a biblical science. The vernacular use of 
scripture, both individual and in corporate renewal movements, predominated throughout the 
low-church varieties of Protestantism, where Evangelicalism spread and flourished most 
vigorously.153 When the sociological forces of urbanization, industrialization, and 
professionalization eroded the rural and small town ground of American evangelicalism (without 
a corresponding urban revival movement), the stage was set for a professionalized science of 
biblical interpretation to dominate Evangelicalism.  
The Evangelical church cannot, of course, merely recognize and step out of the modernist 
horizon that has served as its hermeneutic and communicative dwelling place especially over the 
last century, but by pursuing and listening to certain pre-modern philosophical resources in its 
own broader tradition, both the church’s self-understanding as a different sort of communicative 
organization and its cosmological framework for understanding the dynamics of God’s 
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communication through scripture can be gradually shifted away from their unhealthy dominance 
by modernistic presuppositions.154 Here, also, Augustine’s philosophy of communication—
specifically his ecclesiology and his pre-modern understanding of a participatory cosmos—
provides important resources to speak to a current Evangelical hermeneutics that has difficulty 
disentangling itself constructively from the philosophical groundings that are contrary to most of 
the traditionally scriptural elements of its identity.  
Augustine’s understanding of participation is significantly tied to his view of the 
interrelationship between temporality and eternity, where the works and words of God on the 
eternal plane find their expression, moment by moment, on the temporal plane through the 
participation of the cosmos in its creator.155 The potential for specifically human participation in 
God is greatest because “in His image” humans were created, even though by disobedience the 
grace of participation was lost to “the whole creation, which groans and labors until now.”156 
Reconnecting the eternal and the temporal—and thus opening the way toward a full participation 
of the creation in God, each part according to its nature—was the Incarnation of Jesus, through 
whom humans could again participate in God. This participation proceeds through what 
Evangelicals call “sanctification” and what Augustine called divinization—viz., by taking part in 
the life of God, humans become “partakers of the divine nature.”157 It is this shared participation 
in Christ that shifts the nature of the church’s interpretation of scripture out of philosophical 
narratives of either transcendence or immanence. Because God can be fully at work within his 
participating people in a particular historical moment, the eternal and the temporal can co-exist 
without contradiction, just as Christ could exist as eternal and as a temporal man without 
contradiction. While the transcendence/immanence debate turns on acceptance or rejection of a 
conceptual hierarchy,158 participation turns on the relationship between the course of temporality 
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and the mysterious mode of eternity, in which the point of contact between the two is normally 
on a spectrum of participatory grace. A full separation of the eternal and the temporal in a given 
action would be a nullity, or “evil” as it is conceived by Augustine.159 Conversely, the path to 
greater participation, in Augustine, is one shared with other people, including a shared practice 
of reading the scriptures together with caritas.160 To walk with God, toward God, is to walk in 
the Church, with the brethren, under the scriptures, which constitute the testimony of the eternal 
city of God. It is this picture that modern hermeneutics doesn’t have a frame for, this picture of 
biblical hermeneutics as irrevocably social with both humans and the eternal God who comes 
down into temporality to speak to us in time instead of assuming or demanding that we step up, 
out of time, to build our tower of truth.     
Therefore, the Evangelical hermeneutical question in the current historical moment is not 
just one of the right approach to the text but also involves questions of the nature of language and 
the act of interpretation itself, the relationship of ecclesial organization and habituation to 
hermeneutics, the right relationship between the church and the “world,” and the theological 
question of the nature of God’s interaction with the cosmos. How Evangelicals engage their 
scriptural hermeneutics—not only interpreting but also talking about their approach to 
interpretation—is intimately tied up with their identity, with their ecclesial communication, and 
thus also with their embodied communication of the gospel.  
Interpretive Approach 
This project is framed within philosophy of communication, with the qualification that it 
applies this approach through the bias of the author’s Charismatic Evangelical perspective as 
informed by the philosophical resources of Augustine’s own approach. Philosophy of 
communication, as surveyed and synthesized by Ronald C. Arnett and Annette M. Holba, is a 
40 
pragmatic discovery and proffering of philosophical metaphors that not only give form and 
meaning to existential experience in a historical moment but also move that “meaning into 
embodied and contextual understanding.”161 That is, philosophy of communication mines the 
rich conceptual resources of past human responses to past historical exigencies in order to meet 
current historical exigencies with appropriate linguistic tools for shared thought, shared meaning, 
and joint action. “Philosophy of communication takes information and turns it into meaningful 
connections between persons. What unites persons is not simply information, but meaning 
sculpted between and among them.”162  
This approach presupposes, with Gadamer, the linguisticality of meaning, the importance 
of answering the questions of the current historical moment, and the restricted horizon of human 
interpretation, but it also acknowledges the potential overlapping of historically human 
experiences and problems, carried down through time by language, met through the language of 
earlier philosophers and “poets,” and recovered as pragmatic linguistic solutions through a 
careful reading of the past and the present situations. Pragmatically oriented, philosophy of 
communication moves from real social questions of real people to real social-linguistic—
embodied and/or institutional—courses of action, operating in the realm of rhetorical truth rather 
than in the presumptive realm of modern social science, which claims episteme in the tradition of 
Plato.163  
Philosophy of communication fits well with this present Augustinian project in many 
ways, not least the fundamental importance of language to understanding in Augustine, his 
emphasis on the limitedness of our interpretive perspective, and his insistence on broad learning 
in philosophical and religious traditions in order to deal with pressing questions of the 
moment.164 However, an Augustinian modification of philosophy of communication would 
41 
suggest, first, an ultimate telos or narrative within which multiple “pragmatic” goods can be 
evaluated and ranked—one unabashedly eschatological165—and, second, a conception of the 
transmission of philosophical-linguistic resources that goes beyond pragmatism. Rather, an 
Augustinian philosophy of communication would encompass the phenomena of philosophical 
concepts either as divine “gifts” or as deceptive spiritual suggestions from carnal or demonic 
wellsprings. That is, the question of discernment of appropriate philosophy of communication 
resources (and within those resources of appropriate application to the current historical moment) 
is both more hopeful, because of Augustinian grace, and more dangerous, because of the spiritual 
darkness of an Augustinian self and world.  
It is the philosophical/theological concept of “participation” that mediates these 
possibilities, both in the hermeneutics proposed here and in the interpretive “method” that 
informs that proposal. That is, my interpretive approach, in line with my Charismatic Evangelical 
bias, presupposes the descriptive validity of some of these ancient philosophical resources for 
both the Evangelical hermeneutical problem and the current issue of philosophy of 
communication “methodology.” I understand Augustine’s philosophical resources as divine gifts 
in addition to their usefulness as pragmatic tools—gifts intended for this historical moment to 
meet the current need for greater grace and greater linguistic-social coherence in the Evangelical 
tradition. In this, I seek to practice an Augustinian philosophy of communication for the current 
Evangelical hermeneutical crisis, using Augustinian philosophical resources.  
Therefore, this project pursues those conceptual resources through a dialogue with 
Augustine’s rhetorical philosophy, listening to his premodern hermeneutic and social thought 
through primary texts,166 with the aid of recent literatures of historical, social, and philosophical 
contextualization,167 while also listening to the hermeneutics and social theory conversations in 
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Evangelical scholarship that provide the questions potentially met by Augustine’s philosophical-
rhetorical resources.168 The goal is that the resulting fusion of hermeneutic horizons might be 
ethically fused into the Evangelical “social imaginary,”169 impacting the rhetorical praxis of 
Evangelical scriptural liturgy and corresponding Evangelical identity formation.  
How might the Evangelical crisis in biblical hermeneutics be appropriately met by an 
Augustinian philosophy of communication? The tensions of the Evangelical community evident 
in their 1982 Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics have only become more pronounced, both in 
the realm of evangelical scholarship and in the popular alternative Evangelical movements that 
demonstrate frustration with the social and conceptual integrity of status quo Evangelical 
hermeneutics. Within the purview of philosophy of communication, this project’s rationale 
should be “tested by public opinion offered as a . . . road map that details the particulars and 
temporal suggestions for engaging those particulars.”170 That is, both the urgency of the 
hermeneutic question and the suggested approach to answering it would be evaluated with a 
particular, real public in mind—in this case, the Evangelical “interpreting” public as represented 
by their scholars, ministerial practitioners, and laypeople.171 The urgency of the question is fairly 
easily seen on a scholarly level, with Evangelical theologians and philosophers undergoing their 
tradition’s own permutation of the linguistic turn in hermeneutics—most pronounced in the lack 
of dialogue between biblical studies and theological interpretation172—and engaging in 
significant dialogue with different philosophies proposed as new grounds for biblical 
hermeneutics, in the tradition of Bultmann’s famous appropriation of Heidegger, Caputo’s 
identification with Derrida, Westphal’s positive use of Gadamer, and the eager reception that 
Speech Act Theory has found among scholars with solid Evangelical credentials, such as 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Kevin Vanhoozer, and Anthony Thiselton.173  
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An interesting exemplar of the tensions in the tradition incited by this kind of scholarly 
engagement are the small scandals provoked by Anthony Thiselton’s paper “Understanding 
God’s Word Today” at the National Evangelical Anglican Congress in 1977 and his 1999 
inaugural presidential address of the Society for the Study of Theology. While he is a recognized 
and respected hermeneutic scholar, Thiselton’s engagement with philosophical hermeneutics and 
phenomenology cast a shadow over his evangelical academic orthodoxy, by the same token 
shrouding his conclusions in language inaccessible to many of his evangelical colleagues.174 To 
remedy Evangelical fears of heterodoxy and unfamiliarity with philosophical hermeneutic 
language, a number of Evangelical and other scholars of hermeneutics gathered in 1998 for the 
first Scripture and Hermeneutics Seminar, a ten year project to rethink the approach to biblical 
hermeneutics in dialogue with a number of other hermeneutic questions and modes of inquiry.175  
To what degree this hermeneutical question is at the forefront of the minds of a 
significant number of Evangelical pastors and laypeople is not as clear, though the general 
growth of branches of the “missional” movement that do not self-consciously claim the 
scriptures as part of their core identity, such as the Emerging Church movement and the New 
Monastic movement, hint that some Evangelical communities are disenchanted with their 
scriptures and seeking a new narrative around which to build their “peace.”176 Also, empirical 
sociological work suggests that a high percentage of current Evangelicals lean more on general 
cultural influences than Evangelical scriptural traditions in constructing their “social 
imaginaries,” leading to the phenomenon of the young Evangelical “moralistic therapeutic 
deism,”177 where allegiance to a church is more a matter of fitting into a “lifestyle enclave” than 
keeping covenant with a scripturally and historically grounded tradition.178 Of course, the 
historically trans-denominational identity of evangelicalism leaves it open to this temptation of 
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Western culture. Technically, no one is born an evangelical, only “born again” as one. And thus, 
the communities of evangelicals have to be continually created and maintained by different 
criteria than shared ethnicity, shared liturgy, or shared tradition. The centrality of conversion 
notwithstanding, if the evangelical movement is losing its traditional insistence on formation 
through the scriptures, it has lost a main pillar of its traditional identity.179  
So, the key philosophy of communication areas of inquiry regarding the renewal of an 
evangelical hermeneutical identity are how the interpreters and historical situation affect the 
meaning(s) of the text, and how a unified communal, embodied, and socially engaged life can be 
built up from a shared foundation in the scriptures. Related to both of these pressures on 
evangelical hermeneutics is the question of the kind of literacy, and the road to that literacy, that 
best upholds an evangelical identity in biblical hermeneutical practice. I contend that 
Augustine’s hermeneutical and social thought can provide conceptual resources to deal with all 
of these questions, giving Evangelicals an orthodox alternative to both modern and radically 
postmodern hermeneutics, one that details the communal nature of scriptural interpretation and 
models a form of biblical literacy that current Evangelical communities could emulate.  
In question form, then, this projects asks how an Augustinian understanding of 
participation, scriptural hermeneutics, and ecclesiology, together, can provide a philosophically 
grounded rhetorical response to the current crisis in Evangelical hermeneutics (embedded in its 
ecclesiology), a response acceptable to and effective for ecclesial communication within the 
missional tradition of the Evangelical community.  
Inviting Augustine to the Evangelical Table 
The rationale for grounding this project in Augustine is multi-layered. First, as a 
respected church father, Augustine is a voice that warrants attention across a wide spectrum of 
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Christian sects, including Evangelicals. Thus, in the ongoing debate over how the tradition 
should be both maintained and modified, Augustine is a legitimate conversation partner. Second, 
as a pre-modern theologian and bishop, Augustine provides a perspective that is helpfully 
“Other,” untainted by the specific ontological and epistemological divisions and reductions of 
modernity, and thus fits a philosophy of communication approach of welcoming difference as a 
driver for rhetorical response.180 Augustine’s use of the ontological metaphor of “participation” 
and its conceptual parallels in Augustine’s focus on “incarnation” are foundational recoveries for 
an Evangelical hermeneutics that would be both true to its premodern tradition and faithful to its 
mission as an unconventional spiritual community in the current historical moment.  
Third, Augustine’s foundational work in rhetoric and hermeneutics resists both the 
narrative of comprehensive certainty and control and the narrative of fundamental indeterminacy 
and hermeneutical violence.181 His rhetorical philosophy is grounded instead, on the one hand, 
on a linear narrative—from primordial peace (creation) to eschatological peace—and, on the 
other hand, on a recursive participatory narrative of present confession that ties together inside 
and outside, heaven and earth, word and thing through the godly use of language.182 That this 
Augustinian rhetorical and hermeneutic theory makes the scriptures its ground, authority, and 
central point of dramatic focus is a key point of overlapping horizons with Evangelical 
hermeneutics,183 and it thus promises a fruitful fusion toward the goal of current praxis.  
Fourth, Augustine offers a deep ecclesiology that is grounded in a rich and scriptural 
theory of human sociality. This ecclesiology, resonating with but also resisting social 
constructionist and other immanentist theories of organizations, maintains the sense of the 
church as an entity connected to eternity while also emphasizing the discursive and rhetorical 
construction of the church through its shared language, shared discursive practices, and 
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continued charitable engagements with one another through creative rhetorical venues.184 That is, 
the presence of the city of God in heaven and in the plan of God, to Augustine, grounds his 
assertion that the church-within-time must continue to interpret each particular historical moment 
together to embody the Word of God to each generation. As Milbank argues, Augustine’s 
restoration of the world’s depth by the participation of its temporality in eternity provides the 
ground for us to engage with and value our embodied materiality.185  
Therefore, this project of philosophy of communication seeks to provide philosophical 
resources and conceptual models that articulate the Evangelical hermeneutical problem and 
elucidate the philosophical questions the Evangelical “tradition” would need to engage through 
its traditional institutions and venues, rethinking and re-habituating its current praxis 
accordingly. Because the Evangelical tradition, in line with Augustine’s picture of the church in 
general, is a community mixed in its habits and ideas between the earthly and the heavenly city, 
this proposal is an Augustinian attempt to meet the specific challenges of the earthly city with the 
charity and truth of the scriptures in every age, finding a way to read the scriptures together so 
that they can be not only a “comfort” to the Evangelical communities but also a “stumbling 
block” to “the wisdom of this world” where such is still acting formatively among the same 
Evangelical communities. Unity and mission, under and through the reading of the scriptures, is 
a “way” of being that can be recaptured through an Augustinian reinfusion of the Evangelical 
tradition.186   
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Chapter 2  
Participation: Its History, Return, and Augustinian Form 
 
Therefore He descended that we might ascend, and remaining in His nature 
was made a partaker of our nature, that we remaining in our nature might be 
made partakers of His nature. But not simply thus; for his participation in our 
nature did not make Him worse, while participating in His nature makes us 
better. 
    Augustine, Epistle 140.iv.101 
 
Introduction 
This project argues for the recovery of Augustinian hermeutical and social philosophy to 
meet the current crisis in Evangelical hermeneutics, but there are many challenges to bridging 
that gap of time, culture, and intellectual milieu. One of the most prominent challenges is that 
most of the battles in hermeneutics in the last century have been fought on the field of a modern 
ontology—that is, either a form of modern foundationalist metaphysics (usually attributed to 
Descartes) or a postmodernist rejection of foundations which is, by its nature, dependent on 
modernism for its very identity. Neither of these sparring partners would be consistent with the 
pre-modern participatory ontology from which Augustine, and the early church generally, 
operated.  
None of Augustine’s concepts can be directly translated into modern philosophical 
categories, but rather require a description of the ontological frame that operated latently as the 
ground of those concepts. Therefore, a philosophy of communication recovery of Augustine’s 
well-known teachings on interpretation2 would suggest that we pay attention to the differences, 
the “otherness,” of the ancient rhetor, instead of using Augustine’s words as a mirror for our own 
familiar thoughts. What is, for example, Augustine’s “interior word” to the modern mind but a 
linguistic label by which an observer names, correctly or incorrectly, an objective phenomenon 
(modernism) or a rootless play of signifiers, emerging and continually changing in a cultural 
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linguistic milieu, in an individual response to a perceived phenomenon (postmodernism, 
Derridean flavor)? Proponents of neither of these positions can easily make sense of Augustine’s 
rooting of a true interior word in an interior conversation with an ever-present spiritual being, 
who is not identical with the human speaker nor bound to the speaker’s culture or temporality.3 
Because Evangelicalism and its hermeneutics have been compromised by modernism, as argued 
in chapter 1, a philosophy of communication recovery of pre-modern rhetorical and hermeneutic 
philosophy for Evangelicals also requires a recovery of pre-modern participatory ontology. 
However, just as there are many “Augustines,” there are many concepts of participation.4 
In a possibly promising sign for our historical moment, participation has become not merely a 
term for historians and antiquarians but an actively used and contested philosophical tool, the 
subject of significant debates in philosophy, theology, and anthropology.5 It is also a possibly apt 
descriptive term for the 20th century renewal movements, in the West, of on-the-ground Christian 
spirituality, and for the emerging contribution, in the “Global South,” of distinctly non-Western 
Christian theology and practice.6 That is, the “otherness” of Augustine’s participatory 
hermeneutics may have found its rhetorical entrée in the openness to spirituality of both 
academia and the general population, which are both in need of language to explain 
constructively the questions and experiences that are presenting themselves.  
That is, I argue that the resurgence of the concept of participation is in itself a sign that 
the metaphor represents some fundamental need in the population more broadly, and thus that it 
is a worthy pursuit of philosophy of communication, which deals in the recovery of conceptual 
resources to meet felt needs for shared speech, thought, and action. Kenneth Burke argued that 
though our phenomenal world can only be accessed through our linguistic symbol-systems, 
which pursue their own intrinsic logic, the other parts of the world to which we are “blind” still 
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intrude on or obstruct or draw us, alerting us that something is amiss in our current symbol-
systems.7 This unseen resistance from the non-phenomenal world Burke called “recalcitrance,”8 
and Charles Taylor, in his story of this Secular Age, points to the desire for a spiritual dimension 
of reality, a “transcendence,” as evidence of Western culture’s inarticulate reaction to (what 
Burke would call) the recalcitrance of our nature. To Taylor, that nature is ineradicably spiritual, 
both from its embeddedness in a history of spirituality and on its own terms. When even 
thoroughly modern humans pause from the pursuit of their symbolic goods, or pause after 
achieving such goods, they find themselves asking, “Is that all there is?”9   
It is beyond the scope of this project to trace the full history and decline of participation 
in the West—a version of which Taylor tells through the metaphor of “enchantment” in A 
Secular Age—but this chapter will sketch a definition of participatory ontology, fill it out with a 
few of its key plot points in the history of philosophy, profile a few of its schools of resurgence 
in the twentieth century, and finally clarify the specific Augustinian version of participation that 
will inform subsequent chapters. Later chapters will explore the philosophy of communication 
implications of reading Augustinian hermeneutics and social theory, together, through the lens of 
participation.  
Definition 
Participation is a particular way of understanding the co-constitutive relationship between 
“representational” appearances and multiple realities, including both material realities and 
unseen agentic realities (between earthly and heavenly realms).10 While the “return to the things 
themselves” in phenomenology can be seen as a methodological and studiously agnostic return 
to horizontal participatory approaches,11 the original and most widespread understanding of 
participation is not methodological but relational and ontological. In this perspective, no person 
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or thing is a mere thing-in-itself but is also a representation of some divine person or reality 
beyond itself—all creation has meaning not merely in the interrelationships of things and persons 
horizontally but also in that all things and persons have vertical relationships with unseen divine 
realities. That is, while Gerald Manley Hopkins had to assert that the “world is charged with the 
grandeur of God,”12 premodern cultures presupposed that a god was behind (or in) every bush. 
While the standard stereotype asserts that Catholics retained a participatory sacramental mindset 
while the God of the Protestants was withdrawn from the physical realm, the middle position of 
Hans Boersma and Matthew Levering is, I argue, more correct: while participation was never 
fully or finally banished from either side of the split, the Catholic move to a “more strictly linear-
historical method” was only “a generation or two behind” the Protestants.13 Moreover, religious 
groups tend to segment their application of participation. Evangelicals, in particular, affirm the 
importance of God’s participatory activity in the world, but they are more divided on the nature 
of this interaction and its application to the interpretation of the scriptures.14  
As Owen Barfield points out, the relational ontology of participation affects our 
relationship with language in fundamental ways. Words are not merely arbitrary labels attached 
to objects by human wills, nor are they simple mirrors of nature, but are rather indicators of how 
an object participates in the seen and unseen realities. Words are names that are not completely 
subject to human will but provide an agentic direction or recalcitrance to human will. For 
example, in a participatory frame, names are given to children and adults as expressions of 
cooperation with a destiny that is rooted in an unseen spiritual realm, and the name itself gives 
power to accomplish that destiny by functioning as a shared site of action by human and divine 
agents.15 This is different than the modern psychological study of “self-fulfilling prophecy,” 
which cycles from the self to the self through the linguistic concept.16 In participatory language, 
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no word stands for just an earthly thing, but neither (as in Derrida) does a word just stand for 
other words; words function relationally as meeting places, “collective representations” where 
human societies together interact with spiritual realities.17 These representations have often been 
regularized into liturgy and ritual but without creating a separation between sacred and secular 
modes of reality. Such separations became conceivable only in modernity.18   
Thus participation, by presupposing an unseen (“unrepresented”) realm that is 
interconnected with the representations of the human phenomenal realm, adds a dimension of 
spiritual depth to every aspect of the world through the connecting medium of these 
representations, most universally in language but also in artistic representations, icons, totems, 
and so on. The world is charged with meaning and its representational tokens are given value by 
their participation in the treasury of the spiritual realm. It is for this reason that mimetic art, 
according to Barfield, has progressively become less evocative as the progression of modernity 
overlays nature itself with less and less representational value. In a participatory frame, mimetic 
art is not merely a representation of an object but is, like its real-life object, a medium through 
which the living spiritual world affects and demands of those who gaze upon it.19 Thus, in 
participatory cultures, art is always a religious activity, just as hunting, farming, weaving, and so 
on are always religious activities.  
A participatory framework thus requires its inhabitants to be constantly interpreting, 
while it precludes complete comprehension or control. In this midst of this indeterminacy, 
though, it promises meaning from that constant interpretation that is not only practically 
actionable but that also ties together a community of agents in a powerful communication event. 
That is, while Plato held out the hope of episteme through individual contemplative participation 
in the Forms, most other versions of participation emphasized the relational and practical 
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interpretive path of phronesis (this tension in the nature of participatory knowledge partially 
parallels Augustine’s metaphors of wisdom and knowledge, as discussed further on). It might be 
argued that one of the primary causes of shifts from participatory hermeneutics into epistemic 
hermeneutics of certainty and control has been societal power struggles, with the prime example 
being Plato’s attempt to wrest the interpretive reins from the polis and give it to the philosophers 
in response to Athenian social discord, unwise military decisions, and the unwarranted execution 
of his teacher, Socrates.20 Looking at the question of this “relationship of truth to power” that has 
affected Catholic-Protestant relationships, and, I would add, Evangelical-Modernist 
relationships, Levering says, 
An important reason for contemporary critics not wanting to relinquish any of the 
“objectivity” established by history understood as solely linear is the suspicion that 
ecclesial tradition and authority lead down a corruptive path … On this view, biblical 
interpretation of the traditional historical-critical kind functions as an independent 
doctrinal corrective.21 
That is, participatory biblical hermeneutics functions best in an environment of charity, 
where power struggles do not define the community of identity and insecurity is not the guiding 
motivational attitude. As we have seen in chapter 1, this description was true for an 
Evangelicalism on the rise in the early 19th century, but the social and philosophical conditions 
between the Civil War and the 1950s engendered the type of insecurity and social instability that 
pushed Evangelical biblical hermeneutics more towards a focus on certainty and power. Though 
the current historical moment is also a time of “narrative and virtue contention,”22 the very 
diversity of competing narratives and the lack of a powerful and threatening master narrative 
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have opened the way for marginalized voices long out-of-fashion, such as philosophies of 
communication that emphasize participation.  
A philosophy of communication project to bring a participatory Augustinian biblical 
hermeneutic to light is further justified by Augustine’s role in his own socially tumultuous 
historical moment, when despite the pulls within the Church and without to make interpretation a 
matter of certainty and power, Augustine successfully argued for a participatory hermeneutic of 
teaching, charity, and patience in pursuit of the long-term telos of the kingdom of God.23  
This synthetic definitional sketch is intended to serve as a conceptual foothold for the 
following brief historical narrative of participation, which follows the plot from pre-theoretical 
participation to Plato and his lineage to medieval thought as influenced by Augustine and 
Aquinas to the long decline of participation that started in the scholastic culture of the Late 
Middle Ages and was accelerated by the Reformation, and possibly by the growth of the money 
economy.24 Most of these philosophical resources on participation come from outside or on the 
periphery of Evangelicalism proper, but they are important supplementary sources for a 
philosophy of communication approach that would enable Evangelicals to understand more 
clearly the value of Augustine’s participatory framework.   
Plotting Participation Historically 
This history will follow the basic narrative from naïve participation to ancient Greek 
theoretical participation to early Christian and medieval participation to the late medieval turn 
away from participation with Scotus to the religious, political, scientific, and technological 
revolutions that cemented this turn and set the direction of modernism. In the next section, the 
beginnings of a return to participation as seen in the aesthetic project of Romanticism and the 
surprising acceptance of immanent participatory theories such as Freudianism will be narrated. 
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The history will be interrupted by an excursus on the importance of currently persisting naïve, or 
original, participation, which does not fit within the erstwhile narrative of historical process.   
Original Participation 
Barfield, known to most Evangelicals only as a friend of C. S. Lewis, was a significant 
literary philosopher in his own right, and his 1965 Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry 
tells one version of participation, its loss, and its hoped-for future.25 Coming at the topic through 
the metaphor of phenomena, Barfield portrays “original participation” as a shared experience of 
meaning among people as they, together, have interaction with spiritual beings and forces in and 
through their culture’s “collective representations.” That is, first, for anything to come out of the 
“unrepresented” into public view—for it to become a phenomenon—its observers have to 
participate in it, and to original participating people, everything is alive through its connection 
with the spiritual dimension. Unlike in modern consciousness, the participatory “self” is 
connected in its very being to the exterior world, rather than being an inward self merely 
observing and theorizing about an exterior world. Describing as best he could (as one cultured in 
the West) the participatory phenomenal consciousness, Barfield writes: 
The background picture then was of man as a microcosm within the macrocosm. It is 
clear that he did not feel himself isolated by his skin from the world outside him to quite 
the same extent as we do. He was integrated or mortised into it, each different part of him 
being united to a different part of it by some invisible thread. . . . rather less like an 
island, rather more like an embryo, than we are.26  
Barfield says this “original participation” was “not theoretical at all, inasmuch as it is given in 
immediate experience.”27  
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Therefore, the history of the growth of theoretical thought, what Barfield calls “alpha-
thinking,”28 is in his view the history of the decline of participation, which is also a history of the 
evolution of consciousness. Barfield gives several critiques of modern scholars who attempt to 
study the human cultures of the past from the paradigm of a modern, non-participatory 
consciousness.29  
Mircea Eliade also describes the approach of “archaic man” to time and history as 
“participation in the Center,” a dramatic taking part in the archetypal dramas of the cosmos as a 
way to give meaning to life and its suffering.30 Unlike the attempts of “historical man” to 
recreate himself in history according to a self-authored (or self-discovered) ideal pattern (as in 
Marxism and existentialism), “archaic man” is hostile “toward every attempt at autonomous 
‘history,’ that is, at history not regulated by archetypes.” In this way, he/she “valorize[es] … 
human existence,”31 not giving transcendent meaning to human existence by a higher ideal 
vantage point that he/she has created, but rather listening to the patterns that seem to reveal 
themselves in the social, temporal, and spiritual worlds, submitting to his/her role in society and 
in history as it reveals itself, not as it is reified theoretically or self-created.    
Here is where an excursus on the ahistoricality of original participation may be important. 
Though this historical sketch is intended to be generally chronological, it bears mentioning (on 
pain of offending Hegel-influenced notions of historical progress, those of Barfield and Taylor 
included) that the “original participation” of “archaic man” is still present to some degree in 
Western societies and is still the norm in many non-Western societies. This is a lesson learned by 
philosophical anthropologist Levy-Bruhl, who had to revise his initial sharp distinction between 
rational Western societies and participatory non-Western societies. His revised work shows 
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participation still present as a “mode of thought” in cultures worldwide, not only in “primitive” 
ones but also in cultures dominated by modernistic, scientific modes of thought.32  
That philosophers like Taylor suggest otherwise, asserting that no one in the West can 
avoid self-reflective doubt,33 demonstrates perhaps a bias born of Taylor’s superliterate status 
and environment, a possibility that will become especially important in the practical philosophy 
of communication implications of this project.34 Suggesting one opening for those practical 
implications, Barfield denies that original participation is still possible, but he does argue for a 
reinstating of participation in a more self-reflexive and socially constructed mode.35 In this, 
Barfield is suggesting a similar type of relationship to participation as Eliade argues for: 
specifically, that the perspective of primordial ontology should be used to question and relativize 
our tradition of Western metaphysics embedded in historical time. Eliade writes,  
We hold that philosophical anthropology would have something to learn from the 
valorization that pre-Socratic man (in other words, traditional man) accorded to his 
situation in the universe. Better yet: that the cardinal problems of metaphysics could be 
renewed through a knowledge of archaic ontology.36 
Grecian Theoretical Turn   
Returning to the more “chronological” story of participation in the West, however, we 
see that this original, “archaic” participation began to shift in Western cultures to theoretical 
thought, according to Eric Havelock, through the spread of the technology of writing in Greece, 
which took hypotheses about the world out of the limited context of an oral social event 
embedded in a particular place and time and set them into “permanent” words that no longer 
answered to particular social contexts but spoke the same things to all people in all times, not 
only enabling a further development of self-reflexive consciousness but also strengthening the 
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idea of eternal truths in unchanging (written) words.37 Peter Murphy tells the story of how this 
encroachment of theoretical, self-reflexive thought led, first, to a political leveling and the first 
experiments in democracy38 and, second, to Plato’s reaction against the “sophistry” of Athenian 
politics that had allowed and encouraged the pursuit of individual power rather than participation 
in the good.39  
Though critical of the Sophists’ separation of words from their realities (i.e., words no 
longer used as participatory representations), and though vocal about the dangers of rhetoric, 
literature, and writing itself,40 Plato was still very much a disciple of the new “alpha-thinking” 
and was impacted by the new genre of linear history. Thus, he could not simply return to a 
religious participation embedded in archetypal story and ritual, as had characterized earlier 
Greek life lived through Homer and Hesiod.41 Instead, he reimagined participation as a much 
more cerebral religious progression, a discipline of philosophers to gain sure knowledge by their 
dialectical discerning of the eternal forms from the imperfect participation of earthly particulars 
in those forms.42 His move towards textuality in the relatively new specialty of philosophy 
helped set the course for participatory textual hermeneutics, though he himself was critical of 
textuality and not narrowly dedicated to the meaning of texts over verbal words or physical 
signs.   
In the Phaedrus, for example, Plato portrays participation happening when a particular 
thing, through the possibilities inherent in its particular being, shares in the qualities of its 
transcendent form.43 In his final speech of repentance to the gods for his previous impiety in 
making sophistic speeches about love (a god), Plato’s Socrates says, “For a man must have 
intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one 
conception of reason … clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in 
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beholding which He is what He is.”44 In the Platonic progression of soul, therefore, one can 
(re)awaken to the knowledge of the true and the beautiful through recognizing the participation 
of particular things in the transcendent forms of truth and beauty. However, the particular things 
remain means to the end of the individual’s rising beyond all particulars, at least according to the 
traditional reading of Plato, and they are few who are able to participate in the forms in Plato’s 
elitist rendering of participation: “For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the 
higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them: they are seen through a 
glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and these 
only with difficulty.”45  
The way Plato portrays him, Socrates can be seen as a man between two worlds. Like the 
Sophists and unlike his archaic Athenian forebears, Socrates disdains the possession of 
traditional knowledge and questions everything, but following the basic openness of his culture 
and time period to participation in divine things, Socrates cannot merely play with speeches in 
the Phaedrus but must take warning from his daemon’s “sign” and from the religious tradition 
against blasphemy46—that is, his words are still the meeting place for divine realities. However, 
considering Plato’s later movement from Socratic dialogues to his more politically pragmatic 
works of The Republic and The Laws, it can be inferred that Plato was perhaps less 
interpersonally responsive to his “daemon” than was his teacher. In sum, from an earlier Heroic 
society in which individual participation in the eternal archetypes expressed itself in public social 
roles, what Barfield calls “collective representations,” Plato’s vision privatized and to some 
degree textualized individual participation in the forms, while still acknowledging the need for 
the world of particular people and things through which (by use of which) to ascend in one’s 
own journey of divine participation.47 With the shift in the site of participation from communally 
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interpreted archetypes to individual contemplation as guided partially by the interpretation of 
written texts, the tension between communal and textual meaning was set up as a theme that 
would continue to bedevil the Western tradition, especially in biblical hermeneutics.  
Aristotle, more materially minded than his teacher, did “not consider it a serious 
philosophical theory that paradigmatic Forms are made immanent in the sensible cosmos by 
participation, but rather that these are empty terms and metaphors of a poetical nature.”48 We see 
here, in the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, the philosophical normalization of the separation 
of language into a philosophical prose and a poetics emptied of its connection with the divine. 
This emerging conception is of language serving as a horizontal meeting place between only 
humans rather than a multi-dimensional meeting place for more cosmic meaning.49 Aristotle, 
however, working on the same philosophical problem of how things “become” through time 
what they in essence are, proposed his parallel conception of energeia, or actuality, which he 
conceived as the inherent form of a thing that organized its matter in specific ways through its 
course of development.50 That is, Aristotle subsumed Plato’s semi-religious concept of 
participation into his more “secular” theory of final cause.51 Destiny and divinity were on their 
way to becoming, much later, pre-determinative DNA.  
The level of textualization of Greek philosophical thought can be seen in the contrast 
between Plato’s dialogues and allegories, on the one hand, and Aristotle’s treatises organized as 
rigorous schemes of classification, on the other. Participation in the Unmoved Mover was a 
structural necessity for Aristotle’s hierarchical metaphysics, but it had no central part in the 
pragmatic art of interpreting texts or events, which was a matter of mere semantics and logic.52  
Plato’s philosophical participation through contemplation was transfigured again into 
more mystical and religious tones by Neoplatonism in the socially tumultuous time period of late 
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antiquity. Torstein Theodore Tollefsen, in his monograph Activity and Participation in Late 
Antique and Early Christian Thought, summarizes the general idea of participation in this time 
period as   
A central idea in the philosophy of late antiquity—in Neoplatonism as well as in 
Christian thinking … the general notion that the lower strata of being depend on higher 
principles in the way that these same lower levels are constituted by some kind of 
participation in these higher principles.53 
In Plotinus’s Neoplatonism, “participation” was a necessary concept, though not perfectly 
consistent with his fundamental doctrine of the “double activity” of all “complete entities.”54  
That is, following Plato’s metaphors of love and sight, Plotinus posited that lower entities 
are motivated to participate in self-sufficient higher entities by the “longing” inflamed by the 
“sight” of them,55 but since Plotinus’s One is also a creator (in a different sense than the 
Christian Creator), this “longing” is not just evoked but has been provided by the One through 
the emanation of its divine form of being. Tollefsen develops this process as follows:  
The intelligible principle does not move down, but things move towards it, and because of 
this movement from below, into the principle, things receive into their own constitution 
what they are capable of receiving. Consequently, things somehow come to mirror the 
intelligible in their own being.56   
Humans, therefore, participate in the One as they “see” the One through contemplative 
reflection, though their process of “return” to the One is structurally limited by the capabilities of 
their level of being, their physicality, and their level of active participation in such 
contemplation. Again, the elitism of this conception of participation, its tendencies toward 
individualism (because participation is an individually initiated achievement), and its disdain for 
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the material world (“Platonists could not possibly see matter as inherently good.” 57) provide a 
strong contrast with original participation. Though Iamblichus, a disciple in the Plotinian 
tradition, provided Neoplatonism with a return to the theurgical nature of the physical world,58 it 
would take a different development of participation to revalue society and the temporal physical 
world. That would come in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which also, by emphasis on 
the Word, would provide a new way of understanding the interaction of language and spiritual 
participation.  
Christian Participation 
The growing Christian community in late antiquity had a different conception of 
participation than Neoplatonism—one that developed parallel to rather than from its primary 
philosophical competitor.59 The early Christian conception differed from Neoplatonism in its 
understanding of the basic relationship between humans and the divine, its concept of creation, 
and its concept of God.60 This parallel development may be easier to understand if one keeps in 
mind the background atmosphere of “original participation,” from which both Neoplatonism and 
Christianity drew breath. Following in the steps of the Jewish people, Christians denied that there 
were metaphysically universal connections to God readily accessible to human will through the 
collective representations of nature, a rejection most clearly reiterated by recourse to the Mosaic 
command that no image be made for God. Compared to the widespread practices of participation 
through idols, the positing of a God who was not connected to the world through an external 
image was a significant contrast.61  
While taking this divine connection away from idolatrous externalities with one hand, 
Christians returned participation to creation and the people of God through inward witness of the 
Spirit, external participation in the activities of God, and adherence to the bounded, written 
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verbalizations of God—what Barfield calls a “deepening of participation” even in its pre-
Christian phase in Judaism.62 In fact, while denying the Neoplatonist presumption to know the 
essence of a largely passive God, St. Basil portrays Christian participation as limited but real 
knowledge through experience of an active God.63  
The emphasis on the activity of God, in this early Christian participation, can be seen as 
essential for two reasons, especially from an Augustinian Christian position: first, God’s radical 
otherness as being beyond the plane of creation and temporality necessitates His active 
downward movement in the hierarchy if any transaction of knowledge or goodness is to 
succeed;64 second, the alienation of sin multiplies the separations—the blockages to 
participation—between creation and Creator, human and creation, and human and human, 
necessitating an activity of God to maintain and re-establish participation not only at every level 
of the earthly hierarchy but also horizontally between entities in order to maintain some level of 
cosmic functionality and to accomplish the divine plan.65 That is, Christian participation involves 
perpetual divine works of “grace” and gives value to not only minds or souls but also bodies and 
matter. The question of how the different levels of participation are repaired or maintained by the 
activity of God, especially how the general participation of the cosmos in God should be 
differentiated from believers’ participation in God through Christ, was one of the central 
theological-philosophical questions of the middle ages, with its most systematic development in 
Aquinas.66  
Further differentiating Christianity from Neoplatonic participation, the Christian God was 
not understood as an absolute monad but as a Trinity, and thus “the one and the many both went 
back to the heart of who God is.”67 Therefore, the process of Christian sanctification through 
participation, known in the early church as “deification,”68 was not a process of merely 
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individual perfection but was rather an earthly picture of the divine sociality inherent in the 
nature of God. Becoming like God was a church affair, not an individual affair, and thus any 
Godward movement of contemplation was also to be a humanward movement of godly 
activity.69 As we will see, this communal process of participation in God is especially relevant to 
the scriptural hermeneutics of Augustine.  
This social movement of the church in which, together, the church “body” participates in 
God through its internal and external activity was seen as initiated, enabled, and guided by the 
event of the Incarnation.70 While archaic participatory societies saw history as a cycle of 
dramatic conflicts and heroic returns in which current heroes sought immortality by discerning 
and enacting their cosmic heroic roles, Christianity grounded that cycle and those figured types 
in the historical Incarnation of Christ, subordinating the possible roles, possible ethical norms, 
and cycles of drama to a linear and temporally limited history spoken from the realm of 
eternity.71 The Old Testament was, thus, read both as real history in the plane of temporality and 
as a book of types and shadows of Christ and the church—archetypal prefigurings from the 
atemporal realm of eternity, where the plan of salvation through Christ always resides.72 The 
Incarnation and life of Christ itself, as the temporal and eternal event, was seen as the heroic 
pattern in which, through perfect participation in the Father by the Spirit, “Christ swallowed up 
our mortal and corruptible existence.”73 Moreover, Christ’s pattern, as a model both human and 
divinely graced, became the focal point of the pattern of Christians’ participation in God in their 
own human bodies, communities, and histories. As the principle totus Christus,74 this historical-
archetypal pattern also became the key to early Christian hermeneutical practice, seeking 
Christological meaning in the scriptures for the sake of Christological participation of the 
embodied interpreters in the current moment.   
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While this picture holds in its general shape for early Christian participation, there were 
of course differences that surfaced in different theologians and different practices in different 
parts of emerging Christendom—differences discernible, for example, in the unnamed 
interlocutors who are the targets of Augustine’s arguments for charitable participation through 
the discipline of the scriptures,75 but also differences in how to understand participation through 
objects and icons of contemplation. These variations in participation, among both theologies and 
common lay practices, can be seen especially in the cult of the saints and the significance 
attributed to the liturgical import of baptism and the Eucharist.76 Philosophically, according to 
Tollefsen, the Greek Fathers of the Eastern church took participation a slightly different way 
than the Western concept; in the East, God’s essence is forever beyond our knowledge even in 
eternity, though his attributes can be known as they are manifested in the created realm as a 
plurality technically separate from the simple divine essence, whereas in the West, a knowledge 
of God’s nature and his attributes must go together, a knowledge that is possible in part through 
participation on earth and that will be completed according to the capability of resurrected 
humanity in the realm of eternity. The Western, more “intellectual,” concept relies on 
participation through created mediums and on the possibility of true-though-not-comprehensive 
knowledge. Because “divine transcendence … is conceived in a much more radical sense in the 
Christian East,” the Eastern concept of participation is ultimately more mystical and less tied to 
the created world.77 However, in both East and West, “to be and to be actualized in certain 
perfections is nothing else than to participate in the divine energeia,” which is not a created 
substance but rather animates, directs, and empowers “the essential [created] content of 
beings.”78  
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Unfortunately, the separation of languages, practically and then formally at the Great 
Schism of 1054, and the difference in structuring theological metaphors (Greek philosophy in the 
East; Roman law in the West79) made it difficult to articulate a shared, coherent concept of 
participation, or deification, though as Meconi points out in his survey of recent work on 
participatory deification, “the East and the West have much more in common here than usually 
thought.”80 Especially in its manifestation in less-educated laypeople, the separation of scriptural 
languages between Eastern Greek and the Vulgate of the West made shared participation through 
the scriptures difficult, similar to how it impacted the shared understanding of the bible as 
scripture when the Vulgate was joined by Erasmus’s translation in the late Middle Ages, and 
more recently as the King James English Version lost its cultural hegemony.  
Though many Evangelical Christians acknowledge that the specific words themselves are 
not as important as the unchanging meaning, the words themselves become “collective 
representations” among the members of religious communities, words through which they 
participate together in spiritual realities.81 Augustine is sympathetic to this need for shared, stable 
wording,82 though he also works to undermine the tendency to essentialize language, as we will 
see. However, because Eastern Orthodox language and theology has preserved more clearly the 
metaphors of participation and deification, it has been Eastern Christian notions of participation 
that several recent scholars have brough to bear on interpretation and ecclesial life.83 Studies on 
Augustinian participation, and its implications for rhetoric and hermeneutics, have gained less 
scholarly attention, though his participation forms the ground of his other philosophical concepts 
and, historically, set the foundation for the Augustinian medieval synthesis, whose effects we 
still feel. 
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Medieval Participation 
In the early Middle Ages, the “Augustinian synthesis” that emphasized both the 
sacraments and the primacy of “grace” as God’s work in and through sinful human vessels84 also 
included the Augustinian theology of participatory deification (theosis). While emphasizing the 
work of Christ to bring grace through his earthly work, this doctrine also focused on the 
continuing action of Christ’s grace in the believer, working in mere humans the pattern of 
Christ’s purity and attributes. Jaroslav Pelikan quotes one of the Medieval definitions of a 
Christian—“one who imitates and follows Christ in all things”—in his explanation of how 
Medieval Christianity followed Augustine’s insistence on not just right belief but also right 
practice with a right heart, which requires the active work of grace in the “inner man.”85  
Interestingly, this medieval emphasis on participation was most prominent in the writings 
of those on the frontiers of the great missionary activities of the seventh through the ninth 
centuries.86 The theological idea of theosis in the tradition of Augustine has also been shown to 
be “a central component of standard [medieval] theologies.”87 On the frontiers, though, where 
the church was actively evangelizing barbarian tribes, the questions of mission and theological 
purpose pressed the theological question of participation into active service, especially to 
shepherd the shift from pagan original participation to participation in Christ.88  
This provides an interesting conjunction with the importance of recurrent exposure to the 
“other” in much philosophy of communication. In general, confrontation with the “other” forces 
a tradition to reinvigorate and reinvent its language so that it can understand what it stands for 
vis-à-vis the other, to remember its own central themes and realign the lines between center and 
periphery, and to reassess and repair the internal tensions—between belief and belief and 
between belief and practice—that confrontation with the other highlights. Further, the other in 
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some cases may have something new that might be legitimately incorporated into the tradition.89 
Within an Augustinian framework of participatory theosis, the medieval church’s encounters 
with pagan tribes maintained and strengthened the understanding of salvation as a participatory 
imitation of Christ, a “part of the understanding of salvation since the earliest days of the 
church.”90 
Also following the lead of Augustine, the medieval church understood both sacraments 
and the preached word of God as the means of this grace of deification. Again in the seventh 
through ninth centuries, the emphasis on faith and on missionary work brought heightened 
attention to the ministry of preaching the scriptures, and “the role of the preaching of the Word 
of God as a means of grace assumed considerable importance.”91 In this preaching and teaching, 
it was important not to be restricted to the literal sense of the text, which “brought many down 
the path to heresy and error.” On the other hand, in interpreting scripture through the “four-fold 
norm” of “historical, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical,” it was also advised that one be 
cautious with fanciful interpretation “lest ‘by his allegorizing he desert the explicit faith based on 
history.’”92 The rule of faith was the boundary and the practice of faith the bridge that connected 
heaven and earth through the interpretation and preaching of the scriptures.  
It was widespread practice, though, to combine the preaching of the word with the 
offering of the elements “to make a sacrament.”93 Here, we see the tension between “grace and 
the means of grace,” particularly the tension between the means of the spoken Word and the 
means of a divinely infused physical action, a tension that would resurface again to devastating 
effect in the Protestant Reformation. Christianity rejected the pan-totemism of pagan original 
participation, staying true to its identity in the Judaic tradition, but the Christian tradition was 
continually having to negotiate the bridge(s) over which creatures should participate in their 
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Creator and Savior. Doctrinally, the Incarnation provided the lynchpin of participation,94 but 
liturgically, the boundaries had to flex in response to conflicts interior to the tradition and to 
encounters with the “others” that still surrounded and, to some degree, coexisted within the 
church in the Middle Ages.95  
How the material and spiritual worlds coexisted liturgically, especially in contrast to 
pagan totemism, was a particularly interesting question. In medieval Christianity, “shaped by the 
imagination (as well as by symbolism and ideology), the body occupies a central place in the … 
system of thought. … Body and soul were inseparable.”96 This is not a Marxist grounding of 
imagination in the materiality of the body, nor a Spinozan pantheism in which materiality and 
spirituality are two sides of the same equation, but a drawing together of two different levels of 
being, of temporality and eternity, through representative verbal and physical things which serve 
as meeting places for overlapping and shared action.  The late modern resurgence of interest in 
the body, ecological intersubjectivity, and their connections to communication,97 though not tied 
to a Christian concept of participation, demonstrates possible convergences of a philosophy of 
communication that would reintroduce participation into an Evangelical hermeneutics that, with 
modernism, too easily slips into docetism and quasi-gnosticism.98 
Again, in discussing the medieval tension between different means of participation, it is 
important to remember that the philosophy of communication gulf separating the modern mind 
from the medieval “mentalité” is greater than the brook separating medieval opponents from 
each other. A “symbol” in the Middle Ages, for example, was not the mere opposite of literal, 
but rather indicated the higher meaning that corresponded to any physical thing or word. Because 
physical reality participated in spiritual reality, every earthly thing represented something on a 
higher plane, and the spiritual thing gave meaning to the earthly thing.99 Discussing the same 
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phenomenon, Barfield says, “Our ‘symbolical’ therefore is an approximation to, or a variant of, 
their ‘literal.’ Even when they got down to the bedrock of literal, they still experienced that rock 
as a representation.”100 This sacramental approach to reality also molded the ministry of the 
Word to believers and to pagans, seen in the “common name for creed” which was “symbol.”101 
That is, the words of the creed participated in their spiritual realities and were thus, as a symbol, 
real and powerful. It is for this reason, according to Jacques Le Goff, that the Trivium, and 
especially the careful distinctions made within Grammar, was so important in the Middle Ages: 
the right “name … allowed men, because of the words, to arrive at the hidden meanings of which 
they were the keys.” Or, translating Isidore of Seville, “to name something was already to have 
explained it.”102 
This line between participatory orthodox spirituality and the more pagan “magical 
thinking” of much of the Medieval population was in continual tension, as Le Goff elaborates:  
Amulets, philtres, and magical formulae, widespread in both trade and use, were only the 
coarsest of these beliefs and these practices. Relics, sacraments, and prayers were the 
authorized equivalents of these as far as the masses were concerned. It was always a 
question of finding the keys which would force open the hidden world, the true and 
eternal world, the one in which men could be saved.103 
In Le Goff’s analysis of the Medieval problem of the “marvelous,” he delineates three 
categories—the pagan “marvel,” the more neutral “magic,” and the Christian “miracle”—and he 
theorizes that the growth of a literature of the “marvelous” among aristocratic classes in the High 
Middle Ages was a strategy of class identity in an attempt to consolidate power outside the reach 
of the Church. Whether or not his explanation holds true, Le Goff demonstrates the medieval 
awareness of participatory possibilities, often mediated through language, as well as awareness 
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of the self-reflective tools of skepticism used in the High Middle Ages to “rationalize” and 
“define what may legitimately be considered miraculous.”104 That is, though medieval culture 
was still participatory, the conceptual tools (e.g., the discovery of “antiquity,” “perspective,” 
widespread “literacy,” “individualism”105) were emerging that could be used to separate the 
world of things from the world of spiritual meanings.   
These conceptual seeds generated by internal social divisions and changes in medieval 
Christendom sprouted when the relative insulation of the Church from outside challenges came 
to an end in the 12th century, when “the social, political, and intellectual situation of Latin 
Christendom altered significantly … when questions that had been either neglected or left 
unanswered in the ‘Augustinian synthesis’ … had to be faced.”106 These questions included how 
to mediate the participatory mysticism of “folk piety” with the officially recognized participatory 
elements of the church107 and how to respond to the renewed intellectual encounters with “Jews, 
heretics, and Saracens [Muslims].”108 There was also, along with the Great Schism, a renewed 
interest in “the heritage of Eastern Christianity … partly as a consequence of the intensified 
contact with the East through the Crusades and other forms of travel and commerce,”109 but it 
was the interaction with the powerful “other” of Muslim scholars that was to have an important 
double effect on the concept of participation.  
One important effect, already alluded to, was the recovery of Aristotle’s works through 
Muslim sources, along with heavily influential Muslim commentators such as Avicenna, and the 
massive project of the incorporation of this Aristotelian-Islamic thought into orthodox Catholic 
doctrine by Thomas Aquinas.110 In the midst of a series of Crusades that could have provoked a 
retrenchment and simplification of the Catholic Church tradition, Aquinas reaffirmed and 
developed the Augustinian dictum that all truth is God’s truth because God is at work in all the 
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world, even if not all words and creeds (symbols) equally or perfectly reflect God’s presence and 
communication.111 Importantly, Aquinas is well known for the centrality of the metaphor of 
participation in his work; it was so central and uncontroversial to him, he did not bother to define 
it, though “it occurs almost on every page” of his works.112 Though rearticulated in Aristotelian 
categories, Aquinas brought forward the Augustinian dual emphases on the right confession of 
truth and the corresponding right embodiment of that participation in Christ, the Word; that is, 
“knowledge was defined, not as the defining of hypotheses, but as an act of union with the 
represented behind the representation.”113 Thus, knowledge of the good confession was both a 
linguistic pointer for the interior word and a form of spiritual life, according to the medieval 
mentality as portrayed by Aquinas, in whom “the whole corpus of medieval thought is in a 
manner recapitulated.”114  
The Modern/Medieval Turn Away from Participation 
However, the other effect of the 12th century encounter with other traditions was to have 
a more far-reaching effect: “the defense of the faith against heresy and against the truth claims of 
other faiths inevitably raised the question of how the authority of revelation within the church 
was related to other ways of knowing.”115 This question took two directions in the historical 
moment: the apologetic direction of using “reason” instead of just “authority” in confuting those 
who did not recognize the authorities of the Church116 and “the discovery of the imperative that 
faith must move on to understanding,” which Pelikan calls “perhaps the most important aspect of 
the intellectual changes that took place during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.”117  
Though this renewed motivation to explore and understand the truth that one believes had 
its roots in Augustine118—and helpfully shifted the Church from its earlier allergy to any kind of 
theological novelty—it would eventually not only strain the traditional warning against 
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overstepping the bounds of the intellect119 but it would also metaphysically move the knowledge 
of God into a realm of correlational language and self-directed human intellects, a line crossed 
not alone but most famously by John Duns Scotus.120 This line crossed by Scotus eventually (and 
paradoxically) divided sacred and secular, giving epistemological weight to what could be 
represented in terms of the human world, tempting religious communities to straddle the line, 
reaching into the “secular” realm for the tree of knowledge while keeping the other foot close to 
the tree of life.  
Most times, of course, the story of modernity is told from the genesis point of Descartes, 
who separated the foundational knowing subject from the world of objects, but James Smith, 
following Michael Hanby’s history of modernity, says that “Descartes’s father is Stoicism and 
late medieval scholasticism,” with Scotus leading the way.121 Though Scotus was a moderate 
realist, not disconnecting concepts from unseen universal realities in the same sense as 
Nominalists or Conceptualists like William of Ockham,122 his proposed modification of the 
participatory relationship between knowledge of God and knowledge of the world opened the 
door for the modern world.123 Ironically, therefore, immediately after its high point in Aquinas, 
participatory “biblical exegesis lost its appeal and another form became appealing.”124 
But how did Scotus’s philosophy eviscerate participatory thought and exegesis? Put 
briefly, Scotus, “when considering the universal science of metaphysics, elevated being (ens) to a 
higher station over God, so that being could be distributed to both God and His creatures.”125 
While ostensibly defending the theological priority of God’s freedom, human freedom, and the 
non-determining nature of grace,126 Scotus rejected the “analogy of being” that posited 
participatory “in-flowing” of grace from the unbounded God into creatures,127 creatures who are 
receptive to interior spiritual influence because of their creational potentiality as a microcosm 
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analogous to higher macrocosms. Scotus saw participation as a fundamental violation of “the law 
of the excluded middle,” an Aristotelian law of formal logic that had hardened, by the High 
Middle Ages, to the point that Scotus felt that the dictates of the logical principle should take 
precedence over the encounter with the world in its “actuality.”128  
In place of this two-tiered reality of God and being, mediated by the participatory 
mediums of revelatory language and physical materiality, Scotus argued, first, that the being of 
God and the being of humans are different only in terms of degree, with the infinitude of God 
quantitatively ensuring his Otherness; second, Scotus argued that all beings on the plane of 
Being are equal and incommensurable;129 and third, he argued that communication between 
beings (including revelation from God) involves “revelational positivism: that we know in 
advance that all that God can show us is positive facts and unambiguous information.”130 That is, 
“influence” for Scotus was purely “external,”131 and the integral connection between divine 
revelation and human reason through the analogy of being was transformed into the “atomism” 
of a free human intellect132 interpreting the external signs and choosing, freely, to join by 
“concursus” in “divine-human co-operation” with a God who is similarly free from 
constraints.133 Eschewing the Aristotelian account of an entelechia of human being and final 
causality,134 Scotus portrayed humans as having a sphere of freedom and uniqueness in being 
that is not given by culture, polis, or (in a determinative sense) God.135 That is, while God speaks 
and exerts influence from the outside, seeking to bestow grace according to his own radically 
free will, God must cooperate with what his human creatures do and are, acknowledging that 
they might not be able to read the external signs.    
With the “flattening” of the world to one plane of being, in which its beings are not 
intrinsically mediated by analogy or by the telos of a final cause,136 human knowledge is no 
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longer a matter of “elevation” through confession of and action in the right participatory 
“collective representations,” but rather a search for words that mirror the world.137 Language, 
including conceptual abstractions used in talking about higher-level truths, was no longer a 
gateway but a mirror—because there was nowhere to go. The “collective” nature of collective 
representations was also problematized since the posited freedom and equality of beings 
emphasized the individual over the telos of or distributive justice of a polis or people.138 Because 
revelation, in Scotus’s system, was a matter of individual interpretation of external divine 
influence, not accessible through the sensible world but cognitively recreated in the mind 
according to individual human freedom,139 the possibility for a social body to interpret and act 
together was undercut conceptually by this 
Modern misfortune: the loss of an integrally conceptual and mystical path [, a loss of] … 
the prevailing theologico-metaphysical discourse of participated-in perfections, [in 
which] there was a ready continuity between reason and revelation: reason itself was 
drawn upwards by divine light, while, inversely, revelation involved the conjunction of 
radiant being and further illuminated mind.140 
Without this possibility of shared illumination through the mystical mediation of conceptual 
“collective representations,” the whole metaphysical ground of society, language, and 
hermeneutics shifts, and truth experienced through other realms such as aesthetics and liturgy is, 
for the moment, relegated to an uneasy seat on the periphery.141 As Matthew Levering 
articulates:  
While participation remains in Scotus, it does so in a deracinated form: representation 
rather than exemplarity. … Reality is “desymbolized”: human time is no longer 
understood as caught up in a participatory relationship with God, and history becomes a 
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strictly linear, horizontal, intratemporal series of moments. After Scotus, human freedom 
may submit to the divine will, but thereafter on the grounds of God’s obligating power 
rather than on participatory-teleological grounds.142 
A philosophy of communication approach looks to discern how the questions of a historical 
moment interact with the specific philosophical-conceptual responses those questions provoke,143 
and it seems that Scotus’s recasting of the problem of knowledge in an individually discerned 
flat plane of being is what provided the question that Descartes, the following modern age, and 
modernistic hermeneutics felt compelled to answer.  
The most vocal and thorough critics of Radical Orthodoxy’s move to locate modernity’s 
genesis in Scotus do not disagree with the analysis, but rather disagree with Radical Orthodoxy’s 
negative evaluation of the consequences.144 That is, that it was Scotus who gave articulation and 
force to a move away from participation, and by the same token planted the philosophical seeds 
of modernism, is not an embattled position.145 His “re-orientation of ontology … was necessary 
in order to make possible the move from ontology to epistemology,”146 and after this 
metaphysical paradigm had started to shift, several things started to happen in rapid sequence 
that made a return to a participatory medieval synthesis impossible.  
Modern Social Revolutions 
As is normal in paradigmatic shifts,147 seeming irregularities and inaptitudes in the 
former participatory paradigm led to Scotus’s imagining of a new paradigm, but after the shift, 
there happened to be a major convergence of this interparadigmatic dispute and a major 
breakdown in European society, one that Scotus’s new ontology was better equipped for with its 
emphases on individualism, power, quantification, and the objectivity of the world.   
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As mentioned above, even before Scotus’s paradigm shift, the Church’s confrontation 
with internal heresies and external religions provoked a felt need for a more finely calibrated 
religious language that would maintain the unity of the church and justify its correctness vis-à-
vis its competitors. Participatory language, while meaningful, was not as well suited for 
apologetics—one’s interlocutor might simply refuse to see the spiritual analogy on which your 
argument rests, or might propose a different, though traditionally viable, spiritual analogy. Also, 
as Le Goff points out, the cultural markers that are traditionally used to identify the 
Renaissance—especially increased literacy, the reconnection with Antiquity through document 
discoveries, and a growing sense of individualism148—constituted the atmosphere in which 
Scotus was already working in the 12th century.  
Several aspects of the cultural shift contributed to the downfall of participatory thought. 
As a number of media ecology scholars argue, literacy, by strengthening a self-reflective 
phenomenology of consciousness, creates a sense of individual freedom, an awareness that being 
could be otherwise.149 Nascent individualism and the beginnings of rights as located in individual 
humans can also be seen in the shift to individual property ownership in the technical discipline 
of law, as Thomas Wren points out: “by the middle of the 13th century, canonists and secular 
legal theorists were regularly using the subjective language of natural rights, even though the 
moral philosophers and theologians were still wedded to the objective classical notion of natural 
law.”150 This property-individual rights connection also began to be connected with the resurgent 
money economy, meaning that individual worth was tied to property worth, which was expressed 
quantitatively through money (instead of qualitatively through personal duties and relationships 
within the hierarchy).151 There is significant resonance between these markers in late medieval 
culture—active apologetics, increased literacy, legal subjective individualism—and the main 
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lines of Scotus’s replacements for participation. We can also see from these medieval cultural 
seeds the eventual fruits of high modern literacy, apologetics, and individualism in Evangelical 
hermeneutics.  
Immediately after Scotus’s death in the early 14th century, the conceptual resources of 
these different paradigms (Scotus’s and the traditional participatory one) were tested in the fires 
of several Europe-wide cataclysms. The end of the Medieval Warm period devastated crop yields 
for over a century,152 leading to the Great Famine that killed perhaps 10% of Europe in one year, 
inducing malnutrition that allowed the Black Death to kill off another third-to-half of Europe, 
and exacerbating the already high political tensions between countries,153 political tensions partly 
due to the chaos still following the recently disputed headship of the Holy Roman Empire (1247-
1273). The resulting social anarchy, including a number of popular revolts, might have been kept 
in good order by a strong vision articulated by a strong Church, as had happened in a parallel 
historical situation with Augustine in the chaos of Late Antiquity and was renewed in several 
iterations throughout the Middle Ages,154 but the Church’s vision had become too narrowly 
political and, partly as a result of this emphasis on ecclesial political power, had fallen into 
disarray, most famously in the Western Papal Schism (1378-1417).155 John Henry, in his history 
of the Scientific Revolution, identifies this among other factors as contributing to the shift away 
from a holistic and participatory medieval mindset. Specifically, he identifies the following 
factors: 
The increasing failure of the Roman Catholic Church and the so-called Holy Roman 
Empire to provide the necessary stability for the organization of spiritual and material 
life, the consequent rise of city-states and regional and national principalities, and the 
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break-up of local feudal jurisdictions. … The rise of urban life, the development of 
commercial enterprise based on private capital, and the origins of the banking system.156 
Facing crisis and social breakdown, people who have the conceptual resources to create meaning 
and unity—through dynamic leadership, social identity, and/or strong social institutions—can 
respond constructively and expansively, but without these resources, people tend to fall into a 
“survival mentality,” narrowing their focus and refusing to think seriously and communally 
about the future.157 The lack of clear articulation of participatory philosophy of communication 
to the medieval masses sent them searching for other conceptual tools of survival.  
Since the institutions and communities that undergirded a participatory communal 
mindset were significantly upended in the 14th century, the way was cleared for the more 
individualistic and objectivistic metaphysics of the modern world, which found new institutional 
philosophies and forms in the political atomism of Thomas Hobbes and the new idea of the state 
that eventually grew from Scotus’s metaphysics.158 Besides drastically shifting political 
paradigms, this new metaphysics and its undercutting of received tradition led to revolutions in 
religion, with Martin Luther, revolutions in the pairing of philosophical mathematics with trade 
disciplines and real world problems, starting with Descartes,159 and other revolutions in natural 
philosophy that followed from the Copernican challenge to the nature of astronomical theory.160  
According to Barfield, the “turning point” for participation in science was when 
Copernicus and Galileo argued that their hypothesis about the operation of the heavens was not 
merely a hypothesis—a pragmatic “assumption made for the purpose of a particular argument 
and by the same token not posited as true”—but was instead something that was actually true.161 
That is, in a revision of “theory about theory,” Galileo posited that certain knowledge could be 
gained not just from philosophical contemplation of divinely infused words and realities162 (the 
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heretofore sole route) but also from observations of the external world as a regular and stable 
object in itself. “To the extent therefore that the phenomena are experienced as machine, they are 
believed to exist independently of man, not to be participated [in] and therefore not to be in the 
nature of representations.”163 The perceptions of phenomena, that is, were beginning to be taken 
to be a reality unaffected by human or divine interaction with their representations. In this view, 
things are what they are equally at all times to all people. The participatory world had rendered 
phenomena “less predictable and less calculable,”164 but the modern world could measure its 
phenomena better and, following Bacon’s focus on knowledge as power through 
“technology,”165 could center its agenda of predicting and controlling on the only remaining 
agents in the cosmos, humankind.  
The problem with the withdrawal of a participatory approach to phenomena, on the order 
of the “mechanical model” that occurred, was that representations no longer pointed to 
something beyond themselves but were “collectively mistaken for an ultimate,” becoming what 
Barfield calls “idols.” Having no depth, only a surface, these idols “could only be conceived … 
as a series of impacts of idols on other idols,” and having no telos rooted in a larger narrative 
from beyond the pale of the represented world, the fundamental principle of operation explaining 
idol-idol interaction became “random chance,” which to the ancients was the very thing that the 
hypothesis of the former participatory world was created to avoid.166   
Reading the heavens and the earth scientifically as objective, flat texts was paralleled by 
new ways of reading written texts. With the increased rise of individual-oriented literacy through 
the invention and dissemination of the printing press in 1440 and the beginning of the 
pedagogical philosophy of simplified schemata with Peter Ramus,167 the linguistic richness of 
texts as communal sites of human-divine participation faded (at different speeds in different 
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communities and classes) to a collection of doctrinal words as things-in-themselves that, as 
objects, could be traded like commodities, passed on to the young cognitively, and brandished as 
apologetic weapons against other individuals or groups, in person or through the power of black 
type on white paper. In this way, there is a connection between the Protestant Reformation, the 
rise of a middle class economy, the Scientific Revolution, and the textualization of the Bible.168  
Barfield, like Charles Taylor, argues that participation in some form has never ceased, but 
that we have ceased to be conscious of our participation in the phenomena around us, an 
unconsciousness bolstered by our practical success in predicting and controlling phenomena.169 
The older and more mystical types of participation never fully quit the scene, but a significant 
strand of Western social classes and institutions became more and more convinced of the 
“obvious” rightness of a metaphysics of immanence, equality, and absence.170 The Evangelical 
movement, for most of its history, straddled the divide between an enchanted and a disenchanted 
world through the scriptural text, only stepping more fully into a disenchanted hermeneutics in 
the shadow of modernism at its most Goliath at the juncture of the 19th and 20th centuries. A 
philosophy of communication approach to recovering an older form of participation for current 
hermeneutical questions presupposes the usefulness of that philosophical framework, but what 
does this strategy gain for us, or, stated differently, what really has been lost if we do not attempt 
to see biblical hermeneutics through the ancient ground of participation? How can attention to 
the “other” of an ancient and primitive ontology be important for a 21st century hermeneutic 
philosophy for educated Evangelical adults?  
What is lost with the loss of conscious participation is, first, the “wealth” of all 
philosophy and literature written under its influence,171 including the wealth of our ancient 
philosophical forebears such as Augustine;172 and second, the possibility of regaining in some 
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form the “union” of word, thing, and world that participation opens to us.173 Without that union 
of word, thing, and invisible represented world, the “world” as a shared conceptual dwelling 
place of meanings is lost to language, partly because the rationality of language—the rationality 
of hierarchies of concepts participating in one another—is thinned out. Following non-
participatory understandings of language to their logical end, philosophers such as Wittgenstein 
concluded that “all predication must be either false or tautologous,” disconnected from any 
reference to a shared world.174 Without the “unity and coherence of nature” in a participatory 
framework, science itself fragments, moving more into microdisciplines or technological arms of 
political power. Barfield says, 
There is only an accelerating increase in that pigeon-holed knowledge by individuals of 
more and more about less and less, which, if persisted in indefinitely, can only lead 
mankind to a sort of “idiocy” (in the original sense of the word)—a state of affairs, in 
which fewer and fewer representations will be collective, and more and more will be 
private, with the result that there will in the end be no means of communication between 
one intelligence and another.175  
Though this is the logical end of a non-participatory approach to language and science, it is not a 
world that humans can live in. This led to a series of neo-participatory reactions to modernity, 
including quests for more humane philosophies of communication, starting with Romanticism.  
The Return of Participation 
Again, it is beyond the scope of this project to trace the path of non-participatory 
ontology exhaustively through the history of Western philosophy, so for our purposes, we jump 
forward to the reaction of the human spirit against the flattened ontology bequeathed to modern 
man by Scotus and his heirs. This ontological “separation between sound and meaning”176 that 
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had been felt more and more through the progression of non-participatory modernism provoked a 
series of self-critical backlashes that would eventually be classed under the “linguistic turn,” but 
this felt disenchantment provoked a literary reaction before that, “a growing awareness … of 
[the] capacity of man for creative speech.”177 Noting the “close relation between language as it is 
used by a participating consciousness and language as it is used, at a later stage, metaphorically 
or symbolically,”178 Barfield argues that the Romantic movement followed the human impulse to 
reinfuse language with representational meaning. He says,  
If nature is indeed “dis-godded,” and yet we again begin to experience her, as 
Wordsworth did—and as millions have done since his time—no longer as dead but as 
alive; if there is no “represented” on the far side of the appearances, and yet we begin to 
experience them once more as appearances, as representations—the question arises, of 
what are they representations?179  
This “true impulse” of Romanticism to seek something behind the representations went awry, 
according to Barfield, but only because the “finite personality” and behind that the “body” of 
particular artistic people were put in place of the divinity behind the text.180  
The attempt to re-establish participation as a functional metaphor in language, 
hermeneutics, and social life has followed strange pathways, partly because it is so difficult to 
discern what this ancient and primitive ontology would look like once transmogrified into the 
metaphors and patterns of thought that make up our contemporary mind. I would argue that even 
Barfield, who is so carefully aware of the “other” world of ancient participation, is unduly caught 
up in the philosophical atmosphere of his historical moment. Similar to what Burke says about 
all symbol-systems, Barfield says that “idolatry carries in it the seeds of its own destruction,” and 
he sees an impending change in culture as marked by the wide and rapid acceptance of Freudian 
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and Jungian psychology181 and by the remarkable interest in still-participatory Oriental 
philosophy in the West,182 both of which propose a significant realm of “unrepresented” behind 
our representations. This positive marker of popular hunger for a resurgence of participation is 
paired, on the other hand, with the already noted “rapidly increasing ‘fragmentation of the 
sciences.’”183 
However, though Barfield’s stated desire is to “smash” the idol of Romantic pseudo-
participation and other idols that held sway in his historical moment, he does not propose a 
return to “original participation,” seeing that as an impossibility. Rather, he argues that we 
should use the track of aesthetics laid out for us by the Romantic movement to engage in “final 
participation,” becoming conscious “directional creators” of our phenomenal worlds while 
acknowledging the further reality of which the human self, itself, is merely the representation. 
Describing his proposal phenomenologically, he says,  
I know that what so stands [as a directional creator] is not my poor temporal personality, 
but the Divine Name in the unfathomable depths behind it. And if I strive to produce a 
work of art, I cannot then do otherwise than strive humbly to create more nearly as that 
creates, and not as my idiosyncrasy wills.184  
Therefore, Barfield argues for a final participation in which our directional creation of the 
phenomenal world is acknowledged as itself a creation of a Being on a higher creational plane 
altogether. As his friend J. R. R. Tolkien argued, the Creator has created us as subcreators, 
through which exercise both He and we fulfill the telos of our beings.185  
However, Barfield’s replacing of original participation with his final participation hinges 
on the irreducibility of self-reflective consciousness in the modern human. Perhaps influenced by 
his position in the academy and in one of the generations at the height of literacy (and thus, of 
 
 
91 
“alpha-thinking”), Barfield’s narrative of the evolution of consciousness,186 and of the 
irretrievability of original participation, seems to presuppose the onward march of Western 
culture and literacy. He says we cannot go back,187 and he posits “great lessons” have been 
learned through the evolution of consciousness, the work of a divine hand behind history.188 His 
call for us to take on the responsibility, and the gratitude, of final participation by engaging in 
participatory interpretation by an act of the will,189 following the evolution of our consciousness 
wherever it will lead, reads at times like a variation of Hegelianism. The critique of Hegelianism 
has also been made of Taylor’s similar call for a return to spirituality within the framework of 
historicism and self-consciousness.190 While both Barfield and Taylor seem to say that we should 
cautiously go where the evolution in consciousness is taking us, more materialist-minded 
scholars argue that consciousness is a product of one or another of the shifting material 
conditions of society. The arguments made within media ecology, for example, such as Neil 
Postman’s connection of childhood with literacy,191 might attach a culture’s level of participatory 
consciousness to its level of literacy, which is thought to control the level of personal and 
cultural self-awareness.  
However, if humans were created in the image of the Trinitarian God, as posited in an 
Augustinian Christian account,192 then humans have always had available to them, in their 
potential being at least, both an implicit sense of unity with other persons and an awareness of 
their separateness as individual persons, and a sense of their connectedness on both the spiritual 
plane and the earthly plane. In this view, humans have known themselves from the beginning as 
one with the dust of the earth and as separated from the earth by orders of hierarchy, knowing 
themselves as lords of the earth.193 Therefore, though the level of participatory consciousness 
might shift on a spectrum from awareness of their separation from the objects around them to 
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awareness of their participation in those representations,194 I would argue that that shift is not 
merely historical, unidirectional, or technological but rather, in conjunction with all those factors, 
the volitional initiation of participation on the part of a speaking God. In an Augustinian and 
Evangelical register, this participatory knowledge is not only endemic to human nature but also 
continually renewed and renewable through attention to the voice of God in a Christ-focused 
reading of the scriptures.  
Scholars of Participation  
Other attempts to restore participation to a central place at the philosophical table have 
been undertaken by not only the aforementioned Radical Orthodoxy movement but also L. Roger 
Owens, Hans Boersma, Matthew Levering, James K. A. Smith, and David Vincent Meconi, S. J.  
Radical Orthodoxy. As implied already, the Radical Orthodoxy movement has been the 
party most responsible for pushing the conversation on participation, as Owens notes in his 
monograph on participatory practices in the church: “No discussion of participation can ignore 
the work of John Milbank and the theological movement Radical Orthodoxy inaugurated by his 
Theology and Social Theory.”195 Owens summarizes Milbank’s position on participations as 
follows:  
Participation … is a theological ontology that grounds the integrity of creation, human 
knowing, and human making—materiality as both creation and construction—by 
showing these to be the good gifts of a transcendent God; their giftedness, their being 
upheld by grace, constitutes the depth and the excess of their being so that they are 
fundamentally understood as being just insofar as their being derives from and 
participates in God’s own.196 
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As implied in the title of Milbank’s groundbreaking work Theology and Social Theory, Radical 
Orthodoxy’s framework is primarily critical.197 The goods they seek to reestablish are not 
programmatically anthropocentric, but practically they are so. That is, their focus is not so much 
on human knowledge of God as on human knowledge of the world enabled by participation in 
God.198 Specifically targeting the “secular social sciences” with his “radical theological critique,” 
Milbank argues that human being, knowledge, and making (poesis) are not only philosophically 
untenable and invalid without participation in God but are also “heretical accounts of creation,” a 
parody of the biblical narrative.199 Summarizing the Radical Orthodoxy reasoning about 
participation’s relationship to the validity of all the arts and sciences, Smith says the 
shift away from a metaphysics of participation to an ontology predicated on the univocity 
of being rent the cords of suspension that hooked the immanent to the transcendent, the 
material to the more than material. The result … was modernity’s “flattened” ontology, 
which eventually issued in nihilism … [This] investment of this unhooked nothing-in-
itself as something has been the task of modernity and postmodernity. Nihilism, unlike 
humanism …, recognizes this ontological nothingness of the immanent order.200 
That is, as Barfield articulates above, the fragmented sciences can say less and less about the 
connections between discrete data (the micronarrative of a hypothesis) or about the guiding 
meanings for their investigations (social macronarratives). By focusing exclusively on the mere 
material world, science has lost the material world.   
The postmodern/hyper-modern recognition of and reaction to this nihilism has been to 
emphasize subjective and uncontrollable textual factors in the interpretation of any data, opening 
the way for the resurgence of rhetoric and hermeneutical approaches, but under the sign of 
cynicism and through the predominant evolutionary metaphor,201 placing all its hope for truth in 
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a vague mystical future and a present unending process.202 With an increasing focus on rhetoric 
and hermeneutics, however, has also come the recognition that such an approach must come 
from a practically viable philosophical ground rooted in a real human community, one of the 
basic tenets of philosophy of communication and the key insight from the ethical philosophy of 
Alasdair MacIntyre. Radical Orthodoxy, using Platonic-Augustinian participation as its basic 
ground, and the Christian tradition as its narrative, thus rereads the disciplines and “the times”203 
through that lens, serving “not [as] a system, method, or formula but ‘a hermeneutic disposition 
and a style of metaphysical vision.’”204 In this way, the movement seeks to “save modernity” and 
modernity’s real human goods by reading it hermeneutically against the grain of its problematic 
foundations.205 Importantly also, this “philosophical life … [is] hermeneutical because it 
involves the perpetual discernment of divine mediation through physicality.”206 
So, following MacIntyre’s narrativity and the broader cultural turn toward a hermeneutic 
frame, Radical Orthodoxy puts forward a Christian-Platonic version of participation as the key to 
recovering truth and hope in reinvented interpretive communities of the arts and sciences, 
modeled after the church. Agreeing with several sympathetic critics of the Radical Orthodoxy 
project, I want both to acknowledge the debt owed to their work in bringing participation to bear 
on modernit(ies) and to suggest ways that a more thoroughly Augustinian and biblical approach 
to participation would take slightly different directions than the paths of Milbank and company. 
The participation of Radical Orthodoxy, as we will see, is more abstract, less Christological, 
more enamored with postmodern ontologies, and less grounded in the materiality of the 
Incarnation than an Augustinianism responsive to scripture in an Evangelical horizon.207 
L. Roger Owens. Owens is one of those sympathetic critics, and his primary issue with 
Milbank’s participation is how it remains in the abstract, despite the talk about participation 
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grounding materiality and about its embodiment in particular social groups. Owens specifically 
argues that participation should be Christocentric and ecclesiocentric: 
[Milbank] does not adequately show how an account of participation must begin with 
Christ and his church and how the church as Christ’s body embodies its participation in 
the world. How we understand the rest of creation’s participation in God will take its 
bearing from the particularity of the church’s own participation in God’s life as Christ’s 
body drawing the world into God’s life through its practices of participation.208   
Thus Owens critiques Milbank’s participation as too conceptual, not embodied physically or 
socially. He asks, rhetorically, “Is Milbank’s Jesus embodied and particular enough … or does it 
tend toward docetism?”209 Possibly suffering from the same biases as Barfield’s proposal of 
participation through “directional creation” in an aesthetic frame, Milbank’s participatory 
“universalized grace” is portrayed “as openness and receptivity to the poetic act of another prior 
to any christological specification.”210 Owens is leery of this participation that ignores 
distinctions between church and world by rooting its primary definition in creation, not Christ. 
He further quotes Milbank as saying that “humanity as poetic being can have no bounds set to 
his nature” except the “unimaginable” nature of the God in whose image humanity is created.211 
This focus on the ideal and the figure that is free from the constrictions of nature cannot help but 
undercut the directional social embodiment offered by any particular church and its tradition, 
which does set boundaries within which participatory poesis is truly bound. Quoting another 
similar critique, Owens writes,  
When Milbank engages the biblical text, he constantly translates the particular sense into 
a conceptual or speculative process. The Gospel stories are for him allegories of a 
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participatory metaphysics … a tendency to think theologically in terms of higher, 
purified, and unattained forms.212 
Thus, Jesus ends up more a metaphor than a human being, and His body, the church, similarly 
ends up dis-embodied in the historical world, leaving participation as an idea without a time, 
place, or social group in which to take on flesh.213  
Hans Boersma. Boersma also critiques some aspects of Radical Orthodoxy while 
agreeing fully with the need for a reintroduction to participation, specifically for Evangelical 
theology and practice. Following his scholarly book on the coordinates and possible 
appropriation of Catholic nouvelle théologie, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A 
Return to Mystery, he wrote Heavenly Participation as a parallel work directed at a more popular 
and Evangelical audience.214 Reading the signs of the times, he intends his work to help 
evangelicals navigate the crumbling of modernism and the temptations of postmodernism by 
giving them a ressourcement from premodernism, “look[ing] to the history of the church for 
resources to give theological direction to people in the twenty-first century.”215 In that, his 
project is parallel with my own and in line with the interpretive method of philosophy of 
communication.  
Boersma’s critiques of Radical Orthodoxy generally echo those of Owens, and Boersma 
similarly calls for a participatory path that is biblical and ecclesiological: 
A Christian ontology must be centered on Christ. … It dare not avoid the particularity of 
the visible church, and … it needs to take seriously the church’s engagement with divine 
revelation in Scripture. … There is no such thing as a universally accessible, neutral 
“ontology” separate from the very particular convictions of the Christian faith216 
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The focus on scripture is an important distinction to make with the participatory hermeneutics of 
Radical Orthodoxy, especially for a project directed towards Evangelicals, because while 
Evangelicals have common ground with the premodern church in its love of the scriptures, “one 
of the most significant differences between Radical Orthodoxy and premodern theology is the 
former’s lack of engagement with the biblical text.”217 Another helpful distinction Boersma 
develops at length is the difference between Radical Orthodoxy’s Augustine and a more 
“orthodox,” less postmodern Augustine. That is, just as Radical Orthodoxy deals with Jesus and 
the church as primarily metaphors, their Augustine is more a conceptual tool filtered through 
postmodern attitudes of skepticism and unlimited personal freedom from traditional ethical 
boundaries.218  
Boersma’s project addresses explicitly the aspect of Evangelical identity that privileges 
openness to truth from other sources219—a broad call to ecumenism around the gospel—and he 
sees the articulation of the nature of sacramentality—the relationship between heaven and 
earth—as foundational to any Christian theology that would successfully navigate the ravages of 
modernity/postmodernity in the current historical moment.220 He recognizes and critiques the 
current Evangelical trends of emphasizing this-worldly concerns and generally exuding overly 
positive attitudes towards philosophies of immanence. While acknowledging, with Augustine, 
that the goods of this life are real goods,221 he argues for the role of the theologian as one who 
serves as “a guide leading people to heavenly participation.”222 To repurpose the cliché, Boersma 
argues that the ecclesial practice of biblical and participatory theology should be used to lead 
people to be heavenly minded, and by the same token, to be of earthly good. That is, a 
participatory biblical hermeneutics is the path to the good of the whole person and community.  
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Matthew Levering. Levering brings us closest to a specific examination of how 
participation affects hermeneutics in an ecclesial context, though more in dialogue with N. T. 
Wright and former Cardinal Ratzinger than with Radical Orthodoxy. While certainly familiar 
with Augustine,223 Levering’s lens for participation is primarily Thomistic and set within the 
context of Roman Catholic ecclesiology. After telling a similar story of the philosophical 
sundering of participation in the Middle Ages, Levering presents a three-part argument: that a 
historical-critical exegesis based in linear history must be paired with a participatory exegesis 
based in eternity for “literal” exegesis to succeed; that “biblical exegesis” is “an ecclesial 
participation in God the Teacher”; and that ecclesial authority mediates and safeguards this 
process not through static exegetical rules or arbitrary official decisions but rather through the 
Church’s accretion of historical “wisdom-practices.”224 His analysis of the participatory 
interrelationship of linear and eternal-Christological history, and its implications for ecclesial 
biblical hermeneutics, is especially helpful for an Evangelical hermeneutics that has often been at 
a loss for how to understand history as both material and spiritual.225 In one summary statement, 
Levering says that 
the saints can see more deeply into even the “historical” dimension of Scripture, once 
“history” is properly understood, than can interpreters possessed solely of historical-
critical tools. Thus Christians need not reject patristic-medieval exegesis for “reading 
into” the biblical texts the realities known in faith by the later Church. On the contrary, it 
is just such participatory reading that apprehends the true nature of the history of God’s 
salvific engagement with human beings.226  
Showing his Augustinian influence, Levering rightly notes that instead of a modern focus on 
“biblical texts,” we should learn from the church fathers to look to the “divine teacher” in a 
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participatory attitude that unites “hermeneutical discipline” with “spiritual discipline.”227 The 
goal of interpreting the scriptures for Augustine, Levering says, was primarily “gaining a 
transformative participation in the divine Persons.”228 That is, participation through interpretation 
of scripture is not primarily about individual knowledge or utility, but a relational move toward 
God, with others, that results in the transformation of our character.229  
Where Boersma and Levering do not fully help us is in the practical shape of this type of 
participation in the church, though as a theological project of ressourcement, Boersma’s book 
would not necessarily be expected to produce a blueprint. Levering, to his credit, does more than 
just offer the historical Roman Catholic church as an ecclesial answer, noting that though 
ecclesial participatory hermeneutics requires a level of “obedient receptivity,”230 it must not be 
“consumerist” or “authoritarian,” and it must be “catholic” [speaking to Christians universally] 
and “ecumenically responsive to the divisions among Christians” for “their healing.”231 While 
conceding the value of these points, especially Levering’s critique of the endemic attitude of 
suspicion in Protestant hermeneutics,232 an Evangelical participatory hermeneutics would have to 
develop a different approach to ecclesial authority, one more in tune with its coalitional 
ecumenism and mission-orientation. Owens, more within the Evangelical camp, does offer some 
pictures of what ecclesial participation might look like, though not as fully attuned to the 
revolutionary possibilities of participation as might be possible. He prioritizes the role of the 
interpreter-preacher instead of asking how a participatory ecclesial approach to the scriptures 
might more fundamentally change the shape of the church, as hinted at in his introductory profile 
of early Methodist experience-meetings.233 This question of the ecclesial shape of a participatory 
biblical hermeneutic will have its own return in the last chapter, but before taking a more 
specifically Augustinian turn in participation, we need also to mention two key themes from 
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James K. A. Smith, another recent advocate, that should color an Evangelical appropriation of 
participation.  
James K. A. Smith. Smith, though a fellow-traveler with Radical Orthodoxy, maintains 
a broader scholarly identity by his championing of a Reformed emphasis on the Incarnation and 
by his forays into philosophy from a Pentecostal perspective. Like Owens and Boersma, Smith 
criticizes his colleagues in the Radical Orthodoxy movement for not taking the incarnation 
sufficiently seriously,234 a theme that will be more fully explored when Augustine’s incarnational 
participation is explained below. Interestingly, it is Smith’s Pentecostalism that does not make 
much of an appearance in his discussion of participation, though it is germane philosophically (to 
Smith235) and practically, as can be seen in Pentecostalism’s widespread and significant 
experiential contradiction to modernist ontology, as Boersma notes but does not pursue.236  
From a philosophy of communication perspective, participation is an important theme to 
develop and give language to in the current historical moment because it describes the 
experiences of so many people in the broader population, and especially in the Christian 
population.237 These experiences are, of course, given language according to local communities 
and individuals, or ad hoc according to specific situations, but a more careful exposition of the 
traditional and deeper language of participation would help unify such Christian experiences 
across cultural boundaries (e.g., the West and the Global South) and would help such 
experiences become visible and communicable within the broad scope of Evangelical 
ecumenism.  
Margaret Poloma’s and Matthew Lee’s data from the Godly Love National Survey is a 
case in point for how a significant communication phenomenon had gone undetected for lack of 
theoretical attention and language. While much study of prayer had just measured prayer 
 
 
101 
frequency, or, going the next step, had classified prayer as “devotional” (person speaking to 
God) or “mystical” (God giving person an incommunicable experience), Poloma and Lee found 
that Baesler’s concept of “dialogic prayer” was a powerful descriptor of many people’s 
experience. They define “prophetic prayer” as “a two-way interaction between God and the pray-
er in which the pray-er hears from God and responds to the divine initiative.”238 Following a 
1989 Gallup Poll in which more than half the respondents had “heard God direct them to do 
something very specific during prayer,” Poloma and Lee found the same basic data in 2009, with 
a strong correlation between people who engage in prophetic prayer and those who have 
experiences of God’s love and presence.239 That is, a significant percentage of Western-educated 
people are having participatory encounters with the spiritual realm through the medium of 
language, events leading to actions co-owned with the divine being. This is not only a startling 
bit of data but the examples reported in Poloma and Lee also highlight the dearth of language 
available to the subjects, even the professing Christians, as to how to understand and talk about 
their experience.  
This project in philosophy of communication finds value in both Smith’s “incarnational” 
participation and his less loud Pentecostal leanings, both the giving of the Son and the giving of 
the Spirit. As one of the most visible and voluble scholars in the Evangelical community, Smith 
is uniquely placed to influence the direction of Evangelical hermeneutics for good, if his version 
of Pentecostal participation can incorporate the sense of Godly love and presence reported by 
Poloma and Lee, or if he can incorporate the renewal of the doctrine of deification that has even 
made its way into the flagship journal of the Evangelical Theological Society.240 Such a deifying 
participatory hermeneutics would have to acknowledge in the contours of its theorizing the real 
experiences and practices of Christians in the scriptures. Interestingly, this hermeneutical 
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connection was not lost on Poloma and Lee, who offer their observations of the Christian 
experience on-the-ground by noting that “many Christians approach the Bible in prayer as a 
‘living word’ that speaks to their circumstances rather than a literal and fixed word that is the 
making of doctrine.”241  
David Vincent Meconi, S. J. Meconi also helps us start to understand participation as it 
is developed by Augustine, which is the endpoint to which this chapter has been driving. Of the 
several articles he has published on the subject, it is important to point out first his 2006 survey 
of recent studies of deification, a topic coextensive with participation.242 Noting the recent 
resurgence in attention to deification, including its explicit return in the Roman Catholic 
catechism, Meconi profiles and briefly reviews several recent academic works on deification, 
organizing his review through the categories of broad surveys, specialized studies, and works of 
theological application of deification. His article, covering both Latin and Greek fathers and 
historical and contemporary applications, illustrates that “both academy and ecclesia are 
reawakening to the richness of the doctrine of deification.”243 His description of the early church 
doctrine of deification helps demonstrate its relationship with participation, which is the more 
general term to deification’s specific doctrine and process:  
The early church saw discipleship not so much as a matter of fulfilling various ethical 
prescriptions but more as the faithful’s taking on properly divine attributes: a blissful 
immortality, a fiery love, an unquenchable joy. It happens whenever two persons in love 
spend time together: they slowly become like the other—perhaps even becoming in some 
ways indistinguishable.244 
This discipleship process of “spend[ing] time together” presupposes a participatory ontology that 
provides, metaphysically, the meeting places for divine and human. In an Evangelical register, 
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the primary meeting place for this participatory spending time with God has been the individual 
devotional time reading the scriptures, but largely divorced from official or communal scriptural 
interpretation.  
As Meconi’s survey shows, there were no studies of Augustinian or Catholic deification, 
so he wrote his own: The One Christ: St. Augustine’s Theology of Deification, published in 2013, 
and with Carl E. Olson, MTS, Called to be the Children of God: The Catholic Theology of 
Human Deification, published in 2016. More to the purposes of this project, though, are his two 
articles examining participation in Augustine, focusing especially on the shift in Augustine from 
a Platonic version of participation to a more thoroughly Christian one245 and on the place 
Augustine gives the Incarnation in this shift, as recorded in the Confessions.246  
Participation in Augustine 
The story of participation in Augustine’s thought can be summarized as a shift from the 
hubris of Plato’s upward contemplation to the humiliation of God’s downward movement, from 
the individual pursuit of recollected knowledge to the shared purification of the will through faith 
and love. What these coordinates of the radical shift from Platonic and Neoplatonic participation 
mean will be unpacked, with help from Meconi and others, from several of Augustine’s works. 
Much of the interior dynamics of Augustinian participation will be developed from a synthesis of 
his De Trinitate and his City of God since these two works overlap significantly in content, but 
differ in audience orientation and thus differ in how much Augustine develops different aspects 
of participation explicitly.247 This is an overview rather than an exhaustive analysis of 
participation in Augustine because the basic contours of Augustine’s participation are all that are 
needed to bring into focus how participation helps orient Augustine’s hermeneutic theory.248 
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That participation is a central concept in Augustine, though, is not a disputed issue, as Meconi 
points out, following Agostino Trapé: 
Participation is one of three principles “which enters into the essential nucleus of 
Augustine's philosophy.” Its role is so central ... that in order to understand creation, 
illumination and beatitude in Augustine one must view them as “three modes of 
expressing the one doctrine of participation.”249 
In general, Augustine’s Trinitarian participation not only grounds the possibility of knowing 
truth from scripture but also broadens the scope and purpose for such knowledge, at least to 
those whose wills are being purified through participation in the love of Christ.  
Early Augustinian Participation 
Participation enters Augustine’s polemic work as early as 388 with his De Moribus 
Manichaeorum, a work disputing with the Manichaean sect that had held him enthralled from 
373 to 382.250 Contrary to the Manichaean dualism of warring good and evil beings, Augustine 
asserts that evil is not a “substance” or a being but rather a “privation,” a lack introduced through 
disconnection from God, who is the source of all being and all goodness. The goodness of God is 
therefore self-subsisting, as his own being, while the goodness of creatures (to the degree they 
have it) is their participation in the goodness of God. This basic outline of the participation of 
creation in its Creator follows at first the basic theory of Plato, which Meconi explains from the 
Phaedo.251 God does not diminish or weaken himself through the participatory dependence of his 
creatures, while apart from that dependence the creatures weaken to the point of non-being. This 
participation, paradoxically, “simultaneously relates and makes distant creatures and Creator”252 
by emphasizing both their absolute difference in essential being and their irreducible 
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connectedness through shared being. Here, also, we see one part of Augustine’s basis for 
analogical reasoning from the goodness of existents to the vision of the goodness of God.   
Meeting the Manichaean rejoinder that a single Creator-being would then be the author of 
evil, Augustine introduces his understanding of the will as “not an efficient cause but a ‘deficient 
cause,’”253 an ability to turn away from and restrict participation in one’s ground of being. This 
emphasis on will, and the “love” which directs the attention of the will, is a key shared 
coordinate between participation and Augustinian hermeneutics, as we will see in the next 
chapter.  
As Meconi demonstrates from a close reading of participation in the Confessions, 
Augustine’s answer to the Manicheans was not a nice bit of apologetics but a proffering of the 
ladder he used in his own conversion, climbing out of Mani’s sect, through Platonism, to the 
radical participation of the Incarnation. In book VII, Augustine explains how, though the 
arguments of the Manicheans had been confounded in him by Nebridius, the problem of how to 
understand the evil in the world, even though it was created by an immutable perfect God, was 
still troubling Augustine: 
Up to this time, although I affirmed and firmly believed that you, our Lord, the true God, 
who made not only our souls but also our bodies, and not only our souls and bodies, but 
all men and all things, are inviolable and inalterable and in no way mutable, I still had no 
explicit and orderly knowledge of the cause of evil.254  
The three explicit uses of participation as a philosophical term in the Confessions appear in book 
VII as Augustine wrestles with this question.255  
In the first of these stages that he reports, Augustine had become convinced through the 
Neoplatonist books that the one God had an only-begotten, co-eternal Son who was the express 
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Wisdom of God, through whom humans ascend in Wisdom to the knowledge of God. However, 
this Neoplatonic Wisdom was not yet understood as the really incarnated Jesus of provincial 
Nazareth.256 “Unmistakably Platonic,” this faith in the cosmic Christ was conceptually similar to 
the vertical participation of creature in Creator that became his main weapon against the 
Manicheans.257 Even at this early point, this was not merely a handy polemic for argument’s 
sake, though Augustine was just beginning to understand the depths of Christian participation. 
“Participation is not a metaphor for Augustine, but expresses the real dependence of the creature 
on the Trinity itself,” as Patricia Wilson-Kastner argues in her article on the participatory ground 
of Augustine’s key metaphor of “grace.”258 As Augustine would demonstrate in Confessions, 
book VII, there was more to Christian participation than a Platonic ascent to goodness through 
the Wisdom of the spiritual Son.  
 Augustine confesses his equal and opposite Christological error in the third appearance 
of participation in Confessions book VII,259 in which he replaced the cosmic Christ idea with the 
hypothesis that Jesus was “just a man,” but was special because of his degree of participation in 
the Wisdom of God. In this error, “it is [Christ’s] participation in [God’s] absolute nature, not his 
[own] divinity, that sets Christ apart as the preferred guide or teacher.”260 While this was 
certainly not the error of the Manicheans, it was not yet the identity of the Christ that could 
ground Christian participation, no matter how inspiring the model.  
It is in Confessions VII.xviii.24 that, as Meconi says, “a significant change within 
Augustine’s theory of participation has taken place.”261 Here Augustine chronicles the shift in his 
thought where not only do creatures participate upward in the perfections of the Creator but the 
Creator also, for our necessity, not his own, participates “downward” in the imperfections of his 
creatures. Augustine writes that we “see the Godhead, weak because of its participation in our 
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‘coats of skin,’ and in their weariness they may cast themselves upon it, while it arises and lifts 
them up.”262 This is radically different from the participation of Platonism, as it makes our 
upward participation dependent on both the “downward participation” of Christ and our humility 
in receiving that gift.263 Thus, while the Platonists get close enough to look over into the 
promised land, they refuse the alien virtue of humility and the pattern of the humiliation of God 
that would take them over the Jordan.264 As Meconi says, “Downward participation thus saves 
prideful humanity from continuing in its own self-affirmation. The chasm opened by the pride of 
Adam is bridged by the humility of Christ. This is a chasm nowhere found in Neoplatonism.”265 
Thus, the Incarnation forms the foundation for Augustine’s new Christian understanding of 
participation, and as he progressed more and more in the submission of his philosophy to the 
scriptures—a process given steam by several intra-confessional controversies—the concept of 
participation became not less central but more central to his thought, along with becoming more 
scripturally grounded.266 
Shared Illumination and Deification 
Having seen this shift away from a Platonic ground, we can now examine the other 
coordinate of Augustinian participation, the interplay of the individual pursuit of recollected 
knowledge (illumination) and the shared purification of the will through faith and love 
(deification). That is, coming to know the truth and coming to become like the Truth are 
conjoined participatory processes that are social-linguistic, practiced through right obedience to 
the scriptures, and powered by an active faith that manifests partly in power and partly in 
eschatological hope. The rest of this chapter will be an attempt to explain these conjunctions of 
Augustine’s theological metaphors, especially as a preview of how these are pertinent to a 
scriptural hermeneutic that fits the current situation in Evangelicalism.  
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By “recollected knowledge,” of course, Plato’s participatory epistemology is being 
referenced. Knowledge of the forms, to Plato, was available in the mind through an arduous 
process of dialectical archaeology in the ground of one’s memory, a memory that the soul has 
from its pre-incarnate existence in the heavenly realms, as we have seen earlier in the chapter. 
Participation in the forms through their imperfect copies on earth, to Plato, helps purify the mind 
and recover knowledge of the forms of truth, a practice of contemplation that leads to epistemic 
knowledge. Augustine, thoroughly grounded in creation and a linear history, in which human 
eternal souls have a discrete beginning but no end,267 developed a different participatory theory 
of knowledge that, while it also emphasized the importance of memory, laid more stress on 
creation and on the moral orientation of the prospective knower. In what follows here, I restrict 
my discussion of participation to the themes of language and of knowledge of God, especially as 
they are relevant to scriptural hermeneutics. Augustine’s extensive discussions of the 
participation of the angels in Him and the participation at work in all the creation are mostly 
beyond the scope of the present project.268  
In a way that resonates with recent theological scriptural hermeneutics, Augustine argues 
that knowledge of the meaning of a whole is what gives meanings to its constitutive parts, but 
knowledge of the whole—the whole of a passage, of an event, of a historical moment, of the 
history of salvation—cannot be known comprehensively or at a glance.269 Instead, it is glimpsed 
in part and taken by faith in part.270 The largest of these wholes is God Himself, “in whom we 
live and move and have our being,” one of the key texts from the scriptures that grounds 
Augustine’s understanding of participation.271 As Martin Westerholm argues from Augustine’s 
De Trinitate, the pursuit of the knowledge of any creational good or truth, if done with a “good 
will,” can lead to a knowledge of God because, as Augustine says, “God is truth.”272 Westerholm 
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argues that Augustine’s doctrine of the memory of God is rooted in his belief in our fundamental 
and continual dependence on God, who created and sustains all goods, including our good mind. 
Westerholm summarizes this understanding of recollection as follows:  
It is foundational, for Augustine, that creation is upheld by God, and that its continued 
existence is a visible sign of God’s sustaining presence in all that is. In a similar way, in 
De Trinitate 4, Augustine writes that the mind retains some capacity for true thought 
because the light of truth “was not removed far from any one of us, for in it we live and 
move and are.” ... [I]t cannot leave a kind of memory of God behind, for its memory of 
him is its awareness of his presence even now as the source of all that it is and does.273   
That is, though it is clear that God is not contained in memory,274 our continual pursuit of a 
knowledge of God is activated through an inward turn to memory that corresponds to an outward 
turn to God. To Augustine, we were all created to remember God. As Westerholm points out 
from Augustine’s argument in De Trinitate, this knowledge of God by way of turning our 
attention to memory is not a direct knowledge of God, but a knowledge of God as mediated 
through the goods that are also impressed upon our memory.275 However, the knowledge of those 
goods in memory cannot be accessed objectively, as the modern imagination would have it, but 
is always subject to the ethical framework of our loves, which are ordered,276 well or poorly, into 
some whole.  
Thus, full participation in the knowledge of God that is implicitly available in the 
memory of all humans (through the participation of all created nature, including minds, in God) 
is derailed through idolatrous attention to the good objects of the world, attention without taking 
the “natural” step past the good objects of sense to the goods behind them, to the good God who 
is their remembered source. According to Westerholm, the overall structure of De Trinitate 
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oscillates around this key problem—how to use language which is rooted in sensible objects and 
in the abstractions of the philosophers to speak of the Trinitarian God without tempting the 
readers to attach their picture of God to the idols of these lower, good things.277 How do we use 
language to awaken the knowledge of God in our minds without growing overly attached to that 
language, as if the language itself was part of God instead of just a help on the ascent to that 
wisdom?   
We can hear, here, connections to Barfield’s discussion of linguistic representations as 
gateways joining the visible and invisible realms, and the resulting tension between animistic and 
Jewish traditions of thinking about the nature of such language, as either semi-divine and 
powerful or as a legitimate pointer to a God who is fundamentally holy, separate from the words 
that describe him. We also see foreshadowings of a critique of Evangelicalism’s modernistic 
approach to language. Augustine finds it worthwhile to labor throughout most of De Trinitate in 
order to find the right words for describing the Trinitarian God, but he also clearly frames his 
whole linguistic endeavor to push his readers to work past the language to the realities, 
approaching those realities through the memory of God already part of them, through the 
purification of the will, through the use of scriptural knowledge to reorder their loves aright. That 
is, in Augustine’s participatory approach to the scriptures and theology, close attention to the 
details of the language itself, while an important first step, is not sufficient as an endpoint or as a 
method for gaining Christian truth. Augustine describes the hermeneutic approach to the 
knowledge of God that is beset with disordered loves, and thus detrimental to both truth and the 
Church body, as follows:  
The soul, loving its own power, slides away from the whole which is common to all into 
the part which is its own private property. By following God’s directions and being 
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perfectly governed by his laws it could enjoy the whole universe of creation; but by the 
apostasy of pride which is called the beginning of sin it strives to grab something more 
than the whole and to govern it by its own laws; and because there is nothing more than 
the whole it is thrust back into anxiety over a part, and so by being greedy for more it gets 
less. … it finds delight in bodily shapes and movements [and] wraps itself in their images 
which it has fixed in the memory … to one or other of the following ends: curiosity, 
searching for bodily and temporal experience through the senses; swollen conceit, 
affecting to be above other souls which are given over to their senses; or carnal 
pleasure.278 
Moving away from the “whole” which gives meaning and is “common to all” is, by the same 
token, moving away from the God in whom the “whole” participates. In a prideful grab for 
private power and ownership, the would-be religious expert’s motives can no longer be humility 
or charity but rather “curiosity,”279 one-upmanship, and pleasures that have nothing to do with 
God. The endpoint of this process of falling away from the true knowledge of God “little by 
little” through novel, carnal, and individually-derived knowledge of God is that the would-be 
wise man “cannot even think of anything divine except as being such”—that is, as corresponding 
exactly with the representations of earthly things, whether of body or mind. Augustine warns that 
this moral slide, seeking “to be like God under nobody,” can reverse the progress attained by 
even the “half-way level” of the pagan philosophers, and he says that this approach is antithetical 
to the purpose of divine knowledge, which, following St. Paul, is the building up of the whole 
church through love instead of the prideful puffing up of individual expert interpreters.280  
However, Augustine does not merely warn about the dire consequences of withdrawing 
from participation through memory in God but he also explains the resources and structures in 
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place to renew our participation in God—participation both as a path and as the ultimate goal.281 
Famously, Augustine develops the concept of the “Inner Teacher,”282 but he also explains the 
social, creational, moral, and scriptural factors that give this participatory metaphor meaning. 
Augustine does speculate about the original participation in God that unfallen Adam and Eve 
enjoyed,283 but most of his attention is understandably pastoral: how do fallen humans rejoin the 
upward spiral of participation, and how do believing humans proceed on that upward spiral?  
The social, moral, and creational factors in participation are linked in important ways, not 
only from the beginning of the initial good creation but also in the new creation of the 
community of saints, the city of God. “God created man as one individual,” Augustine says, so 
that “the unity of human society and the bonds of human sympathy be more emphatically 
brought home to man … bound together not merely by likeness in nature but also by the feeling 
of kinship.”284 That is, in the most intimate physical and social-cultural ways, humans are created 
to participate in one another, and together, to participate in their common Creator. However, how 
this shared social participation in the knowledge of God works with Augustine’s focus on the 
inward turn of the individual bears investigation, especially in the light of the label given to 
Augustine as the father of Western individualism.285  
Augustine does portray the initial potential for knowledge of God in an individual 
register, a divine communion without the “medium of any material created thing” in which “God 
speaks … by the direct impact of the truth, to anyone who is capable of hearing with the mind 
instead of with the ears of the body,” an inner word to “the highest of man’s constituent 
elements,” present in him because by creation he is “made ‘in the image of God.’”286 That is, the 
true divine word, a communication of the eternal realm, is higher than any human language and 
thus beyond earthly linguistic sociality.287 This highest of human constitutive elements 
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Augustine says is to be pursued through contemplation of the Trinitarian “image of God” in our 
human selves,288 which leads to wisdom as it leads to gazing on God himself. But it is also to be 
sought through a lower trinity,289 the process of temporal thought in which, by the inward 
witness of “eternity, truth, and love,” we each individually pursue the knowledge of God through 
the goods inherent in the creation: 
Therefore let us run over all these things which he created in such wonderful stability, to 
collect the scattered traces of his being, more distinct in some places than in others. And 
let us gaze at his image in ourselves, and, “returning to ourselves,” like the younger son 
in the Gospel story, let us rise up and go back to him from whom we have departed in our 
sinning. There our existence will have no death, our knowledge no error, our love no 
obstacle.290 
This intensely individual pursuit of the knowledge of God, though, cannot be like that of the 
angels before God’s throne, but requires the corrective and comforting instruments of 
experiential trials,291 the witnesses of other humans, the discipline of the scriptures, and above all 
the mediation of Christ. We humans need these mediating factors to uphold and guide our 
individual capacities to participate in God because of both our fallenness and the difficulty of 
knowing eternity within temporality.  
Regarding our fallenness, Augustine points to the effect of sin, both ancestral and 
personal,292 on our ability to ascend to the knowledge of God by ourselves, which is the foolish 
fantasy of the Platonists. He says, 
[T]he mind of man … is itself weakened by long-standing faults which darken it … it is 
too weak even to endure that light. It must first be renewed and healed day after day so as 
to become capable of such felicity. And so the mind had to be trained and purified by 
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faith, [so] God the Son of God, who is himself the Truth, took manhood without 
abandoning his godhead, and thus established and founded this faith, so that man might 
have a path to man’s God through the man who was God.293 
To be restored to the participatory “path to man’s God,” we must see by “faith” in the mind’s eye 
the things that we have never seen actualized in sensible or conceptual realities of the earth, and 
for that, the mediatorship of a truly divine and truly human Christ is essential.  
Of all human witnesses to the truth, Christ is the one we most needed and need. However, 
he is not the only one. As we return to the knowledge of God through Christ, our individual 
glimpses of God through the inner witness of the goods of this world are true, Augustine says. 
These are individual glimpses of truth, not dependent “on the witness of others,” but these 
glimpses are fleeting, not directed to a clear end, and easy to misapply. Therefore, “we search for 
other witnesses or we have them already to hand.”294 That is, we need the earthly stability of the 
community of the saints, those who also seek to participate in the life of God, to give temporal 
shape to the memory, purpose, action, and (which follows) language of our knowledge of God.  
While our knowledge is gained individually, and no one really teaches the other, we share 
in this knowledge as common property by how we share it together in memory through language, 
how we act on it together, and, above all, how we undertake this sharing with charity towards 
one another. This shared witness, leading to charity, is Augustine’s main rationale for writing his 
treatise on Christian teaching, De Doctrina Christiana. Though Augustine maintains there also 
that true teaching happens through the inner word, he argues that “the human condition would be 
wretched indeed if God appeared unwilling to minister his word to human beings through human 
agency,” a ministry which produces both a truth common to all and “love, which ties people 
together in the bonds of unity.”295   
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This constructive side of Augustine’s warning against purely individualistic, non-
participatory knowledge can also be seen in De Trinitate, where he states that “what it comes to 
then is that if the soul consults its own interest or those of others of good will, it aims at 
obtaining those inner and higher things that are not possessed privately but in common by all 
who love them, possessed in a chaste embrace without any limitations or envy.”296 With the right 
shared goal, the right shared love, people of “good will” can share in a common inheritance of 
truth, even if, as he says later, “it goes wrong through ignorance of temporal matters.” That is, 
the community that seeks God charitably together will be blessed even if they get some of their 
“facts” wrong. “It is a great thing,” Augustine says, “to lead this life, which we are traveling 
along like a road on our return journey.”297 Because participation in God is primarily about 
manifesting his character, this expression of harmonious “unity in plurality” is a not only a 
human analog of the Trinitarian God’s real unity and real plurality but it also pleases God by 
copying the humble love of which he is the perfection.298  
So, while the primary moral duty of the individual is to “love the Lord thy God” through 
the creational potentiality of his/her memory of the good as a human made in the image of God, 
the secondary moral duty is to “love one’s neighbor” in a shared journey toward the truth, 
prioritizing unity through charity and common truth over the preeminence of select experts. 
Christ’s life, participating downward in the creational constraints of temporality and temptation, 
exemplified the first duty toward God the Father, and Christ’s death and continued ministry to 
the church through the baptism of the Holy Spirit exemplify the second duty,299 enabling and 
modeling the social and moral orientation of any Christian hermeneutics. As Christ’s life 
implies, and Augustine’s theory articulates in Raymond Canning’s meticulous reading, these two 
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moral duties are practically inseparable.300 An interpretive orientation that truly pursues the love 
of God will also, necessarily, pursue and guide the love of the neighbor, and vice versa.  
Augustine develops this vision of charitable participation through the metaphors of 
“knowledge” and “wisdom,” articulating each as a different “trinity.” The moral and creational 
“trinities” of the knowledge process and of the wisdom ascension through the created “image of 
God” within every person constitute what Augustine calls the “Inner Teacher.” The trinity of 
knowledge leads to “anything that breeds, feeds, defends, and strengthens the saving faith which 
leads to true happiness,” and the trinity of wisdom leads to the contemplation of the “greatest 
nature” (God), which makes it “capable of the greatest nature and can share [participate] in it,” 
even through the distortions of sin.301 Augustine summarizes this co-owned process, initiated and 
sustained by Christ as the Inner Teacher, as follows: 
Our knowledge therefore is Christ, and our wisdom is Christ. It is he who plants faith in 
us about temporal things, he who presents us with the truth about eternal things. Through 
him we go straight toward him, through knowledge toward wisdom, without ever turning 
aside from one and the same Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and 
knowledge.302  
Unlike the realm of Platonic forms, the image of God as the Inner Teacher is not just a passive 
ground of being but an active potential communicant with every person, the site of God’s 
downward participation through the grace of multiple reminders, multiple attempts to draw 
people’s attention to the God they already know in the hidden recesses of memory.  
This light of Christ, as the Truth, can introduce and verify inwardly the necessary 
temporal truths that arise from the sensible and sign data of the physical world, that arise through 
the testimony of others, and that arise especially through the scriptures.303 As Augustine is at 
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pains to clarify,304 the availability and validity of the divine Inner Teacher does not make world, 
language, scriptures, or historical fact irrelevant. Our faith, though not fully actualized into 
comprehensive knowledge of the eternal God, “has been given actual definite content in Christ, 
who rose in the flesh from the dead to die no more,”305 and our belief in and love of the true 
things that we do know enable us to believe for the further things that are still technically 
unknown to us, such as the unmediated vision of God.306   
Therefore, the Christian interpreter’s first duty is to pursue this inward revelation of the 
truth through persistent and strategic attention to the scriptures, in the social context of the 
leaders of the church and the rule of faith, and his second duty is to teach this received truth in a 
humble way, always pointing beyond his words to the truth that is available through the Inner 
Teacher residing in the memory of every human.307 The structural potential of this shared 
attention to the truth through the scriptures is that the individual faiths of the several believers 
can be practically united in “one soul” and “one faith.”308 Levering picks up this theme well for 
the application of participation to hermeneutics, arguing through one of his central metaphors of 
“God the Teacher” that the “literal sense” of scriptures as discerned through historical-critical 
scholarship is not rejected but rather expanded because the Inner Teacher teaches us “in faith 
[the] other realities operating in history.”309  
Though Augustine does appeal to the “memory” of his readers through the direct appeal 
to reason,310 the scriptures and other reminders given by the grace of God occupy a central place 
in his framework because of the different levels of amnesia humans suffer from through minds 
darkened by sin. Commenting again on the key text from Acts 17:27 that “in him we live and 
move and are,” Augustine says, 
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What, after all, is not in God, of whom it is divinely written, for from him and through 
him and in him are all things? So of course if all things are in him, what can things that 
live live in and things that move move in but in him in whom they are? And yet not all 
men are with him in the way meant … It is man’s great misfortune not to be with him 
without whom he cannot be.311 
He moves from this statement to a hypothetical situation in which someone comes up to a person 
who does not recognize him and says “you know me,” offering proof after proof. Though “you 
have forgotten him so completely that all that awareness has been totally rubbed out of your 
consciousness,” your rational cognizance of his proofs and his manifest trustworthiness induce 
you to have faith in his word, and as you continue your renewed relationship with him by faith, 
you progressively find in memory “what had not been totally erased by forgetfulness.”312 This 
progression from faith—which is divinely enabled by the trinity of knowledge as it is fed the 
witness of the scriptures—to the realities of God—which is enabled by the trinity of wisdom that 
is found to be always already within the created memory of the image of God—is necessary for 
participation in God because one cannot truly love what one does not know.313 That is, if God 
were only believed but not, in any part, known, then according to Augustine, he could not be 
loved. And if God is not loved, we can have no part in him.314 
Westerholm helps us understand this participatory relationship between knowledge, love, 
and faith. First, though all people through their very existence participate in God to some degree, 
“God cannot be known through his sustaining presence alone, for we must love God if the 
awareness of his presence in memory is to lead to knowledge of him.” Once we have knowledge 
of God from memory, this knowledge begets love, and our love turns our attention more to him, 
which begets more knowledge,315 and thus we are on the upward participatory spiral of 
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deification.316 How does one get on that spiral, though, when sin has scrubbed memory of God, 
weakened the will toward God, and vitiated our love for God? Westerholm explains from his 
study of De Trinitate: 
Sinful human beings stand outside of the circle formed by this happy reciprocity. It is in 
response to humanity’s exclusion from the knowledge and love of God that Augustine 
introduces faith into the discussion. He writes that the unknown may be loved provided 
that it is believed. Here faith comes to the fore as that which founds knowledge of God, 
for it brings an end to our exclusion from the reciprocity of love and knowledge of God 
by giving an object to our love. In enabling us to love God, and thus to come to know 
him, faith brings us into the circle of mutual intensification formed by the work of the 
Father and the Spirit.317   
Faith is a divine entryway from the temporal world of words and things to the eternal realm of 
eternal realities. The knowledge of faith enables the love which leads to inward knowledge of the 
truth. For beings that remain temporal throughout their sojourning, faith is also a continual 
necessity for participation until the eschaton, opening people to the higher participation in the 
divine realities embedded in our created memories, memories constantly strengthened by the 
reminding powers of the Christ-centric scriptures and Holy Spirit.318  
For Evangelical hermeneutics, the essential idea here is that Augustinian participation 
insists on two levels of real knowledge. The ultimate knowledge-target at which Augustine aims 
is the wisdom of the contemplation of God and the charity, from God, poured out in our hearts 
by the Holy Spirit,319 given as a divine concomitant of this real knowledge. The knowledge of 
temporal things, such as historical and linguistic data, is also important, but as a reminder and 
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help in the progression to the higher wisdom. This temporal knowledge is what we can use to say 
“You know this, but you do not know that you know it; I will remind you,” as Augustine says: 
Literature performs precisely this function, when it is about things that the reader 
discovers under the guidance of reason to be true, not simply believing the writer that 
they are true as when he reads history, but himself discovering with the writer that they 
are true, and discovering it either in himself or in truth itself guiding the mind. But 
anyone who is unable to see these things even when he is reminded of them and has his 
attention drawn to them, is suffering from great blindness of heart and … needs very 
special aid from God to be able to attain true wisdom.320 
Although Augustine’s reference to literature would include a broad range, including Cicero’s 
Hortensius and the books of the Platonists in his own experience, he clearly reserves a place 
apart for the scriptures,321 making them the focus of his Christianized rhetorical treatise and 
arguing in Confessions for the retraining of our minds through submission to the scriptures.   
Conclusion 
 Pursuing a philosophy of communication retrieval of the ontological concept of 
participation, this chapter has leaned on Barfield’s philosophical description to provide a basic 
understanding of the term, but I have asserted that the relevance of participation goes beyond the 
scope of Barfield’s vision of the “evolution of consciousness.” Though participation is a concept 
with a real history and a real evolution—as the survey of this chapter has demonstrated—the idea 
of the history of concepts to which this project subscribes is an Augustinian version of 
philosophy of communication. Articulated well by Levering in the realm of biblical exegesis, 
this philosophy of communication understands that the history of philosophical resources is both 
linear and cyclical-participatory, with the recurrence of certain ideas built into the “graced” 
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structures of the good world, which includes the graced structures of human being. Participation, 
I argue, is one of those concepts that eternally returns, under many names, because of the 
ontological structure of human being to receive and respond to the presence of its creator, and by 
analogy to receive and respond to communication from other particular human beings. Augustine 
helps give us some specific vocabularies with which to develop an understanding of 
hermeneutics, specifically in his trinity of temporal knowledge and his trinity of eternal wisdom 
administered by the mediating presence of the Inner Teacher, whose structural ubiquity is 
broadened and deepened in particular people through the eternal-historical mediating death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  
 Augustine’s emphasis on the possibilities of participation and its application for real 
human knowledge and joint action is all the more impressive when the difficulties of translation 
from eternity to temporality and the moral difficulties of bad wills and disordered loves are taken 
into consideration. Structurally and morally, there is a great gap between our earthly knowledge 
and the true heavenly knowledge. Available to all humans to bridge that gap through 
participation are the vestiges of the created “image of God” in all people, the “representations” of 
the real goods of the world intended to point to God, but because of the inherent moral failings of 
humankind, these structural rungs on the upward ladder were supplemented, according to the 
eternal plan, with the foundational mediatorship of Christ, the mediatorship of the Church as the 
socially constituted body of Christ on earth, and the perpetual recurrence of the words of God 
through the reading and proclamation of the scriptures within that church. It is through these 
scriptures, within this church, coextensive with this divine mediator that Augustinian 
participation works to connect the two levels of heaven and earth, eternity and temporality, for 
actionable and socially sharable glimpses of truth. The two levels are not collapsed together (the 
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fantasy of modernity) or completely disconnected (the thanatos-wish of postmodernity) or 
relocated purely within the individual (the basic assumption of popular Western individualism). 
How this Augustinian concept of ecclesial scriptural participation works in conjunction with 
Augustine’s more explicit hermeneutic theories and social theories will be the focus of the next 
chapters. 
By way of an ending picture, I would like to bring forward the metaphors used earlier for 
the shift in linguistic “representations,” which moved from participatory gateways that opened 
between the seen and unseen realms to presumed mirrors of the objective world that show no 
more and no less than what is. Augustine also uses the “mirror” metaphor in his own articulation 
of participation, but as a radically creational notion that corrects both the undifferentiated 
ecology of “original participation” and the subjectivism of modernistic epistemology that makes 
words and concepts the exact “mirror” of nature.322 Because the “image of God” is present in us, 
according to Augustine, we can get a glimpse of truth by looking within ourselves, but by 
“inference” and, as it were, by the angle at which we hold the mirror. Augustine warns that by 
not using the mirror of our selves also to look upward and behind us at the God whose image we 
are, we fall prey to a sinful subjectivism, fascinated with the self but unaware of its participation 
in the higher Self that is the creator of all. Looking at our individual selves only, without any 
higher Self for comparison, we are easily deluded and have no checks against the “whirlpool” of 
carnal desires or the social pulls of sin.323 However, as we gaze into the remedial scriptures, to 
see reflections of both what sort of people we are and what we should be,324 we are continually 
led to our need for participation in the grace of Christ, and as we gaze through that upturned and 
scriptural mirror at Christ himself, we are “with unveiled face, beholding as in a mirror the glory 
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of the Lord, … being transformed into the same image from glory to glory, just as by the Spirit 
of the Lord.”325 
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Chapter 3  
Augustine’s Participatory Hermeneutics in the Context of his Rhetorical Theory 
 
As Ronald C. Arnett argues, philosophy of communication is especially attuned to the 
communication problems and questions of populations and communities, not merely an 
interpretive process that deals in abstractions for the few.1 It seeks communicational 
philosophical concepts that give tongues and hands to broad communities of laypeople. As 
explained in Chapter 1, an Augustinian philosophy of communication attends to the manifold 
revelations of God (in scriptures, interior created self, and exterior philosophical resources) in 
order to discern conceptual resources divinely given for the historical moment and thus 
consistent with charity, the whole of the salvific narrative, and the potential for shared ecclesial 
action. Like secular philosophy of communication, Augustine’s draws from a broad humanistic 
array of resources and is directed at a praxis that protects and promotes the goods of a broad 
empirical community in the historical moment. In this way, as Michael Scanlon articulates, 
Augustine’s approach to rhetoric and hermeneutics “seems to anticipate our contemporary 
understanding that truth is disclosed within the nexus of the communicative praxis of discourse 
and action.”2  
Augustinian philosophy of communication is quite apt for renewing Evangelical 
hermeneutics, whose practice is radically populist, “spiritual,” and action-oriented despite its 
scholastic scaffolding.3 That is, as discussed in Chapter 1, Evangelicals maintain theoretically 
and socially a commitment to the “priesthood of every believer.” However, some Evangelicals 
have been calling attention to the need for a theory of hermeneutics more faithful to the 
interpretational experiences and practices of such an Evangelical “priesthood.” That is, there is a 
hermeneutic “crisis” both outside and inside the Evangelical fold. Timothy Gabrielson has 
recently profiled Evangelical responses to the movement’s growing awareness of the unbiblical 
 
 
133 
nature of modernist hermeneutics, and he notes that though “there is some precedent within 
conservative Protestantism for contemporizing hermeneutics,” it is still a “minority position” in 
the academy.4 At back of the academic discussions, though, is the persistent gravitational pull of 
the general Evangelical population, and “no one in the pews reads the canon” in a modernist 
objective way.5 Issuing a warning to Evangelical academics who ignore both the hermeneutic 
practice of its people and the hermeneutics embedded in the bible itself, Gabrielson says:  
Academic study is beneficial, but we who have had the privilege of it must not deprecate 
how the Spirit speaks to all Christians through his holy Word. There is sacredness to all 
thoughtful, earnest reading of Scripture. Only fools rush in where angels fear to tread.6 
He caps his 2015 review of the literature by saying that “we need a hermeneutic that emphasizes 
Scripture’s presence.”7 It is the contention of this chapter that Augustine’s charitable and 
participatory hermeneutics can provide the philosophy of communication resources to reconnect 
academic hermeneutics with devotional hermeneutics in a healthy scriptural praxis. This praxis 
can bring the presence of the Word back to the bible.  
After reviewing the progress of the argument from the first two chapters, this chapter will 
develop the basic coordinates of Augustine’s participatory hermeneutics. Plotting interpretation 
as a contingent participatory activity of both the vertical and horizontal axes, these coordinates 
include the nature of language—even scriptural language—as a pointer to truth and not its 
essence, the importance of caritas (charity/love) at every level of the hermeneutic event, and the 
essential mediating role of narrative “wholes”—especially ecclesial social bodies—in the 
interpretation of and action on scriptural “parts.” This last coordinate draws heavily on 
Augustine’s participatory triangulation of intersubjectivity—how shared interpretation with other 
humans is co-informed by our and their shared interpretations with God, the Word—as will be 
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explained below. After developing these positive coordinates, the two main obstacles to right 
interpretation that Augustine posits—implicit throughout the earlier discussion—will be 
foregrounded and explained.  
In Chapter 1, the crisis in Evangelical hermeneutics was framed as a misguided addition 
of modernistic epistemology to the ecumenical, gospel-centered, and scripture-centered 
Evangelical tradition.8 This addition, proposed as a defense of the gospel in a modernistic 
culture, became such an integral part of Evangelical identity that even when Evangelical 
traditions such as gospel-centered ecumenism and its engagement with the “world” were 
recovered from Fundamentalism, the modernistic biblical interpretation remained close to the 
core of the tradition’s identity. Evangelical hermeneutics was pushed into a crisis, however, 
when the literary and linguistic turns made their way from general hermeneutic disciplines into 
the general culture and into the world of biblical hermeneutics. The general cultural retreat of 
confidence in modernistic assumptions left modernist-leaning Evangelicals alienated from the 
culture and without a clear ground from which to communicate the scriptures that constitute the 
core of their identity.  
This external-facing crisis was accompanied by an internal crisis as generations of 
younger Evangelicals have not only drifted with Western society generally toward what Ricoeur 
calls “linguistic impoverishment”9 but often have also joined Evangelical subgroups that 
prioritize community and embodied action but leave out the traditional emphasis on the 
scriptures.10 That is, despite the success of Evangelical leaders in embedding statements on 
biblical inerrancy in the identity and mission statements of core institutions, the general 
population of the Evangelical movement has been atrophying in its biblical literacy, practical 
institutional focus, and framing attitude towards the scriptures. This is a crisis of practice and of 
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the Evangelical “social imaginary” that, I argue, calls for a renewed practical attention to the 
scriptures through a renewed hermeneutical frame, which I argue should be pursued through an 
Augustinian philosophy of communication.  
In Chapter 2, I developed the premodern philosophical resource of “participation,” 
arguing that a renewed Evangelical hermeneutical frame needs a return to this communication 
resource of the longer and broader Christian tradition. I traced the roots of the philosophy that 
undergirds modernistic hermeneutics to the move away from participation and toward 
“univocity” that began with Duns Scotus in the middle ages, became embedded in Western 
culture through the social and technological events of that historical moment, and pursued its 
entelechia to and through the period of high modernism (1940s-early 1960s), despite the 
significant reactionary movement of Romanticism.11  
In its specifically Christian scriptural aspect, participation entails the connection of 
heaven and earth through the communicational medium of scriptural language, in which 
language and the divine being are not consubstantial but, by the hearing of faith, coextensive in 
action. That is, the Word spoken by God in the realm of eternity is incarnated, again and again, 
into scriptural words that are faithfully read by a believing community in the plane of 
temporality, moving from eternal Word to scriptural narrative to the further incarnation in an 
obedient community. This effective connection of God’s eternal action with human temporal 
action was grounded, in the Christian tradition, in the Incarnation, who is the Word of God 
speaking the words of God, the action of God performing the actions of God, both eternal God 
and temporal man. While establishing that participation was the ontological metaphor that 
undergirded the theology and practice of both extant branches of the Christian church (Catholic 
and Orthodox) until the high middle ages, Chapter 2 also developed Augustine’s Trinitarian 
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theology of participation in particular. It is Augustine’s version of participation that will be used 
as the ontological ground by which to read his hermeneutical theory in this chapter. Indeed, I 
would argue that Augustinian hermeneutics would not make sense apart from its participatory 
ground.  
Providing a renewed frame for Evangelical hermeneutics demands, foundationally, these 
hermeneutic resources from within the Christian tradition, a corrective philosophy of 
communication that represents the “wisdom of God” rather than the “wisdom of the world.”12 
However, a renewed hermeneutical frame must also speak in the language and to the questions of 
the historical moment, the task of philosophy of communication. In this historical moment, a 
renewed hermeneutical frame must speak to the complex cross-section of modern and 
postmodern hermeneutical questions that talk past one another in the Evangelical public sphere. I 
use “Evangelical public sphere” in a similar sense as Gerard Hauser’s “reticulated public 
sphere,”13 but with a slight difference. While a secular reticulated public sphere may naturally 
buzz dialogically with different goals, value narratives, and conceptual languages—operating 
through a plethora of social institutions—the Evangelical public sphere should theoretically be 
more grounded in a type of social institution (the church), a shared overarching value narrative, 
and a largely shared conceptual language through the scriptures. Dialogue, shared concepts, 
conflict, and mutual correction are also part of the Evangelical public sphere, but from a shared 
ground. Currently, this is not what we find in the Evangelical public sphere. Rather, there is wide 
disparity in the level of shared scriptural language, too little use of the ecclesial institution for 
dialogic formation in those scriptures, and competing visions of the appropriate value 
narrative—with competing visions coming both from modernistic, “conservative” narratives and 
from “postmodern” narratives informed to various degrees by secular philosophical currents.  
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 Therefore, a philosophy of communication perspective would direct a conceptual 
recovery from Augustine to interact also in good faith with the philosophical languages in which 
current hermeneutics questions and problems are being articulated in the Evangelical public 
sphere. In its mediation between the commitments of the Evangelical tradition, on the one hand, 
and current legitimate philosophical questions from philosophical hermeneutics, on the other, my 
project is a hermeneutically focused answer to the call of Evangelical historian Mark Noll for 
just such an engagement with hermeneutic philosophy in this historical moment.14 Because these 
questions are manifested in not only language in the abstract but also language in real 
interpreting communities, a renewed hermeneutics for the Evangelical movement must also 
provide more than an abstract explanation of how eternal truth can be manifested in temporality 
through scripture. It must supply both a philosophical and a practical frame to guide interpreters 
in how to live in submission to the scriptures, open to correction from God through them. This 
would constitute a faithful frame of praxis in which we read the scriptures and the scriptures, 
though our obedient shared action to them, read us. It must show a way that its motivational 
resources and practices can create and infuse real communities and reverse the atrophy of 
Evangelical scriptural identity.  
These are the needs that an Augustinian hermeneutics can meet, I argue, if its philosophy 
of communication resources are clearly applied to Evangelical hermeneutical problems in a 
participatory frame. This chapter will focus on explicating Augustine’s participatory 
hermeneutics. The next chapter will attempt to put Augustine’s participatory hermeneutics into 
modern philosophical context, and the last chapter will translate it into the modern institutional 
context of the Evangelical public sphere.   
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Augustine: Participating in the Truth 
To meet the needs of the Evangelical community for a renewed Augustinian hermeneutic, 
we need to talk about truth—or as Evangelicals like to call it, “Truth with a capital T.” Rightly 
wary of the pressures of a pluralistic culture toward a relativistic hermeneutics, modernist-
leaning Evangelicals advocate for not only a stable ground of absolute Truth but also predictable, 
controllable, and universal access to that Truth through the sciences of language, history, and 
institutional organization and communication.  
 The relationship between Augustine’s conception of truth and scriptural hermeneutics is 
more nuanced than that of Evangelical modernists. In its broadest summary, Augustine could be 
said to argue for absolute truth as well, but more limited and contingent access to that truth by 
human actors. In participatory terms, truth is not the object of our study, under our control, but is 
a divine reality in which we participate with God, requiring both our action in faithful 
interpretation and God’s action in faithful illumination.   
As befits this complex reality, Augustine’s conjoined rhetoric and hermeneutics is multi-
faceted and demands that we do interpretive labor in several of his texts. To understand 
Augustine’s complex revision of Ciceronian rhetoric, we must, as James Farrell says, read at 
least De Doctrina Christiana and Confessions together.15 Together, these two works explain and 
model the praxis of Augustine’s scriptural rhetoric and hermeneutics, demonstrating the 
discovery of scriptural truth not merely through language but also through creational knowledge, 
caritas, action, and the grace of the Interior Teacher. Augustine also covers some of the same 
ground in its historical depth in City of God, and he applies and discusses his hermeneutical 
theory in his sermons, which brings those texts to bear on the question of his hermeneutic 
philosophy of communication as well.  
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Augustine shifts the coordinates of Ciceronian classical rhetoric in many ways, not least 
in its relationship to truth, truth which Augustine identifies with wisdom in De Trinitate.16 
Labeled as both a Ciceronian and Platonist, Augustine transforms his inheritance from both.17 
The wisdom to which Augustine points his readers is different from the wisdom of both Cicero’s 
ideal orator and Plato’s ideal philosopher, and thus the eloquence paired with wisdom is also 
transformed. It follows that the interpretation of that eloquence, especially when it is found in the 
scriptures, is transformed as well.  
In the Ciceronian tradition, “plausibility” is the goal of invention, a standard of truth 
which supports the instrumental goal of that strand of rhetoric.18 That is, the rhetor stands over 
both his material and his audience, manipulating both expertly so as to persuade the audience. 
While the ideal orator would have in mind the good of the polis, that end goal still would allow 
him to play fast and loose with his means, even lying if necessary.19 In this political ethics, the 
rhetor might be checked by other combatants in the public arena, but he would not check himself 
by submitting to the truth of the artifacts he was working with. Victory, not “confession,” would 
be the metaphor a Ciceronian rhetor would want associated with himself.20 Contemplative truth 
was also important in Cicero’s writings, but this truth lived in a different, more private world and 
was disconnected from the public sphere of rhetorical action.21 Augustine, pursuing public truth, 
“moves towards a self that is no longer dominated by a need to dominate” and away from the 
Ciceronian victory-centered rhetor.22 He targets transformation of himself and his hearers 
through shared submission to the truth through the rhetorical artifact of the scriptures.23   
Though Augustine is often labeled a Platonist also, he parts company with Plato’s ideal 
of truth as well, as developed partly in Chapter 2 concerning their radically different conceptions 
of memory’s connection to knowledge and wisdom. Though Plato also sought after eternal, 
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unchanging truth, his vision of our participation in that truth was elitist, graceless, and 
rhetorically manipulative. Because the onus for moving toward truth was on each individual, 
with no help or grace from the eternal realm itself, the few lovers of wisdom who made gains in 
wisdom could see themselves as an elite, morally and intellectually worthy enough to rule over 
the still-blind masses through rhetorically structured deceptions and obscuring myths, the 
structure of government Plato recommends in The Republic.24 Ernest Fortin points out the two 
faces of Platonic philosophy, neither one acceptable to Augustine’s picture of truth. On the one 
hand, the Platonic philosopher (a “lover of wisdom,” not a possessor of it) “suspend[s] his 
judgment” about the truth, leading to “an endless and hence unfulfilled quest.” This, to 
Augustine, is a “heartless doctrine.”25 However, the other face of Platonic wisdom is elitist pride: 
Socrates’s “would-be ignorance is merely the obverse of a deep-seated pride which causes him to 
place himself above the rest of society.”26 Though technically available to all through 
contemplation, Plato’s eternal truth was, de facto, not available for common ownership, not 
communicable, and alien to Christian interpersonal caritas.  
Augustine did not merely inhabit some kind of philosophical mean between the epistemic 
relativism of Ciceronian rhetoric and the elitism (and relativism) of Platonic philosophy, though 
he had spent time in both camps in his pre-Christian life. Instead, Augustine’s understanding of 
the truth was transformed by his experience with the Word, and he in turn transformed both 
rhetoric and philosophy by rebuilding them on that more solid foundation of the Incarnation and 
the scriptures.27  
Augustine pairs the inward witness of Christian contemplation of truth with the shared 
social witness of truth through the scriptures, making scriptural hermeneutics central to both 
individually and socially established truth. As we have seen in Chapter 2, in Augustine’s 
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philosophy of communication, Platonic dialectic becomes an individual inner dialogue with the 
Inner Teacher who operates through our creational memory of God, but this inner ground of truth 
is held together throughout the stretching experience of time by the shared witness of others.28 
Wisdom comes to the one, but in dealing with the strains of temporality, two are stronger than 
one and a three-fold cord is not easily broken.29 These individually and socially manifested 
dialogues undergird whatever knowledge we have of the created world, visible or invisible, all of 
which can lead to wisdom, the true knowledge of God. But the central site of knowledge that 
leads to wisdom is the narrative of salvation, grounded in Christ, amplified and developed by the 
scriptures.30  
The scriptures are the pinnacle of this shared witness, flexible but stable and true through 
time, “the words of men sent by God, the creator of all minds.” These scriptures are “poured 
from the divine mind with both wisdom and eloquence,”31 and the transformed goal of the 
Christian rhetor is to interpret these scriptures charitably, make their meaning clear, persuade the 
listeners this knowledge is true, and move them to action. Action, as the end of scriptural 
hermeneutics, might sometimes be moral and embodied practice, but it would always also be the 
worshipful enjoyment of God,32 which is the turn inward and upward to wisdom. In this way, 
Augustine’s rhetoric is centered on discovery of the truth, and that truth in the public sphere of 
the church is discovered and proclaimed from the scriptures. “The wisdom of what a person 
says,” Augustine tells us, “is in direct proportion to his progress in learning the holy scriptures … 
[this wise person is] the person who not only quotes scripture when he chooses but also 
understands it as he should.”33 Augustine’s centering of truth on the narrative of salvation as 
jointly discovered and shared through the scriptures meets the philosophy of communication 
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need of the Evangelical community for a renewed hermeneutical frame that joins salvation, the 
scriptures, and a confidence in the truth.  
However, Augustine’s understanding of truth is also more complex than the current 
Evangelical standard, and thus his scriptural hermeneutics, especially in its participatory frame, 
is more complex. If Evangelicals are willing to be taught by Augustine’s “pastoral” 
hermeneutical perspective,34 they will be both comforted and challenged, both confirmed and 
changed. Evangelicals will be confirmed in the importance that Augustine gives to language, but 
challenged by Augustine’s denial of a simple, perspicuous correspondence of language to truth. 
They will be confirmed by Augustine’s affirmation of history and the factual knowledge of the 
world, but possibly scandalized by his readiness to recognize multiple true spiritual 
interpretations alongside the literal, historical one. They will be confirmed by Augustine’s use of 
hermeneutics to defend the faith from heresies, but mystified by his overarching hermeneutical 
principle of charity, through which he subsumes any single propositional meaning of scripture 
under the larger narrative context of salvation, deification, and charitable community. Finally, 
they will understand Augustine’s call to communal identity and action on the basis of truth, but 
be less sure about the hermeneutics of understanding that scriptural truth through obedient action 
within a communal narrative. In general, Augustine’s famous dictum “I believe so that I may 
understand”35 has often been a stumbling block to Evangelical hermeneutics, but one that points 
towards a needed change of mind.  
Language and Truth 
The relationship of language to meaning is a core question for communication. When that 
meaning is the revelation of God in scripture, with our understanding of God and salvation in the 
balance—the relationship of scriptural language to that divine “truth” takes on even more 
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importance. For this reason, it is no wonder that Evangelical defenders of modernist 
hermeneutical principles speak in such strident accents. To quote McQuilkin and Mullan again 
by way of a representative example of a modernistic Evangelical position: 
To deny the possibility of words corresponding to reality is ultimately an attack on the 
nature and activity of God. … the correspondence between words (language meaning) 
and reality is essential to the nature of God and of human beings made in his image. This 
connection between revelation in understandable words and the nature of God and of 
humankind is a major theme.36 
As shown in Chapter 1, these sincere Evangelical scholars were not able to maintain consistently 
their position in this paragraph, falling back instead to a position that brings Kantian concepts to 
mind: scriptural words correspond exactly to the truth of the noumenal realm, but our fallibility 
as interpreters limits the actual meanings we obtain to the phenomenal realm. As one of the 
fathers of modern philosophy of communication, Kant’s conceptual work to save the 
appearances of absolute truth by moving it outside the phenomenal realm is not an unexpected 
ingredient in modernistic Evangelical hermeneutics.37 However, for all practical purposes, this 
move still separates language from shared meaning, leaving the concept of stable revelatory truth 
emptied of content.  
In a participatory frame, however, the two realms are not merely conceptual but are a real 
eternal realm and a real earthly realm, and language can function as a real meeting place between 
the two, where not only do “understandable” words communicate conceptual meaning about “the 
nature of God … and of humankind” but they also communicate the mind and presence of God 
himself. That is, a participatory hermeneutic is not limited to knowing about God as an object of 
study but is, rather, focused on knowing God through intersubjective communion and action. 
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This is the scriptural figure exemplified by Christ, who said to others only what He heard from 
God.38 Also, moving from Christ’s figural example to his promise and commission, the 
community of those who would follow Christ were promised “the mind of Christ” and 
commanded “if anyone speaks, let him speak as the oracles of God.”39 Speaking about the 
scriptural stories of Jesus raising people from the dead, Augustine explicitly discusses how we 
should participate in both the materiality and the meaning of these stories, how to understand the 
eternal Word and the temporal word together:  
It is not without point that three [resurrections] were recorded [of the many that 
happened]. Our Lord Jesus Christ, you see, wanted the things he did materially to be also 
understood spiritually. I mean, he wasn’t just performing miracles for the sake of 
miracles; he did them so that what he did should be marvelous to those who saw them, 
true to those who understood them.  
Those who saw Christ’s miracles, and didn’t understand what they meant … were 
only astonished that such things could happen. But others were both astonished at the 
things that happened and enriched by understanding what they meant. That’s the group 
we should belong to in the school of Christ.40  
Augustine compares the uncomprehending interpreters to those who appreciate the workmanship 
of “a beautifully written codex” but who cannot read the words. This hermeneutical preamble 
Augustine gives before he preaches the main text seems intended to “persuade” his hearers that 
preaching the resurrection narratives figuratively (not just factually) is not just permitted but 
meets the purpose of participating spiritually in God through understanding the scriptures.41  
The concept of joining together the eternal mind of Christ with the temporal mind of the 
participating human through specific instantiations of language—in time, space, and history—
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does two things for scriptural hermeneutics. First, it provides a solid connection between the 
eternal realm of truth and our temporal understanding, producing confidence enough to ground 
faith and action. This is good news for Evangelicalism. Second, though, it moves the 
“correspondence between words … and reality” from the historical-linguistic frame to a realm of 
spiritual discernment. In Paul’s distinction, the scriptures are “spiritually discerned” and thus 
only available to the wisdom of worldly scholarship in a veiled way.42 This is an apostolic 
hermeneutic practice that Paul himself followed, causing no little discomfort to modernist 
Evangelical hermeneutics scholars.43    
It is, of course, Augustine’s specific version of participatory scriptural hermeneutics—
and specifically how he sees language mediating the eternal and temporal realms—that we seek 
to understand here. Augustine is an especially appropriate conversation partner for Evangelical 
moderns and postmoderns because his theory of language is not only Christian but has also been 
recognized as a philosophy of communication ahead of its time, anticipating and going beyond 
modern linguistics.44 According to R. A. Markus, Augustine was one of the first to make 
signification the core of a theory of language45 and the first to envision signification as a triadic 
process, in which a sign “stands for something to somebody.”46 That is, before Augustine, no one 
had made it a point to identify words as signs (and therefore language as a series of signs). 
Before Augustine, Stoic and Epicurean philosophers generally saw signs as only dyadic 
connections of sign and signified, whereas Augustine noted the third element, the “subject to 
whom the sign stands for the object signified.”47  
To move through this triadic semiotic system to understanding, however, requires the 
work of another triadic process, an overlapping one of learning/interpreting:  “from realities and 
verbal prompts, through personal recollection and reminders, to internal dialogue with Wisdom 
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[the Interior Teacher] that confirms personal knowledge.”48 Synthesizing these two triads, we 
move from the sign (“realities and verbal prompts”) through the subject (the “personal 
recollection and reminders” [i.e., memoria] in “dialogue with Wisdom”) to “personal 
knowledge” of the real object signified. These triads produce knowledge, which then can be used 
in a further triad of contemplation to gain the end of wisdom,49 the enjoyment of God himself, 
which then (in temporality) returns to language in the form of worship. Language, as a 
phenomenon of temporality, does not “correspond” to eternal reality in an airtight structural way, 
but it does direct us to that eternal reality through individual and then shared interaction with the 
indwelling Inner Teacher.  
 Thus, Augustine grounds the hope for true human knowledge and wisdom in 
participatory dialogue with the Interior Teacher who enables, at a foundational level, the 
connection between language and “brute givenness.” Markus makes this point in the following 
memorable language: 
Human teachers, on the one hand, can only teach us the meanings of words and signs, 
and experience, on the other hand, only furnishes us with brute givenness. Only the 
Interior Teacher, which is Christ dwelling in the mind, can teach by at once displaying to 
the mind the reality to be known and providing the language for its understanding. . . . 
This is the teacher whose activity is presupposed by all learning.50 
This Christo-centric semiotic theory anticipates and goes beyond modern hermeneutic theories,51 
transposing them, one might say, into the key of participation. On the one hand, Augustine 
shows that there is no natural, given, or unmistakable connection between sign and signifier, 
between words and raw experience.52 Although “nothing,” Augustine says, “can be learnt 
without the use of signs,”53 the use of signs by teachers does not, by itself, create learning. Thus 
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“rhetors do not persuade . . . [and] teachers do not teach.”54 The modernistic Evangelical desire 
for control over the teaching and interpretation process through an exact science of language is 
stymied, but communication can continue in the framework of participatory humility.55  
Even more seemingly tenuous in its communicability than verbal interpersonal 
communication, the scriptures also come under this framework because of their spiritual, 
temporal, cultural, and linguistic distance. Though the scriptures are not the only way to the 
wisdom of God, they are the language God has given to the church, the “signs” by which God 
intends his people to learn. “All scripture is given by inspiration of God,” Paul says, “and is 
profitable for doctrine, for rebuke, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness, that the 
[person] of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped for every good work.”56 “May your 
Scriptures be my chaste delights!” Augustine prays,57 identifying them as the most important of 
the ways we follow Christ as the Way. Christ, the Word, is He “in whom are hid all the treasures 
of wisdom and knowledge,” Augustine says, while “these same treasures I seek in your books.”58  
However, per Augustine, the scriptures cannot in their mere linguisticality teach anyone 
anything. The text of the scriptures is interpreted through not one, but two subjects, with 
meaning emerging from the dialogue between them. Recall Augustine’s introduction of the third 
element in the first triad, the “subject to whom the sign stands for the object signified.”59 Further, 
Augustine identifies Interior Teacher as the essential third element of the second triad. Both the 
human subject and his/her relationship to the Interior Teacher necessarily empower or constrain 
the interpretive process. “Not for nothing have you willed that these dark secrets be written on so 
many pages” of the scriptures, Augustine says to God, simultaneously affirming their 
accessibility and the need for the grace of participation to understand them: “Lord, perfect me, 
and open those pages to me. Behold, your voice is my joy.”60 What this entails is that the 
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language of the scriptures is only connected to true knowledge and true wisdom when the 
subjects interpreting it are allowing their “subjective” reception of scriptural words to be inspired 
and constrained by the creational and spiritual presence of God within them. In a word, scriptural 
interpretation has to be enacted according to a participatory frame that, in human-divine 
dialogue, structures the array of linguistic and historical interpretive choices that lead to a 
charitable meaning.  
Augustine gives this theory in its basic outlines in De Magistro.61 Ironically, though, one 
of Augustine’s more clear descriptions of this participatory interpretive process involves 
intersubjective communion with evil spirits. Markus has pointed out that one of the understudied 
aspects of Augustine’s semiotics is what Augustine says about communication with demons, and 
one of the key observations Markus makes is the importance of attention in human-spirit 
interaction.62 In City of God VIII.24, Augustine describes the connection between worship 
(which I am connecting with “attention”), fellowship, and shared meaning, saying, “[B]y 
worshipping [pagan gods] he was drawn into fellowship with them, and I do not mean fellowship 
with senseless idols, but with crafty demons.” By people giving attention to demonic signs, 
Augustine says, the path is open for demons to cooperate in bringing more of those expected 
signs about, establishing a reinforcing cycle of communication and fellowship around some 
ungodly common ground, around some linguistic signs as participatory mediums.  
The relationship between attention and meaning is, of course, a major theme also in 
Augustine’s description of his relationship with God throughout the Confessions. For example, 
when he feels himself under the gaze of God, Augustine famously tries to stop paying attention 
to himself, putting himself “behind my own back, where I had placed myself because I did not 
wish to look upon myself,” but is forced to pay attention to himself under the watchful attention 
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of God.63 That is, God exerted himself as Truth on Augustine by making Augustine look 
honestly at himself and understand his own inner world. After conversion and after being freed 
of his teaching position, Augustine turned his attention fully to God through the given 
participatory medium of the scriptures, and the result was a “sweet” time of intersubjective 
interpretation with God, when “by … inward goads you mastered me, and how you leveled me 
down by making low the mountains and the hills of my thoughts…”64 First the language of 
Ambrose, then the language of a spiritual biography, then the language of the scriptures directed 
Augustine’s attention to God, whose presence was thereby actualized inwardly through the 
creational potential of the image of God. This interpretive communion with God was initiated by 
the language of others, and it progressed to his interpretive communion with others. As 
Augustine preaches, the goal and possibility of this interpretive communion in the church is “one 
soul and one heart in God,” symbolized by the bread and the wine of the Eucharist. The 
Eucharist was not a sacrament of individual salvation, but a picture of the body, a “sacrament of 
unity, … bread … not made from one grain but from many.”65 
 There are constraints inherent to the interpreting subject and its interpretive communion 
with both God and others, which will be developed later in this chapter; however, a brief 
explanation of some of the factors of this inner dialogue at work in the interpretation of scripture 
as a participatory medium would be appropriate here. The Interior Teacher, ever-present in all 
people regardless of religion, interacts with each person as a “dialogue” partner,66 relative to the 
“belief and will” of the person.67 That is, from scriptural language, a specific meaning can be 
validly impressed upon the interpreter by the Interior Teacher, but that interpreter can either 
accept that offered connection or reject and ignore it because of perverseness in belief or will. 
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Among many other places Augustine explains this dynamic, he deals with it in several passages 
in the Confessions: 
Thus in the gospel he speaks through the flesh, and this word sounded outwardly in the 
ears of men, so that it might be believed, and sought inwardly, and found in the eternal 
Truth where the sole good Master teaches all his disciples. There, O Lord, I hear your 
voice speaking to me, since he who teaches us speaks to us. But a man who does not 
teach us, even though he speaks, does not speak to us. Who teaches us now, unless it be 
stable Truth? Even when we are admonished by a changeable creature, we are led to 
stable Truth, where we truly learn “while we stand and hear him” and “rejoice with joy 
because of the bridegroom’s voice” restoring us to him from whom we are.68 
This truth of the gospel proclaimed through “changeable creature[s]” draws up in memory, 
through the voice of “stable Truth,” the eternal Truth. As we saw in De Trinitate, all true things 
are in memory by creation, but not all things are thereby (immediately or always) remembered. 
Those whose loves are focused inordinately on other things are, by that pull, turned away from 
remembering the truth.  
Why are they unhappy? It is because they are more strongly taken up with other things, 
which have more power to make them wretched, than has that which they remember so 
faintly to make them happy. … Because they do not wish to be deceived but wish to 
deceive, they love it when it shows itself to them, and they hate it when it shows them to 
themselves.69 
To the degree that our loves are “taken up with other things,” our will and belief turn our 
attention away from the voice of the Inner Teacher and what could be known from our deep 
memory. When that truth does “show itself to them” so that they are not “deceived,” they have 
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no complaints until the truth shows itself not as a controlled objective perspective on the world 
but rather a personal confrontation in which the Inner Teacher “shows them to themselves.” This, 
of course, is the same metaphor Augustine used to describe how he was exposed before his 
conversion by Ponticianus’s conversation about St. Anthony, the Egyptian monk, as mentioned 
earlier.70 Here, also, we see Augustine’s emphasis on true participatory interpretation going 
beyond objective knowledge to transformation. We read the scriptures so that the scriptures, 
through the Inner Teacher, can read us.  
What we learn, or remember, in dialogue with the Inner Teacher, then, we can either 
store in individual and communal memory by confessing it—turning it back into external 
signs—or allow it to slip away from conscious memory down the always flowing stream of time. 
As is well-known, Augustine does not offer a cheery picture of the purity of humans’ belief and 
will. Therefore, the true learning and true communication that could take place in reading the 
scriptures in dialogue with the Inner Teacher is often instead mistaken, misunderstood, 
perverted, or simply forgotten. Augustine warns that even Christians who do not listen to the 
Interior Teacher have “mind[s] whose insight is weakened by [their] habit of living in the 
shadows cast by the flesh.”71 Augustine acknowledged about even himself that though he knew 
“partly” what he was at that time, “what I may be tomorrow I don’t know.”72 According to this 
reasoning, most people most of the time demonstrate the brokenness of the semiotic system, a 
conclusion that resonates with many postmodern philosophers but provokes strong reactions 
from many Evangelical scholars.73  
 However, Augustine’s insistence on the presence of this Interior Teacher in all people not 
as just a creational potentiality but also as an active and personal communicative agent74 can 
undercut any philosophy of communication that dismisses communication and meaning as 
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theoretical impossibilities or improbabilities. That is, wherever people turn to the voice of the 
Interior Teacher in a semiotic event and, in dialog with Him, submit to His connection of sign 
and signified, they thereby achieve by general grace a unit of true knowledge, which is then 
stored in conscious memoria to be recalled by its linguistic sign, confessed, acted upon, and thus 
incorporated as part of the person’s self and the community’s narrative identity. This moment of 
grace and its bit of truth may be infinitesimally small—it is not a totality75—but to Augustine it 
is nevertheless true and is therefore a ground for further belief, further logical investigation, 
rhetoric, praise, and/or action.76 If a person, by the grace of God, makes a habit of listening to the 
Interior Teacher, he or she will become truly wise. Among unconverted seekers after truth, the 
potential for limited but true wisdom can lead to the further event of actual conversion, and 
within conversion, this wisdom can lead up the seven stages of deification to Wisdom Himself.77 
 How does this grounding in eternal truth differ from modernistic foundationalism? A 
comprehensive answer to this question cannot be attempted here, but a partial answer is 
important for especially a philosophy of communication that would fit Evangelicals. Modernistic 
Evangelical hermeneutics, I have argued, is grounded in a foundation imposed wrongly on the 
tradition from modernistic natural sciences. Augustine offers, in place of that foundation, a 
hermeneutic foundation that is less concerned about the accretion of a more and more rigid 
doctrinal structure through time and more concerned about being responsive to the current 
doctrinal needs for the furthering of the gospel, the deification of the saints, and the protection of 
the church from schism and heresy. That is, modernistic hermeneutics wants to have its fully 
formed eternal truth now, within the realm of time, encased in language that is not subject to the 
fluctuations of time and social history. Augustinian hermeneutics wants to listen to the part of the 
eternal truth that the Inner Teacher wants to give now, seeking the inner word from the Inner 
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Teacher that fuses eternal truth with temporal language, an inner word that pursues the divine 
narrative with charity and draws along with it the language and style that fits the historical 
moment. Modernistic hermeneutics trusts itself with the controls in hermeneutics;78 Augustine 
trusts God.79  
Augustine’s analogy of a Psalm being sung as a picture of eternity and temporality is 
helpful here. The Psalm, fully formed, is in the memory of the singer, but it can only enter 
temporality one syllable at a time, each sound in its proper place and never all present at the 
same time. The eternal truth, similarly, is fully formed in the mind of God in the realm of 
eternity. It is not inaccessible to us in the realm of temporality, but it can only come syllable by 
syllable as appropriate for the sequence and situation. Augustine portrays this unviolated whole 
coming into being by temporal parts as a relationship that “holds for a man’s entire life, the parts 
of which are all the man’s actions. The same thing holds throughout the whole age of the sons of 
men, the parts of which are the lives of all men.”80 As we have heard from Augustine’s City of 
God in Chapter 2, the “whole” truth is not given to us in temporality as a whole except in the 
broad outlines of the narrative of salvific history and in the person of Jesus Christ, the perfect 
Word of God. As Ayers notes, Augustine’s use of the church “rule of faith” was more broad and 
flexible than textually dogmatic,81 a conclusion that makes sense if it is an ever-present “whole” 
whose details fade in and out according to our participation and the doctrinal question of the 
moment.  
 We will see in the next section how this moment-by-moment grounding of eternal truth 
requires both linear and participatory concepts of history in Augustine’s understanding, but 
Augustine’s “participatory foundationalism” has a few other philosophy of communication 
coordinates that recommend it to Evangelicals. First, Augustine argues for the ineradicability of 
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creational memory—a concept familiar to Evangelicals through their familiarity with Paul’s 
opening salvo in Romans: humans “suppress the truth in unrighteousness, because what may be 
known of God is manifest in them … For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes 
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and 
Godhead, so that they are without excuse.”82 Though Augustine is rightly identified with the 
doctrine of depravity that portrays humans as unable to rightly read the truth that is right there 
within them,83 he also insists on the general grace of God’s participatory maintenance of truth in 
the inward parts of all people. Not by education, skill, or cultural training, but by grace, everyone 
can recognize the truth within them as truth. In Augustine’s discourse on memory, this is what he 
holds out as the perpetual hope of salvation: “If it had been completely wiped out of the mind, 
we would not remember it even when reminded of it. … what we have completely forgotten we 
cannot even look for if it is lost.” But no created being can completely forget its God.84 
Another linguistic coordinate that recommends itself to Evangelicals from Augustine’s 
participatory foundationalism is the priority he puts on the gift of the scriptures. As we have 
argued in Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, the scriptures are at the core of Evangelical 
identity, and the current Evangelical crisis involves how to maintain that center in an 
intellectually and socially responsible way. Paradoxically, Augustine both insists on the 
centrality of the scriptures to Christian life and identity and acknowledges that, because of our 
creational participation in God, the scriptures are not technically necessary.85 Where some 
Evangelicals insist that our knowledge of God is built up solely from our systematic study of the 
scriptures—and that apart from the right interpretation of scripture there is no true knowledge of 
God—they will find themselves at odds with Augustine. But where Evangelicals pursue the 
scriptures as God’s gift of a perpetual witness to his creational and salvific work—an especially 
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providential witness that recapitulates the narratives of eternal truth and keeps them grounded 
throughout the flux of temporal history—they can find common cause with Augustine, and find 
again a reason and a way to be centered on the scriptures. Of the different ways that humans 
might seek for a shared witness to the inward truth to guard them against forgetting again what 
they know, the scriptures hold a privileged place in Augustine’s theory and practice.86  
 Finally, as we will investigate more later in this chapter, Augustine’s understanding of 
how eternal truth manifests in language has its ultimate fruition in social and ecclesial action. 
Language is what enables people to share thoughts and experience communion with one another. 
Language does not merely enable a shared memory of individually discerned truths, but it 
enables both the confirmation of jointly discovered truths and the shared labor of correcting and 
disciplining the understanding of eternal truth that is currently at work in the church. As 
Christians share action through shared language, they create the social witness of the proclaiming 
church through the grace of God.87 Thus, the eternal truth that makes its way through many 
people’s “memories” into linguistically shared concepts and then into physically shared actions 
becomes a foundation in the best possible sense. This participation in truth through shared social 
language and social action is not restricted, in Augustine, to the society of just a local church of 
living members, but is rather also extended to the broader city of God, primarily (again) through 
the scriptures but also through respectful dialogue with the longer and broader church tradition.88  
This correspondence of language to understandable truth that Augustine offers is broader 
than the one current in Evangelicalism. It is one that is grounded not merely in a rational 
academic mastery of language, languages, history, culture studies, textual studies, and discourse 
analysis (all of which, in their 4th century versions, Augustine advocated in De Doctrina). In 
addition to these, Augustine exhorts us to interpret rightly by dealing with the complex problems 
 
 
156 
of the interpreting subject and by participating with the indwelling Christ Himself in the 
interpretation process. He exhorts us to bolster the witness of our creational participatory selves 
with scripture as an old “wellspring” of continually new water,89 and to bolster our individual 
participatory interpretation with a shared labor in hermeneutics that alone can reincarnate the 
hidden truth in public language and action.  
To use an analogy that would resonate with most Evangelicals: just as it is impossible to 
enter into and continue in the salvation of Christ through fleshly means, but instead one must be 
born “in the Spirit” and made perfect “by the Spirit,”90 so also is it impossible to interpret the 
scriptures through merely fleshly means, but instead the interpreter’s spirit must be aligned with 
the Spirit and by continual dialogue with the Interior Teacher his interpretation must be made 
perfect. As the sections below will develop further, though, what a “perfect” interpretation is to 
Augustine is a bit different than mere conceptual uniqueness and stability.  
Linear and Participatory Historical Truth 
One of the key questions in current biblical hermeneutics is how to relate biblical 
exegesis and history, and behind that, how to understand history itself in a Christian way. The 
larger struggles of modern historiography in biblical hermeneutics are beyond the scope of this 
project. However, some of these struggles impinge on my appropriation of a participatory 
Augustinian hermeneutics. Thus, some general exposition of the different hermeneutical 
perspectives on history will be necessary to provide a contrast to the participatory hermeneutics 
that is otherwise difficult to make clear in a modern social imaginary.  
The relevant lineup of perspectives, many of which have introduced misreadings of 
Augustine’s own historical hermeneutics, are Platonic cyclical history, modern linear historical 
science, and humanistic/rhetorical dialectical historicism. The key importance of these 
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perspectives on history is that each one of them opens and precludes different hermeneutical 
possibilities for the scriptures, as we will see. After developing positively Augustine’s linear-
and-participatory perspective on history and noting some of its hermeneutical implications, I will 
clarify its lines by contrast with these other perspectives with which it has been implicitly in 
dialogue in various ways.  
My view of the historical aspect of Augustine’s hermeneutical theory follows the basic 
lines of Levering’s work,91 to clarify my underlying bias at the outset. In light of my 
investigation of participation in Augustine and his time’s social imaginary (Chapter 2), 
Levering’s perspective seems most sensitive to the historical context and Augustine’s primary 
sources. In this reading, Augustine valued both literal, linear history and the eternal meanings in 
which linear history participated, and he practiced a historiography in which the sacred history of 
the scriptures, culminating in the first and second comings of Christ, served as the “figural” lens 
through which to read past and present history.92 To clarify the point for Evangelical 
hermeneutic practice, Augustine argued that the tropes and figures of “past” scripture could be 
faithfully interpreted to disclose charitable meanings and courses of action for “present” history, 
not as the single epistemic application of a scriptural antitype but as a spiritually discerned 
instance of rhetorical participation. In a hermeneutical move that resonates with the work of 
Gadamer,93 Augustine asserts and explains how application is interpretation, how past history 
and present history fuse through participation in the divine Word.  
This expression of Augustine’s historical-hermeneutical thought represents the position 
he came to in his later work, especially in City of God.94 While he had recognized the need for 
some focused education in history in his educational program in De Doctrina,95 it was only after 
the traumatic events of the barbarian sack of Rome that Augustine recognized the “need for a 
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new kind of Christian historical apologetic.”96 Before then, as Markus elaborates, pagan and 
Christian histories had functioned as separate genres with separate subject matters and different 
ends.97 As Augustine grew in biblical literacy and in his awareness of the importance of the 
Incarnation—tying together eternal Word and temporal history—he became more insistent on 
the distinction between ahistorical Platonic philosophical narratives and the real historical events 
through which God spoke/speaks his truths. As human authors speak through words, God can 
speak through events.98 Thus, all history, in a hidden sense, participates in God, and the salvific 
history recorded in the scriptures, in a more specific sense, is a public revelation of the core plot 
of linear history. As Markus puts it, “universal history is articulated in a meaningful structure in 
so far as its course is projected on to a map defined by the co-ordinates of the sacred history.”99  
This use of the biblical frame to read and judge “secular” history, as opposed to secular 
history standing in judgment over scriptural history, is also the core thesis for a renewed 
“figural” hermeneutics put forward in Stephen Wright’s essay capping the Scripture and 
Hermeneutics Series volume on “history and biblical interpretation.”100 The seminar’s reversal of 
hermeneutical authority—from secular authority to revelational authority—demonstrates that 
Augustine’s framework still has contemporary resonance.101 That these coordinates come to us 
from the Augustinian tradition is argued by Paula Fredericksen, who says that Augustine’s 
synthesis of sacred and secular history, of Old and New Testaments, was a departure from the 
previous Christian historical apologetics that had insisted on reading the Old Testament as a 
purely spiritual revelation and its Jewish reception as a completely carnal failure. Instead, 
Augustine saw God at work, and the Jews being faithful, through the literal, carnal commands of 
the law in their season.102  
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This re-valuing of literal history, philosophically called for by the Incarnation, was given 
structure and language by the Donatist bishop Tyconius, who helped Augustine reorient himself, 
around the time he wrote his Confessions, in how to read the bible.103 Augustine’s contribution 
as “the first Christian philosopher of history,” though, was only to make explicit the 
historiography implicit in the New Testament, which was neither a Gnostic rejection of history 
nor a “Constantinian” politicization of history.104 The bible was to be neither allegorized away 
nor hardened into a coercive political and interpretational scheme.  
Instead of reading the bible only allegorically, Augustine could now see how the tying 
together of the eternal and temporal realms could be expressed “typologically—and thus 
historically.”105 That is, though Christianity had always emphasized both the historicity and the 
spirituality of the scriptures, expressed most famously in the four-fold interpretational schema of 
Origen,106 it fell to Augustine, following Tyconius, to explain how the interpretation of the 
eternal-spiritual and the temporal-literal worked together in the scriptures.  
Levering does two things to help us understand how and why these linear and 
participatory histories need to have a reintegration in hermeneutics through Augustinian 
philosophy of communication. First, and briefly since this territory was covered in part in 
Chapter 2, Levering points us to the problem that in current biblical hermeneutics “there seems 
to be no exegetical bridge between past and present. This gap, much more than questions about 
inerrancy or inspiration, is the heart of the current crisis of scriptural authority.”107 That is, how 
can we explain how scriptural events from the different world of the past have real and important 
connections to our lived history today? Because of the Christian “faith in other [spiritual] 
realities operating in history,” Levering says, an authentically historical reading of the scriptures 
must include both the linear historical-linguistic data and the theological, ecclesial, spiritual 
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framework. Together, historical-critical data and spiritual framework help us discern what was 
really going on in that past scriptural history and what is really going on in our current spiritual 
history.108 In his book Participatory Biblical Exegesis, Levering argues from Augustine and 
Aquinas that eternal scripture given in the past is reappropriated faithfully in the present through 
participatory interaction with the inward-dwelling divine Teacher, with the shared human 
conversations around the scriptures, and with the tradition of ecclesial authorities. In sum, linear 
history needs these participatory coordinates to be historical at all.109  
Second, Levering demonstrates for us that this tying together of linear, temporal history 
and eternal, participatory history was Augustine’s intentional and explicit aim in his City of God. 
Resonating with Levering’s historical-hermeneutic frame, Augustine says early on in the City of 
God that he has no wish to write like a pagan historian, “just another chronicler” of battles, 
events, and leaders.110 As discussed in Chapter 2, Augustine saw the meaning of history as the 
whole of which individual events are just parts. Citing several instances in the Augustinian 
corpus, Markus summarizes Augustine’s philosophy of history well:  
He was certainly never without a deep sense of God’s ever-present activity in each and 
every moment of time, as in every part of space [Confessions VII.xv.21]. He often 
thought of the whole vast fabric of human history as a majestically ordered whole, an 
extended song or symphony [Epistle 138.5; City of God XI.18], in which each moment 
has its unique, if impenetrably mysterious significance [City of God VI.17; Epistle 
197.2].111 
Following Augustine’s own five part breakdown of City of God, as described in an Epistle to 
Firmus, Levering argues that books 1-5 critique pagan history as focused on “attainment of 
solely linear-historical ends”; that books 6-10 approve a basic Platonic participatory frame to 
 
 
161 
history but find it inadequate through its hubris and its denigration of temporal life;112 that books 
11-14 defend a linear participatory Christian account of history that avoids the difficulties of 
cyclic Platonic history; that books 15-18 use this participatory framework to integrate scriptural 
history and standard world history; and that books 19-22 “describe … the participatory 
consummation of linear history.”113 That is, in its overall structure and in many of its specific 
parts, City of God is, according to Levering, an argument for how to read the bible and history as 
a narratively patterned confluence of human and divine actions. “On biblical grounds,” Levering 
says, “Augustine argues that every event in linear history has a participatory dimension, so that 
human words and deeds cannot be understood solely in terms of temporal causality and 
progression.”114  
This participatory reading of history works to open up scriptural meaning in several 
directions: the scriptures might be used to interpret the participatory meaning of events of past 
history (as Augustine does in City of God), or one event in scripture might open up further 
meaning for another scriptural event (as in New Testament fulfillments of Old Testament 
prophecies), or scriptural themes from past history might overlay present and future historical 
events with possible charitable meanings. All these moves are grounded in the Incarnation as the 
historical event that reconnected the temporal realm to the eternal,115 and all look forward to the 
eschaton as the future historical event that will consummate and end the temporal mode of 
being.116  
Of the several passages from City of God, from Levering’s reading and my own, that help 
develop this vision of hermeneutics as grounded in both linear and participatory history, only a 
few will be necessary to establish the tenor of the argument. First, Levering draws our attention 
to Augustine’s treatment of the biblical narrative of Cain and Abel, which Augustine uses as an 
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origin paradigm of sorts for his “two cities” metaphor. Augustine’s primary interest in Cain’s 
story is how it functions figuratively to foreshadow the murderous envy of those who killed 
Christ, which of course continues to be instantiated in the murderous envy of carnal Roman 
authorities who in Augustine’s day had continued to kill Christians.117  
Abel, by offering a right sacrifice and suffering righteously for it, participates in the 
eternal plan of salvation before it is actualized in time. Christian martyrs, by offering a right 
sacrifice of the good confession and suffering for it, participate in the eternal plan of salvation as 
it has already been actualized. Christ was of course the eternal prototype whose perfect 
confession and perfect suffering serve as the way, the model, and the end for this scripture-wide 
theme of participation, ensuring that faithful communities facing persecution have a historical, 
not merely a literary, example and ground.118 In David Lyle Jeffrey’s words, the historical and 
typological example of Christ gives us, through hope in its guarantee of a real end to history, a 
“journey … [of] radical mimesis coming to obedience through suffering as he did and as he has 
called us to do.”119 However, as Levering points out, it is not just the story of Christ but also that 
of the “lesser” biblical character of Cain that “Augustine is also concerned to defend … as linear 
history.”120  
For hermeneutics, we see that Augustine sees spiritual and literal interpretations co-
informing each other in large part through the externalized memory of the scriptural text. “Cain’s 
story has ramifications that cannot be adduced through the causal chain of linear history alone,” 
Levering tells us,121 so the spiritual import of the story needs to be brought out to give meaning 
to the linear history,122 securing it in memory and thus preserving it as history. Understood 
humanistically, history is not a catalogue of facts but the pattern of the past that tells us who we 
are. Jeffrey attributes this understanding of history to Augustine in the statement “We are what 
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we remember.”123 However, it is the basic factuality of the Cain narrative that ensures us that 
God’s participatory providence can speak through events, not merely words. As Augustine the 
rhetorician knows, well-structured narratives with beautiful words can be cheap and can be 
cheats.124 A divinely spoken rhetoric might be less uniform and less stylistically elegant, but it 
comes through actions that manifest God’s power (e.g., His manipulation of a historical 
Pharoah125) and His commitment (e.g., his delivering His Son to incarnation and death126). 
Spiritual meaning is important for the meaning of our history, but factual embodiment is 
important for the ethos of our history.127  
Another example from City of God, one that Levering also notes,128 is Augustine’s 
disquisition on the hermeneutical approach to the story of Noah’s Ark. Augustine argues for an 
approach to the biblical narrative that is both historically factual and figuratively fruitful, 
defending the narrative explicitly against mere historians and mere symbolists. Referencing the 
transmission of the story through the faithful tradition for so many years, Augustine finds it 
“twisted” that anyone would “consult [the books] simply for historical facts,” but he also speaks 
against “those who maintain that the account of the Flood is not historical, but is simply a 
collection of symbols and allegories.”129 Augustine spends several paragraphs answering 
objections to the factual nature of the story, using the science, history, and mathematics available 
to him in his historical moment, but he concludes the section by bringing together again the 
importance of both fact and symbol, linear and participatory history:  
It could not plausibly be said that the events, though historical, have no symbolic 
meaning, or that the account is not factual, but merely symbolical, or that the symbolism 
has nothing to do with the Church. No, we must believe that the writing of this historical 
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record had a wise purpose, that the events are historical, that they have a symbolic 
meaning, and that this meaning gives a prophetic picture of the Church.130 
Though all history is connected in hidden ways to God’s action in the world and can sometimes 
be read through the private interpretation given to prophetic individuals,131 the scriptures are a 
public revelation given for the good of a public community.132 This public community is both the 
public church, which interprets its specific history through the figurative key of its Christological 
salvation, and the larger public sphere, for whose sake the confessing community interprets and 
embodies the scriptures. This confessing community is a current lived history participating in a 
past written history, both of which are participating temporally in the eternal Word who 
manifests “stable truth”133 in events and words, in facts and meanings.  
Perhaps because of its alien participatory frame, this confluence of history and scriptural 
hermeneutics has not been well understood.134 Even erudite and thorough scholars of Augustine 
seem to have been unduly affected by historiographical philosophies alien to Augustine himself, 
a problem perhaps to be expected if our inherited preunderstandings of history are as hidden and 
basic to identity and interpretation as they seem to be.135 That is, any approach to history is 
embedded in and takes its coordinates from what MacIntyre calls “narratives” and what Taylor 
calls “social imaginaries.”136 Jeffrey explains this connection between what we “remember” as 
history and our implicit systems of meaning:  
The hermeneutical underpinnings of specific acts of interpretation are not often reducible 
to matters of method, or even of ideology more or less philosophically conceived. There 
is a deeper structure to world-views, almost invariably referred to as “history” [for the 
ancients] … and it is invariably narratively encoded in forms or genres that that are 
conventionally regarded as literary rather than historical.137  
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Though “primitive” or ancient Platonic cyclical history would be participatory, few if any 
modern hermeneutical scholars would advocate for those forms of participatory history with all 
their hermeneutic entailments, especially members of the Evangelical community of scholars and 
practitioners.  Augustine himself, though he has been consistently mischaracterized as a 
Platonist, subverts and replaces Platonic cyclical and participatory theories of history and of 
interpretation in City of God, noting in their favor mainly that they listened to the inward truth 
about the One God in whom we participate.138 But even Augustine’s compliment to the 
Platonists is backhanded since he affirms some of their conclusions by placing their discovery of 
spiritual truths under the scriptural paradigms of Romans 1 and Acts 17.139 In non-Western 
contexts, Evangelical missionaries and biblical translators face hermeneutical problems that arise 
from a variety of participatory cosmologies—often in helpful ways—but this project speaks 
mainly to Evangelical interpreting communities in a Western context.140  
A more likely challenge to Augustinian participatory historical hermeneutics comes from  
modern “linear” historical science, on the one hand, and humanistic/rhetorical dialectical history, 
on the other. Historical science is, of course, the dominant strand of history that followed from 
the modern “flattening” of being, resulting in “a laundry list of evidentially corroborated 
facts.”141 This “scientific” biblical interpretation, whether “to subvert or to uphold [the bible’s] 
veridical relation to history[,] can be [understood] to engage ipso facto in a rejection of the 
meaning of history as the bible’s authors themselves understood it.”142 This is the background 
understanding of history of much of Evangelical scholarship and apologetics. However, as 
Jeffrey implies and Radical Orthodoxy scholars argue, this form of history untethered from a 
higher spiritual realm loses not only its Christian meaning, but any possibility of any meaning.  
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Augustine, while defending the historicality of the biblical narrative, presupposed that 
factuality was just one aspect of a larger sensus plenior of meaning, one of many testimonial 
functions of the scriptures. While he could argue, as we have seen, for the scientific and 
historical probability of the Noah’s Ark narrative, this was just a preliminary and not technically 
necessary step toward proving the validity of the scriptures through its ecclesial interpretation 
and application. The point of the scriptures is to provoke the wisdom of faith and love through 
spiritually discerned knowledge. Of the two, the wisdom of God was more real to Augustine 
than knowledge.143 However, Augustinian participation denies the usual either/or between 
worldly knowledge and spiritual wisdom that separates fact and meaning in an epistemologically 
fragmented modernity. 
Dialectically oriented perspectives of history and interpretation, while more 
humanistically inclined, make it even more difficult to “see” Augustinian participatory 
hermeneutics. Enabled in its self-reflexivity by print culture,144 dialectical history’s watchword 
could be said to be, as Barfield says, “evolutionism,”145 the metaphor of incremental change of 
past ideas into the present through conscious or unconscious participation through language. 
While Hegel may have been the last and greatest exponent of a directed meaning of history 
through dialectical growth, this perspective in a muted, more immanent form seems to underlie 
most of the Romantic and post-Romantic turn towards historicism.146 As I have already 
mentioned in my reservations about Barfield and Taylor, their perspectives seem to emphasize 
the need to go with the change of the times and to seek ever-more conscious and articulate 
choices through which we can direct the evolution of our linguistic traditions. In biblical 
hermeneutics, this perspective can be subtly invasive, as I would argue it is in the work of 
Stephen Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, and of Stephen Wright. In Fowl and Jones, as will be 
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explored more in the fifth chapter, the Hegelian move of their otherwise very Augustinian 
biblical hermeneutics is to take at face value, as neutrally valenced, many changing social mores. 
They implicitly believe the progress narrative of humane values,147 and they read the bible 
accordingly.  
Wright’s misstep is more directly at the intersection of history and hermeneutics. He 
argues for a historical “inhabiting” of “the story” by comparing past and present events through 
figuration. Wright takes his beginning cue from Auerbach, who says that “the two poles of the 
figure are separate in time, but both, being real events or figures, are within time, within the 
stream of historical life.”148 The goal of Wright’s figural interpretation is to allow scripture “to 
be an endlessly new source of interpreting power.”149 Wright’s bringing together of historical 
events through figuration corresponds with Augustine’s philosophy of communication, but his 
emphasis on novelty and the transient pragmatic telos of interpretation does not fit within an 
Augustinian perspective. In Wright’s exposition, the figures operate historically and 
linguistically within linear historical time, and the interpretive principles given by Wright leave 
little room for a participatory interpretation to tie together eternity and “the stream of historical 
life.” Neither does he recognize that his (otherwise healthy) emphasis on “provisionality” of 
interpretation operates mainly as an accommodation to the preunderstandings of the modern 
subjective individual, nor that such an accommodation is not helpful for communities seeking a 
shared basis for action, nor for institutions seeking to build healthy long-term praxis.150 Wright 
even denies individuals a scriptural interpretation that can last throughout their lifetimes, but 
rather insists that individual, communal, and institutional interpretations progress and evolve by 
“parabolic … juxtapositions” that engage “imagination” to produce ever new scriptural syntheses 
of novel meanings.151 The novel interpretation is here more valued than the enduring one.  
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To elaborate my critique by way of example, Wright calls to mind the “pietistic” 
interpretation of scripture by which a person becomes convinced that a command or example 
from past (scriptural) history is a figure for his/her current obedience or self-understanding in the 
present time. Wright gives the example of God’s call to Abraham (“get out of your country … go 
to a country I will show you”152) being interpreted as God’s command for missionary service. 
However, Wright offers a caution:  
It would be a faith in a perpetual state of immaturity that tied that verse perpetually to 
that experience. … [The interpreter would be] deprived of seeing the many ways in 
which that verse might continue to address him or her throughout their personal history 
… a grasp of symbol as symbol, of figure as figure, is central to growth.153 
What Wright overlooks here is the whole biblical history of exhortations to remember the 
promises of God—whether directly or figuratively delivered—and to hold on to those events of 
past communication in past history through the vicissitudes of a present where such “words” 
might be distinctly awkward, impractical, or dangerous. For example, when the Israelites were 
told to make a pile of rocks from the bottom of the Jordan River, which had been miraculously 
stopped, and to use the rock pile as a memory object for teaching throughout their generations,154 
it was clearly intended as an anchoring meaning that ties story, command, and history together in 
successive Jewish generations. To address Wright’s example specifically, if the Abrahamic call 
does come to a person who is seeking direction from God through the scriptures, his/her 
interpretation of the personal missiological meaning of that text does not have to be merely a 
“symbol,” just an “imaginative” comparison of the two poles of a figure in historical time. In the 
participatory frame, he/she could instead interpret the scripture rightly as a very real command, a 
past historical event that is being figurally applied to his/her current historical life now and is 
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thus solid enough for both present action and the perpetual labor of memory to keep “that verse 
… tied … perpetually to that experience.”155 It is not that the verse could not also take on other 
meanings, but if it was tied to that experience by the Word, its meaning should not be untied for 
the sake of some modernistic metaphor of “maturity.”  
The basic temptation of dialectically oriented historical perspectives, that is, is to see the 
participation between historical narratives in the horizontal plane only, with the potential for 
correctional perspectives inherent in the language of a tradition rather than in the God who 
commissions prophetic corrections. Transcendence becomes a linguistic phenomenon only. 
Along with that, dialectically oriented perspectives systemically exclude the strong ties between 
past historical figures and present historical interpretations that enable individual and communal 
obedience and individual and communal memory. Augustine’s participatory hermeneutics gives 
us a stronger connection between past and present history through figural interpretation because 
both those historical moments can be tied, in a participatory triangulation, with the eternal Word 
of God.  
In a participatory frame, then, an Augustinian “figure” (or trope, or allegory, or type, or 
analogy, or anagogy156) is not as rigidly categorized as a purely literary device might be since the 
latter is dependent on textual rules to ensure correct transmission of meaning down through 
historical time through language. Augustine had little regard for such narrow grammaticisms.157 
“Someone who attends to and worships a thing which is meaningful,” such as a figure, “but 
remains unaware of its meaning is a slave to a sign,” Augustine says, but access to the “things” 
beyond the signs raises faithful interpreters to “Christian freedom.”158 Rather than purely 
linguistic tools, historical figures can be understood in light of the thing (res) of the “masterplot” 
of the story,159 which we know from its historical details, from our inward witness, and from the 
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ecclesial commitments we have entered into, commitments to meanings that are to be maintained 
in our memory of past events and re-memorialized in their recurrence in present and future 
events. When we read scriptures within those commitments and in a faithful and charitable way, 
God’s work in past history and his work in present history are connected in eternal meaning for 
us by the scriptural figure.  
 Caritas: The Telos of Hermeneutics 
Though I have argued that Wright’s vision of “inhabiting the story” is insufficiently 
participatory to enable strong ties of meaning between ancient scripture and present individual 
and communal commitments, his advocacy of the “provisionality” of meaning addresses a real 
problem in the history of totalizing Christian hermeneutics. Jeffrey, also, cautions that the moral 
implications of scriptural hermeneutics will depend on whether the “promised land” of the 
scriptural narrative is believed to be fully realizable here and now, through currently available 
means, or whether it is believed to be an eschaton (history-ending event) only prefigured here, 
not realizable except by the special work of Christ at his second coming. The first storyline leads 
to Christian empire, and it demands a hermeneutics that can justify systemic coercion. The 
second storyline puts the church on continual pilgrimage in the world, and while its hermeneutics 
demand specific commitments and actions in the church, those demands are more relational and 
partial, hoping in a perfection at the eschaton that cannot be fully realized now. Augustine 
consistently cast the Christian, and thus also the scriptural interpreter, as a peregrinato, a pilgrim 
or sojourner in the world.160 Scriptural interpretation was a journey that got the church where it 
needed to go, but each place it stopped was one more place to “dwell in tents with Isaac and 
Jacob, … heirs with [them] of the same promise … wait[ing] on the city which has foundations, 
whose builder and maker is God.”161  
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In his scriptural hermeneutics that is neither entirely provisional nor supportive of a 
totalizing Christian empire,162 Augustine enshrines caritas as the hermeneutical principle that 
faithfully covers for what lack we have of knowledge, wisdom, and intersubjective communion. 
However, because exhibiting caritas is also our greatest form of participating in God himself—
who “is Love”163—caritas is not just a provisional measure to cope with a broken world but also 
the right telos of all interpretation. This telos of caritas, some argue,164 even moves hermeneutics 
beyond the realm of the fallenness of human interpreters or language; it is argued that since God 
is fundamentally other than even his sinless creatures, our interpretation of God will never be 
totalized, though our love for Him will necessarily be consummated. Thus, even in eternity love 
is always ahead of knowledge, though not ultimately separable from it.165  
This picture of caritas perpetually bridging otherness is thrown into even sharper relief 
when we consider hermeneutics in the temporal realm:  a redeemed but fallible people in the 
midst of a fallen, temporal world interpreting a compilation of ancient historical scriptures 
through the slippery medium of language. Thus, given these constraints on ideal formal 
interpretation in Augustine’s philosophy of communication, he who interprets the scriptures in 
love interprets rightly, even when he interprets them wrongly.  
Caritas in Rhetoric. Understanding the place of caritas in Augustine’s broader rhetorical 
theory is relevant here since rhetoric is the whole of which his hermeneutics is a constitutive 
part. Augustine’s articulation of the process and purpose of rhetoric makes caritas the central 
metaphor (rather than self-interest, or power, for example166). Because of the interior grounding 
of words with the Incarnate Word, it is the orientation of the hearer’s will to that Inner Teacher 
that is paramount, as we have seen. The hearer must listen to the inward truth for himself. 
Though words rhetorically employed are powerful sacramental signs, they “work” only to open a 
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space for the person’s will to have conversation with the inward Christ.167 Thus, when Augustine 
follows Cicero in De Doctrina Christiana in formulating the purposes of rhetoric as to “instruct, 
delight, and move,”168 the content of the instruction has shifted to the scriptures, the delighting is 
only to get still-carnal ears to hear this instruction, and the moving is always to move people to 
love God and their neighbor, and thus be moved to seek to be found in Christ on the day of 
redemption.169  
In contrast to Cicero, it is not the good of the state or the attainment of optimal 
circumstances in this world that Augustine has in his sights, but rather the future heavenly city 
and whatever earthly goods that can be “used” toward that ultimate Good.170 The one who is far 
along in pursuing this good has “wisdom,” and because truth is common, not proprietary,171 this 
wise man will necessarily endeavor to help others along the same path. Thus, the goal of 
Christian rhetoric is to deal gently and realistically (i.e., charitably) with the hearers’ wills to 
move them towards both interior love of God and neighbor and exterior loving action towards 
God and neighbor. The goal of Christian social life is to direct one’s love toward God in the 
presence of others, and by this to cohere socially as a body in the shared love of God, using 
everything toward that end. In Augustine’s anthropology, this is how humans’ loves form society 
through implicit and explicit confession of those loves: “Notice that that’s how you love 
yourself, and that you are drawing [the other] to yourself, and inviting him to what you love. 
Loving him as you love yourself, you are bound to draw him there to what you also love.”172 By 
means of caritas towards caritas. Interpreting the scriptures with love for God and neighbor is an 
eternal good that is also fitted to serve an earthly, temporal good. 
For Augustine, caritas guides every aspect of the rhetorical process. In his arrangement, 
caritas means that he watches his audience for understanding and conviction, adding examples 
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and development until the goal is reached, but no further, lest he become “a bore.”173 In style, 
caritas chooses the style most necessary for the spiritual edification of his hearers.174 Caritas 
chooses lively delivery that invites no audience members to sleep. Above all, caritas means that 
the rhetor prays for good communication, knowing that only God can make the wills of the 
people well-disposed to truth and the minds attentive to right inward meanings.175   
Caritas in Scriptural Interpretation. This principle of rhetoric writ large also holds for 
the hermeneutical aspect of rhetoric. Caritas moves the student of scripture to diligent study and 
gives him the undergirding narrative and purpose through which to read the scriptures. This is 
summed up for us by Augustine at the end of book one of De Doctrina: 
The chief purpose of all that we have been saying in our discussion of things is to make it 
understood that the fulfillment and end of the law and all the divine scriptures is to love 
the thing which must be enjoyed [God] and the thing which together with us can enjoy 
that thing [i.e., other humans] … To enlighten and enable us, the whole temporal 
dispensation was set up by divine providence for our salvation. We must make use of 
this, not with a permanent love and enjoyment of it, but with a transient love and 
enjoyment of our journey, or of our conveyances, so to speak, … so that we love the 
means of transport only because of our destination.  
So anyone who thinks that he has understood the divine scriptures or any part of 
them, but cannot by his understanding build up this double love of God and neighbour, 
has not yet succeeded in understanding them.176  
Augustine clarifies here the “chief purpose” of his hermeneutical teachings: that the 
interpretation of the “divine scriptures” should provide a social platform (“together with us”) for 
the love and enjoyment of God.  
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The scriptures are one of the “conveyances” within temporality that get us to our ultimate 
destination, which is God Himself. As such, the “temporal dispensation” of the scriptures should 
be loved and used with a “transient love” as aids on our “journey,” but not as the endpoint. 
Further on in this section, Augustine even says that “anyone who derives from [the scriptures] an 
idea which is useful for supporting this love but fails to say what the writer demonstrably meant 
in the passage” is “misled in the same way as a walker who leaves his path by mistake but 
reaches the destination.” Augustine does advocate “put[ting] right” the textual practices of this 
type of person, but more to guard against potentially harmful habits in the person than to guard 
against truth being lost.177 Because the truth is inward and outward, secured by the will of God, it 
cannot be lost by our occasional misreadings of scripture, especially if those misreadings achieve 
the point of that truth, the love of God and neighbor.  
 It must be pointed out that this process of charitably teaching one another in the truth is 
stable because of our participation through the Holy Spirit, not merely because of textual rules of 
interpretation. In Sermon 28A, Augustine tells us that the natural response of inward faith is how 
we speak outwardly to our neighbors, like water pouring from a jug,  
But it must be poured out for others in such a way that you are not left empty yourself. 
That’s why the Lord, when promising believers an abundance of his Holy Spirit, said, It 
will become in him a fountain of water leaping up to eternal life. It’s in the nature of 
fountains, you see, to pour out their water without getting empty.178 
Because we are connected inwardly with the Word of God, which is Christ, and because the 
scriptures likewise are inexhaustible treasures spoken by the Word of God,179 the truth is not a 
limited resource. Limited resources are part of the social imaginary of modernism, but not of an 
Augustinian philosophy of communication. As we use the scriptures to participate together in the 
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love of God as we travel this “journey” through temporality, the same scriptures continue to 
show us new ways to love God and neighbor.  
While entailing flexibility and openness in interpretation, caritas also submits to that 
larger narrative of the scriptures in that it operates under the scriptures and under the rule of 
faith.180 If someone holds on to a private interpretation even when it is shown to be incorrect or 
uncharitable, that person is raising his/her own authority above the authority of the scriptures. 
“Faith will falter if the authority of holy scripture is shaken,” Augustine says, “and if faith 
falters, love itself decays. For if someone lapses in his faith, he inevitably lapses in his love as 
well, since he cannot love what he does not believe to be true.”181 Holy scripture is the temporal 
ground of truth through faith, read through the rule of faith, pointed toward love, co-owned with 
the rest of the city of God. As a temporal ground, it has to be read charitably within the church, 
but as a temporal ground, it can be the basis for shared action and even legitimate conflict.182 
This sometimes means, in the larger public sphere, that one should choose to participate in the 
scriptural narrative of the city of God rather than to avoid controversy by dropping that narrative 
when it contradicts the secular pieties of a given age.183  
In Augustine’s scriptural inventio, caritas is the determining factor both in which 
interpretation one is able to choose and in which interpretation one should choose.184 Caritas 
shapes hermeneutical division of the scriptures and the selection of the meaning most in line with 
the eternal happiness of the community. The “key to a true interpretation is caritas: the 
transformation of our eros by God’s agape of grace. This alone frees us to discover both the true 
wisdom of all our inexorable desires and strivings for wisdom and happiness.”185 Since in 
Augustine’s theology, humans’ attention, and thus their interpretation, is driven by their desires, 
or loves, any redeemed interpretation of scripture must start with redeemed loves, but this is a 
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process that takes a lifetime and is never fully complete. Redeemed loves are rightly ordered 
loves in a “just and holy life,” which Augustine develops at length as follows:  
He is also a person who has ordered his love, so that he does not love what it is wrong to 
love, or fail to love what should be loved, or love too much what should be loved less (or 
love too little what should be loved more), or love two things equally if one of them 
should be loved either less or more than the other, or love things either more or less if 
they should be loved equally.186 
Though it is clear, to Augustine, that every temporal thing should be loved with a transient love 
in service to love for God as an end in Himself, the exact path of how to follow the right order of 
loves is fraught with interpretive difficulty. Augustine gives us a famous picture of this 
interpretive difficulty in his portrayal of the judge who has to deliver the accused to torture to 
obtain a testimony to clear him.187 “Thus the ignorance of the judge frequently involves an 
innocent person in suffering,” and though the judge might know that he is to love God by 
loving this accused man before him, his judgment as to how to love the accused man is a 
“darkness [that] shrouds social life.”188 
If this is the case with a person who lives a “just and holy life,” what further difficulty 
will there be in an ecclesial context where not everyone is necessarily similarly pure or focused 
in their love of God and neighbor? Augustine was quite upfront with his congregation about the 
need for them to change the focus of their loves:  
God hates you as you are but loves you as he wants you to be, and that is why he urges 
you to change. Come to an agreement with him, and begin by having a good will and 
hating yourself as you are. Let this be the first clause of your agreement with the word of 
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God … When you too have begun to hate yourself as you are, just as God hates that 
version of you, then you are already beginning to love God himself as he is.189 
Augustine compares people’s obedience to God to carrying a harp. Obeying because of fear of 
God is merely carrying the harp, but “if you do it out of love, you are singing the new song.”190 
However, he says, “But go on being afraid, all the same, so that this dread may keep guard over 
you, may lead you to love.”191 This progression from servile fear to the “chaste fear” of the love 
of God is a continual learning, or healing, process of learning to love our own souls by directing 
them toward the love of God, replacing carnal loves with godly loves, or just putting them in 
their proper places.192 “So let us learn, then, brothers and sister, how to love our own souls. … 
and in this way love your neighbor as yourself; because if you don’t know how to love yourself, 
how will you be able to love your neighbor in truth?”193 To the degree we are still disordered in 
our loves, our own interpretation of the truth of scripture will be compromised, and to the degree 
that Christians’ reading of the scriptures differs because of different lenses of different loves, our 
shared interpretation of the scriptures will be fractured. Therefore, long before this problematic 
of desire, perception, and interpretation was noticed in later hermeneutical theory,194 it was 
central for Augustine. However, Augustine has reason to hope because God has “given us so 
much of his spirit to support us on our journey,” has “bestowed individual gifts for the 
consolidation of his church,” and has “tie[d] together his own body, with its many members 
performing different tasks, in a bond of unity and love like a healing bandage,” treating it 
medically by “various disagreeable medicines.”195  
Even if the “just and holy” person interprets the scriptures according to a rightly ordered 
love for God and his narrative of salvation, he or she has to consider the possible impact of 
different interpretations on the others with whom he/she is committed in the church, knowing 
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that some legitimate textual interpretations might tear down other Christians in their current state 
of understanding and love. Augustine himself had to put aside his reading of the book of Isaiah, 
when he was a young convert, because he could not understand the “Lord’s mode of speech,”196 
and with this in mind, he was sensitive to what his own readers and hearers could handle. As a 
bishop who had to deal regularly with questions that were both doctrinal and practical/moral, 
Augustine’s hermeneutical theory was not insulated from the practical need for charitable 
interpretation, as Evangelical hermeneutical theory is when it is not closely paired with mission.  
Augustine showed his familiarity with Paul’s famous exposition of charitable 
hermeneutic relativity, citing Romans 14 in his discourse on the temptation of gluttony in the 
Confessions:  
You have taught me, good Father, that “all things are clean to the clean,” “but it is evil 
for the man who eats with offense,” and that “every creature of God is good, and nothing 
is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving,” and that “meat does not commend us 
to God,” and that “no man should judge” us “in food or drink” and that “he who eats 
should not despise him who does not eat, and he who does not eat should not judge him 
who eats.”197  
In a verse that does not fit well with the outlines of modernistic Evangelical hermeneutics, Paul 
states baldly that in the interpretation of scriptural dietary and ceremonial laws “let each 
[Christian] be fully convinced in his own mind,”198 as long as he holds this interpretation with 
charity toward his brothers and sisters in the church. The wrong interpretation, as Augustine 
seconds, leads a person to “eat with offense,” to “despise him who does not eat” or “judge him 
who eats.” As Calvin Troup argues, Augustine posits a hermeneutic that does not haggle over 
words but “pursu[es] charity,” seeking not to “violate … the community.”199 Therefore, not only 
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does hermeneutic charity constrain what interpretations of scripture can be approved privately 
before God but also which ones can be held publicly as a shared standard within the church.   
Finally, caritas entails a dialogic approach to interpretation, as we have seen,200 locating 
the truth of the scriptures in the intersection of text, faithful interpreters, and the Teacher in 
whom they participate—rather than just in the text itself. It is this explicit relocating of the text 
of scripture into the context of spiritual participation, the rule of faith, and dialogue that contrasts 
most sharply with the modernist hermeneutic strand of Evangelicalism. Evangelicals agree that 
love of God and neighbor is a goal for Christian theology and practice, but Augustine’s explicit 
use of caritas as a hermeneutical principle might be received by Evangelicals as an error, the 
uncleanness of subjective interpretation soiling the objectivity of textual truth. However, if we 
Evangelicals would exchange our certainties grounded in modernist optimism in rational control 
of textual meaning for the certainties grounded in humble participation in God’s revelation, we 
would have to do so by looking steadily at this law of love as the hermeneutic that does not puff 
us up, but builds us up.201  
Caritas in the Narrative Whole. There is a further sense in which caritas should guide 
our interpretation. So far, I have explained that caritas guides our perception of the text of 
scripture and its divisions, that caritas motivates our study and application of the scripture, that 
caritas functions as a principle of selection among valid possible interpretations, and that, in 
proclamation, caritas shapes how those love-centered interpretations are delivered. However, 
within this version of the “hermeneutic circle,” Augustine also recognized a frame or narrative 
ground, a whole within which exegetical parts could function charitably. This further component 
of Augustine’s hermeneutical theory—the public and explicit owning of a preexisting bias in 
interpretation—is quite different from the presumably objective hermeneutics of modernist 
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Evangelicals, whose hermeneutical presuppositions are the more dangerous for being treated as 
if they did not exist.202 Augustine’s emphasis on this narrative whole has resonance with 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of a tradition, though Augustine’s interpretive whole lives in the 
participatory dialogue between the Creed (or “Symbol”) and the comprehensive story of 
redemption in the mind of God, the story that we only ever know in parts and dimly.203   
This narrative whole that is essential for scriptural interpretation has two parts, which one 
might label a synchronic part and a diachronic part. The diachronic part of the narrative whole is 
the “rule of faith,” the “faith once for all delivered to the saints,” that weaves together the whole 
canon of scripture into a grand narrative of God’s salvation through Christ, reaching from its 
exigence and promise in the first chapters of Genesis to its resolution and fulfillment in the last 
chapters of Revelation. This is the faith that we must maintain in discursive memory through 
time. This longer and deeper narrative encapsulated in the rule of faith and developed at length 
throughout history was the structure through which Augustine read the scriptures,204 as seen, for 
example, in his City of God. The narrative through which we interpret what “charity” itself 
means,205 and thus what a charitable interpretation of a passage would be, is not our own story, 
nor just the story of our particular sect or generation. Rather, it is the longer and deeper story into 
which God has gracefully thrown us, a story to which we owe respect because it is a God-given 
tradition.  
However, there is also a synchronic aspect to this narrative, as there is with any tradition 
in the plane of temporality and history, and that synchronic aspect is the way the narrative is 
continually reinstantiated through discursive practices that constitute institutions through both 
normal and special dialogue.206 Normal dialogue is the way in which institutional members 
attempt to maintain and pass along the diachronic ecclesial narrative through the perduring 
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mediums of material resources, mini-narratives, and what Francois Cooren calls “agentic 
texts,”207 which would include scriptures, liturgies, and the organizational and governing 
documents of a church. As more recently examined through Structuration Theory and 
Constitutive Communication of Organizations (CCO), even when members attempt to maintain a 
diachronic narrative in its purity through time, the dialogic nature of interpreting and 
reinterpreting the diachronic narrative and its artifacts introduces slippage.208 Since no tradition 
can be transferred in its chemical purity but is subject to language and the interpretive fusion of 
different historical horizons, it is best to approach the normal dialogue of faithful transmission 
with charity, with an eye toward the basic shape of the narrative, social cohesion, and willingness 
to do the labor together of the interpretive process. Just faithfully passing along the diachronic 
tradition requires caritas.  
Caritas is even more essential for the shared synchronic interpretation of the Christian 
narrative when the situation demands something more than faithful transmission of the narrative, 
such as reformation, change, or dialogic response to contingent historical exigencies. Special 
dialogue in ecclesial situations involves the adaptation of the diachronic narrative to significantly 
different cultures or historical moments, and it may involve significant conflict,209 as modeled by 
Augustine’s dialogic encounters, through treatise, letter, and public debate, with several different 
heresies of his time.210 Thus, even conflict in the synchronic interpretation of the narrative of the 
faith involved dialogue. At Augustine’s time, and up through Christian history until the 
aftermath of the Reformation, heresy was treated fundamentally differently than schism. Heretics 
were considered wrong enough to exclude them from positions of authority or teaching, but the 
general approach to them was persuasion, not force. Schismatics, on the other hand, were those 
who had removed themselves from the sphere of discourse and thus were doing irrevocable harm 
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to those trapped within their separate discourse communities.211 Augustine’s consistent emphasis 
in his rhetorical theory was on the primacy of moral persuasion, the importance of coming to 
agreement through dialogue, emphasizing the charity of arguing for the faith narrative through 
dialogue wherever possible.212  
Frederick Russell, studying Augustine’s thought process on coercion in the context of the 
schismatic sect of the Donatists, summarizes the situation as follows:  
Most of the modes of coercion that Augustine advocates consist of words—words in 
bishops’ sermons, words in the texts of imperial edicts. We may see these words as 
shoddy euphemisms for brute force, but they need not be. They can be seen as conversion 
through coercion by words. The emphasis is on persuasion, not on punishment.213 
This emphasis on persuasion in a charitable frame is borne out as well by Augustine’s 
admonitions to his congregation concerning the Donatists. He rebukes his zealous congregation 
for driving Donatist seekers away (suspecting their motives for asking to be rebaptized), and he 
argues that because even insincere re-converts are coming within the hearing of the word of God, 
bringing them back into dialogue with the truth is the only charitable thing to do.214 Jennifer 
Ebbler concurs in her book-length study of Augustine’s pioneering use of epistles as mediums 
for public correction and conversion. She notes that “the Donatists resisted Augustine’s 
invitations to participate in mutually corrective letter exchanges. Their persistent intransigence 
led Augustine [eventually] to abandon the corrective correspondence and the possibility of 
friendly correction.” These exchanges were “mutually corrective” in that Augustine explicitly 
invited Donatist bishops to correct him in the epistolary dialogue and explicitly framed the 
discourse as a semi-public event. Since some of the earlier letters of correction were from 
Augustine as priest to officials higher than he in authority, it seems clear that they were not an 
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expression of institutional power.215 Rather, because there was a significant difference in the 
interpretation of the larger Christian narrative to which both Catholics and Donatists belonged, 
Augustine’s theory and practice pointed toward dialogue through the “agentic text” of the 
scriptures as the necessary expression of caritas in that historical moment.  
Shared Action for Shared Understanding 
A final aspect to Augustine’s hermeneutics which is not often pulled out of the 
background is the intended fruition of scriptural interpretation in shared action, and the 
corresponding new understanding of those scriptures through the embodied lens of that action. 
That is, the narrative whole—passed down through time and rhetorically interpreted in the 
present—is not a merely mental or linguistic construct (an individual “worldview”216) but rather 
a social-material site of action. This picture is important for understanding, as well, the 
Augustinian philosophy of communication through which this project is carried out.  
In the philosophy of communication of Arnett and Holba, philosophical resources are 
appropriated in order to provide language, and thus thought, and thus a shared social perspective, 
and thus shared action to a question or problem in the historical moment.217 In Augustine, the 
philosophical and scriptural language available functions similarly, but within the guiding 
narrative of the rule of faith, which provides a general structure for identifying perennial 
questions and problems—through scriptural figures—and for discerning between philosophical 
gifts from God and philosophical deceptions from lying spirits. In Augustine also, the unity of 
action is through communication, but is not ultimately linguistic. Shared faith still comes by the 
hearing of truth in language,218 but the faith is not located in the linguistic-conceptual “idea of 
God” that helps a community deal pragmatically with current questions and problems. Rather, 
the linguistic resources serve as participatory mediums through which individuals “remember” 
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truth through the scriptures, move toward wisdom, and take right action. God is not the right 
pragmatic idea in their individual minds or shared tradition; rather, God is the being in whom 
they intersubjectively participate, through language and through action. The language interpreted 
within the broader narrative, in consultation with the Inner Teacher, spurs shared action, and the 
completed action in God and with God (i.e., participation) then adds further meaning 
retroactively to the language by which the ecclesial body had acted. In this way, philosophical 
resources—and preeminently the scriptures—provide pointers and pathways for triangulated 
interpretation and action, participation in both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of the 
city of God.   
The key corrective to modernistic Evangelical hermeneutics is that, in contrast to the 
well-traveled Evangelical injunction against interpreting scripture through “experience,” 
Augustine says that we choose either literal or figurative interpretation of a passage through “the 
advantage of experience fortified by the exercise of holiness.”219 I argue that this “experience” 
and “holiness,” in an Augustinian context, is not primarily an individual phenomenon, but 
requires a social body for shared action and shared understanding in the complex public sphere 
of the city of God. Augustine lived in the long shadow of the Roman concept of the public 
sphere, where the good of the res publica was ostensibly the ground of all legitimate 
interpretation and the warrant behind all patriotic rhetoric.220 While Augustine devastatingly 
critiqued that Roman ground of interpretation in City of God,221 he did not reject the importance 
of the unified social body in interpretation, but rather shifted its identity in a participatory 
direction.  
Modern Evangelicals—especially veterans of recent culture wars—might assume that 
Augustine shifted the authoritative interpreting body from the political polis to the church, which 
 
 
185 
has as its ground the “perspicuous” scriptures. This modernist Evangelical viewpoint would give 
as the explanation for why our political public is so mixed-up the political public’s lack of 
authoritative scriptural ground, but modernistic Evangelicals would then posit a simplistic 
solution: that the scriptural text provides clear and equal access to all personal, social, and 
political questions, and that the main problem of ecclesial institutions is overcoming the 
recalcitrant wills in the public sphere to enact those scripturally clear answers. In this simplistic 
picture, interpretation is a problem of mainly the secular public sphere, while application is the 
chief activity of the (Evangelical) ecclesial public—because its interpretation is unproblematic. 
However, this is not the direction Augustine took, and for good scriptural reasons.  
First, in Augustine’s philosophy of communication, shared action, and thus shared 
interpretation, is made difficult because of the mixed nature of the church. In discussing 
Tyconius’s rules of interpretation, Augustine re-titles one of them as “On the mixed church,” and 
in his discussion, he problematizes the church itself as a unified interpreting body. To interpret 
scripture correctly, we must understand that it may be “actually speaking to another set of 
people,” and he cautions against assuming the church is a completely coherent interpreting body, 
“as if both kinds formed a single body by virtue of their temporary unity and their participation 
in the sacraments.”222 Referencing Augustine’s earlier discussion, those in the church who 
actually participate in God through Christ have the “Christian freedom” of some real “inner” 
knowledge of God and the whole of his gospel narrative, and thus they have the key ingredients 
to a charitable and spiritual interpretation. Those in the church who only participate socially, 
linguistically, and liturgically are still “slaves of a sign,”223 unable to join in public action with 
the indwelling Christ and with other participating Christians.  
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This point is underscored in the final hermeneutic rule from Tyconius, “On the devil and 
his body,” which enjoins us to recognize two social bodies that affect scriptural interpretation: 
not only the spiritual body of the city of God but also the opposite spiritual body of those 
participating in their head, the devil, “a body which consists not only of those who are quite 
clearly outside but also those who although they belong to [the devil] are nevertheless part of the 
church for the time being.”224 Recall that a right love is necessary in order to “remember” and 
understand eternal truth, as well as to practice the wisdom of charitable interpretation. If the 
church is a mixed population between those who participate in Christ’s body and those who 
participate in the devil’s body, the church itself will be the site of necessarily conflicting 
interpretations, requiring the caritas of stubborn insistence on the rule of faith, dialogic 
persuasion, and gentle care of the doctrinally sick, in whatever ways that needs to be manifested. 
“The Church is [Christ’s] body, and … in his body, as its very health, is to be found the unity of 
its members and the framework of love. … Whatever … remains in the body need not despair of 
being restored to health; but any part that has been amputated can be neither treated nor 
healed.”225  
Moreover, even given a participatory social fellowship of those in the city of God, 
hermeneutics is not easy and univocal. Rather, participation in the broader public of the city of 
God means that the community extends through time and beyond time,226 that different temporal 
exigencies give legitimate rise to new interpretations,227 and that interpretation is a jointly owned 
endeavor that is enacted together by different individuals with different levels of gifting and 
grace.228 Again, this is not merely a horizontal, human hermeneutic endeavor. Because “the 
whole Christ [totus Christus] is both head and body[,] … he is already in heaven, and he is 
struggling here as long as the Church is struggling here.”229  
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Thus profiled, Augustine’s ecclesial interpreting body makes its way slowly and 
dialogically—participating with Christ—through the progression of understanding, then delight, 
then assent, which flowers into action. It is because of the mixed nature of the ecclesial body that 
Augustine’s rhetoric for the church enjoins a diverse set of goals and tactics, as he says, 
How do those … things benefit a person who admits the truth and praises the style but 
does not give his assent—which is the whole point of the speaker’s tireless concentration 
on the subject-matter of his address when advocating a particular course of action? … 
When one is giving instruction about something that must be acted on, and one’s aim is 
to produce this action, it is futile to persuade people of the truth of what is being said, and 
futile to give delight by the style one uses, if the learning process does not result in 
action.230 
This action on the basis of faith, as we have seen from De Trinitate, then imparts divine 
“wisdom,” which is according to truth. Wisdom is not immediate, purely intellectual, or 
comprehensive, in the distentionem animi (i.e., our stretched-out-in-time being) of the church or 
the self.231 Even knowledge about the self is “for the most part hidden away unless brought to 
light by some experience,”232 and what is true for the self is a synecdoche for what is true of the 
larger ecclesial body.233 Wisdom is individually discerned, but socially confirmed and owned, 
tying together the faithful with cords of shared experience in the truth. Augustine articulates how 
this individual love of the truth becomes a co-owned truth: “because [an interpretation] is true, it 
is by that very fact not theirs. Therefore, if they love it because it is true, then it is both theirs and 
mine, since it is the common property of all lovers of the truth.”234 Augustine divides this 
experience in the truth into contemplative experience and action experience, inward action and 
outward action, and he argues that both should constitute the Christian’s life: 
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As to these three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, 
although, so long as a man’s faith is preserved, he may choose any of them without 
detriment to his eternal interests, yet he must never overlook the claims of truth and duty. 
No man has a right to lead such a life of contemplation as to forget in his own ease the 
service due to his neighbor; nor has any man a right to be so immersed in active life as to 
neglect the contemplation of God.235 
If individual believers never moved between contemplation and action, their faith would never 
become wisdom and would never move from a mere opinion of faith to a testimony of wisdom. 
This movement back and forth between contemplation and action, though, is the province of the 
church.  
In some cases, understanding can become action, and thus wisdom, with the goal of 
testimony to raise the faith of another, provoking similar individual action. Augustine gives an 
example of this in Confessions when recounting the conversion of the prominent pagan 
Victorinus. Victorinus had attempted to claim a Christian identity through private understanding 
rather than the public action of confession and baptism, but was rightly turned away. “Through 
reading [the scriptures] and longing, he drank in strength,” though, and let his understanding and 
delight bear fruit in baptism and public confession of the faith.236 The testimony of such 
attainment of wisdom has an important social impact in leading others to new or further 
contemplation of God, and joy, as Augustine says: “For when many men rejoice together, there 
is a richer joy in each individual, since they enkindle themselves and they inflame one another. 
… they exercise authority towards salvation for many others, and they lead the way on which 
many others follow.”237  
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Augustine’s conversion itself can be seen in this paradigm of individual understanding 
flowering into action, and from there into testimony which creates a community founded on 
wisdom, ready for good works. His conversion was alone and in silence, but he immediately 
shared conversion testimonies with Alypius, joined the fellowship of his mother,238 and soon 
began speaking of the Christian life in the plural: “your love pierced our heart like an arrow, and 
we bore within us your words, transfixing our inmost parts. … So strong a fire did they enkindle 
in us that all the hostile blasts from deceitful tongues would only inflame us more fiercely and 
not put out that fire.”239 That pronominal “our” and “us” then grows a charity and wisdom that 
renews its ecclesial community’s interpretive framework and readings of the scriptures.  
In other cases, for understanding to become action, it requires more than one human 
participant: either two together sharing the action or a faithful giver acting towards a faithful 
receiver. Again, though each person is accountable for his own seeking of inward wisdom, 
Augustine insisted that such seeds must flower into “bear[ing] one another’s burdens,” which 
“fulfill[s] the law of Christ.” He memorably applies this principle to rich and poor: “You haven’t 
got poverty as a burden, but you have riches as a burden. … [The poor man has] got one burden, 
you another. Carry his with him, and let him carry yours with you, so that you end up by carrying 
your burdens for each other.”240 Augustine saw his own writing career as a provocation not to 
mere understanding but to action, saying, “If those by whom these books are read and praised do 
not actually take action and do these things, of what good are the books?”241 Augustine thus saw 
his own labor in the scriptures, and that of the church itself, as potential gifts that could be 
actualized by their reception. These charitable interpretive actions then feed back into the 
church’s reading of scripture, and thus inform and perfect its wisdom, and thus blossom into 
praise, the “new song” of loving obedience.242 
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As explained above, this model illustrates an Augustinian philosophy of communication. 
The scriptures, while on a higher level than Augustine’s own writing,243 are similarly dependent 
on the inward and upward turn of receptive hearers. These different gifts of language to the 
ecclesial interpreting body, like the biblical metaphor of the seed, may have different levels of 
effect, but the target is “he who hears the word and understands it, who indeed bears fruit and 
produces: some a hundredfold, some sixty, some thirty.”244 And the effect that such scriptural 
language produces cannot or should not remain within the individual mind as personal meaning, 
Augustine says, but, as the truth of God, should be treated as common property. This move from 
individual meaning to communication and shared action to a shared meaning through the 
embodiment of truth to a now-deeper shared language explains why Augustine’s hermeneutic 
philosophy requires for its full functioning a participating ecclesial body.  
Augustine’s Participatory Social Thought 
Because Evangelicals are embedded within the individualism of modern culture and thus 
have a hard time seeing the participatory sociality of the scriptures, it might be difficult for them 
to follow my argument that scriptural interpretation is necessarily co-owned. Their hope in the 
stability of the text and the incorruptibility of hermeneutic methodology is an understandable 
defensive reaction to the modern quandary of intersubjectivity and the further fragmentation of 
the Christian narrative. That is, modernity undercuts intersubjectivity, even as intersubjectivity 
continues as a felt need and a human practice.  
As Samuel Moyn explains, modern philosophers have for some time been trying to 
resolve the question of how intersubjective meaning is (or is not) possible, and this tension has 
been a goad for much of the philosophy of communication in modernity. For the most part, 
Moyn says that philosophers have started with meaning as arising within the individual knower. 
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The potential incommensurability of different knowers, though, leads to the further problem of 
communication since interpreting the communication of another person demands some level of 
shared preunderstandings. When the communicator is absent, is from an alien culture, and is 
separated from the other by layers of textuality, the problem of intersubjective interpretation is 
exacerbated. This tradition of thought culminated in the work of Edmund Husserl, who 
acknowledged that he never solved the problem of intersubjectivity. His student Martin 
Heidegger then shifted the ground of the problem by presupposing intersubjectivity, but this 
neither answered the question nor provided resources by which to diagnose successful or ethical 
communication.245  
Augustine himself acknowledged the real division between person and person. He rested 
on the charity of his readers to understand and believe his words in the Confessions,246 and he 
also wrote in Confessions extensively of the intersubjective gulf that bears on scriptural 
interpretation, citing Moses as a representative scriptural other. Moses is absent, speaking within 
a different historical moment, immersed in a different language, and available only through text, 
not conversation. However, even if Moses were present in conversation speaking the same 
language, Augustine asks, “how would I know whether he spoke the truth?”247 Further on, 
Augustine puts the exact content of Moses’s communication in the same place as its veracity: 
“Can I say with the same confidence that Moses meant nothing else than this when he wrote, ‘In 
the beginning, God made heaven and earth?’ I do not see him thinking this within his mind as he 
wrote those words.”248 However, as we will see, Augustine’s confidence in the participatory 
work of the Inner Teacher249 and his clear priority on charity in mutual understanding250 give 
him a distinctly non-modern grounding for confidence in intersubjective interpretation.  
 
 
192 
Without a healthy participatory sociality passed down from this longer Christian 
tradition, Evangelical hermeneutics has had difficulty dealing with the problems of scriptural 
interpretation and shared social meaning, as narrated in Chapter 1. To Evangelicals, the text 
itself, rightly interpreted, is supposed to be the authority that is clear enough to each individual 
that each individual priest in the priesthood of all believers can come quickly to the one 
interpretation that was meant by the author, an interpretation clear enough that each individual 
interpreter would express it in similar language. This is how scholarly Evangelical interpreters 
have, in the last century at least, tried theoretically to put together the inwardness of the 
interpreting process and the outward objectivity of the truth. In general practice, Evangelical 
hermeneutics has never functioned this way, though scholars and practitioners were not for a 
long time forced to come to grips with the gap between theory and practice.251 The linguistic turn 
has exposed the social and contextual nature of interpretation—that it is never purely individual 
nor purely objective with the text. But part of what philosophy of communication needs to 
explain is the nature of humankind that allows its interpretive faculties to be always already 
mutually influenced. And in an Evangelical narrative where right and wrong interpretation of the 
scriptures might have eternal consequences, not just sociological consequences, how can the 
dangers of an intersubjective hermeneutics be mitigated?  
This also is where Augustine can help us: his philosophy of communication gives us an 
intersubjective anthropology that not only points us toward the charitable hermeneutics made 
possible by the created sociality of our nature but also warns us about the equal and opposite 
dangers of interpretive division and false interpretive “peaces.” This is the nexus in which 
scriptural interpretation operates: enabling shared interpretation through spiritual participation 
 
 
193 
and charity and refuting interpretations that undercut the faith and the charity of the ecclesial 
social body.   
According to James K. A. Smith’s reading of Augustine, “finitude and intersubjectivity 
… are the conditions for hermeneutics.”252 Intersubjectivity makes interpretation possible, while 
differences and human finitude make it necessary. Articulating the problem of intersubjective 
hermeneutics after the linguistic turn, Smith says,  
We never have (nor ever will have) access to the thoughts of another as immediately 
present … Every act of reading or listening is an act of translation: a negotiation between 
two (or more) universes of discourse, two (or more) traditionalities, two (or more) ways 
of understanding the world.253  
Helpful as it is, Smith’s reading of Augustine is indebted overmuch to modern individualism, 
especially Kierkegaard’s “leap of faith” between one individual’s and another’s understanding. 
He does identify for us Augustine’s “primordial hermeneutics of trust,” but he sets it in the 
context of mere language more than in the participatory possibilities of God’s “presence” to 
multiple people.254  
 The participatory nature of intersubjectivity, and thus of hermeneutics, can be seen, 
though, in Augustine’s complex pairing of love for God (which draws us into intersubjective 
communion with God) and love for our neighbor (which draws us into intersubjective 
communion with him/her). As Raymond Canning argues exhaustively in his 1993 opus The 
Unity of Love for God and Neighbor in St. Augustine,255 these two loves are inseparable in 
Augustine. We are by nature fitted to have fellowship with God, and we are by nature fitted to 
have fellowship with one another, and these two types of types of intersubjective communion 
are—as part of one created nature—complementary and not contradictory. This is, of course, a 
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nature that was created good and continues to be good, though partially de-natured and marred 
by sin. In City of God XIX, Augustine says,  
How much more strongly [than an animal] is a human being drawn by the laws of his 
nature, so to speak, to enter upon a fellowship with all his fellow-men and to keep peace 
with them, as far as lies in him. … [I]t cannot help loving peace of some kind or other. 
For no creature’s perversion is so contrary to nature as to destroy the very last vestiges of 
its nature.256 
That this peace is not merely political257 is shown by the ensuing metaphors in City of God 
XIX.12 of an embalmed body as one that is kept at peace with its original form and the decaying 
body as one that becomes at peace with the earth, all according to the natural laws of God. That 
is, the desire for peace through intersubjective sociality operates on every level, from the 
microbes to the human body to the circle of friends to the body politic. In fact, Augustine says 
that we can see the operation of this natural desire for intersubjectivity in even our relationships 
with the “irrational creatures” of the world: “It almost seems as if they long to be known, just 
because they cannot know themselves.”258 So, the desire to be known is part of human nature, 
and the desire to meet this desire to be known is its matching characteristic. Importantly, the 
directionality of this desire for intersubjectivity is not just toward other humans or irrational 
creatures but also toward God, for “our heart is restless until it rests in [God].”259  
 Augustine also underscores the naturalness of intersubjectivity in the plan of God by 
emphasizing our common human genesis in Adam. He also says in City of God: 
God created man as one individual; but that did not mean that he was to remain alone, 
bereft of human society. God’s intention was that in this way the unity of human society 
and the bonds of human sympathy be more emphatically brought home to man, if men 
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were bound together not merely by likeness in nature but also by the feeling of kinship. 
… God started the human race from one man to show to mankind how pleasing to him is 
unity in plurality.260 
Thus, natural human intersubjectivity involves “unity” and “sympathy” that flow not just from 
“likeness in nature” but also from “the feeling of kinship.” Besides being natural from creation, 
kinship is given here as a rhetorical argument for our belief in and action in service of 
intersubjectivity—that is, that our intersubjectivity “be more emphatically brought home” to us. 
Intersubjectivity, then, though natural, is not just descriptive but also hortatory. Also, because 
God’s object is not mere “unity,” but “unity in plurality,” it is obvious that even pure 
intersubjectivity (prelapsarian) involves difference as well as similarity. Hermeneutics, as a 
social intersubjective phenomenon, would involve both unity and plurality, made possible by the 
participation of all in one body with one head, Christ.  
That is, Augustine grounds in God what Derrida (quoted approvingly by Smith) grounds 
in human communication: the “dissymmetry of an affirmation, of a yes before all opposition of 
yes and no … Language always, before any question, and in the very question, comes down to 
the promise.” Smith connects this primordial “yes,” or positive attention, with Augustine’s 
presupposition that “goodness is more primordial than evil,”261 but it may be more accurate to 
Augustine to say that God is a more primordial ground than evil, that the primordial “yes” is 
rooted more in the participatory engagement of God with his creation than in mere language.  
To Augustine, language is important in the realm of temporality, but it is a means and not 
the ultimate ground of intersubjectivity and right interpretation. In the Preface to De Doctrina, 
Augustine defends the importance of human-to-human intercommunication:  
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All this could certainly have been done through an angel, but the human condition would 
be wretched indeed if God appeared unwilling to minister his word to human beings 
through human agency … Moreover, there would be no way for love, which ties people 
together in the bonds of unity, to make souls overflow and as it were intermingle with 
each other, if human beings learned nothing from other humans.262  
Here, we see again the return to our natural “unity” through “love.” Moreover, the description of 
the result—“souls overflow and … intermingle with each other”—certainly describes a presence 
to one another beyond a “leap of faith” and beyond a mediated textual science.  
Augustine also recognizes the “power of the tongue” in the peace of even the earthly city 
in his retelling of the unity of Babel against God.263 However, we notice in the above quotation 
from De Doctrina Christiana that it is God doing the ministering. In another place, Augustine 
warns “that no man … may attribute it to his own powers, when some other man, whom he 
wishes to correct, is corrected by his words.”264 In fact, as we have seen, Augustine calls into 
question any simplistic understanding of communication that would posit immediacy and 
transparency through language alone.265 While he acknowledges and develops the limits to 
knowing one another inwardly, Augustine says that the only happy life is “social,”266 and, 
crucially, he posits a way that the turn inward to Christ is also a turn outward to the neighbor. In 
both of these turns, communication through language is a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for intersubjective hermeneutics.  
In City of God XI, for example, he says that the angels around the throne of God know 
themselves and the world not by “spoken words, but by the actual presence of the unchanging 
Truth,” and that their knowledge without words is better than our knowledge with words.267 He 
never downplays the scriptures, sign of a sign though they be, and he does trace part of his 
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salvation journey back to the infiltration of his mind with Ambrose’s faithful words.268 However, 
Augustine believed that temporal words had to be grounded in the eternal speech of God for 
communication, and thus for intersubjectivity, to occur. The scriptures are the participatory site 
in which to connect eternal and temporal speech, together, through their figures, thus grounding 
our own worship and action.  
As we have seen already, the keystone of this grounding, for Augustine, was the 
Incarnation. The Incarnation joined Christ in his identity as the Eternal Word with Christ in his 
human identity as the mediator, the one who removes the sin that blocks full and free 
intersubjectivity with God: “For as man, [Christ] is mediator, but as the Word, he is in no middle 
place, since he is equal to God, and God with God, and together one God.”269 As the Word, 
Christ brought everything into existence from before time began; he does not stand between a 
real eternal realm and a discrete real temporal realm and carry messages back and forth between 
them, but as “no middle place” is the ground of both. Every explanation of this in language is 
insufficient, but it may help to set it in contrast to the presumed separation between the Cartesian 
subject and his known object. While Christ is by his divine nature separate from his creation, his 
identity as the eternally speaking/spoken Word also collapses that separation, creating a ground 
of meaning shared between himself and his creation that can then manifest its participation in 
various ways in human beings—in the inner word primarily and in communal language 
secondarily. Messages are not transmitted to create meaning, but meaning that has always 
already been spoken is manifested in messages that can be recognized and shared through 
participatory attention to the Word (and then labeled as communication or interpretation). The 
mistake of modernity is to assume a univocal temporal realm in which communication and action 
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must be initiated in time and carried out through the effective mediation of the right language, 
implemented through the right rhetorical or hermeneutical technique.  
But Christ, as the Word outside of time who is embodied in manifold ways inside time, 
is, as Paul said to pagan Athenians, “not far from each one of us,” to the point that he is “within 
our very hearts.”270 Quoting John, Augustine insists that Christ “is the true light that gives light 
to every man who comes into the world.”271 Therefore, even for unbelievers, Christ as the Word 
opens up the possibility of communication with God through attention to the Interior Teacher. 
And to the degree that unbelievers can seek wisdom through the inward turn to their creator, they 
can to the same degree have fellowship with one another on those shared goods from their shared 
creator. In this way, traditions that are centered on shared goals and values that are truly good 
can share, by general grace, interpretive competence.  
For believers, though, Christ as mediator opens the possibility of an intersubjectivity that 
goes further than that experienced by secular society. This intersubjectivity could be said to be 
based on a new underlying “yes” to God that grows from God’s primordial “yes” to us through 
the redemption of the cross, carrying with it a persistence in attention that evokes a positive cycle 
of communication (like that with demons, but in an opposite direction) centered on a new love. 
This new intersubjectivity with God is not portrayed by Augustine as having a distancing effect 
from other humans, as we have seen in how Augustine’s pronouns show that the depth of divine-
human understanding and agreement was shared among other human believers as well.272   
Augustine did not believe that even faithful Christians could achieve unclouded 
interpretive communion, except perhaps occasionally through mystical events such as the vision 
at Ostia he experienced together with his mother.273 Augustine says in Confessions,  
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Whoever thinks that in this mortal life a man may so disperse the mists of bodily and 
carnal imaginings as to possess the unclouded light of changeless truth, and cleave to it 
with the unswerving constancy of a spirit wholly estranged from the common ways of 
life—he understands neither what he seeks, nor who he is who seeks it.274  
Augustine nevertheless worked tirelessly for interpretive communion and unity in the church, 
and he even maintained a limited hope that a low-level cooperation on basic issues might enable 
something like a Ciceronian commonwealth, a political community that is grounded more in real 
common agreement than on domination.275 In the church, the primary language through which 
intersubjectivity with God and humans might be achieved was, to Augustine, the language of the 
scriptures. And the way those scriptures themselves were interpreted was undertaken 
dialogically, in pursuit of both inward and outward actions of charity, within the broad 
framework of the Christological rule of faith—while also taking into account the linguistic, 
philosophical, historical, and scientific knowledge current at our disposal. That is, participatory 
communion would provide a secure venue for interpretive deliberation, and even conflict,276 by 
setting knowledge and limited personal interpretations within the larger context of the scriptural 
narrative of the church and its order of loves.   
Because of the introduction of sin, discussed more below, this triangulated interpretation 
was interrupted at every juncture, but the work of Christ to forgive sin and deify humans enables 
the healing of broken intersubjectivity between human and human and between human and God. 
These two directions of relational healing are not separate but are intimately connected in a 
participatory reassembling of a godly and godward community, which is necessary for a right 
practice of scriptural hermeneutics. Though some excoriate Augustine for making God alone the 
ultimate focus of enjoyment, they do so without understanding (or agreeing with) the 
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participatory ecology of caritas in which the enjoyment of God is the only ground for true human 
community, full human love and joy, responsible human action, and thus true human 
interpretation. Augustine made clear through his insistent preaching and writing on the conjoined 
Christian responsibilities of loving God and neighbor through communal action that only 
interpretations and actions that demonstrate charity to one’s neighbor are the ones that 
demonstrate charitable enjoyment of God, participating both upward in God and across to one’s 
fellow human.277 This triangulated social theory provided Augustine an interpretational paradigm 
for the scriptures that provoked the action of praise upward and the action of service outward—
often both through the same scripturally-figured good deed.  
Two-fold Challenge to Living under the Scriptures  
As implied already in the discussion of the coordinates of an Augustinian hermeneutics, 
the problems addressed by those coordinates are not primarily problems of textual science or 
historical knowledge, which has been the preoccupation of Evangelical hermeneutics over the 
past century. Because the nature of the core problem, or question, is so central to understanding 
any rhetorical problem in philosophy of communication, an explicit explanation of the two-fold 
challenge to hermeneutics in Augustine’s philosophy is important. Though Augustine upheld the 
importance of grammatical and historical knowledge for especially those charged with teaching 
and preaching, the chief problems that beset scriptural interpretation he saw as human moral 
failings and human temporal finitude.  
Moral Barriers to Hermeneutics 
The goodness of nature and its concomitant diversity, according to Augustine, is strained 
to the breaking point through sin, which infests, as it were, the natural labor of intersubjectivity 
with the curse of communicative thorns and briers. Our nature is our common “breath of life,” 
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but sin is not according to nature, and is thus a strike against our commonality.278 In our natural 
diversity, we were still to be equal with one another,279 but sin introduced a lust for domination 
that complicates intersubjectivity through unnatural hierarchy. Augustine says, “Pride is a 
perverted imitation of God. For pride hates a fellowship of equality under God, and seeks to 
impose its own dominion on fellow men, in place of God’s rule. This means that it hates the just 
peace of God, and loves its own peace of injustice.”280 That is, the goodness in human nature still 
seeks peace, but it is the situation now that our nature seeks peace through either domination or a 
shared love other than the love of God. People still have interpretive communion, but centered 
on areas of temporal knowledge and loves other than God. Even commendable earthly loves 
such as provision for material needs or seeking the peace of the family, if not rightly ordered vis-
à-vis an appropriate love for God, can create interpretive communities that distort their members’ 
reading of the world and the word. This is a moral problem that leads to systematic interpretive 
problems.  
Moreover, these skewed interpretive narratives often function in a way that enacts not 
only identification and consubstantiation but also, by the same token, division and 
disconnection.281 In Augustine’s reading, the Roman love of the glory of its empire became the 
basis for emotionally moving examples of intersubjectivity between Roman citizens and their 
shared interpretation of the world, but, at the same time, it became the impetus for the extreme 
opposite of communion and shared interpretation with their human enemies, specifically through 
wholesale slaughter and pillage. Since the thing that binds people together in harmony is some 
common love, the prevalence of differing loves and interpersonal lovelessness means that some 
people can effectively have “nothing in common,” and thus have no shared basis for 
interpretation. This principle is appropriated for political thought from City of God XIX—“A 
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people is the association of a multitude of rational beings united by a common agreement on the 
objects of their love”282—but “objects of their love” is a prepolitical social principle that divides 
as much as it creates a people. Sin, then, limits intersubjectivity to a more shallow human 
connection, centered on lesser loves, and opens the doors for those bonds of fellowship to 
become a sword instead of a plowshare. Commenting on the same phenomenon on an 
interpersonal level, C. S. Lewis says that “friendship makes good men better and bad men 
worse.”283 By the same token, it can make people better or worse interpreters by creating better 
or worse interpretive communities.  
Even fellowship with good angels, Augustine says, is blocked not because of the 
“conditions of fleshly existence” but because of the “impurity of our heart.”284 Though these 
spiritual beings are decidedly “other” than us, not sharing our history, our social influences, our 
language, our bodies, or our nature, they would be prime candidates for true fellowship if not for 
the effect of sin on our loves and on the foci of our attention. For Augustine, though, an even 
more shattering effect of sin is the loss of connection with God. “He is within our very hearts, 
but our hearts have strayed from him,” Augustine says of God in the Confessions.285 Though the 
Inner Teacher is still present from creation in all people and available, by general grace, for those 
who turn inward to Him, “our hearts have strayed from him,” and thus all people to some degree 
have strayed from the only stable ground of interpretation available to them. The content of the 
scriptures may be available in several ways to those who do not turn to the Inner Teacher—who 
turn instead to personal, cultural, or disciplinary narratives—but without that inward and upward 
turn, what remains unavailable to those interpreters is the Truth Himself.  
Thus, the one-another morality of an interpreting community will move its hermeneutics 
in a better or worse direction—a hermeneutic coordinate that Evangelical congregations would 
 
 
203 
do well to pay heed to as much as or more than the congregation’s textual savvy. This is an 
Augustinian move that Fowl and Jones helpfully bring to the forefront in their influential 1998 
book Reading in Communion. They say,  
The discontinuities that arise from historical divergences are not nearly as important for 
faithful interpretation as are the discontinuities that arise from our contemporary failure 
to embody faithful living in ongoing Christian communities. That is, the discontinuities 
are not so much historical as moral and theological.286  
We will look more closely at their proposal—and their own moral and theological lens—in 
Chapter 5, but their point here is well taken. An Augustinian hermeneutic is necessarily one that 
puts diverse Christian readers, together, under the moral scrutiny of the scriptures. Only by being 
searched by the participatory God through the medium of His scriptures can ecclesial groups be 
spiritually healthy by becoming better readers themselves of those scriptures.  
Temporal Hermeneutical Challenges 
Smith’s The Fall of Interpretation details how most hermeneutic traditions see 
interpretation as a necessary response to some sort of fall, whether a theological fall from grace 
or a naturalistic fall into language itself, language which is always already violent. Smith argues 
that Augustine’s perspective redeems hermeneutics, identifying it as a prelapsarian and post-
eschaton reality that continues to enable love by continuing to deny “immediacy.”287 My 
reservations about his argument stem primarily from Augustine’s own words, such as 
Augustine’s description of the wordless communion of the angels,288 but there is an important 
insight that I think can be recovered from Smith’s argument. While Smith is correct that humans 
were created in a materiality and temporality that required hermeneutics as a creational good, not 
a fall, he does not take into sufficient account the way that Augustine points towards the 
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eschaton as an eternal “re-creational” good that transcends hermeneutics as we know it. That is, 
temporal hermeneutics is good; eternal hermeneutics will be better, and quite different.  
However, along with sin, temporality itself provides hermeneutical challenges. For one, 
temporality problematizes the individual self. Augustine’s “self” is famously complex,289 and the 
root of his understanding of this problematic was how it is stretched out in time.290 Each person 
contains a “multiplicity,”291 and Augustine spends all of Book X of the Confessions explicating 
all the ways he is a “question to himself.”292 We are not sufficient to understand even ourselves 
because our being, and the being of the other, is embedded in a temporality that allows us to see 
only a part of the whole that is being/has been spoken by God outside of time.293 To engage 
oneself is to engage a person as he is at this point in his history, tenuously connected through 
memory to his past and his expected future, a self-in-narrative unfinished and only vaguely 
aware of himself as a narrative. The other that we seek to interpret, in person or through a text, is 
likewise in flux.  
These personal narratives themselves can tie people together in a shared interpretive 
frame through language, but it is itself subject to temporality. The meaning of the “whole” of a 
sentence, of a discourse, of a book can only reach its hearers or readers one part at a time, 
moment by moment, on the temporal plane. Augustine says in many places that we cannot know 
the inner depths of our fellow humans unless they enlighten us, to what degree possible, through 
the means of language. He says, “We have only a hearsay acquaintance with any man’s 
conscience; we do not claim to judge the secrets of the heart. ‘No one knows what goes on inside 
a man except the man’s spirit which is in him.’”294 Even this basis of interpretation is undercut 
when people speak mutually incomprehensible languages. Augustine infamously says that it is 
easier to have fellowship with a dog than with a human who speaks a different language.295 Thus, 
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if people share the same language, they can utter syllables stretched out in time that, to some 
degree, stick in memory and might let the communicating people share some momentary 
common perspective that they happen to have, and that they happen to remember, at that point in 
their longer life narrative. In this way, temporality enjoins continual labor in the interpretation of 
scripture,296 a continual confession of the truth, and a continual dialogue with one another over 
the scriptures, a continual obedience to charitable duties so as to understand and remember what 
we confess.297  
When the indeterminacy and polyvocality of the self and the slipperiness of language in 
temporality is complicated with the turning away from memory of inward sinfulness and the 
discord in the loves of society, hermeneutics does seem to be a treacherous endeavor. It is no 
wonder that a society disconnected from a participatory trust in its creator God would seek some 
other solid ground, such as modernistic textual science, on which to build a hermeneutical house, 
sand though it may be. However, the Evangelical tradition would do well to remember that its 
solid hermeneutical foundation can still stand, as Augustine’s philosophy of communication can 
remind them. “Those who hear these words of mine and do them,” Jesus says, have the secure 
foundation.298 Augustine tells us that because of the Incarnation, individuals and communities 
can truly hear those words of the Word, participating together through the scriptures in not just 
earthly knowledge but also the eternal wisdom by which not only do they know about God but 
also hear from, speak with, act with, and know God. It is this Augustinian redirected frame for 
scriptural hermeneutics that I argue can provide a constructive philosophy of communication 
solution to the current crisis in Evangelical hermeneutics.  
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Chapter 4  
Locating Augustine’s Hermeneutics in the Evangelical Philosophical Conversation 
After this examination of Augustine’s multi-faceted hermeneutic theory, the temptation 
might emerge to apply it immediately to the Evangelical hermeneutic crisis in the current 
historical moment. However, a philosophy of communication approach constrains us to do the 
further work of bringing the horizon of Augustine’s philosophy into a meaningful interaction 
with the language of current hermeneutical theory. By way of developing and justifying this 
philosophy of communication approach at the outset of this chapter, I address two equal and 
opposite questions: On the one hand, some hermeneutics scholars (including some Evangelical 
ones) might ask why Augustine needs to make an appearance at all if the conceptual resources of 
philosophical hermeneutics are already present, up-to-date, and sufficient to meet the needs of 
Evangelical hermeneutics. On the other hand, other scholars and theologians might ask why 
“secular” philosophical hermeneutics needs to make an appearance at all if Augustine’s 
hermeneutic philosophy is comprehensive and Christian enough to fit the Evangelical bill. 
Addressing these hypothetical poles in turn, I will further develop the specifically Augustinian 
version of philosophy of communication that frames this project.  
After thus clarifying the frame and goals of this approach, this chapter will explore 
possible fusions of Augustinian and philosophical hermeneutics horizons. For the latter, this 
project uses a reading of Gadamer and Ricoeur partially mediated through the Evangelical 
reception of their work. Because it is the Evangelical reception of these philosophers’ 
hermeneutic theories that is most relevant to a philosophy of communication approach to the 
hermeneutical crisis in Evangelicalism, it is the mediated versions of these theorists that will be 
the main focus.  
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Why Add Philosophical Hermeneutics to Augustine?  
To address first the Evangelical suspicion of philosophical hermeneutics,1 we need to 
answer the question about why these seemingly secular voices might have value for scriptural 
hermeneutics. Here is where Tertullian’s old protest against pagan philosophy—What has 
Athens to do with Jerusalem?—makes its influence felt in the Evangelical social imaginary, a 
fear felt especially keenly after a century of bewilderingly diverse attacks from a series of new 
philosophies and new versions of “Athens.”2 There are three philosophy of communication 
arguments that I propose by which to justify serious conversation between philosophical 
hermeneutics and Evangelical scriptural hermeneutics: the providential availability of truth, the 
way language enables thought and dialogue, and the necessary bridge with pre-critical 
participation.   
First, following Augustine’s lead and the confession of many current Evangelical 
scholars, there is general Evangelical agreement that all truth is God’s truth.3 Therefore, though 
Evangelicals have to do, together, the hard work of discerning what of secular scholarship might 
be true and helpful, they cannot reject it out of hand as untrue just because it does not come from 
a confessing source. As characteristic of an Augustinian philosophy of communication, an 
Evangelical belief in divine providence would even suggest that, like other sorts of mysterious 
provision through unbelieving and oblivious people, philosophical concepts and language can be 
gifts of truth even from theorists who do not personally know the Truth. In agreement with 
Merold Westphal, I argue that Evangelical hermeneutical philosophy can gain helpful “truths” 
from the secular critical tradition in how to excise Evangelicalism’s adopted modernistic 
leanings, especially truths from philosophical hermeneutics. These secular “prophets” have 
helpfully exposed the problematic assumptions and implications of modernistic hermeneutics 
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and have provided philosophical language to suggest an alternate, constructive way forward,4 
often themselves drawing on the language of Augustine,5 though without Augustine’s 
participatory frame. 
Second, philosophy of communication rightly emphasizes that the language available to 
us strongly affects what ideas are possible among current communicating populations. Individual 
thought is affected by what vocabulary is present to make distinctions and categories (though 
individuals can also lean into the language as innovative “poets”6), and shared social thought, in 
particular, requires a shared vocabulary for shared thought and action. Neil B. MacDonald warns 
that  
Theologians and biblical scholars are sometimes unaware of the linguistic distinctions 
that philosophers deem essential to an understanding of philosophical and especially 
metaphysical questions, questions of truth. … The “linguistic turn” … has sought to show 
that such distinctions matter a great deal as regards extending the limits of rational 
thought, and that to ignore or neglect them is precisely to limit oneself in the arena of 
critical argument.7  
Because all areas of the humanities, including hermeneutics and theology, have been affected by 
the linguistic turn, the vocabularies of philosophical hermeneutics can be considered basic tools 
by which to think about and discuss scriptural hermeneutics, a common conceptual ground to 
enable internal discussions among Evangelical academics and external discussion with the wider 
academic world. Owning philosophical hermeneutics for its value as a conceptual common 
ground does not obligate the Evangelical community to stop there as an endpoint for its own 
philosophy of communication, but it rather lays out some of the ground rules by which to 
discover and communicate more clearly Evangelical hermeneutical distinctions.  
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Third, Evangelicals should engage philosophical hermeneutics because of its potential as 
a linguistic and conceptual bridge to one of those distinctions of the longer and broader 
Evangelical tradition: the participatory nature of God’s relationship to his people through the 
medium of figural scriptural hermeneutics. As we saw from Barfield’s exposition of the theme of 
participation in Chapter 2, the concept of participation continues to return, phoenix-like, in 
different metaphors of different philosophical eras, and the emphasis on the contingency and 
“thrownness” of being in post-Heideggerian hermeneutics is, in particular, structurally analogous 
in many ways to pre-modern and pre-critical theological hermeneutics.8 Some theorists in the 
philosophical hermeneutical tradition, such as Jean-Luc Marion and Paul Ricoeur, move 
explicitly toward the religious implications of philosophical hermeneutics.9 If, as I have argued, 
modernist hermeneutics is a suspect interloper in the longer Evangelical tradition, Evangelicals 
should be seeking some such conceptual bridge to return responsibly to their roots. Because 
philosophical hermeneutics has structural and genealogical connections to premodern and 
precritical hermeneutics, especially through its connections with Augustine, it is well-positioned 
to help us actually understand Augustine’s philosophy of communication in a current 
hermeneutical idiom.    
Why Add Augustine to Philosophical Hermeneutics?  
However, the opposite question now comes to the fore in this dialectical preamble: if 
philosophical hermeneutics provides linguistic resources, in a genealogical line from Augustine, 
to meet the current crisis in Evangelical hermeneutics, why would the voice of Augustine even 
be needed?  The basic answer is, of course, that philosophical hermeneutics does not provide a 
sufficient philosophy of communication response to repair Evangelical scriptural hermeneutics. 
Its replundered Egyptian gold from its Augustinian genealogy is separated from the social and 
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ontological context of Augustine’s thought, its philosophical tools are insufficient apart from 
Augustine’s theological narrative, and its persistent emphasis on linguistic immanence 
fundamentally misses the Augustinian call to participation.   
First, we will look at why Augustinian echoes in philosophical hermeneutics are not 
sufficient for the Evangelical tradition. It has been demonstrated that most of the circle of 
twentieth century hermeneutic philosophers were influenced by and inspired by the writings of 
Augustine in their influential work, including Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Hannah Arendt,10 
and the wellspring of ordinary language philosophy (and thus Speech Act Theory), 
Wittgenstein.11 In fact, we could trace still more genealogical and proximal connections, 
examining Augustine’s anticipation of post-structural hermeneutics,12 or comparing his 
understanding of the constraints of habit with the habitus of Pierre Bourdieu,13 or tracing the 
lines of his similar perspective on the irreducible otherness of human beings with Levinas.14 
However, Augustine’s philosophy of communication was in many ways an applied discipline 
whose concepts sprang from and were bound for rhetorical situations in an institutionally 
embedded set of social relationships.15 Ever since he was forcibly pulled from his short history of 
Christian philosophical contemplation to be a priest, then bishop, then controversialist and 
Roman magistrate,16 his philosophical ideas were never free to have a life of their own, not even 
for his own private contemplation,17 but were instead theoretically and practically embedded in 
social praxis. Augustine was more encyclopedic than systematic (in the modern sense) in his 
thinking,18 but his ideas travel in packs and are not separated from one another and from their 
social context without some violence to their meaning. That he intended his philosophical corpus 
to be self-consistent can be inferred from his Revisions, his late-in-life commentary on and 
corrections to all his extant works.19 Therefore, the conceptual and selective borrowings from 
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Augustine by his admirers in philosophical hermeneutics neither do justice to Augustine’s fully-
rounded concepts (i.e., socially embedded) nor are as applicable to real ecclesial hermeneutical 
questions—in real Evangelical congregations—as is Augustine’s ecclesiastically bent philosophy 
of communication.  
Second, though, even if a philosophical hermeneutics solution to the Evangelical crisis 
were examined in the realm of mere ideas (rather than praxis), Augustine’s “whole” of the divine 
theological narrative is a necessary structure within which to know how to use different 
conceptual tools for hermeneutics. What this “whole” is and how it relates to different 
hermeneutical conceptual tools is where Augustine helps us avoid errors on the right hand and on 
the left. That is, an Augustinian narrative of the participatory city of God helps us avoid the 
metanarratives of modernity while providing a “meganarrative” within which to turn the 
postmodern moves toward “finitude” and “suspicion” to constructive and worshipful ends. This 
characterization of the lines of contention and possibility in Christian use of philosophical 
hermeneutics comes from Westphal, who says: 
My argument for a Christian appropriation of [hermeneutical philosophy] is theological. 
The hermeneutics of finitude is a meditation on the meaning of human createdness, and 
the hermeneutics of suspicion is a meditation on the meaning of human fallenness.20 
Westphal’s position is that Augustine’s theology is needed to provide a three-fold critique, 
questioning modernity, postmodernity, and the Christian tradition where that faith tradition has 
absorbed unbiblical conceptual apparatus from both secular orientations.21 Westphal “suggest[s] 
that the God who comes after postmodernism is the God of Augustine, especially as presented in 
the Confessions.”22 
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Because it is a key point in my argument for the importance of Augustine’s philosophical 
corrective to modernity and postmodernity, we need to look more closely at how his theological 
narrative empowers hermeneutic conceptual tools in a better way than the alternatives. 
Westphal’s distinction between Lyotard’s “metanarratives” and the Christian “meganarrative” is 
a good place to start. According to Westphal, a meta-narrative is a second order philosophical 
explanation and legitimation of a first order narrative. In Evangelical theological parlance, this 
would translate to “apologetics,”23 which is not Christian life and practice but rather an 
intentional philosophical structure intended to eliminate different areas of uncertainty deemed 
discomfiting to the faith.  
As MacIntyre also tells us, everyone and every community structures its life and practice 
within the bounds of a first-order narrative, which is always partly in and partly outside of 
consciousness.24 In earlier participatory frameworks, any attempt to step above the first-order 
narrative and create philosophical scaffolding for a “view from nowhere” was held in check by 
the reality of a realm outside of human prediction, control, or knowledge. Thus, first order 
experiential narratives were primary, and second-order theoretical narratives did not suffer under 
the presumption of being “true” in a comprehensive sense. However, after Scotus’s turn to the 
“univocity” of the world and the concomitant revolution in epistemology, philosophical 
metanarratives became possible, whose object according to Westphal has not been mere meaning 
but also the legitimation of political and social institutions such as Hegel’s modern state and 
Marx’s revolutionary movement. Legitimized by these metanarratives, “believing” social 
institutions seek an “essentially homogenized humanity,”25 and in their epistemology seek an 
essentially homogenized hermeneutical process. In a modernity characterized by this type of 
metanarrative, then, the goal of scriptural hermeneutics is to establish conceptual tools and 
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methods that are self-consistent, unchanging, and infallible. In this way, a modernistic 
metanarrative avoids Augustine’s confessed ignorance and perpetual need for divine help.26 
Thus, hermeneutically educated modern people can interpret the Bible without interacting with 
God.   
This kind of meta-narrative, then, enables independence from hermeneutical participation 
in God, functioning as a modern hermeneutical Tower of Babel. Evangelical hermeneutics, I 
argue, needs the corrective “whole” of Augustine’s theological meganarrative, which demands 
dependence on and participation in God. Westphal sees Christianity’s “meganarrative” as “a 
philosophy of history, a [first order] big story in which we place the little stories of our lives as 
individuals and communities,” with its origins in “revelation” instead of human philosophy and 
its business as “kerygma” rather than “legitimation.”27 However, neither is Augustine’s 
hermeneutic meganarrative a set of postmodern critical tools whose goal is perpetual movement 
(e.g., Derrida’s deferral) through the new, the now, and the contingent. In Westphal’s terms, 
when the hermeneutic moves of finitude and suspicion—of “creation and fall”—are moved from 
their “atheistic” context to the constructive context of the Christian faith, they are not merely 
useful but actually home, back where they belong.28  
That is, while postmodern moves to decenter the interpreting subject and emphasize his 
finite thrownness (and thus the contingency of his interpretations) do so largely in response to 
the arrogance and human destructiveness of metanarratives—Christian and otherwise—the 
Augustinian Christian move to decenter the interpreting subject does so in humble submission to 
the basic lines of the Christian story, specifically that we are creatures to whom existence, 
knowledge, and direction come as gifts, not as our own proper possessions. We are in a story that 
is not primarily about us; it is about God. Also, while postmodern hermeneutical suspicion 
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functions as a cynical mistrust of every stable “truth,” Augustinian Christian suspicion comes 
under the Christian narrative of fallenness that makes us a “question to ourselves” at the very 
core of our being, the will.29 Augustine’s suspicion is less radical, though, than the postmodern 
one because his fallenness is a normal condition only within the confines of a segment of earthly 
history, a darkness between the creational “it is good” and the eschatological new heavens and 
new earth, a darkness ameliorated by the work of the Christological promise “it is finished” that 
distributes light in the meantime. Locating Augustinian finitude and fallenness within its 
narrative, Westphal says, “Yes, in a certain sense Christians know how the story ends. But in an 
equally important sense we do not. And it’s important to keep clear about what we know and 
what we don’t.”30 Augustine’s theological narrative is an important guide and corrective to 
philosophical hermeneutical concepts because it says yes to some of that postmodern school’s 
important critiques of modernity while giving them a constructive narrative origin and end, 
together with a participatory place of refuge and rest in a relationship with the Narrator.  
Third, and perhaps most telling, philosophical hermeneutics needs Augustine’s 
participatory framework for philosophy of communication in order to open up its own limiting 
framework of linguistic immanence. Immanence (i.e., univocity) is a philosophical shared 
ground for both modernism and postmodernism.31 Modernist biblical interpretation, of course, 
disallows divine causation in history, making it “largely … immanentist in its explanations and 
incapable of appreciating the category of revelation,”32 though such biblical criticism puts its 
own metanarratives in the place of revelation. Where these metanarratives provide the warrant 
for different analytical philosophies of language, its “presuppositions about univocal meaning … 
prevent it from developing a relevant analysis of … metaphoric language.”33 Thus, the 
modernistic immanent approach to the world and the scriptures as perspicuous, predictable, and 
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controllable—using language as a stable and unproblematic tool—fails both in presenting a 
justified hermeneutic “whole” and in dealing with language’s metaphorical “parts.” 
“Postmodern” philosophical hermeneutics, for its part, critiques modernism’s confident 
univocality and its mechanistic approach to language, showing how there is more to the world 
and the text than meets the eye and that language is an ever-moving target, flying on the 
powerful wings of metaphor. However, philosophical hermeneutics lacks two things that 
Augustine can provide: it misses the creational ground of truth that can be expressed in language 
(the counterpoint to creational finitude), and it misses the further participatory dimension of 
grace (the counterpoint to fallenness), two participatory dimensions which continue to connect 
the real eternal realm to particular moments in the temporal realm through divine 
communication. Both of these Augustinian additions are participatory concepts that enable an 
Augustinian philosophy of communication not only to say yes to the critiques of philosophical 
hermeneutics but also to transcend them.  
Without Augustine’s participatory frame, philosophical hermeneutics cannot refer to a 
real eternal realm—and thus the communicational value of scripture remains within the 
horizontal realm of mere language and the social interactional patterns of present ecclesial 
communities and their traditions. While Gadamer and Ricoeur both defend the constraining 
power of the textual work to set a range of acceptable receptions in the different horizons of 
different times and cultures,34 the guiding factor to set that range is still at the level of human 
language, human traditions, and human wills. The thrown subject position of the interpreter 
cannot help but loom over the hermeneutic process, with no grounded hope that the resulting 
interpretation is anything other than a reflection of himself and his language, or more to the point 
for Augustine, with no grounded hope that his interpretation of the scriptures is current 
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participation in the Word of God. Moreover, in the Gadamerian picture of hermeneutics, the 
exigencies of the present and of the earthly realm also loom over the interpretive process,35 
which I argue makes it difficult to obey Gadamer’s injunction to listen with an open attitude to 
the text.36 That is, when the text has no actual, active voice behind it to correct or rebuke an 
interpreter’s unwittingly distorting frame (or to offer a positive affirmation), I argue that the 
recalcitrance of the text is too passive to in the face of the horizons of presentism or of an 
“evolved” tradition. This is a question that we will take up more specifically when considering 
the insistence of Gadamer and Ricoeur on the being of the text itself.  
The foregoing defense of the appropriation of both Augustine and philosophical 
hermeneutical thought for Evangelical hermeneutics has been pursued with an Augustinian 
philosophy of communication as its background. Augustine tells us that nothing can be learned 
without the pointing value of signs (words) but that signs themselves do not teach—language is 
necessary but not substantive.37 An Augustinian philosophy of communication, then, would 
encourage Evangelical hermeneutics to trust God’s provision of truth by seeking all available 
conceptual resources that can help get its people to participate in God through the scriptures. 
This concept of looking for divinely provided conceptual bridges to Christian truth in otherwise 
radically “other” cultures has become a basic Evangelical missiological principle,38 and 
Augustine articulates for us the reasons to approach similarly cross-cultural scriptural 
interpretation (across time and cultures) with not just humility (because of human finitude and 
fallenness) but also hope (because of creational memory and participatory grace). The language 
of philosophical hermeneutics, I argue, may be a divine gift in its power to remind us of the 
necessary humility of interpretation, while the language and broader narrative of Augustine can 
also remind us of the direction and hope for interpretation. Perhaps most important in an 
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Augustinian philosophy of communication is the participatory frame that corrects both 
modernistic and postmodern hermeneutical theories, reminding us that the “kingdom of God is 
not in word but in power.”39  
Augustinian and Philosophical Hermeneutic Horizons (Re)fused 
In an Augustinian philosophy of communication, the mutual impact of scriptural and 
philosophical concepts—an idea Gadamer made famous as the “fusion of horizons”—would not 
be an equally weighted affair, nor would it be merely an evolving linguistic tradition without a 
ground in unchanging eternal truth. Therefore, a fusion of horizons of Augustinian hermeneutics 
and selected concepts in Gadamer and Ricoeur will come across as a comparison and contrast, 
with the criteria of judgment being weighted towards Augustine’s scripture-informed 
hermeneutics. Because one horizon of this endeavor is a scriptural hermeneutics mediated 
through Augustine and the other horizon is a limited survey of some aspects of the hermeneutical 
thought of Gadamer and Ricoeur, partly mediated through a handful of important Evangelical 
hermeneutical philosophers, this is a highly mediated inquiry that cannot claim general or 
comprehensive validity. But I hope to suggest from this inquiry some of the possibilities and 
pitfalls of Evangelicals using current philosophical hermeneutics language to carry out an 
Augustinian scriptural hermeneutic. This mediated fusion of horizons will be organized around 
the core figures of Gadamer, Ricoeur, and the extant Evangelical fusions of Westphal, 
Wolterstorff, and Smith.    
Gadamer’s Horizon 
Westphal points out that Gadamer’s Truth and Method is “the most influential twentieth-
century work in philosophical hermeneutics,”40 and its importance as a conversation partner for 
Evangelical hermeneutics cannot be ignored. Gadamer was not seeking a foolproof method for 
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explicating texts but, following and clarifying the hermeneutical philosophy of Heidegger, 
offered a philosophical description of how “understanding” is actually possible.41 His analysis 
was shaped by his reaction to the modern subjectivization of aesthetics, rejection of tradition, and 
instrumental separation of word and world. While the question of the unity and consistency of 
Gadamer’s work—not to mention its complexity—make it unwieldy to summarize,42 what 
follows is a synopsis of Gadamer’s key themes and an exploration of the questions that put the 
hermeneutics of Gadamer and Augustine into productive conversation.  
 As a central starting place, we will look at the paired themes that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics holds in dialectical tension: the prejudiced horizon of the interpreter and the 
disclosive being of the work itself.43 The first of these themes will take us into the historicality 
and traditionedness of the interpreting subject. The second of these themes will take us into 
Gadamer’s understanding of the linguisticality of being. The event of understanding, then, is 
described by the “fusion” of the horizons of the interpreter and the work, both reproducing and 
producing meaning in the current historical moment.44 Though horizons are always being fused, 
this event of understanding is to some degree dependent on an interpreter’s openness and 
interaction characterized by appropriate “questions,”45 the practice of “a hermeneutically trained 
mind” ideally embedded in a hermeneutically sensitive community.46 This fusion (which 
Gadamer also describes as “translation”47) between the interpreter and the work is bilateral and is 
never complete, creating areas of overlapping (fused) horizons where the interpreter and the 
work share a legitimate “understanding” but also leaving areas of “what remains unsaid” that 
maintain the otherness and inexhaustibility of the two parties.48 Interpretation, then, proceeds 
through time, history, and circumstance as the way we practice our being as both faithful 
guardians of the past and vanguards responsive to our projection of the future. 
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   Historical Horizon of Interpreters. “Understanding is,” Gadamer asserts, “a historically 
effected event.”49 And this is because every interpreter and every community is positioned in a 
certain time, a certain culture, a specific historical instantiation of a language, and a unique set of 
questions that direct the interpreter’s attention as she reads the text. Even our understanding of 
history is a historically conditioned phenomenon, not an “object” that constitutes objective 
criteria for interpretation.50 In this, Gadamer was indebted to Husserl’s metaphors of 
“intentionality,” “horizon,” and the “lifeworld,” especially as transferred from Husserl’s 
transcendental subjectivity to Heidegger’s focus on Being.51 “The concept of the life-world is the 
antithesis of all objectivism,” Gadamer says. “It is an essentially historical concept … something 
quite different from what the natural sciences could even ideally achieve. [It is] the whole in 
which we live as historical creatures.”52 Gadamer’s central metaphor for describing this limiting 
and enabling positionality in time and history is the “horizon,” which he explains as follows: 
Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of “situation” by saying 
that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the 
concept of situation is the concept of “horizon.” The horizon is the range of vision that 
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. … [W]orking out 
the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for the questions 
evoked by the encounter with tradition.53 
This historicality of the horizons of both an author and an interpreter is the basis of Gadamer’s 
critique of and rejection of the psychological school of hermeneutical science that conceptualizes 
interpretation as a reconstruction of the original thought and intention of the author through the 
text by means of a set hermeneutic methodology.54 Gadamer agreed with the attempt at 
universality of the general hermeneutics attempted by Schliermacher and Dilthey,55 but he 
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argued it was neither possible nor desirable to return to the horizon of the original author. It is 
not possible because every attempt that we make to reinsert ourselves into the linguistic and 
historical situation of the author’s time (let alone the personal history of that author him/herself) 
will always be done from the ground of our own horizon informed by our own current linguistic 
and historical exigencies.56 It is not desirable, as we will see more below, because such 
misplaced objectivity forgoes the truth claims of the text on the present.57  
 As implied above, the interpreter in Gadamer’s thought is not alone with history but is 
“thrown” into traditions of interpretation, and since interpretation itself always seeks out a 
language to fit the facticity of its object, hermeneutics is ontologically a way of being that 
develops linguistic traditions (i.e., vocabularies of theory and practice). However, because 
tradition had become a dirty word in the history of interpretation stemming from the 
Enlightenment, Gadamer takes pains to defend tradition. Negatively, he critiques the 
Enlightenment’s prejudice against prejudice and its negative evaluation of tradition as the 
antithesis of reason.58 Thiselton summarizes this aspect of Gadamer’s thought thus: 
Prejudice, or pre-judgment, influences the individual through tradition, and often through 
his acceptance of certain values, attitudes, or institutions, as authoritative. [Against] the 
Enlightenment outlook, … the acceptance of authority … may be based on the 
thoroughly rational insight that as an individual of a particular historical generation I 
have my own built-in limitations, and may stand in need of learning from a source which 
has a better understanding of something than I do.59  
That is, tradition is both inescapable and helpful because of the historicality of our being, and is 
thus not in principle opposed to reason, though Gadamer acknowledges that people can use 
tradition in ways that are not hermeneutically well-informed or fruitful.60 Positively, Gadamer 
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argues also from the historicality of being that tradition is the essential “horizon within which we 
do our thinking.”61 Our traditions give us the opening set of questions by which we can open 
ourselves to the experience of a text. Though traditions do both open and hide hermeneutical 
openings to a text or situation and are constrained also by the recalcitrance of the text being 
interpreted, traditions are communal dialogical conversations that enable interpretation. This 
communal dialogue with other interpreters in a particular moment in a tradition opens the text 
beyond individual subjectivity and shapes the tradition itself through time. Gadamer argues that 
“temporal distance” within a tradition helps “distinguish between fruitful and unfruitful pre-
judgments,” allowing inapt and unhelpful prejudices to drop out of a tradition.62  
 The Being of the Text. Therefore, because we “belong” to a tradition and language in 
history, we are enabled to understand a text by the horizon of that tradition and language. 
However, Gadamer also argues that since the text itself discloses not the subjectivity of the 
author but rather, through the author’s horizon, some aspect of the world itself, the text itself 
demands a hearing and is not fundamentally plastic. Having passed through the interpretive 
gauntlet of “temporal distance”—a history of being read and interpreted—the text is a thick 
artifact that brings a language, a history of interpretation, and a cultural weight.63 That is, 
Gadamer says that the “temporal distance” between our present and the composition of the text is 
“a positive and productive condition enabling understanding.” It is “filled with the continuity of 
custom and tradition, in the light of which everything handed down presents itself to us.”64 This 
traditioned “presentation” of the text “addresses us” as an Other. Because it speaks to us 
something that is not already part of our own “prejudices,” we must “suspend” those prejudices, 
even though as historically situated beings our suspension of such can never be total or 
complete.65  
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Gadamer says that the suspension of our prejudices that enables us to listen to the text 
addressing us manifests as “the logical structure of  a question,” whose “essence … is to open up 
possibilities and keep them open,” even to the extent of putting ourselves at “risk.”66 Without 
this putting ourselves in question in the face of such a text addressing us, there can be no 
understanding of the text. And without the doubling back of a historical understanding, through 
questioning, on the interpreting self, there can be no thick self-understanding.67 That is, 
following and modifying Heidegger’s hermeneutical ontology, Gadamer affirms that ideal 
human “being” is openness to the alterity of texts that disclose the world in ways otherwise than 
our current prejudices, engaging in an interminable dialectic that enriches self-knowledge and 
world-knowledge in the same historical process.68  
  Gadamer “mixes epistemological and ontological language” (language of knowing and of 
being), because he believed that “it belongs to the very being of things … to show or manifest 
themselves.” Thus the “truth” that is “beyond method” is “this event of uncovering, of showing, 
of manifestation, of revelation.”69 Gadamer takes as exemplars in Truth and Method the classical 
texts of artistic and religious traditions that, though born in very particular historical 
circumstances, nevertheless continue to inform the horizons of people in other historical and 
cultural circumstances.70 These classical texts’ groundings in particular historical traditions and 
their universal (though not uniform) appeal are connected through the shared contexts of their 
linguisticality and their human world that continually speaks to its interpreters, interpreters who 
belong to different lifeworlds otherwise. Gadamer focuses a significant part of Truth and Method 
on how the interpretation of these kinds of texts should be understood otherwise than in the 
“univocity” of the “naive objectivism” of the sciences.71 Gadamer argues that a return to the 
original historical horizon of a work is not desirable because 1) there are more possible truths in 
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a textual work than can be seen from the “epistemologically restricted” perspective of the 
original author72 and 2) such a restricted perspective “loses sight of the primary aspect of the 
work, namely that it addresses us, that it makes a claim on us that deserves to be called a truth 
claim.”73 That is, an objectivist hermeneutics, by restricting the interpretation to the original 
horizon of the textual work, eliminates the text’s truth value for the current reader. In Truth and 
Method, Gadamer says,  
The text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim to be saying 
something true. We think we understand when we see the past from a historical 
standpoint—i.e., transpose ourselves into the historical situation and try to reconstruct the 
historical horizon. In fact, however, we have given up the claim to find in the past any 
truth that is valid and intelligible for ourselves. Acknowledging the otherness of the other 
in this way, making him the object of objective knowledge, involves the fundamental 
suspension of his claim to truth.74 
In contrast, Gadamer’s truth beyond method owns its positionality within a “formative” horizon 
(Bildung), which, while limiting its possibilities, also fundamentally enables interpretation and 
thus opens those formative horizons to real change. “This knowledge … is born by practices as 
well as by propositions, attitudes as well as articulations.”75 Gadamer’s view of hermeneutic 
truth entails opening the doors of interpretation to application, and application to interpretation.76 
Bringing this Gadamerian point more into the realm of biblical interpretation, Thiselton, agreeing 
with Fuchs, says that “only on the basis of this broader understanding of hermeneutics can the 
New Testament ‘strike home,’ so that the interpreter is confronted with reality rather than with 
‘concepts.’”77 
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Though Gadamer makes this radical connection between hermeneutics and action, he 
points to language as the irreducible entry point for the process of understanding, a move made 
possible by his broadening of language to a linguisticality of all experience.78 In contrast to the 
idea that primary meaning arises in the mind and then chooses words as a “secondary” aspect of 
the thought, Gadamer claims “that words serve a disclosive rather than referential function.”79 As 
David Vessey summarizes, also quoting Gadamer, 
We don’t bring words to wordless experience. Instead, “experience of itself seeks and 
finds words that express it. We seek the right word—i.e. the word that really belongs to 
the thing—so that in it the thing comes to language.” The world becomes intelligibly 
disclosed to us through words.80  
This linguisticality of being separates Gadamer from his teacher Heidegger, who saw the 
primordial interpretation that underlies propositional language as a-linguistic.81 In contrast, 
Gadamer “points to modes of pre-understanding that already have the form of judgment 
(assertion, constative speech act).”82 Gadamer puts this in the apothegm, “being that can be 
understood is language.”83 According to John Arthos, it is this placing of “language . . . at the 
exact center of the mystery of human identity” that is the “central borrowing of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics from the Augustinian corpus.”84 In a way followed by Gadamer, according to 
Arthos, Augustine insists that “[an interior] word . . . is absolutely the same kind of thing as the 
knowledge it is born from,”85 a picture of human speaking and interpretation modeled on the 
model of the Trinity, where the Word of God both represents the Father and is Himself God. 
Westphal points out that, in this respect, Gadamer is arguing for a hermeneutic that recognizes 
and values difference without falling into dualism.86  
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This relationship between an inner interpretive “word” that discloses the world and the 
language it finds that “really belongs to the thing” shows Gadamer’s debt to medieval theories of 
language, as Vessey also shows,87 but its relationship to Augustine, and to the medieval 
participatory frame of language, will be a matter of further discussion below. Because Gadamer 
himself was possibly midreading Augustine on this point, conflating Augustine’s inner word 
with its later medieval version, especially in Aquinas,88 the issue bears looking into. How 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Augustine’s can share a language and practice will depend partly 
on this core relation between fundamental interpretation and language. For now, it is important to 
note Gadamer’s linguisticality of primordial interpretation for its connection to the being of the 
text. A text as a linguistic artifact is a legitimate, if limited, disclosure of the world—it is being 
incarnated into language—and as such it is ontologically on equal terms with the person 
interpreting it.  
  The fundamental authority of a text, to Gadamer, comes from, then, its ontological 
disclosure of a world, but Gadamer also acknowledges the importance of learning as much about 
the original historical and cultural horizon of the text as possible (“what it meant then”) to help 
guide our understanding of how the text elucidates and articulates our understanding of our 
historical moment (“what it means now”). These can be seen, respectively, as the “reproductive” 
understanding of the text and the “productive” aspect, but “while Gadamer grants that the 
reproductive aspects of interpretation can be distinguished from the productive, past meaning 
from present meaning, he rejects the notion that they can be separated.”89 Texts disclose the 
world in ways relative to the historicality of their production, but interpreters can only read 
reproductively (interpreting past meaning) in a productive way (the text’s meaning now) because 
of their own historical positionality. Thus, reproductive and productive interpretations inter-
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penetrate, with the being of the linguistic text standing as a perpetual conversation partner with 
the interpreter’s present horizon, which is enabled by interpretive tradition.90  
 Fusion of Horizons. Gadamer thus restores to current hermeneutic theory the “function 
of interpretation in relating the meaning of the text to the present”91 while also locating the 
rationality of the text (for the most part) within interpretive tradition.92 Denying modernistic 
pretentions to comprehensive and once-for-all readings through his focus on the limitedness and 
historicality of interpreters, Gadamer instead describes a dialogic process of the living text 
continuing to speak and shape language through its position “in between” the alterity of its 
historically unique articulation of being and the familiarity of our experience of being, through 
our shared inheritance of language.93 This is Gadamer’s well-known metaphor of the “fusion of 
horizons,” and we will briefly examine what he says about this interaction between the being of 
the text and the being of the interpreter.   
The dialogic interactions between interpreter(s) and text depend on the traditions that 
belong to the language of the text and of the interpreter(s), but these dialogic interactions also 
create in that event of interpretation a new instantiation of the tradition of those languages, not 
just reproducing but also producing meaning. Thus, though there is a horizon of meaning that 
belongs to the text and that good interpreters/listeners should wrestle with, such wrestling always 
ultimately produces a fusion of horizons within the linguistic tradition, a fusion of horizons that 
responds to the questions of the interpreter’s historical moment. Thus, an interpreter’s wrestlings 
with a text is productive of “new” meanings that can be seen as consistent with, though different 
from, previous meanings. In Gadamer’s view, this new meaning is a legitimate interpretation 
because it also is a disclosure of the world, whose possible linguistic descriptions are limitless. 
Authors and interpreters are finite, describing the world from finite historical perspectives, but 
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the world and its possible linguistic descriptions is infinite. For these reasons, as mentioned 
above, the “productive” results of the “fusion of horizons” are both unavoidable and desirable.94  
But Gadamer also gives us language to explain how he sees a “fusion of horizons” 
unfolding, and his key metaphors are translation and play/performance. Though these are given 
as two different ways to understand how a text is interpreted, Westphal points out that Gadamer 
“assimilates” performance and translation: 
To perform—either in the narrower sense in which an actor performs a play or a musician 
performs a sonata or in the broader sense in which to read a novel is to perform it—is to 
translate. It is to (try to) make it understandable in a semantic context different from that 
of the author or composer. This is true even for the first “performers,” who more nearly 
than later “performers” belong to the author’s world.95 
These metaphors are helpful in discussing how this fusion of horizons is neither an exact 
correspondence to the intention of the original author nor an “anything goes” anarchy of an 
interpreter’s subjectivity. To “interpret” music or any other performance piece is, of course, one 
of the definitional types of interpretation,96 but Gadamer suggests that all interpretation, even the 
silent reading of a text, is an interpretive performance that brings the interpreter into the text’s 
game and transforms the text through the interpreter’s performance.97 In this light, a good 
interpretation of the scriptures would be judged for both its adherence to the text and for its 
aptness to the horizon of the interpreter and his/her tradition in the historical moment. An 
interpretation that refuses to “perform” the text for the questions implicit in the congregation’s 
horizon might be technically correct, but not to the purpose of the text. An interpretation that 
pays insufficient attention to the horizon of the text itself fails to disclose any fresh aspect of the 
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world to the congregation, showing them instead only their own horizon of prejudices, leaving 
their horizon unedified, untransformed.  
 Gadamer develops this vision of hermeneutics through the metaphor of “play,” which he 
discusses in relation to the work of art.98 Even though “for the player play is not serious,” 
Gadamer also says that “seriousness in playing is necessary to make the play wholly play.” The 
difference in “seriousnesses” here is between the subjective reflective attitude toward the game 
(“it’s just a game”) and the “purpose” of the game to have the player “lose … himself” in it.99 On 
the Little League baseball field, the parent-spectators should not yell as if the baseball game were 
“serious,” but the players within the game should lose themselves in the play by taking their in-
game responsibilities and execution seriously. And players who take the game too seriously in 
the first sense (stepping outside the game through reflection) often find that it interferes with 
their ability to lose themselves seriously in their performance in the second sense. Further, 
Gadamer emphasizes that play is responsive back and forth activity with “no goal that brings it to 
an end,”100 that it temporarily blurs the line between “being and playing,”101 and that it is 
fundamentally interactive, a “being played,” even when the other is a game, imaginary opponent, 
or text.102 On this point, Gadamer says,  
Play is not to be understood as something a person does. … The actual subject of play is 
obviously not the subjectivity of an individual who, among other activities, also plays but 
is instead the play itself. …  
The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden 
of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence.103  
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For anyone who has lost him/herself “in the zone” in a game, this is a clear example of the 
ontological power of the game not only to call for standard roles and responses but also to lay out 
criteria for legitimate creative interpretations of such responses within the game.  
 That is, there is for the player “a freedom of decision which at the same time is 
endangered and irrevocably limited.”104 Play is a “process that takes place ‘in between’”105 the 
player’s interpretations of the possible choices within the “irrevocable limit[ations]” of the game, 
a process of “self presentation”106 which involves a player being absorbed in the game’s “reality 
that surpasses him.”107 Gadamer insists that the “self presentation” of the play itself cannot be 
reduced to “life function and biological purpose” (i.e., an evolutionary adaptation),108 and neither 
can it be reduced to individual subjectivity, even in its “true consummation in being art, [a] 
transformation into structure.”109 Instead, it is social in the humanistically meaningful way of a 
tradition. Because of the nature of human being as always already interpreting and linguistic, 
human play “is always presentation,” which is always “potentially a representation for 
someone,” which is “all the more the case where the game is itself ‘intended’ as [a representation 
of] a reality.”110 That is, interpretation is a social game that discloses a real world. In this light, 
the scriptural text can be seen, like other artistic texts, as a realm of serious play that invites 
participation in its representation of reality.  
In the interpretation of a work of art (this game that represents reality by its own 
particular rules), the play of the interpreter both reproduces meaning through recognition of the 
world and produces meaning by a new “interpretation” of that recognized world. As Gadamer 
says, on the one hand, “we experience in a work of art and what invites our attention is how true 
it is—i.e., to what extent one knows and recognizes something and oneself.” But on the other 
hand, the “profoundest nature” of that “recognition” comes in the “joy of knowing more than is 
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already familiar.” This disclosure of truth that is both recognizable and new is the text’s “task” in 
the “game” of “representation,”111 and the corresponding interpreter’s task is to “participate” in 
the work, by reading to perform “passiv[ely]” the text already performed actively by an author 
(and sometimes mediated by a performer), reading hermeneutically in the sense of being “totally 
involved in and carried away by what one sees.”112  
This is how the play of the interpretation of a work is a fusion of horizons, reproducing 
and producing meaning through the game that the being of the text calls its interpreters into. It is 
important to remember, here, that in Gadamer’s perspective, the interaction between the 
interpreter and the text is necessarily performative because of the nature of text and of historical 
temporality. The being of the work of art exists only in its re/presentation, its interpretive 
performance in which its “reality is disclosed afresh.”113 Thus, as Thiselton says, “the concert or 
the dramatic presentation which overwhelms and transforms a man today may be more faithful to 
the score or to the script by adopting a form not identical with that of two hundred years 
earlier.”114 While a “hermeneutic that regarded understanding as reconstructing the original 
would be no more than handing on a dead meaning” because of the “historicity of our being,”115 
Gadamer’s performative hermeneutic, disclosing reality “afresh” by fusing its past 
(representational) meaning with the current interpreters’ horizon, produces a living meaning, one 
that respects the authority of an interpretive tradition by continually retranslating it through time 
and successive generations. It “acquires its proper being in being mediated,”116 Gadamer tells us, 
giving us a picture of mutual mediation: the text is the medium through which the interpreter 
reads the world, but no less importantly, the interpreter is the medium through which the text re-
presents the world to the current time and generation.  
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Gadamer’s complex description of what “understanding” is, how it is possible, and how a 
“hermeneutically trained consciousness” can smooth the way for the natural process of 
understanding provides some intriguing possibilities for how to understand the interpretation of 
the scriptures across different cultures and times. However, those explicit and implicit possible 
applications to Evangelical hermeneutics need to be read within the horizon of Augustine’s 
specifically Christian hermeneutics, which is the philosophy of communication game being 
played in this project.  
Gadamer in Augustine’s Court 
In part, the question of how Gadamer’s hermeneutics fits Evangelical Christian 
hermeneutics is a subset of the larger question of how Evangelicals should relate to 
postmodernism. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Evangelical hermeneutics might profit from 
the emphasis on finitude and fallenness that secular philosophical hermeneutics has brought to 
the fore in the postmodern era. This is Westphal’s specific thesis and project, and he argues that 
such an emphasis belongs naturally in the Christian theistic context, which reminds us that we 
are neither as comprehensive nor as pure in our interpretational motives as God: “Taken 
together, the hermeneutics of finitude and of suspicion tell us: We cannot attain to the Truth, and 
if we could, we would [sinfully] edit (that is, revise) it to suit our current agenda.”117 While 
similarly arguing for interpretive finitude (though less for fallenness), Gadamer is generally 
characterized as the “glass half-full” hermeneutic philosopher, optimistic about the possibilities 
of interpretation (unlike late Heidegger and Derrida) through the performative possibilities of 
tradition, especially as seen in the arts and humanities (including religious traditions and 
liturgies).118 He has characterized his whole project of description as focused on 
“transcendence,” and he argued more insistently in his later years for the ontological importance 
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of religious experience as a hermeneutical ground.119 This makes him, prima facie, a more 
attractive conversation partner for Evangelicals than some other hermeneutical philosophers.   
However, in this conversation, Evangelicals would do well to heed Augustine’s 
philosophy of communication modifications of Gadamer. Compared with Augustine, Gadamer’s 
understanding of human finitude seems to be similarly tied to temporality, but Gadamer’s 
description of human linguisticality lacks the creational ground of Augustine’s inner word. Also, 
Gadamer’s understanding of hermeneutical fallenness seems to miss both the real possibility of 
evil in Augustine’s philosophy of communication and the real possibility of grace through 
participation. Gadamer appropriates Augustine’s Trinitarian thought to express how a text can be 
“incarnated” in its performance by an interpreter, a fusion of horizons that produces a new reality 
as a source of blessing for his historical moment. However, Gadamer seems to limit this 
appropriation to an aesthetic transcendence that remains agnostic about any participatory 
connection between a real eternity and a real temporality. Nonetheless, Gadamer’s description of 
the performative re-vivification of the work of art—if the world it describes can be broadened to 
the spiritual and eternal, not merely the carnal and temporal—might be a helpful way to describe 
Augustine’s reproductive/productive performance of the scriptures, which brings together 
different textual horizons through figuration to focus on a participatory response to current 
historical exigencies.  
 Historicality and Temporality. Since Gadamer’s theoretical touchstone is historicality, 
it will be important to examine how this metaphor compares with Augustine’s similar focus on 
eternity and temporality. To rehabilite tradition, Gadamer develops a critique of “historicism,” 
against which we can better see his “historicality”:  
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The recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the 
hermeneutical problem its real thrust. In light of this insight it appears that historicism, 
despite its critique of rationalism and of natural law philosophy, is based on the modern 
Enlightenment and unwittingly shares its prejudices, … [including] the prejudice against 
prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power.120 
That is, “reconstructing the conditions in which a work … from the past was originally 
constituted” in order to reproduce its past meaning exactly (historicism) is a fool’s errand121 
because human beings’ fundamental reality is their embeddedness or “belonging” to a particular 
point in historical time,122 with all the social and cultural baggage (“prejudices”) that come with 
that point in time (historicality). Augustine agrees with this constraint in many ways, pointing to 
our self as life being stretched out in time (distention animi),123 to our individual interpretive 
perspectives as affected at every temporal step in our personal histories,124 and to the 
fundamental limitations of time and culture on our interpretations of the truth.125 
 However, the basic reality on which Augustine founds his understanding of temporal 
hermeneutics is eternity. Augustine’s eternity is a real and totally other realm that is nevertheless 
connected to us within temporality by our active participation in the Word of God (Christ). 
Gadamer hints at this alternate possibility in his rejection of the “timelessness” of art. Gadamer 
says that “historicality”—the “radical finitude” of Heidegger’s Dasein—is not just one way to 
understand existence but is rather “the mode of being of understanding itself.”126 This undercuts 
the idea of a timeless “sacred time” of art, with Gadamer’s following caveat: 
Only a biblical theology of time, starting not from the standpoint of human self-
understanding but of divine revelation, would be able to speak of a “sacred time” and 
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theologically legitimate the analogy between the timelessness of the work of art and this 
“sacred time.”127  
However, Gadamer’s own focus seems to be on the timelessness of the work of art and the “re-
creation … of the created work” in a way that “presents itself so differently in the changing 
course of ages and circumstances,” yet is “contemporaneous with every age.”128 This 
contemporaneity is not a “mode of givenness” (i.e., it is not ahistorical or eternal) but is rather 
the interpretive “task for consciousness and an achievement that is demanded of it.” That is, 
when we fulfill our task of being given over to the text in this play of an interpretive game, “all 
mediation is superseded in total presence.”129 This “total presence” seems to suspend historical 
time existentially, but it is the result of giving oneself to the being of the work within the horizon 
of one’s historical time. “Participation,” which Gadamer references specifically in its ancient 
Greek manifestation, is a giving of oneself to the being of the work, “being totally involved in 
and carried away by what one sees.”130 Thus, Gadamer’s focus is on participation in the work of 
art through hermeneutic openness, a total fusion of the being of the work and one’s own 
historicality that manifests in existential timelessness. While this description may hold for works 
of art in general (a topic beyond the scope of this project), it violates an Augustinian 
understanding of participation by replacing a real point of contact between two real and different 
realms with an immanent participation of one historical horizon in another, existentially achieved 
through hermeneutic openness.  
 Gadamer also thus undercuts the “biblical theology of time” through his philosophical 
description, even while he provides pictures of biblical interpretation that fit well with an 
Augustinian participatory hermeneutic. For example, Gadamer picks up Kierkegaard’s concept 
of a “claim,” which is “something lasting” and “can be enforced at any time.” It is the “legal 
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basis for an unspecified demand,” which is made concrete in different historical periods as a 
demand.131 The claim could be seen as a divine speech act, an approach favored by 
Wolterstorff,132 but Gadamer keeps its function within history: 
The application to Lutheran theology is that the claim of faith began with the 
proclamation of the gospel and is continually reinforced in preaching. The words of the 
sermon perform this total mediation … We shall see that in other ways too the word is 
called on to mediate between past and present, and that it therefore comes to play a 
leading role in the problem of hermeneutics.133  
It is true to an Augustinian perspective, in my estimation, that the lasting “claim of faith” comes 
down to us through the scriptural “proclamation of the gospel,” which is constantly made alive 
again in our historical time through the performative interpretation of the “word.” The 
“permanence” of the claim has to be applied through its “performance,” which in Augustinian 
parlance would be “confession.” However, the word that is mediating past and present, in an 
Augustinian perspective, must also be mediating the realms of eternity and temporality to have 
any legitimacy in its “permanence.” That is, while we participate horizontally in the languages, 
traditions, and texts of our fellow humans in the temporal plane (i.e., Gadamer’s focus), we must 
also be participating vertically through the Word in the eternal plane. Augustine acknowledges 
and discusses the importance of the first, horizontal dimension of interpretation while setting it in 
the context of the more basic, spiritual dimension of interpretation. “Total presence”134 for 
Augustine is not an existential result of virtuous hermeneutical actions but a real future state 
outside of historicality itself,135 and in this temporal life, it is the goal and motivation for 
participating in the real presence even in its mediated temporal artifacts.    
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 However, Gadamer’s criticism of modernistic “historicism” and his philosophical 
descriptions of the performative incarnations of the (scriptural) text in the current historical 
moment can be helpful language for Evangelical hermeneutics, especially if it is recontextualized 
in an Augustinian framework.136 One particular passage shows the promise of Gadamer’s 
discussion of “contemporaneity” in the reception of a textual work:  
For Kierkegaard, “contemporaneity” … names the task that confronts the believer: to 
bring together two moments that are not concurrent, namely one’s own present and the 
redeeming act of Christ, and yet so totally to mediate them that the latter is experienced 
and taken seriously as present (and not as something in a distant past). … 
Contemporaneity in this sense is found especially in religious rituals and in the 
proclamation of the Word in preaching. Here, “being present” means genuine 
participation in the redemptive event itself. … A spectator’s ecstatic self-forgetfulness 
corresponds to his continuity with himself. … What rends him from himself [the self-
forgetfulness of total mediation] at the same time give[s] him back the whole of his 
being.137  
Gadamer means this description of “ecstatic self-forgetfulness” through the total mediation of the 
Christological text or ritual as an existential event, an exemplar of a good tradition of 
hermeneutic openness. However, for an Augustinian participatory hermeneutic, we could say 
that “being present” in the reading of the text of scripture is truly—not just existentially—
“genuine participation in the redemptive event itself.” When Paul wrote that we have “died” with 
Christ and have been buried with Him in baptism,138 he did not merely invite an existential 
fusion of historical events (Christ’s event, Paul’s addressee’s conversion, the modern reader’s 
conversion) but, even more, described the real connection of the eternal event of the sacrifice of 
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Christ (“slain from the foundation of the world”139) and the temporal event(s) of Christ’s work 
and its every recurrence in every conversion throughout time. It is a “rend[ing]” us from our 
temporal selves—“thin,” stretched out, fallen, self-absorbed140—to “give [us] back the whole of 
[our] being,” the creational depth of self only possible through the participatory redemption of 
the imago dei and the worshipful focus upward, through the scriptures, that restores meaning by 
putting our “self” in its decentered place.   
Linguisticality and Narrative. The question of how Augustine’s grounding concept of 
the “inner word” and Inner Teacher squares with Gadamer’s appropriation of medieval linguistic 
thought is a complicated one. Considering the fact that scholars of the stature of David Vessey 
and John Arthos seem to disagree on this point of the Augustine-Gadamer relationship, my own 
conclusions should be understood as tentative.141 First, however, we should look at Gadamer’s 
basic comparison between language and the Trinity: 
The mystery of the Trinity is mirrored in the miracle of language insofar as the word that 
is true, because it says what the thing is, is nothing by itself and does not seek to be 
anything … It has its being in its revealing. Exactly the same thing is true of the mystery 
of the Trinity. … This is more than a mere metaphor, for the human relationship between 
thought and speech corresponds, despite its imperfections, to the divine relationship of 
the Trinity. The inner mental word is just as consubstantial with thought as is God the 
Son with God the Father.142 
Drawing primarily on Augustine’s De Trinitate,143 Gadamer appropriates the analogy between 
the eternal procession of the Son from the Father and the eternal procession of the “inner mental 
word” from “thought.” Echoing Augustine’s hermeneutical warning not to be “slaves of a 
sign,”144 Gadamer says that our “reason preserves its freedom” by inventively exhibiting its 
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“capacity to rise above bondage to language to attain the sense intended,” but this “capacity itself 
is, as we have seen, linguistic.” That is, reason preserves its freedom by multiplying language, 
not by getting beyond language.145 So, thinking proceeds, like the Son, into its “consubstantial” 
inner mental word (i.e., sense, meaning) that can be incarnated into a multiplicity of words, 
gestures, and other signs.   
 Not satisfied yet, Gadamer further interrogates this “inner word.” He says that as a true 
description of some aspect of the world, this “inner word” “has the ontological character of an 
event,” orienting itself towards utterance but not “completely coincid[ing]” with any “particular 
language” or specific linguistic formulation.146 That is, it has a solid root in its connection to the 
world but is not predetermined in the direction of its linguistic flowering. This characterization 
of the “inner word” as linguistic without being tied to any specific language or formulation is 
also strongly Augustinian.147 Also like Augustine, Gadamer characterizes the “discursiveness of 
human thought [as] not basically temporal in nature,”148 but like the atemporal procession of the 
Son from the Father, thought is a dialogic process in the special sense that its conversational 
ontology operates before any “reflective act.”149 That is, the basic hermeneutic act is when our 
openness to some aspect of the world elicits, “simultaneous[ly]” with our attention, a thinking-
inner-word,150 ready to find expression in outer words before we even realize that we have 
thought/interpreted anything.  
Gadamer follows Aquinas’s distinctions between the Trinity and a human inner word, 
noting that the Son (unlike the inner word) must remain “incomprehensible”; that unlike the 
Trinity, “the human word is potential before it is actual”; that though the inner word “reflects 
completely what the mind is thinking” (similar to the Son), the mind’s thinking itself is finite and 
thus “imperfect” in its attention to self and world; and that the thinking human interpreter, unlike 
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God, “cannot contain [the thing] as a whole within itself.”151 That is, because human beings are 
finite and historically rooted, their interpretive grasp on the real world is true, but radically 
limited, proceeding in “not one, like the divine word, but … necessarily … many words.”152  
Springing off of this, Gadamer insightfully notes that “even the divine Word is not 
completely free of multiplicity” since “there is an essential connection between the unity of the 
divine Word and its appearance in the church.”153 The unified Word in the church is multiple 
because “the meaning of the word cannot be detached from the event of proclamation,”154 an 
event which might take place in different times, circumstances, and choices of exterior language. 
In “totus Christus” language that resonates with Augustine and Dietrich Bonhoeffer,155 Gadamer 
asserts that “the Christ of the resurrection and the Christ of the kerygma are one and the same.” 
Gadamer recognizes that this medieval solution to the problem of the one and the many 
manifests a view of the world that is “not covered by the structure of logic” and is “not content 
with viewing concept formation as simply the reflection of the order of things.”156 That is, tying 
this development of Gadamer’s thought back to his analogy with the Trinity that is “more than a 
mere metaphor,” the hermeneutical inner word can be said to be an atemporal unity of meaning 
that has its being in its expression in a multiplicity of expressions throughout time—just as the 
Son is the “event” of a unique, eternal Word of God while also being the “events” of his 
proclamation through time in the Church. This identification of the timeless event of Christ in 
God and the temporal events of Christ in his church hint at a different logic and a different 
relationship of word and world, as Gadamer says. This also brings Gadamer right up to the 
threshold of Augustinian participation.  
Arthos points out that Gadamer believed the verbum interius was the core concept to 
explain the universality of human hermeneutic experience.157 A version of this concept also 
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undergirded Augustine’s understanding of the potential universality of hermeneutics, but are they 
the same inner word? Summarizing his perspective on this connection, Arthos says,  
Augustine’s analogy of the verbum interius feeds on the epochal achievement of the 
church to conceive of itself and its kerygmatic mission as an extension of God’s 
utterance, and of world history as a figural and narrative enactment that bespeaks the 
person of the Word. Gadamer’s reappropriation of the link between incarnation and 
Sprache ... continues to feed on this link.158 
The Augustinian inner word operates with revelational potential, connected to a creational 
beginning, a historical narrative “whole,” and a “kerygmatic” identity that goes beyond mere 
description of the world. There is no doubt that Gadamer drew on this link, but if we follow 
Vessey’s pointers,159 we might find that while much of Gadamer’s language is helpful, his 
appropriation of Augustine misconstrued the world that Augustine was attempting to describe. 
The world described by Augustine’s philosophy of communication is different than that 
construed by Gadamer in that Augustine’s hermeneutical world is creational, fallen, and graced 
with a divine Other in its basic dialogic linguisticality.  
In Augustine’s description, it is not only the Son who is the image of God but, through 
the Son’s creation and maintenance of the world, we are as well. The imago Dei is ineradically 
present in all people as the universal ground of human interpretation, as explained in Chapter 3. 
Gadamer seems to take creation as a conceptual metaphor that “only interprets the structure of 
the universe in a temporal scheme,” “not a real process” that sets out the ontological conditions 
for linguisticality itself.160 In this way, though Gadamer and Augustine have similar perspectives 
on the linguisticality of being,161 Augustine gives us the ground of this linguisticality.  
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Augustine also gives us a different perspective than Gadamer on the conversational 
nature of the inner word. Gadamer says, “Because our understanding does not comprehend what 
it knows in one single inclusive glance, it must always draw what it thinks out of itself, and 
present it to itself as if in an inner dialogue with itself. In this sense all thought is speaking to 
oneself.”162 That this is not merely an individualistic subjective inner dialogue is clear from 
Gadamer’s insistence that the “content” of tradition is inseparable from this dialogic inner 
word.163 However, all the conversation partners in Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutics are 
within the plane of temporality, whereas Augustine explains his dialogic linguisticality in terms 
of an Inner Teacher who is not present merely structurally (in tradition or language) but also 
personally. The inward turn is also an upward turn. The Inner Teacher is, in a Christian mode, a 
Hermes figure164 who speaks the languages of God and humans, of the eternal plan of God and 
the temporal situation of particular historical humans. The Inner Teacher is an Other who can 
lead interpreters to read their situation otherwise than some of the voices of tradition while 
affirming other voices of tradition. The Inner Teacher is a norming criterion who is not a 
conceptual principle but a communicating person. Vessey points out that, in contrast to Gadamer, 
Augustine’s inner word can be more fundamentally true (because of the Inner Teacher) while its 
outward expression in language can never be comprehensive or perfect.165 That is, in dialogue 
with the Inner Teacher, a faithful interpreter can gain a perspective on the world that, while still 
limited, is precisely what is needed to respond faithfully to a particular historical situation. In 
Augustine’s understanding, our dialogic hermeneutics can be “true” to the eternal plan and the 
narrative whole of history, even when we ourselves do not have the whole of the eternal plan and 
the narrative whole of history in our possession.  
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In this way, participation in God’s truth enables a right hermeneutical response to a 
moment—a faithful hermeneutical event—without needing or giving a comprehensive 
description of the rest of the world. Knowledge of the part can be in true relation to its whole as 
long as the Inner Teacher who knows the whole has enabled a clear knowledge of the part. An 
instructive illustration of this from the scriptures appears at the beginning of Acts when the 
disciples (understandably) ask the post-resurrection Christ about the whole: “Will you at this 
time restore the kingdom to Israel?” Jesus answers them, “It is not for you to know times or 
seasons which the Father has put in His own authority. But you shall receive power when the 
Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be witnesses to Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea 
and Samaria, and to the end of the earth.”166 Granted, the Teacher here was also exterior, but the 
dynamic between part and whole is helpful for us. The disciples had been preaching the kingdom 
of God, and they knew “the end of the story,” but now with access to the manifestly divine Son 
of God, they were ready to get the whole story, the whole schedule, straight from their 
authoritative source. Jesus does not cooperate in playing the part of informant, though, but rather 
gives a command and a promise. This command and promise within its largely unknown whole 
is nevertheless a clearly known part, and it comes from the participatory relationship with that 
authoritative personal Teacher.  
A final significant difference between Augustine’s inner word and that of Gadamer is that 
Gadamer seems to insist that all language is a true though limited perspective on the world, but 
Augustine argues that the impact of fallenness on language—especially in the mode of lying—
can create whole linguistic worlds (interior and exterior) that have no fundamental connection to 
the world.167 That is, Gadamer insists that the “word reflects completely what the mind is 
thinking,”168 but Augustine points out that because of sin, people routinely have divided hearts, 
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leading to divided interpretive possibilities. He says we love the truth because it is the truth, 
though we also dislike it because it calls our other loves and actions into question.169 In this, 
Augustine insists that we are faced with not one hermeneutically discerned world, but multiple 
competing ones. In agreement with Gadamer, our perspectives are limited by our historicality, 
but Augustine goes further and says that our historical perspectives are always already morally 
divided and scattered as well. The path that turns away from the Inner Teacher’s voice is still 
linguistic, but leads to interpretations that are less and less connected to any real world, which 
was created good. That is, the fallenness of our loves complicates our basic hermeneutic 
approach to the world and makes possible interpretations and representations that have no 
legitimate connection to the world, including lies, falsehoods, and false doctrines. The creational 
and participatory presence of God in the inner parts of humans, on the other hand, keeps open the 
hermeneutical possibilities of participation in the world as it is, which is not merely physical or 
historical but also moral and spiritual.  
The end rhetorical product of both Gadamer and Augustine is the multiplication of 
interpretive discourses to elaborate the given inner word. Gadamer’s inner word multiplies and 
grows as the interpreter’s horizon shifts—as the world he encounters continues to manifest new 
aspects. Augustine’s (faithful) inner word multiplies and grows, first, as the interpreter seeks 
exterior language to do better justice to the inner word (though he never quite gets there), and 
second, as the eternal inner word is disclosed differently in participatory response to the temporal 
historical situation.170 Neither one of them expects to find, through interpretation, exterior 
linguistic expressions that perfectly mirror the inner word which perfectly mirrors a world 
horizon uniformly for all time and all people. Such an “objective” interpretation would need no 
further words, no further attention to its world, and no further participation in its Creator God, 
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but would instead make itself a prime candidate for fossilization in text and use in uncritical 
social segregation, an “objective” labeling without further listening. In the conceptual language 
of the inner word, such is the description of modernistic interpretation that, I argue, should be 
recognized as an interloper in Evangelical hermeneutics. This hermeneutic is at cross purposes as 
well, I argue, with the participatory command from Acts to obedience in evangelism without a 
comprehensive grasp of the projected narrative, a missional imperative which is another 
significant part of the Evangelical identity. “We believed and therefore we spoke,” Paul says,171 
and Gadamer understands this generative need in the structure of Protestant hermeneutics.172 
There is a content to the gospel that continues through history,173 but needs to have its textual 
tradition reembodied over and over again, multiplying its interpretations/applications through the 
unified multiplicity of the church of Christ.  
 Transcendence Versus Participation. From the very beginning of Truth and Method, 
Gadamer insists that his project is one of “description,” not normative prescription.174 However, 
if every interpretation is application (at least, embryonically),175 it should come as no surprise 
that Gadamer’s interpretation of interpretation has manifested in a specific religious application. 
For an Evangelical appropriation of hermeneutic philosophy, this is where Augustine’s applied 
hermeneutics is a much better fit than Gadamer’s.  
Gadamer identifies the Augustinian analogy of linguistic incarnation as a key 
improvement over Greek hermeneutical thought, as we have seen. But further, as Jens 
Zimmerman explains from an interview with Gadamer late in his life, Gadamer came to see this 
hermeneutical inner word as itself a “quasi-religious” experience of transcendence:  
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Gadamer does not merely use the theological model as a heuristic device but believes, 
and indicates in Truth and Method, that the correspondence of inner word and intended 
meaning is itself an indication of the divine or religious transcendent.176 
In line with his phenomenological tradition, Gadamer insists that this transcendence is not 
“theoretical” but “must be genuinely experienced.”177 Gadamarian transcendence, then, is the act 
of openness to the world that provokes a true inner word whose linguistic expression enables 
both true knowledge of the world and true self-knowledge of oneself as a historically limited 
knower. We know something, but we know that our knowledge is due to our traditioned 
standpoint, and thus we know that continued hermeneutic openness to continued fusions of 
horizons is the essential precondition for knowledge in every new historical moment.  
For this reason, Gadamer “refuses to allow any positive content for religious 
experience,”178 an insistence that stands in tension with his argument for the permanence of 
content in traditions179 and with his indebtedness to the specifically Christian ontology of 
language.180 Though he acknowledges this tension in his interpretation-application, Gadamer 
“insists that he does not see any other way to ensure religious dialogue than to reduce all 
religions to a common denominator: the experience of transcendence.”181 It only makes sense, 
then, that Gadamer also locates the hope of “inter-faith dialogue” in philosophy rather than in 
religious traditions proper because of the danger of “dogmatism,” which is the positive content 
of experienced creeds.182 It also makes sense that he would similarly reject missionary work, at 
least in terms of promoting the specific content of a tradition183 (his own promotion of 
hermeneutic openness is an acceptable form of proselytizing, apparently). In line with many 
other recent philosophers who have made a “religious turn” without turning to any traditioned 
  
254 
religion,184 Gadamer redefines religious transcendence philosophically as a felt experience of 
human finitude within a uniform horizon of temporality.  
 As we have seen, Augustine would take issue with this in many ways, providing counter 
concepts which I argue prove to be important philosophical resources for not only correcting 
modernist leanings in Evangelical hermeneutics but also defending Evangelical hermeneutics 
from Gadamer’s historical-linguistic ideology. In this, again, the Augustinian ground of 
participation provides the key corrective to Gadamer’s “all too human” concept of hermeneutic 
transcendence. In its basic contours, an Augustinian hermeneutic—while agreeing with the fact 
of finitude and emphasizing more the seriousness of fallenness—upholds the hope of truth from 
divine eternity, and it is this participatory ground of truth that upholds the content of the 
Christian tradition, which both opens and forecloses the hermeneutic possibilities in the 
scriptures and enjoins evangelism, with confidence that the eternal “gospel delivered once for 
all”185 can speak timelessly to every time and culture. In a biographical illustration that should 
set Evangelicals more at ease, the same Augustine who argued for the multiplication of true 
interpretations of most particular scriptures (the opposite of modernistic hermeneutics) was also 
the Augustine who was confident enough in a textual and participatory hermeneutic to spend 
much of his life and writings correcting various misreadings of the scriptures.  
 It is participation that is the key ground for an Augustinian hermeneutic that puts 
boundaries around a Gadamarian openness because participation 1) entails a level of reality 
(eternity) beyond the temporal plane of bare history and purely human transmission of tradition 
and 2) in its Augustinian incarnational dimension, entails an active inward connection to that 
eternal realm through both creational memory, which is the active general participation of Christ 
  
255 
as “the light of every man,”186 and the active specific participation of the Holy Spirit in 
Christians—in individuals, ecclesial bodies, and traditions.187  
As pointed out by many scholars (especially the Radical Orthodoxy movement), our 
potential connection to an eternal realm provides a depth to reality and a check to historical 
knowledge—creating a persistent source of alterity and critique—without giving any person or 
group an “Archimedean point” in the modernist sense. In Augustinian participation, we know 
some truth, but it is more important that we know the One who knows and is the Truth. 
Epistemology is not merely structural but also relational. Retaining a hermeneutic openness 
about things that we have had no participatory communication about, pace Gadamer, is 
necessary and commendable, which is a type of faithful ignorance that St. Paul also advocated.188 
However, if we retain a participatory openness about things that we do know, after having been 
party to a participatory communication between eternity and our historical moment, we would be 
sinning, violating our vertical interpersonal relationship by turning away from the Inner Teacher. 
The paradigmatic case of standing on one’s ground of participatory knowledge would be Jesus 
himself, pressured by the religious leaders (whose authority came horizontally, from one 
another) to deny that he knew God. Jesus said, “If I say, ‘I do not know Him,’ I shall be a liar 
like you; but I do know Him and keep His word.”189 For the one who knows something from the 
testimony of the Inner Teacher, there are positive and negative duties of discourse. Negatively, 
we are not to deny what we know to be true, lest it be pushed down in our individual and 
communal memory until it seems forgotten. Positively, we are to confess the truth, a conclusion 
that Gadamer acknowledges,190 though he also rejects its missionary implications.191  
As Zimmerman notes, Gadamer’s position is in tension between the need for 
“convictions” in a tradition and the need for radical hermeneutic of openness.192 Augustine has 
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his own tension between the mixed identity of the church (i.e., a body never fully participating in 
Christ) and its authority—with scripture—to define and maintain the dogmatic content of the 
faith. These are similar descriptions of the problem of a tradition’s content, but coming from 
different grounds and met with different solutions. It seems that Gadamer’s solution is to select 
hermeneutic openness as the necessary emphasis (perhaps trusting in the tribalism of tradition to 
forever play the yang to hermeneutics’ yin). Gadamer chooses philosophy as the ideal home for 
this hermeneutic religion since its tradition is already so weighted towards the question, not the 
answer. Augustine, on the other hand, argues that for eternal orthodoxy to continue being 
incarnated in temporal history, the church needs to continue its tradition of charitable, dialogic 
hermeneutics that keeps it desperately close to its scriptures and its divine Teacher. Because the 
church will continue to face heresies within and contradictions without, it can never be finished 
with its participatory labor in the scriptures. There is no “definitive” edition of systematic 
theology,193 only the faithful, participatory response of theology and spiritual praxis to the 
expressions of finitude and fallenness of the current historical moment.194 And because every 
individual interpreter is also finite—by nature and by the eternal design of the church—this 
hermeneutics is necessarily dialogic within the institution that has been entrusted with the few 
essential answers to the perennial human questions.  
I argue that these philosophy of communication resources from Augustine should find 
their natural home in Evangelicalism. However, to be a confirming support to Evangelicals in 
their opposition to the hermeneutical “spirit of the age,” Augustine’s philosophical hermeneutics 
also has to correct Evangelicals where they have strayed into unholy alliances with the gods of 
modernism. As defined in Chapter 1, the operational construct of Evangelical identity I am 
working with is an ecumenical coalition centered on the scriptures and shared missional action 
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through the gospel. Such cross-tradition ecclesial communication and cross-cultural missionary 
communication makes it both natural and necessary for the Evangelical movement to be 
characterized by open hermeneutic discovery and intensely participatory hermeneutical dialogue.  
That is, Baptists and Anglicans recognizing each other as cross-traditional brothers in the 
gospel despite different liturgical practices extracted from the scriptures can plant the forms of 
charity and hermeneutical multiplicity in healthy ways, while also sending both of these 
confessing people back to the scriptures with renewed awareness of their own finitude and 
fallenness. This encounter pushes them back towards the scriptures and back towards the Inner 
Teacher, but it also confirms them in the creed of the gospel in which they both participate. 
Cross-culturally, Evangelicals can recognize that “God has not left himself without witness” in 
peoples across the globe,195 while at the same time recognizing that every culture has a darkened 
understanding because of turning away from the Inner Teacher, and it is this mixed tradition that 
makes hermeneutic openness and careful scriptural wariness natural and necessary in missions. 
While still wary of syncretism, Evangelical missiology has become progressively more and more 
open to listening to the communicational keys already present in every culture, conceptual gifts 
present in native traditions because of their creational and historical participation in God. By 
listening, Evangelical missionaries have discovered that untouched native cultures already know 
about the Creator God’s unique characteristics, God’s manifestation as a Trinity, humans’ 
disconnection with God because of past historical sin in which they listened to a deceiving spirit, 
the need of blood atonement for sin, and the promise of a future message of reconciliation that 
would come through a book sent from God.196  
Though these insights from the mission field and from cross-tradition work in evangelism 
are an essential part of traditional Evangelical identity, the missional move towards a right 
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balance of hermeneutic openness and orthodoxy needs to be translated back into the realm of 
biblical hermeneutics and philosophical apologetics in the West, a task for which Augustine’s 
open and faithful hermeneutics can be the bridge. Theologians  convening at Wheaton College, 
the Evangelical educational institution par excellence, have already begun moving theology this 
way, with George Lindbeck arguing as early as 1995 that in the task of reformulating theology 
and ecclesial practice to meet the postmodern moment, the task “is more likely to be carried on 
by evangelicals than anyone else.”197 That task in hermeneutics must be carried out in 
conversation with Gadamer, which I argue should be engaged within the deeper participatory 
context of Augustine’s scriptural hermeneutics.   
An Excursis with Ricoeur 
Paul Ricoeur is often mentioned in the same breath with Gadamer,198 and his work has 
been engaged frequently by Evangelical scholars.199 While I acknowledge Ricoeur’s work as 
independent from Gadamer’s and a worthy dialogue partner in its own right, this current project 
can only afford to pick up from Ricoeur a few of his ideas that have sometimes been aggregated 
into a Gadamarian philosophical hermeneutics. That is, this excursus further defines 
philosophical hermeneutics through the philosophy of communication of Ricoeur, especially 
with regard to the possibilities of figuration in an Augustinian scriptural hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics is similar to Gadamer’s in several of its key 
metaphors, including their overarching ground of historicality, their focus on the “being of the 
text,” their shared emphasis on the “productivity” of the text in its every new performance 
(Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons”), and their vision of the hermeneutical process as one that 
responds to finitude by holding in tension both a “naïve” commitment to an interpretation and a 
wariness of dogmatism. While Gadamer gives us the guiding metaphor of play as the way an 
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interpreter approaches a particular world through language, Ricoeur develops for us the 
fundamentally human maneuver of that game—metaphor—that keeps the hermeneutical circle 
connected but not closed. 
Ricoeur and Gadamer Together. Ricoeur, like Gadamer, insists that the constant 
movement of language (and its purveyors) through time is the fundamental ground of 
hermeneutics. For Ricoeur, this is expressed in “diachronic analysis … [of] language over time” 
because “words mean different things not only in different literary and social contexts, but also at 
different times.”200 Ricoeur also makes it clear that temporality is a fundamental constraint of 
even biblical hermeneutics:  
As a text, [the Gospel] expresses a difference and a distance, however minimal, from the 
event that it proclaims. This distance, always increasing with time, is what separates the 
first witness from the entire line of those who hear the witness. Our modernity means 
only that the distance is now considerable between the place I myself occupy … and the 
original site of the first witness.201 
Ricoeur takes as a strong distinction the one between the “discourse” event possible in 
conversation and the distanced trace of that event set down in text, a “difference and distance” 
that by its very nature introduces the need for the textual hermeneutic that he develops.202 As 
Wolterstorff points out in his summary of this distinction, the key underlying distinction for 
Ricoeur—beyond the mediums of conversation and text—is the possibility of dialogue.203 An 
author who cannot interact with his reader dialogically must leave the author to his own 
hermeneutical devices with the quasi-permanent text/artifact that remains. 
 Like Gadamer, Ricoeur sets his hermeneutic philosophy in contrast to the psychologism 
of earlier general hermeneutics, and both of them restore to the text itself a sense of being that 
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can speak for itself rather than merely reveal the mind of its past author. If anything, Ricoeur 
takes this importance of the text itself further than Gadamer, though he takes care to avoid the 
closed textual essentialism of the structuralists.204 As we have seen above, the text is not 
equivalent to the discourse event that initiated it, and Ricoeur proclaims the autonomy of the text 
as a “threefold autonomy: with respect to the intention of the author; with respect to the cultural 
situation … of the production of the text; and finally, with respect to the original addressee.”205 
Though there is still technically a connection between the text and the author, the meaning of the 
text does not stay stable because cultural, literary, and historical contexts continue to shift on the 
plane of temporality and because the “polysemy of language,” especially “metaphorical 
language,”206 also affect the sense and reference of the text. What the author said came out in a 
discourse that had a specific sense (textual meaning) and reference (pointing to some aspect of 
the world), but once that discourse leaves the realm of possible dialogue, its reference value 
remains clear in only certain genres and its original sense is slippery.207 However, Ricoeur still 
maintains that the text provides a significant constraint on the interpreting subject:  
For an interpreter of a text in a distanciated situation [separated from authorial presence], 
everything of significance in the act of discourse, of which that text was the medium, has 
been lodged in, and is therefore recoverable from, the sense of the text which was 
composed.208  
The text, by its own being, continues to speak things “of significance” through time, but the key 
to that significance is not the original author’s intention. Thus Ricoeur says that “what the text 
says now matters more than what the author meant to say.”209  
 Though it is unclear whether Ricoeur is justified in doing so, he distinguishes between 
straightforward texts and artistic texts, with the latter including religious texts such as the 
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scriptures. Religious texts, to Ricoeur, do not refer to the world but they do invite the reader into 
“a world,”210 a Gadamarian game that, in a roundabout way, effects self-knowledge through 
linguistic participation in productive interpretation.211 Ricoeur says,  
What is “made our own” [from the text] is not something mental, … nor some design 
supposedly hidden behind the text; rather, it is the projection of a world, the proposal of a 
mode of being-in-the-world which the text discloses in front of itself by means of its non-
ostensive references.212 
To Ricoeur, then, the point of texts, especially religious texts, is to communicate a “way of 
being-in-the-world,” an existential orientation rather than an assertion about something in the 
world itself. 
 As already implied in the discussion above, Ricoeur and Gadamer both emphasize the 
point of meeting between the text and the historically bound standpoint of the interpreter, what 
Gadamer calls the “fusion of horizons.” Texts have no being apart from their 
interpreters/performers, but their being in the act of performance is not an imposition from their 
performers. Rather, through an interpretive “dialectic of belonging and distanciation,”213 reading 
a text is “productive” of a sense that is not “immediat[e]” but rather “mediate[s] again and again 
in a new and more creative fashion.”214 In this emphasis on the productive dimension of 
interpretation, Ricoeur is less enamored than Gadamer of tradition, less sure about the 
intersubjective possibilities of human linguisticality, and more insistent on the need for a 
dialectical engagement with the problems of the text itself.215 As Westphal summarizes 
Ricoeur’s dialectic of belonging and distanciation,  
By belonging he means the embeddedness of (human) author and reader alike in 
contingent and particular horizons, contexts, and perspectives to which the meanings they 
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put or find in a text are relative. … By distanciation Ricoeur means the adoption of 
methods of testing interpretations that render the reader as objective as possible and that 
treat the text as an object to be explained[,] … scholarly norms by which biblical 
interpreters seek to step back, to distance themselves from the particularities of the 
traditions to which they “belong.”216  
As synthesized by Lewis Mudge and affirmed by Ricoeur, this “productive” dialectic proceeds 
through three stages. Because of our “belonging” to a historical position, our first reading of a 
text is always necessarily “naïve,” but as we distance ourselves methodically to read more 
objectively, we move into a “critical” reading. Unlike critical theorists and other denizens of 
modernity, however, Ricoeur argues that our dialectic must progress beyond “arid criticism” to a 
“secondary naiveté.”217 That is, we must belong again to the text, letting the textual senses that 
emerge present us with a world and an attitude that we can make “our own.”218  
 Thus, as we have already seen with Gadamer, Ricoeur also negotiates the tension 
between “naïve” commitment and hermeneutic openness from the ground of radical historicality. 
Traditions of interpretation and of textual methodology are our inescapable starting points, but as 
historical accidents, they cannot also be our unchanged ending points. Likewise, critical 
interrogation of the text is an essential middle step to enable the being of the text to speak anew 
to our historical moment, but it cannot be the ending point, either, because interpretation always 
ends up creating the “world” we live and act in currently. Because of Ricoeur’s ground of 
historicality, though, no interpretation lasts unchanging through time, and each generation’s 
secondarily naïve response to a text’s sense is undergirded by a critical readiness to move on. In 
this way, Ricoeur’s commitment to interpretational commitment also precludes dogmatism. This 
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critical commitment, or savvy naiveté, is what Ricoeur says characterizes hermeneutics as a self-
aware discipline in the modern era.219  
Thus Ricoeur provides a second conversation partner, next to Gadamer, to lay out some 
of the language and concepts of current hermeneutical thought that might be engaged 
productively by an Augustinian approach. Ricoeur’s more focused exploration of textual issues 
makes him, in some sense, a more likely candidate for an Evangelical hermeneutics that rightly 
focuses on the interpretation of the text of the scriptures as its lodestone. Besides Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutical themes that largely overlap with Gadamer’s, however, we still have to explore 
how his exposition of metaphor fits with his broader theory of textual interpretation.  
Ricoeur and Metaphor. The way in to this question is Ricoeur’s metaphor of the “world 
in front of the text,” the world in imagination to which the artistic text refers through the means 
of the “split reference” of metaphor. But this will need to be explained more carefully. Westphal 
helps us, first, to define this world “in front of” the text: “What is ‘in front of’ the text rather than 
hidden behind it is a world, a complex of meaning and truth that is ‘opened’ by the text and 
thereby ‘proposed’ as a mode of being-in-the-world that we might ‘inhabit.’”220 Ricoeur’s world 
“in front of” religious texts, as we have seen, does not primarily reference the historical time-
space world (nor the spiritual world), but it is still a public world through shared interpretation of 
a text that invites its interpreting community to “inhabit” its world together existentially. As in 
the post-liberal theory of Hans Frei, the text is a “history-like” narrative that gathers a 
community and organizes identity and action.221 “Narratives, more than any other ‘language 
games,’” says Ricoeur, “have this power of reshaping human experience at least along its 
temporal features,”222 and Ricoeur traces their power to the linguistic structure of metaphor, 
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which allows “the emergence of new meanings in language and of the referential claims raised 
by such nondescriptive languages as poetic discourse.”223  
How does metaphor negotiate a “relationship between suspended reference and displayed 
reference,”224 though, to create new meanings, and thus new worlds, and thus a shared habitation 
for an interpreting community? Ricoeur sees the sense of the text itself as the rails on which 
reference to a “world” runs, but the textual sense of metaphors splits that reference in productive 
ways, creating a new way of being-in-the-world. The two parts of the metaphor each still 
maintain meaning relative to the literal world-reference (e.g., “you” and “frog”) while they 
violate the normal contextual relationship with the identifying “is” (“you are a frog”).225 That is, 
while “you” has referential validity to a human addressee and “frog” to a type of amphibian in 
the real world, their equivalence produces a “semantic impertinence” that opens new ways of 
knowing “you” and knowing “frogs.”226 About this “split reference,” Ricoeur says it “contains in 
nuce all that can be said about metaphorical truth,” and he develops the process more in depth, 
following Jakobson, as follows:  
What happens in poetry [and, by extension, religious texts] is not the suppression of the 
referential function but its profound alteration by the workings of ambiguity: “The 
supremacy of poetic function over referential function does not obliterate the reference 
but makes it ambiguous. The double-sensed message finds correspondence in a split 
addresser, in a split addressee, and what is more in a split reference, as is cogently 
exposed in the preambles to fairy tales of various peoples, for instance, in the usual 
exordium of the Majorca storytellers: … ‘It was and it was not.’”227 
Thus, underlying the dialectical hermeneutic of distanciation and belonging in Ricoeur’s 
approach to religious texts, there is the deeper dialectic between the “is” and “is not” in 
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metaphoric discourse that perpetually creates an opening for interpretive productivity,228 for new 
synthetic worlds of meaning that respect both the being of the text and the historical being of the 
interpreter, while transcending both.  
This metaphoric vision of the world created by seeing simultaneously two 
incommensurable references at the same time creates a “stereoscopic vision,”229 a sense of depth 
of meaning that cannot be reduced to “logical … consistency.”230 Paul explains the connection 
between metaphor’s “split reference” and the space of interpretive meaning as follows:  
The reference within the [speech] code is then the reference to a world, to a set of 
relations that have been refigured by the semantic impertinence of the metaphor. This 
refigured understanding of reality is what Ricoeur calls “the world in front of the text.” 
Metaphorical language contains a “surplus of meaning,” and this provides new cognitive 
space for the reader to inhabit.231 
Ultimately, it is not primarily the ambiguity of this “surplus of meaning” (which would be just 
blurred vision) but rather the transference of sense between different things and their 
autonomous words that is important and productive.232 Citing Goodman and Aristotle, Ricoeur 
says that “metaphor is not one figure of discourse among others, but the transference principle 
common to all of them.”233 It is this transference principle that can function at every level of 
discourse, from explicit sentence metaphors to the broader metaphorical patterns of narratives,234 
and that can tie together “it is” and “it is not” in a “stereoscopic vision” of a textual world that 
one can inhabit, along with the rest of one’s public community of interpreters. It is this 
transference feature of Ricoeur’s hermeneutical theory that not only explains the openness and 
possibility of understanding language across time (opening as well the closed system of 
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correspondence)235 but also, as we will see, provides the opening and boundaries for Augustinian 
figural interpretation, especially when shifted to the key of participation.  
  Thus, Ricoeur also provides constructive language and concepts that can be appropriated 
as gifts, in an Augustinian philosophy of communication, though in a qualified way. Like 
Augustine, Ricoeur points out that interpretation of a text is done with respect to a whole (a 
literary context, and that within a narrative) which is historically, temporally bounded—“no one, 
neither the author nor the reader,” Ricoeur believes, “is in actual possession of the whole that 
would give fully final and determinate meaning.”236 Like Augustine’s insistence that scriptural 
words themselves are an insistent dialogic voice which enjoins listening and obedience,237 
Ricoeur emphasizes the being of the text that continues to speak anew to each generation with a 
textual sense that holds its own in the dialogue of interpretation. Like Augustine’s hermeneutical 
discovery process constituted by a dialogue of questioning, attention to textual detail, figural 
creativity, and “naïve” obedience to the text, Ricoeur’s dialectic moves between personal and 
textual horizons to produce “imaginative” interpretations that are not reducible to the logic of 
textual structuralism but still require some level of action and commitment.  
 Besides these broad-brush similarities, Ricoeur’s analysis of the way metaphor opens up 
language at every level can be especially helpful to my proposal of Augustinian participatory 
hermeneutics as an Evangelical approach to the scriptures. As developed with help from 
Matthew Levering in earlier chapters, a participatory approach to the scriptural narrative operates 
also with “stereoscopic” vision, fixing the historical reference of a scriptural event or command 
with one eye (in dialogue with the text and the tradition) while fixing one’s interpretation of the 
current historical moment with the other (in dialogue with the tradition), all while in dialogue 
with the Inner Teacher whose voice can bring these two dissimilar references into focus as a 
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“true” match with historical and spiritual depth—or conversely, can blur or contraindicate 
possible metaphorical connections between the scriptural text and one’s historical moment. That 
is, because metaphoric “transference” can open the text to many possible interpretations within 
the boundaries of a particular communal narrative (Ricoeur’s “public” of discourse, or 
Gadamer’s “tradition”), it enables the text to be continually relevant, but requires the continual 
labor of a dialogic interpretive practice that respects the text, puts the interpreter to the question, 
and ultimately gives the interpreter a ground for belief and temporal action. These are the 
Augustinian hermeneutic goals that I argue are consistent with the longer and broader 
Evangelical tradition—in which interpreters approach the scriptures humbly, looking for how 
they are to change us and what direction they give us for faith and practice. Ricoeur’s analysis of 
metaphor, applied to the narratives of the scripture, the tradition, and the hermeneutical process 
itself, can help restore to Evangelical hermeneutics the philosophical language that explains how, 
exactly, people “shall not live by bread alone but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of 
God.”238  
 As implied above, though, this Evangelical use of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy is 
dependent on the broader Augustinian ground of a Christian participatory hermeneutics. Without 
the underlying Augustinian ground of participation—participation in the creational memory as 
the site of dialogue with the Inner Teacher and in the pneumatological grace that can overcome 
the fallenness of our wills—Ricoeur’s bare historicality and optimistic reliance on the being of 
the text itself cannot provide any scriptural “truth” that could be obeyed as “God’s truth.” That 
is, Ricoeur (like Gadamer) binds his hermeneutics to the temporal plane, making any metaphoric 
openings and constraints immanent to the text and the horizon of the interpreter rather than 
linked to the larger context available by participation, the “world above the text.” He thus 
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restricts unnecessarily the possible “world in front of the text” and misses the radical possibilities 
of metaphoric “split reference” to connect text, world, and eternity.  
Ricoeur (unlike Gadamer) is suspicious of primary linguistic intersubjectivity,239 arguing 
instead for a secondary intersubjectivity through dialogic discourse and, in turn, only an oblique 
and world-focused intersubjectivity through distanciated texts.240 Without confidence in the 
“intention” of a human author and without the hope of a creational or spiritual dialogue with the 
Inner Teacher, however, interpretation of the text of the scriptures, I argue, is both too 
“productive” relative to the subjective and traditional biases of the current historical moment241 
and too barren relative to the correctional and edifying perspective that might be spoken from 
the eternal plane. Thus, for example, the highly literate Christian tradition in South Africa—
literate in both the scriptures and textual hermeneutics—could respond to the text and the 
historical moment to create a powerful “productive” reading that built the segregational system 
of apartheid instead of reading the text “against” themselves and their historical biases through 
the voice of the Inner Teacher.242 In building this interpretational edifice, the Presbyterian 
Church in South Africa was not without critical, prophetic voices that argued for an alternate 
interpretation, but it is instructive that the primary prophetic voice was that of Andrew Murray, 
whose now-classic writings on Christian spirituality and revival all emphasize what we have 
been calling the participatory nature of interpretation. The alterity of the eternal enabled Murray 
to escape the racist biblical interpretation of his tradition and time.  
In a particular counter-example to the temporal and cultural interpretational plane of the 
larger church, Murray was himself confronted in his interpretive prejudices, and changed, in 
mid-life. When a “disorderly” revival service had started spontaneously with the prayers of a 
young black woman, Murray initially tried to quell the disturbance, but he allowed the Inner 
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Teacher to chasten his prejudices, which led him to read the scriptures differently on this issue 
than his contemporaries.243 
Thus, theoretically and practically, Ricoeur’s focus on the metaphorical openness and 
productivity of the scriptural text can be helpful for Evangelical hermeneutics if there is “behind 
the text” not a singular ideal meaning put there intentionally by a singular past author 
(modernistic hermeneutics) but rather our creational memory and an active Inner Teacher who 
can legitimately transfer the sense of the world “in front of the text” to the world in front of the 
interpreter(s) through our participatory dialogue with the creational and spiritual “world above 
the text.” In this way, though we continue to pursue, with Augustine, a better and better reading 
of the being of the text itself—its history, best critical text, intratextual connections, and 
linguistic and literary devices—we can have now a right and a good reading of the text through 
our participatory attention to the meanings already offered us by the Inner Teacher’s lessons 
about Christ, the gospel, and ecclesial charity. And this good reading will often be an application 
that has us interpret the scriptures “stereoscopically” as referring to past events, promises, 
commands, and ways of being-in-the-world that “are not” and—vitally—“are” equivalent events 
and speech acts relevant to us now, “today.” Thus, for example, Evangelicals can read 
“stereoscopically” the exhortation by the author of Hebrews to a first century group of 
Christians—which is already a metaphorical application of an older Psalm 95, which is already a 
metaphorical interpretation of the Pentateuchal narrative of the post-Exodus rebellion—
“Therefore, as the Holy Spirit says: ‘Today, if you will hear His voice, do not harden your hearts 
as in the rebellion.’”244 Though we want to understand the text as best we can in its three 
different temporal reference points (times of composition of Pentateuch, of the Psalm, and of the 
letter to a first-century Jewish Christian community) and the intratextual interrelationships 
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between them, we need only hear ourselves the “voice” of the “Holy Spirit” speaking through 
this text to tremble at the possibility of a hard heart and to recognize where this warning applies 
“today” in our own personal and ecclesial horizon.  
Extant Evangelical Fusions 
In mining the philosophies of communication of Gadamer and Ricoeur for Evangelical 
hermeneutics, this project is, of course, following in the footsteps of (and profiting from the work 
of) several Evangelical scholars who have gone before. My debt to several of these scholars 
should already be apparent in the way I have cited them in conjunction with primary sources 
from Gadamer and Ricoeur. Because these scholars form part of the emerging tradition of 
Evangelical interpretation of philosophical hermeneutics, which has undergirded my own such 
interpretation, it will be important to provide synopses of their interpretational perspectives in 
order to position my own within this emerging tradition. Though this project has been informed 
by insights from several Evangelical scholars,245 the three whose interpretational paradigms as a 
whole have been my conversation partners are Merold Westphal, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and 
James K. A. Smith.  
Westphal: The Apostle of Finitude and Fallenness 
Though there have been a number of philosophers who have recently explored the 
intersections of Continental philosophy and religion, Westphal’s approach has been a “more 
conservative counterpoint” to those fusions while still provoking interest in Continental thought 
on the part of traditional and modernist-leaning Evangelicals and their conservative kin.246 In his 
provocative readings of Continental philosophers normally demonized among Evangelicals for 
their postmodernism, Westphal has done good work in listening carefully to the questions these 
thinkers are addressing, turning an honest eye to the Christian tradition through the lenses of 
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these thinkers, and identifying not only common ground between Christianity and Continental 
thought but also the prophetic ways in which Continental philosophers remind Christians of the 
hermeneutic truths they have forgotten in their modernistic “hubris.”247 Drawing on Kant and 
Kierkegaard, and ventriloquizing Ricoeur and Gadamer in many ways, Westphal’s contribution 
to an Evangelical philosophical hermeneutics, at least for my project, can be summarized by his 
themes of finitude, fallenness, and prophetic hermeneutics.  
 Because I have drawn extensively on Westphal’s books Overcoming Onto-Theology and 
Whose Community? Which Interpretation? in earlier sections and chapters, my discussion of his 
themes of finitude and fallenness will be brief. Westphal believes that the move of Continental 
philosophy after Heidegger and Gadamer to a radical historicality could help Christianity to 
return to its roots in creational finitude,248 rejecting the presumptions of “pure reason” and its 
metaphysical edifices.249 “Postmodernism, [to Westphal], is another expression of the 
hermeneutics of finitude dedicated to reminding human beings that they are not God.”250 The 
genius of Westphal’s project has been to read the concerns of Kant, Kierkegaard, Freud, 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur as “theological” and to do the work of 
philosophical translation that makes the boundary between theology and philosophy 
permeable.251 The philosophical hermeneutic emphasis on finitude that we have been examining 
in Gadamer and Ricoeur, therefore, is one that Westphal connects to the theology of Christianity, 
specifically of the “Augustine of the Confessions.”252  
 Westphal also connects the premodern Augustinian argument that fallenness has a radical 
impact on our hermeneutics with postmodern hermeneuts of “suspicion” who examine 
interpretations critically for their skewed readings that create and maintain power over others, 
especially skewed readings embedded in authoritative traditions.253 “The interests of the 
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interpreter,” Westphal says, “may be morally problematic, even from the standpoint of the 
interpreter, in which case interpretation and self-deception will be inseparable.”254 Putt notes the 
convergence between Westphal’s dual emphases on finitude and fallenness in hermeneutics, 
specifying about fallenness that  
These malignant motivations directly affect rationality in both the individual and 
communal dimensions, substituting rationalism for reason and ideologies for traditions. 
The skepticism of suspicion confronting these mutations of epistemic sin directly 
challenges the integrity of the person and the public.255 
That is, neither individual interpreter nor institutional bearer of the tradition of interpretation get 
a pass in Westphal’s prophetic Christian hermeneutics because, similar to Augustine’s insistence 
on human depravity, Westphal points out that sin introduces “epistemic” problems deeper than 
any methodology, rationality, or public institution.256 Westphal’s hermeneutics of suspicion is 
not “skepticism,” though, and our selective “editing” of the truth “is not an all or nothing affair.” 
“Suspicion,” he says, “doesn’t ask whether our beliefs are true or whether they have sufficient 
warrant”; rather, it targets the questionable motives and destructive uses to which a particular 
scriptural reading is the mere instrument.257   
 Finitude and fallenness together combine to make interpretation not just a dim mirror but, 
in Westphal’s metaphor, a “prism.” To Putt, this is Westphal’s central hermeneutical metaphor, 
and is thus ensconced in Putt’s book title Gazing Through a Prism Darkly: Reflections on 
Merold Westphal's Hermeneutical Epistemology. Westphal’s metaphor entails that interpretation 
become “irreducibly manifold,”258 just as a prism separates light into incommensurable parts 
based on their place in the spectrum. That is, our finite perspective in a particular time, place, 
and culture splits the light coming from the scriptures, as does our mixed motivations stemming 
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from a will that is still oriented toward self-preservation, pride, and power over others 
(Augustine’s libido dominandi). To Westphal, we need, along with a hermeneutics of belief, his 
hermeneutics of suspicion, constituting a dialectic of belonging and distanciation that he models 
after Ricoeur.259 It is this need for the believer to doubt his interpretations of himself and his 
tradition that Westphal believes philosophical hermeneutics can help provide, though he does 
note that the postmodern undermining of Christian truth itself might not be positive in an 
unqualified way.260 The target he attacks is the synthesis of Christianity and modernistic 
philosophy that has been labeled by postmodern critics as “onto-theology,”261 and he hopes by 
such a targeted approach to let Christian truth re-emerge, a truth that is characterized by the 
“wisdom of humility,”262 the “fear of the Lord,”263 and a temporally-oriented hermeneutics that 
focuses on situational “obedience” rather than metaphysical “knowledge.”264  
In this, his deep affinity with Gadamer’s translation-performance-application model of 
hermeneutics emerges, further clarified with Speech Act language borrowed from Wolterstorff. 
Westphal says the goal of the Christian interpretive community is to “embody scripture” through 
a dialectic of reading and obeying, which is Gadamer’s traditioned phronesis: “To understand is 
to apply; to apply differently is to understand differently.”265 We will develop more fully 
Wolterstorff’s theory of “double discourse” and “double hermeneutics” in the next section, but 
the key point that Westphal borrows in his connecting of hermeneutics and application is 
Wolterstorff’s insight that the scriptures, as “covenantal discourse,” are not primarily focused on 
asserting truths about the world but are rather speech acts of warning, promising, commanding, 
etc.266 That is, they are already interpersonal relational speech pointed towards shared action 
more than they are a scientific mapping of the world. While it is important to establish as clearly 
as possible what speech acts were being performed in the original biblical context (Gadamer’s 
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“reproductive” aspect), this investigation is only preliminary to, not primary over, the 
“productive” question of how we are to understand and apply these speech acts to ourselves 
today.267   
 Finally, the deep biblical roots of Westphal’s Christian philosophical hermeneutics can be 
seen in his focus on the image of the prophet as the model for the Christian hermeneutic 
philosopher.268 He separates the roles of the preacher and the Christian philosopher,269 a 
separation we will return to in a moment, but he gives to the latter the responsibility of speaking 
prophetically into each historical hermeneutical situation. Westphal characterizes prophets as the 
ones to speak the apt response to the particular historical moment in the context of human 
sinfulness.  
Through discourses characterized as personal, untimely, political, and eschatological, the 
biblical prophets brought messages that were not universally grounded but oftentimes 
were ad hoc admonitions fitted to the particularities of a given situation. The prophets 
admonished their listeners that truth was often absent … because of intentional rebellion 
against the precepts of God. Westphal contends that prophetic philosophers of religion 
should likewise speak critically against the unattainable absolutism of universal 
foundations and against the reality of calculated deception and delusion for purposes of 
oppression and manipulation.270 
Because it is already the traditional province of philosophy, Westphal proposes that the dialectic 
between defending and doubting—between the “priest” function and the “prophet” function—be 
the realm of the Christian hermeneutic philosopher, though the preponderance of “priestly” 
apologetics in the modern age makes the role of “prophet” more needful.271 In line with Ricoeur, 
Westphal agrees that the “priest” function of Christian philosophers and institutions is necessary 
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to forestall the illiteracy and cultural erosion that always threaten a tradition.272 Priests keep the 
tradition, and “tradition gives the gift of voice, of a language given to express the community’s 
inherited patterns of reality and to respond to other voices calling those patterns into 
question.”273 However, he sees current philosophic prophets, from inside or outside the Christian 
tradition, as walking in the footsteps of the Hebrew prophets who, wary of the ability of the 
tradition to “betray” itself,274 “are always appealing to the tradition against the tradition ... [and] 
are always affirming that which [they are] critiquing.”275 Westphal seems to see different 
Christian confessional traditions as fairly self-consistent within themselves but prophetically 
“pluralistic” in their openness to one another as they pursue “overlapping consensus.”276 Thus, 
he has an Evangelically “ecumenical” vision of hermeneutics that folds his own Reformed 
tradition within it, enabling both appeals to tradition and critiques of the tradition.  
 It is this appeal to the tradition in order to critique the tradition that this project has been 
engaged in, pulling from the church’s longer tradition of charitable participatory hermeneutics 
and Evangelicalism’s broader identity in ecumenism, scriptural populism, and evangelism to 
critique the more recent imposition of socially divisive modernistic hermeneutics as a criterion 
for Evangelical orthodoxy. However, despite Westphal’s ostensible grounding in Augustine, I 
argue that his prophetic vein slips into overcorrection, paying more heed to the secular prophets 
than to the creational and participatory ground of the sacred prophetic tradition. His emphasis on 
finitude and fallenness without their Augustinian theological counterpoints leaves him open to 
sliding into a philosophy of religion alien to the broader Christian tradition, and he also separates 
unhelpfully the believer and the philosopher, the proclaimer of the kerygma and its believing 
critic.  
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Especially in a sociological context where Christians are often divided between those in 
“primary naiveté” (i.e., the naïve Evangelical masses), those in prophetic critical mode, and those 
attempting “secondary naiveté,”277 this “division of labor” approach to scriptural hermeneutics 
avoids the hard question of philosophy of communication, which is how can these conceptual 
resources be appropriated for the benefit of the broader discourse community.278 In scriptural 
terms, the separation of ecclesial and philosophical applications works against Westphal’s own 
advocacy for interpretation-application and puts in question his own use of II Timothy 3:16: “All 
Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, 
for instruction in righteousness, that the [person] of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped 
for every good work.”279 This upward teleology of scriptural interpretation (scriptural comfort 
and critique to make Christians “complete”) may never be “ontotheologically” stable—especially 
as the dual task of a preacher-philosopher—but there should be discernible progress, faith that 
moves into knowledge and thus opens the door for another faith opportunity. If the believing 
preacher of the kerygma is kept in a role separate from the prophetic (or priest-prophet) role of 
the Christian hermeneutic philosopher, Augustine would be a strange patron saint for Westphal.  
 Though Westphal sees his hermeneutic position as one intentionally medial,280 Putt 
would push the implications of Westphal’s prophetic hermeneutics further in the direction of 
critique. Stating the implications of Westphal’s position, he says, 
Since faith seeks understanding always within the structures of existence, it is a timeless 
task that should not succumb to the seduction of security offered by the idols of 
modernity. … [It should be] a prophetic philosophy of religion that always maintains an 
element of doubt concerning whether truth and meaning have indeed been discovered.281  
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Without a strong Augustinian counterpoint in creation and grace (i.e., without Augustinian 
participation), I cannot but agree with Putt that this is where Westphal’s hermeneutical “prism” 
leaves us. Westphal affirms that “suspicion is not incompatible with trust,” explaining that a 
healthy self-awareness of our sin-skewed hermeneutics is an “essential ingredient” in the trust in 
God’s love and His justifying and sanctifying work in our lives.282 But wouldn’t a robust self-
suspicion also call into question our trust in the basic facts of the gospel or their applicability to 
us, personally, at least without an equally robust belief in prophetic comfort?283 To frame this 
question with Putt’s language, is it true that “faith seek[ing] understanding … within the 
structures of existence” precludes any glimmer of truth from outside these temporal structures? If 
it does so preclude glimpses of eternal truth, then doubt must necessarily be the constant 
companion of belief, and the content of the ecclesial tradition that is passed down is more a set of 
existential questions than any positive content—which is where Gadamer would leave us.284  
 As we have seen in Chapter 3, though, God “has not left himself without witness,”285 
speaking to all people through the inward witness of creational memory and closing the gap 
between the temporal “structures of existence” and the eternal realm through the “downward 
participation” of the life and work of Christ.286 Though sin diverts our attention from the good 
and thus skews our interpretation of the scriptures, the participatory grace of Christ refocuses, 
again and again, our vision and our hermeneutics, restoring our horizon through repentance to 
see again Him who is invisible. Though creaturely finitude restricts our earthly horizon to a 
particular time, culture, language, and social location, our creaturely memory—the imago Dei 
within—can be accessed and sharpened through continual pursuit of the truth with the Inner 
Teacher. Because this inward turn is also, in its very nature, an upward and outward turn to a 
Person, this Augustinian move to true knowledge cannot be interpreted as a personal discovery 
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or cause for self-congratulation, but is instead the very “wisdom of humility” that Westphal also 
wants to promote. An Augustinian participatory cosmology, that is, maintains both creational 
finitude and creational access to the eternal God; and it both acknowledges the radical 
hermeneutical skew of sin and proclaims, kerygmatically, the equally radical hermeneutical 
ortho-doxy of grace, established by the cross of Christ and worked moment-by-moment by the 
Holy Spirit.  
 As we see in Westphal, and will see systematically later with James K. A. Smith, the 
question of a Christian hermeneutics is inescapably tied up with perspectives on temporality, and 
in this we are all following the lead of Augustine. However, Westphal’s emphasis on the 
temporality of hermeneutics with an insufficient calibrating connection to eternity287 keeps him 
from seeing how a hermeneutics of temporality and eternity might function together. I would 
propose that the participatory “wisdom” that we gain in interpretation is absolute particular 
knowledge in temporality. That is, it is a true “part” delivered to us from the “whole” which God 
knows in full and we know only vaguely and partially, but it is knowledge that has been opened 
to us by the Inner Teacher explicitly for that point on the temporal plane.  
Westphal, following Gadamer’s perspective on the interpretation of the work of art in 
time, comes close to my position, but still without the participatory dimension. Quoting 
Gadamer, he says that the scriptures’ “own original essence is to be something different. … It 
has its being only in becoming [difference] and return [identity].”288 This language is close to a 
participatory perspective, but the stable thing that remains itself while being constantly different, 
here, is the textual work (not the eternal Word of God), and the participation is still on the 
temporal plane only. Westphal similarly quotes Gadamer on the interpretation of the gospel: 
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The gospel does not exist in order to be understood as a merely historical document, but 
to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving effect. This implies that the text … if 
it is to be understood properly—i.e., according to the claim it makes—must be 
understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way.289 
Westphal says, following Kierkegaard, that such understanding is beyond the question of belief 
or doubt but is instead a matter of obedience or disobedience,290 but I would suggest that the 
metaphor of belief/doubt that Westphal is referencing is the specifically modern one, not the 
scriptural or Augustinian one. To separate belief and action ontologically is already to have 
stepped across the threshold into the modern world, where belief is a pure process of mind. To 
interpret in a participatory frame is to seek incarnational wisdom, and when we thus “draw near 
to God” in this way, He “draws near” to us,291 giving us through memory and Spirit a word of 
truth that is apt for that moment in time, since wisdom and action are fundamentally 
interconnected. As that moment passes, the truth we learned does not change or invite doubt—
nor is it to be glued immovably into a metaphysical edifice—but it rather fades into the 
background, still in memory but no longer the focus of attention. Its ground is in eternity, its 
token is in the scripture, its claim on belief and action is in the moment. Once its moment has 
passed, it lies there until it is brought to memory again by the conjunction of the horizon of the 
text of the scriptures, the multi-level horizon of the participatory Inner Teacher, and the horizon 
of the historically-located interpreter, who is facing ever-new interpretational needs in the 
cultural horizon of challenges to her faith and life. This, I argue, is how to describe hermeneutics 
in an Augustinian philosophy of communication.  
 To illustrate this, perhaps a bit whimsically, we can pair Jeremiah and Heidegger. 
Jeremiah tells us that the word of God is like a “hammer that breaks the rock in pieces,”292 and 
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Heidegger famously tells us about hammers that fade in and out of our abstract awareness, 
depending on whether they are part of the unconscious structure of our world (ready-to-hand) or 
something “objectively” present through “severe abstraction from experience.”293 In the flow of 
temporality, the Evangelical is faced on a regular basis with the need for some kinds of 
conceptual tools—and this is where we intersect with an Augustinian philosophy of 
communication. For the Evangelical, it is not enough to find just any conceptual language that 
might provide pragmatic coping by opening up some interpretation of her situation; the 
Evangelical wants to hear from God. In the unconscious structure of her world, her social-
cultural-linguistic position has also been laced through with the narratives, metaphors, and 
phrases of scripture. These are all ready-to-hand, hammers of all types lying in the background, 
some for rebuke, some for correction, some for comfort. All of them are true, but then one of 
them is brought forward by the question of the moment, suddenly “present-to-hand” as a gift, 
brought forward by participatory dialogue between the scriptures, the will, and the Inner 
Teacher. Then, what was true and hidden becomes true and revealed, a truth that can be made 
public by assertion, given to the community as common property, and kept in memory for such 
time as it may be needed again. It is not any problem with this hammer that makes it present-to-
hand, nor is it the desire to objectify experience for the sake of building knowledge, but it is 
rather the voice of a wise inner counselor drawing the attention of his friend to the particular 
tool, already present, that she needs to make public for the temporal situation at hand. The result 
is not mere coping or the defensive warding off of cognitive dissonance but rather charitable 
action, thanksgiving, praise, and love. 
 What scriptural interpretation is designed for is, in part, the breaking of the “rocks” of 
“Luciferian” pride,294 the exposing of self-idolatry and of the destruction of the weak and 
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victimized. As Westphal points out, “since the sinful misuse of religious beliefs may occur even 
when those beliefs are correspondently or consistently true[,] … sinful thinkers may still use true 
beliefs in order to ‘justify ungodly practices of exploitation or domination.’”295 In this correcting-
rebuking function, Westphal’s prophetic hermeneutics is strongly in line with what is needed in 
Evangelical hermeneutics today. However, the other main purpose of scriptural hermeneutics is 
to “comfort the faint-hearted,”296 to encourage the believers in what they have believed, that they 
might have an “anchor of the soul”297 without the constant companion of doubt. This is also a 
“prophetic” function, as Paul says: “But he who prophesies speaks edification and exhortation 
and comfort” to people.298 For these things, a more Augustinian hermeneutic—one that is both 
pastoral and philosophical—is needed to meet the pastoral and philosophical needs of the current 
Evangelical crisis in hermeneutics.  
Nicholas Wolterstorff: Double or Nothing 
If Westphal provides us with a conservative “postmodern Christianity” that uses the 
postmodern “armies of Assyria”299 to provoke repentance among Evangelicals for their 
hermeneutical hubris, Wolterstorff does the philosophical labor to try to explain the 
phenomenological data of God speaking in human interpretational situations. That is, while 
Westphal preaches the limitations to Evangelical hermeneutics, Wolterstorff tries to speak for its 
possibilities and to explain its successes.  
 Wolterstorff is interested in examining philosophically the “far more ancient and 
enduring … practice of interpreting scripture for divine discourse.” Explicitly or implicitly in 
preaching and devotional contexts, Christians have long been reading the scriptures as “the Word 
of the Lord.”300 What does it mean, Wolterstorff asks, for us to say that the scriptures speak to us 
as the Word of the Lord?  
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As mentioned above and summarized briefly here, Wolterstorff appropriates the language 
of Speech Act Theory to formulate his theory of “authorial discourse interpretation” through the 
concept of “double-agency discourse.” Hermeneutical theory is normally discussed as between 
the poles of author intention, on the one side, and reader-response, on the far opposite side—
either reconstructing the psyche of the author or wrenching the text itself from the cold, dead 
hands of the author and doing with it whatever one likes. Wolterstorff argues for “authorial 
discourse” as his position between these two poles, which entails the interpreting of the text not 
primarily as the “self-revelation” of the author but as the author’s record of a series of speech 
acts (i.e., discourse), illocutions such as commands, questions, promises, requests, and assertions. 
Though we generally say what we intend to say, creating a natural connection between an 
author’s intention and her discourse, that connection is neither airtight nor essential to 
understanding and applying the text.301 Wolterstorff makes it clear that authorial discourse 
interpretation seeks to discern the illocutionary act that the author “did perform, whether or not it 
was intended.”302  
 Wolterstorff further applies Speech Act Theory to divine discourse itself through the 
theoretical extensions of “deputized” and “authorized” speech. In deputization, people can be 
sent to speak on behalf of someone else (e.g., ambassadors), and their promises and threats 
thereby carry the force of the one they represent, even if the form of their discourse is uniquely 
theirs. In authorization, an authority can appropriate or “sign” an existing discourse, giving it his 
or her authority during or after the fact of its generation (speaking temporally).303 This is how 
Wolterstorff understands the famous tolle lege command that Augustine hears, a child’s song 
from over the wall that is appropriated by the authorizing voice of God. Augustine’s subsequent 
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reading of Romans 13, to “put on Christ,” is a similarly authorized command which effects 
Augustine’s salvation.304  
These possibilities create a “double-agency discourse” situation in which the original 
authorial discourse may be joined by a divine discourse that is being “literally” spoken to the 
reader here and now.305 This, of course, necessitates a “double hermeneutic,” not only an 
interpretation of the original authorial discourse through close attention to the text in its various 
contexts but also an interpretation of the divine speech to us through this text,306 which may bear 
different levels of similarity to the discursive figure of the original text. Relating these two 
aspects of hermeneutics, Wolterstorff says,  
Interpreting Scripture for divine discourse requires a double hermeneutic: first one 
interprets these writings so as to discern the human discourse of which they are the trace; 
then, and only then, does one move on to interpret for what God said by way of this 
human discourse.307  
Wolterstorff rejects the imposition of a single mode of discourse and a single universal 
hermeneutics308—suggesting we “embrace literary-critical heterodoxy”309—but he does argue for 
his “authorial discourse hermeneutics” of “human discourse” as the one “all of us employ most 
of the time.”310 Further, he notes that this default hermeneutic in its “double-agency” application 
to divine discourse has been the normal approach to scriptural hermeneutics for most Christians 
throughout the history of the church.311 That is, though Wolterstorff engages in detail with a 
number of philosophical questions and fields in order to conceptualize and defend this double 
hermeneutic, the underlying exigence for his development of this concept is the long and broad 
experience of religious people. In this, Wolterstorff is himself engaging in a philosophy of 
communication project, not a mere philosophical “thought experiment.”312  
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 Wolterstorff’s authorial discourse focuses on the text as someone’s discourse about 
something in a form that largely maintains its integrity through historical time. In this, he 
connects the being of the text more closely to its author than we have seen in Ricoeur and 
Gadamer, though he also quotes both of them in agreement with this “anti-historicist” view of 
the text.313 Since the text is not primarily the self-revelation of an author’s psyche but instead a 
complex of publicly understandable illocutionary actions, Wolterstorff points out that we have an 
ethical responsibility to perform the first level of hermeneutics with diligence, acknowledging 
that the author wrote something with the desire of being understood.314 Wolterstorff has a 
“conviction” 
that interpretation is a mode of normative engagement with my fellow human beings. … 
that in interpreting texts we have responsibilities to their authors. In reading and 
interpreting the Confessions, I have responsibilities to Augustine. I may not just engage 
in a play of interpretation, and I may not take cheap shots.315  
In this, he aligns himself with what he argues is a better reading of Schliermacher, that what we 
know of the author of a text is secondary to and dependent on how we understand what the 
author has said.316 Our knowledge of the author is oblique; our knowledge of her discourse is the 
more direct focus of our interpretive labor; but we undertake that textual labor within the ethical 
sphere of human communication and interpersonal responsibility.  
 Wolterstorff acknowledges a number of different legitimate types of hermeneutics—
including the “performance” hermeneutic exemplified by music—but, as a greater proponent of 
“objective” interpretation than Westphal,317 Wolterstorff argues that before and behind those 
special cases, the human communication practice of authorial discourse hermeneutics constitutes 
the basic ground.318 Thus we are ethically obligated to respect the author’s discourse, but the 
  
285 
interpretation process is not simple. Wolterstorff describes the process of even this first level of 
interpretation as a series of challenges that require “imagination” and “phronesis.” First, one has 
to imagine and “discern” the authorial discourse in the text at hand: what is the nature of the 
speech acts present here, as compared with the possible speech acts and their contexts that I 
know from my communication phronesis (i.e., practical wisdom)? Then, one has to imagine and 
discern the “world of the text” that is being constructed through that discourse, and which thus 
functions as the whole that further qualifies one’s interpretation of the discursive parts. Finally, 
one “indwells the text,” imagining the spaces of one’s own world as coextensive with the spaces 
of that textual world, imagining and acting the text in ways that build further phronesis and feed 
back into the interpretive process,319 which Wolterstorff characterizes as a “spiral” rather than a 
circle.320 
 It is when Wolterstorff brings in the divine discourse aspect of his double-agency 
discourse that things get both more interesting and more open to an Augustinian shift. What the 
metaphor of double-agency discourse allows Wolterstorff to do is to acknowledge the historical 
and cultural distance of the text321 while, at the same time, to free texts (especially the scriptures) 
to speak with illocutionary force in the present historical moment. That is, what the author said to 
his own time can be studied, with imagination and phronesis, as a past discourse, but that 
authorial discourse can be appropriated as divine speech—understood through imagination and 
phronesis as present discourse—even if the product of the first level interpretation is never fully 
complete. Thus, ideally, the connection between the first and second hermeneutical steps is 
centered on a respectful discernment of the speech acts embedded in the text itself. “God is in the 
details,” Wolterstorff says, “It’s the details of texts that resist imposed interpretations.”322 It is 
Wolterstorff’s belief that God will speak through our present, incomplete understanding of the 
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scriptural text; nevertheless, ideal scriptural interpretation involves listening to how God 
“appropriates” the scriptural discourse as he originally “deputized” it, the original “authorial 
discourse” which we have faithfully interpreted through our common communicational medium 
of human speech acts.323 This hermeneutic paradigm has been fairly influential in the 
Evangelical scholarly community, and it is especially interesting for this project since it 
addresses both the Evangelical practice of dealing seriously with the scriptural text as enduring 
communication and the broadly Evangelical identity marker of hearing God’s voice.  
 However, to fully tie together the human authorial discourse of the text and the divine 
authorial discourse through the text, I argue that we have to cross the boundary between 
philosophy and theology,324 a need that Wolterstorff acknowledges but refuses to meet fully.325 
Augustinian participation is the cosmology that calls such boundaries into question and can not 
only help tie together these two forms of discourse but can also say something to Wolterstorff’s 
insistence on speech acts as the basic ground of interpretation. Wolterstorff is certainly not 
antagonistic to the basics of a participatory perspective. He says that to be able to interpret divine 
discourse at all, we would need some “knowledge of God” on which to build our spiritual 
phronesis and guide our imaginations. “Specifically,” he says, we need “knowledge which 
enables us to determine with more or less confidence what God would have wanted to say by 
appropriating these texts.”326 This knowledge of God enables us to hear “when God was 
speaking literally and when metaphorically.” Those who know only the horizon of the text and 
the horizon of the interpreter—both radically located in temporal history—might anxiously ask, 
“Don’t we learn everything we know about God from Scripture?” Wolterstorff replies, “I think 
not.”327 His immediate reasoning is that such a circle would be closed, precluding hearing 
anything from God, which is not only theoretically infelicitous but contrary to the general 
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experience of a number of people, currently and historically.328 He seems, though, to have in 
mind an upward progress of hermeneutical phronesis, both through a first level growth in 
understanding scriptural discourse and through a second level growth in knowledge of God as a 
discourser. “Here, too, there’s the hermeneutic spiral.”329  
 There are parallels, here, to Augustine’s picture of the growth of true knowledge about 
the text and the world (first level) being an entry point to true wisdom about eternal things and 
God himself (second level), a hermeneutic process that starts with and continues on the track of 
creational memory of God and that has one of its key ends in obedience to the promises and 
commands (speech acts) of God.330 Thus, to Augustine and Wolterstorff, while scripture is a key 
aid to progressing upward on the hermeneutical spiral toward God, it is not the only or even the 
primary source of knowledge of God. However, I would argue that Augustine’s grounding in 
participation gives us a clearer picture of how to deal with temporality, how to understand 
scripture as truth, and how to understand the figural and metaphoric language that mediates past 
and present meanings.  
 In Wolterstorff’s theory, he makes a strong separation between revelation and divine 
speech. “Revelation occurs when ignorance is dispelled—or when something is done which 
would dispel ignorance if attention and interpretative skills were adequate,” Wolterstorff says, 
emphasizing that revelation is “unveiling the veiled, of uncovering the covered. … The 
counterpart of the revealed is the hidden.”331 What is unveiled by the revelation of the scripture, 
to Wolterstorff, is primarily the “hidden” self of God.332 By contrast, divine speech engages a 
different level of interpretation and manifests in speech acts that—though riding on the prior 
scriptural interpretation—are not revealing the hidden in ancient text but engaging us in right, 
“godly” responses to the current temporal moment.333 Wolterstorff hopes that this picture can 
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move conservative Christians past their obsession with “infallibility” since most of what is in the 
scriptures (as divinely appropriated human discourse) and some of what we get out of the 
scriptures (as divine discourse) is outside the province of infallibility,334 which is focused on the 
truth or falsity of assertoric statements.335 That is, Wolterstorff has narrowed the scope of 
difficult questions in biblical criticism to the bible’s few seeming assertions about the world that 
don’t square with modern prejudices, and he is impatient with biblical scholars who focus all 
their attention on biblical cultural history while giving none to the discourse of the human or 
divine authors of scripture. Wolterstorff argues that biblical critics are often asking the wrong 
questions by reading the scriptures as only assertoric revelation,336 and he proposes, as we have 
seen above, that below and before discerning the “world of the text,” we should ask, what is the 
nature and purpose of the discourse in the scripture under consideration.  
However, as Mary Hesse has pointed out, this diminution of the question of assertoric 
truth still leaves unanswered the question of how truth relates to these other speech acts. As an 
analytic philosopher, Wolterstorff may be comfortable with separating assertion, with its 
true/false orientation, from promises and commands, with their apt/inapt orientation, but this still 
leaves truth and falsity out of the realm of normal discourse with others and with God.337 This 
would not only seem like a prevarication to most Evangelicals, reared as we are on the language 
of truth, but it would also disconnect most of the scriptures and our experiences of divine 
discourse from their connection to eternal truth, which was Augustine’s theoretical center. That 
is, Augustine understood that the scriptures witness, however vaguely and imperfectly 
interpreted, to an eternal Word which we can also access and confirm through our “discourse” 
with the Inner Teacher. Both first-level temporal authorial discourse and second-level divine 
discourse, to Augustine, have the same root in eternity, not just the same divine speaker in two 
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different temporalities. Therefore, what was said about Moses leading a people out of bondage 
and what was said about Jesus leading a people out of bondage and what was appropriated by 
Martin Luther King, Jr., about leading a people out of bondage, to Augustine, might all be 
recapitulations of the same eternal word that had its epitome in Christ, whereas to Wolterstorff, 
the connection between these historical manifestations would seem not to be essential but rather 
created by the decision of God as spoken in the current moment. In this way, Wolterstorff is 
perhaps just being faithful to his Reformed tradition which, after Scotus and the rise of 
nominalism, emphasized God’s absolute decisional power to maintain theologically God’s 
freedom to act in an otherwise univocal universe.338  
 This disconnection from Augustine’s focus on eternal speech also manifests in the lack of 
clarity in Wolterstorff’s theory concerning figures of speech, though he does elucidate the 
question to some degree.339 Leading up to the exposition of his own theory, Wolterstorff 
discusses the textual-sense interpretation of the New Critics, whose claim that the text’s sense 
comes from its unity leads to the further claim that the “open-ended … metaphorical meanings” 
in the text open that “sense” up to multiple valid interpretations. The unity of the text provides 
the stability while the metaphorical “ambiguity” of the text provides the flexibility for different 
interpretational horizons that enable the artistic text to be timeless.340 However, Wolterstorff 
argues, the assumption that “texts have unified senses” is problematic341 except through recourse 
to a real human author (for most texts) or a divine author (for the scriptures). Double-agency 
discourse “offers us a way of understanding the unity of Scripture at a deep level … [as] God’s 
deputized and/or appropriated discourse.”342 Though authorial-discourse interpretation has been 
criticized, Wolterstorff says, for restricting the “richness and openness of the meaning of texts,” 
he responds that “illocutionary acts are just as open-ended, and as little determined in their 
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character by what their performers think their character to be, as textual-senses were assumed to 
be.”343 However, we can notice here that Wolterstorff has replaced figurative language with 
illocutionary acts as the source of the indeterminacy that a trans-historical text would need in 
order to continue to meet new horizons. He has not given us a way to understand how metaphors 
function with or alongside discourse to create the text’s sense within its unity as divine discourse. 
In Divine Discourse, he offers that we receive metaphors with some level of assumption about 
what the discourser would “intend” to say to us through the metaphor,344 but also that the author 
“only dimly apprehends” what she intended when she spoke metaphorically.345 Attempting to 
keep “meaning” unitary, Wolterstorff separates the question of meaning (the author’s intention 
as performed in discourse) from the question of “literality and metaphoricity,” which he 
aggregates to “use.”346 But this shuffling of metaphor to the periphery, outside the question of 
meaning and outside the question of truth, does not seem valid from an Augustinian participatory 
standpoint, as pursued below. This lacuna was also pointed out by Mary Hesse, who notes that 
the “classic tropes” were treated as having “no truth value” in original Speech Act Theory. “But 
in all serious natural language texts, and pre-eminently in Scripture, metaphor and the other 
tropes are pervasive. No theory of interpretation that neglects them can be adequate for biblical 
hermeneutics.”347  
 How should the “pervasive” figuration of the scriptures relate to Wolterstorff’s focus on 
the scriptures’ discursive aspects, especially given his helpful openness to both human and supra-
human communicational factors? First, Wolterstorff’s either/or between performative and 
discourse approaches to interpretation would need to be loosened.348 It would seem to me that 
participatory figuration invites a more “performative” interpretation of the scripture, so that the 
figure, say, of walking “through the valley of the shadow of death” under the care of the 
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shepherd is performed again in each particular situation where threatening circumstances are to 
be counterbalanced by trust in the divine shepherd. There is, to be sure, a degree of attention that 
needs to be paid to the interrelationship of textual factors in that Psalm, especially an 
illocutionary act of trust (the “word of faith”).349 Even in Wolterstorff’s example of Augustine’s 
conversion, the divine discourse had preempted and overpowered Augustine’s attention to the 
original authorial discourse. Augustine did not first discern the original authorial discourse of the 
child singing tolle lege, or of Paul’s letter to the Romans, but rather discerned immediately the 
second level of discourse, the divine.350 While Wolterstorff may have been using this as an 
example of something other than normal authorial discourse interpretation, the example hangs 
over his whole discussion as paradigmatic. For the appropriation of biblical scenes, situations, 
commands, and promises as figurally applicable to the present moment, the present voice of God 
would similarly need to be heard to confirm which of the many biblical figures we are now to 
inhabit, and how. That is, contra Wolterstorff’s suggestion,351 the second level of discourse (the 
divine) is often necessary in order to choose and appropriate which metaphoric worlds the 
interpreter is to inhabit, which thus provides the context for understanding how the ambiguities 
of the original speech acts are to be interpreted. In line with participation, Wolterstorff’s hard 
either/or between metaphoric and literal stances352 would need to be reconfigured.  
To try to make this clearer, let’s look again at our previous example of how a New 
Testament author interprets the Old Testament. The author of Hebrews quotes Psalm 95 as a 
current message to his Christian (and probably Jewish Christian) audience, “Today, if you will 
hear His voice, do not harden your hearts as in the rebellion, in the day of trial in the wilderness, 
where your fathers tested Me, tried Me, And saw My works forty years.”353 Tracing the author’s 
use of Old Testament scripture here, the first thing that the author does is establish the 
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metaphoric connection between the children of Israel led by Moses toward the Promised Land 
and the church led by Jesus toward the promised land of faith.354 How does the author know this 
figural connection is valid? This, I argue, is where divine speech would be needed first. The 
author of Hebrews sits down to write his letter, and the divine voice speaks to him convincingly 
that “this is like that.” Once the metaphoric connection between past and present has been thus 
mediated through the Word from the realm of eternity (Augustine’s Inner Teacher), the 
ambiguities of both the figural relationship and the discursive acts in the passage can be 
approached responsibly with serious attention to the text and serious attention to the further 
speech of God. For example, we can now ask how the discursive situation should be 
characterized between the children of Israel and God in that passage—should the 
command/refusal speech acts be emphasized or the complaint/rebuke speech acts, and how 
should we understand the temporality of the figurative comparison (“today”)? For these further 
interpretational decisions, divine speech would also be sought.  
It may be that Wolterstorff and others would fault this example for taking the scriptures 
themselves as an exemplar of participatory scriptural interpretation. However, with Gabrielson 
and Augustine,355 I argue that though the scriptures have a different level of authority than their 
later interpreters, the scriptures lay out the pattern of interpretive practice that is still possible and 
necessary. The difference between the text of the scriptures and any other text through which 
God might speak is not merely that the scriptures are revelatory (since God could technically 
unveil himself through any text) but that it is the text through which God has committed to 
continue speaking, again and again. That is, the text of the scriptures always has latent potential 
for divine speech because God, by divine speech, has committed the speech act of promising to 
speak to those who honestly seek him in that Word,356 the mediating venue where the scriptural 
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text and the eternally spoken Son can be heard together. Wolterstorff recognizes that Christians 
keep coming to the scriptures, again and again, because it is a “medium of divine revelation” that 
meets every new historical situation down through time and provides a formative reservoir of 
“phrases and images, … narratives and songs … [through which] it sees reality and imagines 
possibilities.”357 All this is true from an Augustinian participatory standpoint, but while 
Wolterstorff makes revelation and speech two different divine activities, demanding two types of 
hermeneutics that are not connected at the root in God’s eternal Word, Augustine ties both 
scriptural revelation and present divine speech to that eternal Word that is accessible to all 
through creational memory and the Inner Teacher and is even more strongly opened through the 
grace given by the participatory work of Christ and the indwelling Holy Spirit. In a participatory 
hermeneutic, God speaks literally by metaphor, tying phrases, narratives, and images from past 
moments in divine history with the present moment in divine history and thereby opening a 
space for shared action between God and his people—not merely a command nor merely a 
human interpretation of a situation, but a participatory event that includes both.  
In Wolterstorff’s hermeneutical texts so far perused, two other important Augustinian 
themes are missing or deemphasized. The first is the question of where the community fits in the 
hermeneutic process; the second is where worship fits in the goals of interpretation. Though 
Wolterstorff is acutely aware of the role of the community in continually recreating its self-
understanding through scriptural language, following its hermeneutic tradition,358 it is unclear 
how the community participates together in discerning either human authorial discourse (the first 
level of interpretation) or divine discourse (the second level of interpretation). If God’s speech 
through the scriptures is “free” in that it is not rooted in an (Augustinian) eternal Word, how can 
it be shared as a community resource, as emphasized by Augustine?359 That is, must God 
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“freely” speak the same word at a particular moment in time to multiple members of the 
community in order for them to share in common that divinely infused scripture?  
Second, Wolterstorff emphasizes that the “goal of interpretation” is not to “understand 
the other,” especially not to understand (except obliquely) the radical alterity of the personhood 
of God, but rather to understand “what the other said.”360 While commendably humble, avoiding 
the hubris of a modernistic God’s-eye theology of God himself, this interpretational goal does 
not address the Augustinian and apostolic goal of worship, which is the contemplation of God 
himself.361 While scriptural speech acts do put Christian disciples under their Master by putting 
them under the discourse conventions of human language (the vita activa), they are not clearly 
targeted to aiding Christians in “beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, … being 
transformed into the same image from glory to glory, just as by the Spirit of the Lord”362 (the 
vita contemplativa). To Augustine, of course, both of these are necessary,363 and both are 
connected together by a participatory interpretation of the eternal Word of God.   
James K. A. Smith: The Presence of the Spirit?  
James K. A. Smith, the final philosophical interlocutor of this chapter, has been busily 
mining a number of Continental thinkers for philosophical concepts and vocabularies through 
which to rethink Christian hermeneutics and worship. He argues for the fundamentally 
constructive nature of hermeneutics as part of creational goodness,364 and for the importance of 
an incarnational grounding in Continental philosophy of language,365 all from a “modified” 
Augustinian perspective.366 In his proposal for a “creational hermeneutic,” Smith first describes 
what he sees as three current but problematic models of hermeneutics:  the “present immediacy 
model” of many Evangelicals that sees interpretation as a “curse” resulting from the Fall but, 
“lifted here and now … for the Evangelical Christian”;367 the “eschatological immediacy” model, 
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where interpretation is similarly to be overcome, eventually, through some form of evolutionary 
or historical process; and the “violent mediation” model of Heidegger and Derrida, where 
interpretation—as co-constitutive with mediation—is never to be “overcome” but is also 
structurally “violent.”368 Against these modern and insufficiently postmodern models of 
hermeneutics,369 Smith posits an Augustinian creational hermeneutic, arguing that the limitations 
of human creaturehood and the indeterminacy of the linguistic medium are both “structurally 
good” as aspects of God’s creation. Interpretation is fundamentally linguistic (like Gadamer’s 
view) and never-ending by God’s design, and thus will not cease to be so at the eschaton but will 
continue as part of human be-ing. It can be practiced violently (a la Derrida) in the current fallen 
world, but it doesn’t have to be.370 This “Augustinian philosophical hermeneutic,” Smith says, 
entails that interpretation “is not accidental but an inescapable aspect of human existence,” that it 
is “affected by the Fall but not … the product of the Fall,” and that “it is an aspect of human be-
ing that is primordially good and remains such in a postlapsarian world,” not a problem to be 
“overcome.”371  
 Though Smith grounds this creational hermeneutic in Augustine, it is a confessedly 
“demythologized” Augustine. That is, Smith “seek[s] to critically read [Augustine’s] devaluing 
of temporality, finitude and language against the horizon of his fundamental affirmation of the 
goodness of creation,” two Augustinian themes that Smith sees in “tension.”372 Smith’s reading 
of Augustine as “devaluing temporality, finitude, and language” is part of the problematic 
tradition of reading Augustine as significantly corrupted by Platonic influences,373 a tradition of 
whose disputes Smith is aware.374 Smith chooses to emphasize Augustine’s doctrine of the 
goodness of creation, but he seems, in my reading, to aggregate to it the metaphors of 
historicality and situatedness of post-Heideggarian philosophical hermeneutics. In so doing, 
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Smith follows Derrida in calling into question the nostalgia for “total presence,” for a 
communion that is unmediated by language or hermeneutics. He says, “As finite human beings 
we never have (nor ever will have) access to the thoughts of another as immediately present,” 
and he argues that without intersubjective difference, “one would wonder if even something like 
communication would be necessary, let alone possible.”375 Though Smith identifies his place in 
the tradition as following the “good” Augustine, mediated through Abraham Kuyper and the 
Wesleyan-Pentecostal tradition of affirming creation,376 I suspect that his choices of emphasis in 
Augustine are significantly grounded in his promotion of hermeneutical “difference,”377 which is 
a cardinal doctrine of the church of philosophical hermeneutics and a formational theme from 
Smith’s own history.378  
Smith does, however, helpfully bring together the hermeneutical questions and themes 
from Augustine and the philosophical hermeneutical tradition—and in a clear and perceptive 
manner. Of the many conversations about hermeneutics that this project could engage in with 
Smith, the two most pertinent are, first, how Augustine’s incarnational/participatory thought 
affects Smith’s understanding of hermeneutics and, second, how a Pentecostal praxis might 
inform participatory hermeneutical theory.  
Two years after publishing his book on a modified Augustinian creational hermeneutic, 
Smith engaged more fully with the participatory theme of Radical Orthodoxy scholars in his 
excellent book Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation. There, he both 
identified participation with Augustine’s Incarnational thought and rejected the Radical 
Orthodox synthesis of Platonic participation and Augustinian Incarnation.379 After examining 
Smith’s basic exposition of language, we will consider more fully how participation might speak 
further to his hermeneutics.  
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Smith first develops the problem of language in Continental thought as between the 
violence of kataphantic approaches (positive referential content in language) and apophantic 
approaches (respect for ungraspable otherness).380 That is, does the nature of language imply that 
we have to commit the violence of grasping the other through speech, or should we instead move 
towards silence as the only ethical alternative? Smith argues that Augustine’s linguistic theory 
deals with this conundrum in both exterior and interior aspects. Exterior language is 
“insufficien[t]” because “things” are always more than what they can be described linguistically, 
and there is a similar interior “insufficiency” because the incomprehensible “depth” of the self 
means that no language can fully or perfectly articulate the “infinity” of the self.381 Smith 
develops Augustine’s philosophy of language in response to the external challenge of 
“conceptualization” and the internal challenge of “expression”: “If ‘praise’ is a methodological 
strategy developed in response to the challenge of conceptualization, then ‘confession’ is a 
correlate strategy taken up in response to the challenge of expression.”382 Both “praise” and 
“confession,” Smith says, follow from Augustine’s understanding of the “incompletion of the 
sign.”383  
External language is “radically incommensurate” with not just God but any “thing”; 
however, language can point someone towards a thing that people can then “experience” 
themselves. This knowledge of experience then makes the knowledge of the words more 
“complete.”384 But since the thing always exceeds language while still calling for language, it 
generates “praise,” which is “a non-objectifying, non-positivistic mode of conceptualization,”385 
and which “says something about someone, but without prescription or definition.”386 Smith says 
that every thing in the world, to Augustine, is also to be a sign used to direct “non-objectifying” 
attention to God, following Augustine’s language of love in which our love of earthly things 
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should be referential to our enjoyment of God through praise.387 That is, all earthly things are 
like signs in that they point toward God while not objectively describing God, constituting a 
world of provocations to praise God. Because not all these external descriptions can be “known,” 
they have to be largely taken by “faith” through interaction with the “Inner Teacher.”388 Thus, 
external language, by its ontological incompleteness, provides a space for intersubjective 
experience of the world and a medium for the continual flow of praise from things made to their 
maker.  
External language is also incommensurate with the internal language of the self, even 
though “language makes public the ‘private’ intentions and desires of the self [and] words are 
therefore ‘common property,’ belonging to a community.”389 This public external language does 
not capture the “secret life of the soul,”390 both because the soul is never fully known to itself 
and because “the radical privacy of the self is incommensurate with the public traffic of 
language” (i.e., the self is particular, language is universal).391 However, for the sake of ethical 
engagement with our community, we cannot be and are not silent. Augustine’s metaphor of 
“confession,” Smith suggests, “is literary and aesthetic rather than doctrinal and didactic, … able 
to indicate the secret of the soul in such a way that the secret can be (ap)present to the other, but 
not fully disclosed.”392 Because we are not privy to the interior “secret souls” of others except 
through the incomplete medium of language, we have to take by “faith” our shared “confessions” 
of our inward selves.393  
Smith’s driving thesis is that Augustine’s Incarnational thought is key to understanding 
how language functions as both a “presence” and an “absence,” neither conceptually determinate 
of meaning nor disconnected from meaning. Smith says that the Incarnation  
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is a structure of both presence and absence: present in the flesh, and yet referring beyond. 
[It] retains the structural incompleteness of the sign which is constitutive of language. … 
Divinity, while it cannot be reduced to this body, is nevertheless infleshed in it and thus 
signaling beyond itself. This is why the God-man is a mediator between divinity and 
humanity, finitude and the Infinite. This is also why, for Augustine, all signs function as 
mediators … By referring or pointing to what is other than themselves, signs make 
knowledge of transcendence possible.394  
Through the mediating function of language, we make “present” to one another in a “weaker 
sense” our internal knowledge of external things or of our internal selves,395 and these linguistic 
incarnations are received partly by faith and partly by experience. True communication happens, 
but never so completely that things or others are grasped comprehensively, and thus true 
communication continues to provoke more interpretation and more language, more “praise” and 
more “confession.” It is this connection between Incarnation and hermeneutics that leads Smith 
to posit hermeneutics as a prelapsarian and post-eschaton structure of creation, affected by the 
historical fall but not ontologically connected to a Fall. Confession and praise through the 
incompleteness of the sign is, to Smith, part of God’s perfect plan in creation.  
 It is perhaps unfortunate that the form of participation that Smith is primarily reacting to 
is the self-described “Platonism/Christianity” of Milbank and company. As I have endeavored to 
describe in Chapter 2, participation has a much broader and longer heritage than Platonism, and 
there are sources to draw from other than Radical Orthodoxy. Smith rejects the Platonism of 
Milbank, but it is not clear whether he fully sees the possibilities of traditionally participatory 
Christian thought, or “deification.”396 If we consider the Incarnation of Christ as paradigmatic for 
the possibility of language (though not operative in its every instantiation397), then the language 
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of identity and reference is not adequate. That is, Christ was not making the Father present in a 
“weaker form,” nor was he “referring or pointing to what is other than” himself. As God, he fully 
participated downward in our humanity; as man, he fully participated upward in the Father. As a 
mediator, he is not a weaker form of both sides, whose insufficient representation of divinity 
makes unrequited “faith” a continual structural necessity. Through the medium of Christ, we go 
from “faith to faith,” or in Augustine’s terms, through faith to knowledge to wisdom.398 
Likewise, words can be a strong form of mediation between eternal truths and temporal people, 
creating an incarnational “presence” by the participatory work of God in the particular time and 
situation of their utterance. Full “presence” does not mean that the grace-filled utterance is 
objectively perceptible to all hearers, the modernistic fallacy that Smith rightly critiques, but it 
does mean that the word bears actionable fruit, whether direction, obedience, conviction, or guilt 
and condemnation. Even a word that is fully present, like Christ’s incarnation itself, is not a 
comprehensive statement that unveils all the secrets of the universe, but a word in due season 
with a purpose, an audience, and sometimes a date of expiration.399 “He who has seen Me has 
seen the Father,”400 Jesus said, but the full presence of the Father in Christ did not obviate the 
particular focus of Christ’s purpose, audience, and timing as the Word.  
 Perhaps I am tilting at windmills, but I argue that a broader participatory understanding 
of language, while resonating with Smith’s description of its common function, would also look 
for the strong form of linguistic incarnation as a relatively common event in the context of 
seeking God through the scriptures. Here, perhaps, Wolterstorff’s “divine discourse” can make 
its appearance, not as an alien divine voice that “possesses” (i.e., “authorizes”) a scriptural text, 
but as the divine voice that authored the text and proclaims that it is the time and situation for the 
text to be incarnated again. That is, reading the scriptures can initiate the opening of a space for 
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the “human, all too human” words of the text to become, again, not merely pointers to the divine 
but words that participate in the very power and presence of God. “Take up your bed and walk” 
would be one of these divine speech acts, as would be a “Come” spoken to a disciple in a storm-
tossed boat.401 The authority in these words is not conventional, not nomos, as in “I pronounce 
you man and wife,”402 but instead ties together heaven and earth to provide certainty and truth 
for that particular situation in time.  
 This strong form, it may be argued, moves a bit beyond Augustine, but Augustine also 
argued for a (non-Platonic) access to knowledge and wisdom, an access that starts with faith but 
does not end there. For different particular truths (to recap Chapter 2), we need knowledge of 
them in order to love them, but our knowledge is hidden inaccessibly in creational memory. The 
true things are depicted, though, in language that can provoke our love and our search for these 
things inwardly. Finding them inwardly, our faith becomes true knowledge and a stronger 
ground for our continued love, which we maintain through “praise” (referring our love of the 
truth to its object in the love of the Truth) and “confession” (making the truth public and thus 
keeping it fresh in personal and communal memory through the dulling effect of time). That is, 
there are at least two points of connection to universal truth—in creational memory and by the 
participatory voice of the Holy Spirit—that are mediated through language, which is then made 
more “complete” by its connection to those realities.403 Because of the participatory structures of 
memory and the grace of the indwelling Spirit, intersubjectivity can be present through language, 
generally, but Augustine may also have believed in the voice of God being incarnated in 
language with power. What else is Augustine doing when he asks God to speak through him in 
his preaching and writing? What else was he hoping for when he agreed to government force 
against the Donatists, if only they could be brought again under the preaching of the gospel? 
  
302 
Though the preacher may be inadequate—as Augustine felt of himself—and the audience be ill-
disposed to search their own hearts—as the Donatists were—the word itself can still come as an 
incarnational force, a medium that becomes by grace a mediator.404  
 Smith points us toward this participatory perspective on language through his exploration 
of the hermeneutical implications of incarnation for language and hermeneutics, but I have 
argued that Smith, perhaps reacting against the fundamentalism of his upbringing,405 did not go 
far enough toward an incarnationally re-enchanted cosmos. However, as can be seen in Smith’s 
scholarly agenda to bring pentecostalism and philosophy to bear on each other,406 he does point 
us, in ways germane to philosophy of communication, to current Christian “social 
imaginaries”407 that picture for us a participatory biblical hermeneutic. Taking up briefly Smith’s 
invitation to “see [his] articulation of a pentecostal worldview challenged, revised, and 
supplemented,”408 I affirm his hermeneutic emphasis on “radical openness to God” while 
qualifying its description as “surprise,” I affirm his emphasis on embodied praxis in 
interpretation while retaining a more integral role for philosophy of communication, and I affirm 
his “affective, narrative epistemology” while broadening the operative narrative to the 
Evangelically ecumenical tradition.409  
 To an Evangelical sensibility, “radical openness” can be a disturbing metaphor, but Smith 
develops this metaphor well in an exploration of how a pentecostal worldview holds a position 
between “nonreductive naturalism” and what he calls “interventionist supernaturalism.”410 Smith 
describes the modernistic continuum of hermeneutic ontologies from reductive naturalism (all 
things are material and materially caused) to nonreductive naturalism (there are causes, 
properties, and categories that emerge from and above material realities) to “interventionist 
supernaturalism.” The latter Smith identifies with modernist strains of Evangelicalism, which 
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presupposes a “natural” world similar to the other two ontologies while arguing for God’s 
“intervention” into such naturalism from a “super,” or outside, position.411 In opposition to these 
ontologies, Smith describes a pentecostal ontology as “noninterventionist,”412 even though it is 
clearly “fantastic” and open to “events of miraculous healing, divine revelation in tongues-
speech, divine illumination, prophecy, and other ‘supernatural’ phenomena.”413 Drawing 
generally on the participatory thought of Radical Orthodoxy414 and what he characterizes as the 
“gritty, material, physical mode of worship” of pentecostalism,415 Smith argues that a pentecostal 
noninterventionist ontology understands God as always already at work in and through the 
material world. Thus, the “regularity” of natural processes is understood as God’s faithful 
maintenance of the material world,416 and the “special action” of the miraculous is not an 
intervention but rather an intensification of the grace that was always already present in the 
situation.417 In light of this ontology, Smith rejects the implications of the word “super-natural,” 
though he has to retain the word for the sake of the public he is addressing.418 This participatory 
pentecostal ontology—or cosmology—gives pentecostal-charismatics419 justification for being 
unsurprised at (and thankful for) the normal operation of the world while also being “committed 
to a universe open to surprise.”420 As an example of the practical outworking of this viewpoint, 
Smith notes the non-conflicting pentecostal attitudes toward medical care, both seeking God’s 
grace through the normal medical processes (in which God always already participates) and 
through the “surprise” of a more intense influx of grace, resulting in divine healing.421   
 As we have seen in the description of Augustinian participation in Chapter 2, this 
ontology is very Augustinian, and Smith even cites Augustine’s argument in De Trinitate about 
the naturalness of miracles.422 Applied to scriptural hermeneutics, this ontology would imply that 
God always already undergirds the communicational process—oral or textual—through the 
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constant action of the Inner Teacher, while he sometimes intensifies the Inner Teacher’s voice in 
some way, resulting in a “miraculous” scriptural communication. While God’s presence in 
communication is always already there in the background, his manifest presence sometimes 
jumps into the foreground, just as both God’s omnipresence and his localized, special presence 
are attested by the scriptures, sometimes in the same passage.423 But are the metaphors of 
“openness” and “surprise” the best way to describe or communicate this phenomenon? Here, 
Kenneth Burke’s argument for the fundamental human appetite for the eloquent movement of 
plot over the formless energy of “surprise and suspense”424 can give timely language to 
Augustine’s insistence that we participate in a story with cosmic aesthetic dimensions.425 While 
we are “open” to the voice of God’s “divine discourse,” that openness operates within the 
boundaries of a rule of faith, a historical Christian story, and a personal history with God, all of 
which have always already partaken of God’s grace and are therefore essential to the open/closed 
dialectic of scriptural hermeneutics. While we are momentarily “surprised” by God’s intensified 
voice beyond the historical or grammatical horizon of the text, the aptness of the divine message 
or action to the current situation tempers our surprise with our recognition of the narrative plot. 
This is all the more true as we grow in what Wolterstorff identifies as spiritual “phronesis,” 
wisdom concerning what types of things God would say to us through the scriptures.426 God’s 
surprises operate unsurprisingly in the repeated patterns of his character and plan, as epitomized 
in the overarching narrative of the work of Christ.  
According to Jon Bialecki, this intensified participation of God in scriptural interpretation 
is thematized as God’s “presence” in the broad pentecostal-charismatic community of 
Evangelicals and is held in an ecclesiological dialectic with the “disseminated” scriptural text.427 
Even the cessationist “fundamentalists” who theologically dismiss the gifts and the voice of God 
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actively spoken through scripture—whose theologians still speak in “interventionist” terms428—
take part in the broader lay practice of this participatory “social imaginary.”429 From my 
historical treatment of Evangelicalism in Chapter 1, I argue that this commonality of “spiritual” 
hermeneutics is due to the experiential, egalitarian lay Evangelical foundation that has survived 
the onslaught of modernism, both within fundamentalist denominations and through their 
Pentecostal offshoots. Since it is the openness of the social imaginary, with its implied 
worldview, that is Smith’s focus of description, I would therefore broaden the population for 
which this description is relevant, even beyond the “catholicity of charismatic Christianity.”430 
This connection of ancient and future scriptural hermeneutics across denominational and 
religious-cultural lines is particularly important at the current time for the self-understanding of a 
globalized Christianity, whose participatory stirrings in the West need appropriate conceptual 
equipment to interact effectively and charitably with the native “charismatic” participation of the 
exploding church in the global South.431 My argument is that this ecumenical spirituality that 
finds its Christological center in the gospel is and has always been, in on-the-ground spiritual 
practice, the real force animating Evangelicalism, more so than the slick marketing campaigns, 
the crusade organizational strategies, or the purity and unanimity of orthodox doctrinal 
statements. However, without a clearer conceptual language in which to practice a public shared 
understanding of its identity and scriptural hermeneutic, Evangelicalism will have difficulty 
grasping the possibilities of the cross-denominational scriptural hermeneutic that it already 
practices and may lose the ecumenical foundation for a global Christianity, and with it the fruits 
of its missional labor. While Smith gets us part of the way there in his “pentecostal” philosophy 
of communication, it is Smith’s Augustinian ground that, I believe, can provide us a less 
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sectarian and less philosophically compromised philosophy of communication to meet the 
Evangelical need for an ecumenical hermeneutical ground.  
A final way Smith’s philosophy of communication helps us resist a Cartesian modernity 
in hermeneutics is his emphasis on the essentially “affective” and embodied nature of a 
participatory hermeneutics. A more full discussion of this must wait until the next chapter, but 
Smith basically argues that since God is always already participating in all our material reality, a 
pentecostal approach to worship values the body and the material concomitants of worship. 
While he uses the term “worldview,” Smith also deconstructs it in several of his books,432 saying 
that  
It should be noted that being able to articulate [a worldview] is not a requirement for 
absorbing the understanding; rather, this affective understanding can be transformatively 
absorbed, shaping our passions and dispositions, even if we might not have the 
theoretical ability to articulate what we “know.” … [This] “I know that I know that I 
know” … is a knowledge, an “affective understanding,” that is on a register prior to 
propositional articulation.433 
So, reading Heidegger and Augustine together,434 Smith understands our worldview as 
“transformatively absorbed” through our material embodied practice and continually “shaping 
our passions and dispositions.” In this process, he devalues rationality and doctrine, not 
absolutely but relative to the affective and embodied aspects of hermeneutics which, he argues, 
are what shape our “loves.”435  
 While it is true to Augustine’s hermeneutics that our interpretations are shaped by our 
loves, that the (dis)order of our loves is partly given to us by our social and embodied 
“thrownness” in Adam’s race, and that such problematic embodied hermeneutics are 
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strengthened through the “chains of habit,”436 Augustine’s way out of this vicious hermeneutic 
circle is not primarily through the body, but rather through the scriptures. Given, Augustine 
emphasizes action on the basis of the scriptures in order to ground true and good interpretations 
again in the individual and social body,437 but it is the voice of God through the scriptures that 
provides a grace-filled interruption in our otherwise helpless selfhood. This is the voice of God 
through the normal meaning of the scriptural text, which can be sought through participation 
with the Inner Teacher in creational memory, and this is the voice of God as the manifest 
presence of God in the text, an incident of divine speech for a specific historical moment. 
However, whether through normal participatory interpretation or special divine speech—or a 
dialectic of the two—even an affective charismatic spirituality, I argue, should be seen as 
conceptual as much as it is embodied, though the concepts are the narrative structures and 
phrases of the scriptures. Though Evangelicalism in its modernistic aspect may have erred in 
emphasizing too much the rationalistic conceptual nature of the faith (i.e., “worldview”), Smith, 
in my view, goes too far in his overcorrection, proposing primarily an embodied liturgical 
solution to Evangelical ecclesial problems that need, instead, a philosophy of hermeneutics that 
synthesizes the conceptual and the material in the scriptures. In this, Smith needs to give more 
heed to his teacher Augustine than to his teachers among the Continental philosophers.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with the question of what philosophical resources might be brought 
to bear on an Augustinian scriptural hermeneutics in order to “translate” it into a current 
philosophical register. In its approach as Augustinian philosophy of communication, this project 
considers the extant conceptual resources of Gadamer, Ricoeur, Westphal, Wolterstorff, and 
Smith as potential gifts, providential systems of thought that have at least a partial purchase on 
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the truth and that, therefore, might need to be appropriated by Evangelicals if this movement is to 
return to a participatory scriptural hermeneutic, a hermeneutic that takes seriously not only the 
being of the text and its human author but also the very real authorial presence of its divine 
author. Though all of these philosophers have a self-confessed claim to be doing an Augustinian 
hermeneutic—and they provide us with helpful vocabulary along the way—I have argued that 
none of them have fully captured the hermeneutic humility (through finitude and fallenness) and 
possibility (through creational memory and God’s “presence” through participatory grace) that 
Augustine’s system provides, nor have they provided a similarly robust explanation of how we 
participate in scriptural figures not just aesthetically (through imagination) but also actually 
(living in the moment Christological patterns that are spoken timelessly from eternity). 
Augustine’s confidence in the eternal Truth that, through the scriptures and the Spirit, can be 
discerned as the truth that is fit for today explodes the problematic distinction between doctrine 
and application and returns us to a pre-Cartesian holistic cosmology. At the dawn of a 
globalizing Christianity in which the “norming” center is shifting away from the Cartesian West 
to the “native” participation of the global South, it is this Augustinian philosophy of 
communication that can provide an ecumenical Evangelical basis for hermeneutics that is both 
textual and spiritual.  
Isaiah 55 provides us a concluding picture of scriptural hermeneutics through the lenses 
of several of our philosophical interlocutors. The chapter opens with a call to receive blessing 
without payment or work, moves to a call to repentance, characterizes the distribution and effect 
of God’s word, and finally describes the Edenic scene of joy that greets whose who receive such 
blessing. Merold Westphal picks the second of these sections as his key to hermeneutics, saying 
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that “the hermeneutics of finitude can be read as a commentary on Isaiah 55:8-9,”438 which is the 
famous section, 
“For My thoughts are not your thoughts, 
Nor are your ways My ways,” says the Lord. 
“For as the heavens are higher than the earth, 
So are My ways higher than your ways, 
And My thoughts than your thoughts. 
Westphal says that this hermeneutical finitude means that our “embedded” standpoint will 
always be necessarily different from other humans’ and from God’s.439 With this separation of 
ways and thoughts, we start and end the interpretation process in ignorance, but at least we are 
humble.  
 Gadamer takes the next verse as his focus, citing it for its “sensitivity” to the 
linguisticality of humankind.440 It reads as follows: 
 For as the rain comes down, and the snow from heaven, 
And do not return there, 
But water the earth, 
And make it bring forth and bud, 
That it may give seed to the sower 
And bread to the eater, 
So shall My word be that goes forth from My mouth; 
It shall not return to Me void, 
But it shall accomplish what I please, 
And it shall prosper in the thing for which I sent it. 
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Gadamer rightly sees in this passage a proto-Incarnational metaphor,441 but his focus is still on 
the workings of language within the plane of human temporality.  
 So, while Westphal sees a check on human interpretive arrogance through the alterity of 
God (and others), Gadamer sees the common stream of language as the hermeneutical conditions 
of being. Neither one of them seems to put together the participatory possibilities of the 
metaphor: God’s eternal thoughts and ways are in heaven and our temporal ones are on earth, but 
through the downward participation of His Word (from the heavens to the earth), all sorts of 
goods are produced that, in their turn, not only provide earthly sustenance (Smith’s “confession”) 
but also grow upward toward the heavens (Smith’s “praise”). To Augustine, the real otherness of 
the eternal God, provoking continual interpretation, and the real participatory grace rained down 
on us through the scriptures and the Spirit, provoking continual hope, do indeed create a spiral of 
interpretation in which we make “progress” even while we continue to seek. Augustine thus 
homes in on the verse of Isaiah 55 in which the tension of that spiral is manifested: 
The prophet Isaiah testifies that the Lord God can be found provided he is sought, when 
he says, Seek the Lord and as soon as you find him call upon him, and when he draws 
near to you let the godless man forsake his ways and the wicked man his thoughts.442 
But does anyone ever comprehensively “find” God, Augustine asks? No, of course not. Knowing 
that God is unsearchable, though, how does the interpreter go forward without losing heart? 
Augustine says  
You should not give up the search as long as you are making progress in your inquiry 
into things incomprehensible, and because you become better and better by looking for so 
great a good which is both sought in order to be found and found in order to be sought … 
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It is sought in order to be found all the more delightfully, and it is found in order to be 
sought all the more avidly.443  
That is, a Christian hermeneutic enables real progress but not completion, with the outcomes of 
personal growth for the interpreter, delight in the contemplation of God, and motivation to 
continue the searching and the finding—in a word, worship. It is this worship—generated “in 
between” heaven and earth, between seeking and finding, between mystery and knowledge—that 
is the telos of an Augustinian scriptural hermeneutic. Beyond modernist fantasies of 
comprehensive control and postmodern reductions of the cosmos to historical intertextuality, 
Augustine can reopen the scriptures for Evangelicals through the participatory third dimension of 
the mediating Word of God.   
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Chapter 5  
Moving Augustinian Hermeneutical Principles into Current Evangelical Practice 
In this final chapter, we will examine the rhetorical implications of applying a 
participatory Augustinian hermeneutics to the current crisis in Evangelical hermeneutics. That is, 
what might the philosophical concepts recovered from Augustinian hermeneutics look like if 
embodied in current Evangelical contexts? Could an Augustinian approach to the scriptures 
function as a new norm for an Evangelical “language of biblical hermeneutics,”1 restoring the 
scriptures to their rightful place at the heart of Evangelical community and mission? Answering 
these questions is the rhetorical turn required by a philosophy of communication interpretive 
approach, which submits proposed conceptual solutions to the “pragmatic test of public opinion 
in the public domain,” according to Ronald C. Arnett.2 For “a public” to “ask whether the theory 
does what it attempts to do,” the theory must have some concrete applicability or social 
embodiment. Such embodiments of communication theory enable “assessment” on the ground, 
which is “itself … a communicative event.”3 
 Therefore, to complete this philosophy of communication project, this chapter seeks to 
describe the proposed hermeneutic theory concretely enough to make it assessable within its 
target context, which is Evangelical ecclesial practice. This description will proceed in two ways: 
comparatively and synthetically. Comparatively, we will examine how other theorists and 
practitioners have provided similar descriptions of one or more metaphors of an Augustinian 
participatory hermeneutics. Not all of these examples are explicitly Augustinian, but they are all 
responding in similar ways to some of the same aspects of the hermeneutic crisis into which 
modernism has led the church. Synthetically, I will describe a particular set of ecclesial practices 
that might provide a testing ground for a participatory Augustinian hermeneutic.  
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 First, then, the key themes of a participatory Augustinian hermeneutic will be 
summarized from their theoretical development in the preceding chapters. Second, these themes 
will be examined in various recent descriptions and embodiments. These more recent examples 
will be assessed for their comparative value with Augustine’s theory and for their fit with the 
tradition of Evangelicalism. Third, a synthetic ecclesial praxis of participatory Augustinian 
hermeneutics will be described for the Evangelical tradition. I will explain and defend the 
particular description of participatory Augustinian hermeneutics in the context of an Augustinian 
version of philosophy of communication articulated in this project, in which the conceptual 
resources of the scriptures and the Christian tradition continue to return as gifts of grace to the 
church, and in which the “public domain” of assessment is the greater public of the “city of 
God.” 
Toward a New Evangelical Norm: Augustinian Hermeneutic Themes 
Augustine’s hermeneutics lived in the actions of the church, not just in an academic 
ethereal sphere, so his hermeneutical theory is particularly well-suited to the assessment 
associated with philosophy of communication. As I argued in Chapter 4 in opposition to Merold 
Westphal’s separation of the roles of preacher and scholar, Augustine embodies the synthesis of 
the faithful preacher and the hermeneutic scholar, providing a challenging premodern model 
toward which Evangelical hermeneuts should again aspire. Augustine’s biblical hermeneutics 
encouraged continual academic study, not on the ground of academic elitism but rather on the 
ground of universal access to God through creational memory and the Holy Spirit, within the 
boundaries of charity and of the mission of the church. His hermeneutics was embedded in the 
mission of the church, directed toward spiritual communion with God, intensely scriptural, and 
embodied in charitable social interactions.  
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Interpretation as Participation through Language, Will, and Narrative 
In Chapter 3, I summarized Augustine’s hermeneutic thought through the themes of 
language, will/love, and the hermeneutic importance of narrative “wholes.” First, language, 
especially the language of scripture, “points” people to participation in God’s truth. Second, a 
charitable will is the ideal guiding principle of the interpretation of the scriptures. Third, 
participation in communal and narrative “wholes” directs the interpretation of scriptural “parts” 
in appropriately charitable ways. I emphasized in Chapter 3 that, in Augustine’s perspective on 
language, will, and communal narrative wholes, human interpreters have control or 
comprehensive knowledge of no part of the interpretive process. Language does not correspond 
inherently to truth. Our wills are neither perfectly charitable nor unchanging in their hermeneutic 
focus. And the whole of the story of salvation history is known to us only dimly, making our 
interpretation of scriptural “parts” a contingent affair. All of these hermeneutic contingencies, to 
Augustine, must be met by the active temporal participation of human interpreters in God—in 
the Inner Teacher operating through creational memory and the divine discourse of the Holy 
Spirit. Moreover, this human upward participation depends on God’s foundational “downward 
participation” through the Incarnation.4 Only in this way can our language, our wills/loves, and 
our individual and communal narratives have an effective and ethical grounding, enabling unity, 
action, and worship.    
 As developed in earlier chapters, Augustine’s grounding of language, charitable will, and 
narrative wholes in participation makes it the key metaphor in his complex premodern 
hermeneutic, a radically different paradigm than that assumed by modernist or postmodernist 
hermeneutics. In this way, participation provides a bridge back to the earlier tradition of 
Evangelicalism, as well as to the longer Christian tradition (premodernism) and to the broader 
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missiological context (non-Western religious sensibilities). Participation, I have argued, also 
provides an alternative to both modernist historicism and “postmodern” historicality, both of 
which throw out eternal truth in their move to root all perspectives in temporal human history. 
Modernist historicism assumes that with enough scientific historical study, the chasm between 
the present and the past can be overcome, eliminating the bias of the current interpreter and 
making the text perspicuous and transparent. This puts the current interpreter in a godlike 
position over the text, extracting self-evident interpretations that can then be used to justify 
social divisions that are more numerous and less charitable than need be. This problematic 
historicism has been the default position of American Evangelicalism since its turn to 
modernistic epistemology in the social and philosophical upheavals of the late 19th century,5 but 
as I argued in Chapter 1, this historicism is neither the predominant position in the history of 
Evangelical hermeneutics nor the de facto hermeneutical practice of most of the Evangelical 
“priesthood of believers” currently, in Western or non-Western contexts. 
“Postmodernist” historicality correctly locates interpreters within their own historical 
perspectives, and Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur both helpfully emphasize the text itself 
in the hermeneutic process. However, their historicality restricts the horizons of interpretation to 
the limited ones of the horizontal temporal plane. The human-in-time interprets the text within 
the context of that historical moment of an interpreting tradition. The “being of the text” is 
posited as a trans-historical factor.6 But, even as an “ideal entitity,” the text does not rise much 
above the plane of temporality. Rather, interpretation of texts makes brief flights of “naiveté” 
punctuated by “critical” returns to the historical moment in the Ricoeurian dialectic of 
interpretation.7 The key importance of the “being of the text” for both Gadamer and Ricoeur is 
that the horizon of the text disciplines the subjectivity of interpreters, forcing interpreters into a 
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never-ending process of interpretation that nevertheless allows for moments of application. 
Interpretation of a text never ends or settles on interpretational norms (i.e., eternal truth); rather, 
interpretation pauses to constitute a temporary ground from which it launches itself again down 
the dim track of time. This hermeneutic position has become attractive to many Evangelical 
philosophers who have been actively seeking ways to appropriate historicality while also 
safeguarding orthodox Evangelical positions on truth. However, historicality excludes explicitly 
spiritual horizons: it has no place for unchanging elements of creational memory, for the 
horizons of inward spiritual interlocutors (i.e., the Inner Teacher, and/or the Holy Spirit), or for 
an eternal realm from which truth can be manifested in time as both “stable” and adaptable to the 
historical moment. Augustinian participation disciplines and enriches the historicality of 
philosophical hermeneutics by returning to hermeneutics its earlier spiritual and eternal horizons. 
It is Augustine’s participatory hermeneutics that can, I argue, provide an Evangelically orthodox 
way to appropriate the most helpful “postmodern” critiques of Evangelical hermeneutical 
science.  
Interpretation Elevates the Scriptures as Eternal/Temporal Medium   
Augustine’s hermeneutics is also inescapably scriptural, which provides both a point of 
commonality with the Evangelical tradition and a point of assessment for the practical 
outworking of his hermeneutic metaphors. As we have seen, modernist biblical hermeneutics 
naturally creates strong divisions based on the mastery of historical and linguistic knowledge 
about the bible—a division between Evangelical leaders who focus on objective correctness and 
defensibility of their interpretations and Evangelical laypeople who focus on the devotional value 
of their interpretations. There is no theoretical bridge between these two forms of “scriptural” 
faith in modernist-leaning Evangelicalism. However, Augustine’s insistence that Christians come 
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under the scriptures falls neither in the errors of objective mastery of the scriptures nor of 
subjective molding of the scriptures to one’s own preferred practice. Instead, he insists that the 
scriptures, as a revelation of God from beyond the temporal realm, provide a divinely appointed 
venue through which eternal truth can make its return in temporality.  
This truth is sometimes understood through figuration and sometimes understood 
directly, but the choice in how it should be understood and applied can be made only with the 
participatory aid of God. At times, our understanding of a scripture will be frustrated or denied, 
requiring long labor and humility while highlighting our lack of objective mastery. At times, 
scripture will offend our current sensibilities, chastising our beliefs and practices and thus 
highlighting our shortcomings in holiness. The church, as a group of interpreters who for many 
reasons see the truth only dimly, strives together in the scriptures through dialogue and a 
persistent focus on the model of Christ to become a scriptural community. “Bible-believing” 
would describe not primarily a community in full possession of a set of doctrinal content 
statements (though they would have stable elements of the tradition) but rather a community 
which pays reverent attention to the divine voice as it manifests through scripture, from which 
the church builds its common possessions of truth and practice.  
This metaphor of “scripture” in Augustinian and Evangelical hermeneutics—the special 
place of one particular narrative text within the hermeneutic process—marks a significant 
difference with philosophical hermeneutics,8 and with all modern/postmodern traditions for 
whom historical being is seen as the fundamental reality. Scripture, focused through the lens of 
the Christ-narrative, is the grounding “meganarrative” that provides a continual and relational 
connection to eternal Truth.9 The comprehensive divine narrative “whole” (“above the text”) that 
comes in partial and contingent ways through the scriptural text provides a check on all other 
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competing narrative wholes, including the sometimes idolatrous narratives of personal selfhood, 
community traditions, ecclesial self-righteousness, and national identity. It is the grounding story 
of the city of God that provides a continual narrative contrast to the earthly city in every age of 
temporal history.10 Without a return to participation, though, the scriptural story has no 
continuing anchor against the constant “evolution” of interpretation within a tradition, and thus 
the potential for both doctrinal stability and ethical critique through the scriptural story is 
severely weakened.  
Interpretation Privileges Communal Charity over Comprehensive Knowledge 
As we have also seen, Augustine’s scriptural hermeneutic is built on his assumption that 
charity is more foundational than comprehensive knowledge in the interpretational matrix of the 
church. This is a point that can be both more appreciated and more misunderstood in the wake of 
the social revolutions of postmodernity that give explicit priority to “love.” In the (post)modern 
social imaginary profiled by Robert Bellah, et al., “love” represents the value of human 
connectivity, especially affective, over the truth value of any ideational structure but one; that 
one remaining doctrine is the inviolability of the individual’s will and beliefs.11 That is, “loving 
people” in postmodernity are assumed to remain connected through affectivity and mutual 
affirmation of their different desires and beliefs. For this reason, Augustine’s argument that good 
interpretations of scripture are the ones that produce charity—and Augustine’s excoriations of 
premodern fundamentalists12—would be well-received initially by those who are embedded in 
the current social imaginary.  
However, Augustinian charity is not our current cultural value of “love.”13 In the charity 
that underpins Augustinian interpretation, individual wills and beliefs are exactly what are to be 
questioned. His charity presupposes a narrative of human depravity, divine perfection, and 
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growth through humble submission. Charity is affirming someone else’s interpretation of a 
passage—even though it differs from our preferred one—because both their interpretation and 
ours challenge us both to right thoughts, affections, and behaviors after the pattern of Christ. The 
(Post)modern “love” of the emotivistic self locates interpretive flexibility in individual 
preference;14 Augustinian charity locates interpretive flexibility in the scriptural narrative of 
recovery from the sickness of depravity to the ultimate health of becoming like God.  
A thoroughly modernistic epistemology, of course, leaves both love and flexibility 
outside of the scriptural interpretation process. While Augustine could be said to say that God’s 
ends (our deification) justify the means (multiple true interpretations of scriptures that apply 
differently at different times, applied with charity), the modernist-leaning hermeneutic of 
Evangelicalism denies the legitimacy of any means other the one that can be both controlled and 
used for social control by those with institutionally approved historical and linguistic knowledge. 
Where there is only one true answer to every hermeneutic question and that answer is found 
through academic knowledge, charity has no place in scriptural interpretation. Scriptural 
knowledge is no longer a publicly shared good among Christians who give and receive truth 
within a shared narrative, but rather a universal fact that is de facto withheld from all but the 
appropriately educated. The authority of the scriptures themselves among charitably disposed 
interpreters becomes then, instead, the authority of certain interpreters whose teachings can be 
either followed uncritically or disputed. Charity drops out of the equation. 
Though Augustine understood charity as being integral to scriptural interpretation in the 
context of ecclesial life, this understanding of charity involved conflict, persuasion, and real 
boundaries. That is, charity does acknowledge multiple true interpretations of scripture that lead 
to the same good end, but it also argues against certain sets of interpretations that violate the 
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good ends of worship, orthodox doctrine (focused on the identity of God), and right ethical 
practice. Charity does not argue against certain interpretations from a standpoint of 
comprehensive knowledge, but from a standpoint of true partial knowledge gained through 
humble participation in God. Similarly, as Augustine models many times, charity may also argue 
from a standpoint of seemingly true knowledge, hoping that the ensuing dialogue will drive both 
parties further towards listening to their divine Teacher, leading to greater knowledge of the truth 
by one or both of the disputants.15 In this way, Augustine’s metaphor of hermeneutic charity 
makes scriptural interpretation more flexible, and it provides a persistent motivation to engage in 
dialogue in scriptural interpretation. Charitable hermeneutics encourages and opens ecclesial 
interpretation of the scriptures without thereby abandoning communal truth or dividing the 
ecclesial community into unspeaking camps.  
Interpretation is Individual AND Communal Embodied Praxis 
Whereas the inward vision of eternal truth, to Augustine, is primarily individual, it has its 
necessary outworking in the communal truth shared through ecclesial life in the scriptures, which 
entails the inward truth discerned individually by the many then being recognized together 
through the pointing language of the scriptures. Christianity is meant to be social and public, and 
the life together of the church is meant to be an integral part of its interpretation process.  
This metaphor was developed in Chapters 2 and 3 from De Trinitate and under the term 
of intersubjectivity. Though language does not adequately correspond to truth in an essential 
way, it can enable two different partakers of divine truth to recognize their shared inheritance, 
rejoice in it together, and engage in appropriate action on the basis of that truth, which then 
enables them both to know that truth in a deeper way. That is, Augustine gives us a picture in 
which our inwardly discerned true knowledge is to be enriched by becoming public communal 
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truth—enriched through shared praise and its embodiment in shared language—and then further 
developed through its embodiment in shared action, which gives it a history/tradition, feeds back 
into the hermeneutic process, and enables habit-formation as a positive possibility in contrast to 
the former sinful “chains of habit.”16 
Thus, Augustinian hermeneutics cannot be merely textual, mental, or individual, but must 
rather become incarnated into public language (confession) and shared action. This public 
confession and shared action in Augustine’s rendering also had a different end than just 
pragmatic communal action. Rather, it was focused on the end of enjoying God, either directly 
through praise or through the medium of shared charitable actions toward others. The point of all 
interpretation was to enjoy God, the ground and end of our shared life, and the means of 
enjoying God was primarily our charitable actions toward one another.17 An interpretation of 
scripture which did not enjoy God through doing good together to other believers or those in 
need would not have made sense to Augustine: no matter how correct the textual interpretation, 
the hermeneutic as a whole would be incomplete outside of its intended narrative, which says 
that “faith without works is dead.”18  
This metaphor of hermeneutic praxis has not been as developed as the others in earlier 
chapters, but it will be explained more fully from the Rule of Augustine, among other sources, in 
the comparison and synthesis below. Augustine’s Rule was not as ascetic as the earlier examples 
of the Desert Fathers and was not as institutionally structured as St. Benedict’s later rule.19 
Rather, his rule emphasized charity, flexibility, and dialogue that nevertheless found its end in a 
shared rule of life—a combination that I argue would be humanly possible only through 
continual communal participation in the divine life. If Evangelicals are to succeed in their stated 
desires for missional community through the scriptures, though, Augustine’s participatory model 
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of the interpenetration between textual interpretation and communal action demonstrates a way 
to proceed that is both rhetorical and spiritual.  
Trying to tie together Augustine’s hermeneutic theory briefly in order to test its 
implications and applications can only ever be an incomplete endeavor. However, at the risk of 
some repetition with earlier chapters, I have brought together what I argue are the key elements 
of Augustine’s hermeneutic theory, the elements which, from a philosophy of communication 
standpoint, would need to find some expression in a concrete ecclesial embodiment of his 
hermeneutics. First, and foundationally, an Augustinian hermeneutic would need to demonstrate 
its dependence on participation in language, will/loves, and narrative rather than making any of 
those elements either absolute or hopelessly historically relative. Second, an Augustinian 
hermeneutic reserves a special place for the scriptures as the revelation of God, through 
participation in which our language, loves, and narratives are informed and chastened. Third, an 
Augustinian hermeneutic demonstrates charity both through opening scriptures to multiple 
interpretations and through reconfiguring the boundaries of interpretation around the end of 
loving God in the context of the basic Christ-narrative. Fourth, an Augustinian hermeneutic 
pushes interpretation beyond a merely mental and individual act toward a confessional, 
communal, and “incarnational” act. In the next section, we will examine recent theoretical and 
praxical attempts to bring one or more of these elements back into ecclesial life and practice, 
testing their fit with Augustine’s theory and practice and their potential applicability to 
Evangelical hermeneutics.  
New Approaches to Hermeneutic Praxis 
This section will restrict its examination of recent hermeneutical thought to the practical 
themes of ecclesial bible reading, liturgy/community formation, and the impact of the 
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Charismatic revolution on recent Evangelicalism. While examining recent thought—from 
Christian ethics, philosophy, and theology—on each of these themes, I will comment on the fit of 
this recent work to a possible Augustinian hermeneutic in Evangelical ecclesial contexts. In 
particular, I will focus on how scholars such as Brian Brock, James K. A. Smith, and Jonathan R. 
Wilson help us get a better idea of the possible shape of the four hermeneutic criteria discussed 
above. To be assessed as helpful and appropriate for the real communicational problems of the 
Evangelical historical moment, these four hermeneutic criteria need this development through 
comparison, making them more clear and actionable.  
Ecclesial Bible Reading 
When Evangelicals have spiritual conversations with people from other Christian 
traditions, their relative scriptural literacy often stands out,20 and Evangelical spiritual formation 
consistently emphasizes that every individual should read his/her bible daily. As a former lay and 
staff worker with the Evangelical organization The Navigators, I was involved in this kind of 
cultural maintenance work of encouraging and building Evangelicals’ biblical literacy through 
regular study and bible memorization. The cultural ideal for an Evangelical “great man” was that 
he (or she) knew the “great words,” the scriptural epea that provided not just a biblical style but, 
more importantly, the right truths, stories, and exhortations for the current situation.21 This ideal 
in the Navigators was somewhat systematized through a “Topical Memory System” (TMS) 
which pointed young Evangelicals toward particular scriptures to memorize for particular 
recurring situations, but the system was a loose heuristic rather than a science. Each person was 
encouraged to listen to God through scripture for their own particular “promises” and occasional 
guidance.22 
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However, despite the continuing prevalence of this ideal of bible reading practice in 
pursuit of biblical literacy, the actual practice among Evangelicals has followed the general 
downward cultural trend towards the biblical “linguistic impoverishment” that Ricoeur has 
brought to our attention.23 While Ricoeur was concerned about the loss of “symbolic, 
metaphorical, mythological language [which] gives us … the basis for reflective reasoning,”24 I 
argue that the current Evangelical bible-reading practices are impoverished in a number of ways 
that acknowledge Ricoeur’s point but go further.  
First, as I have argued in Chapter 1, Evangelical bible reading has partially shifted away 
from a mode of participatory attention to God and towards a defensive and scientistic marshaling 
of apologetics. In Evangelical parlance, this is called “prooftexting,” with two combatants 
drawing and deploying scripture after scripture in the attempt to win a theological argument. 
While this does encourage a form of biblical literacy, it is an impoverished form in which texts 
become ossified chess-pieces in the hands of the combatants, no longer venues in which the 
voice of God is sought. This attitude toward the scriptures is aided by many of the tools of the 
bible study industry, whose various word study reference works and study bibles encourage a 
linguistic essentialism that portrays the bible as a Newtonian linguistic system.  
Second, Evangelical bible reading is impoverished by being practiced more as an 
individual discipline than as a communal one. While many have argued that the printing 
revolution enabled Protestantism to be grounded in individual bible reading from the very 
beginning, Elizabeth Eisenstein points out the counterbalances of liturgy and community in these 
emerging Christian traditions.25 Though people did read their bibles individually, they always 
also read them together, and the together part was strengthened by the sociological ties of the 
ecclesial institutions that provided the essential structure for Christian formation. To illustrate, 
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though the Christian of John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress can be read as an isolated 
individual—fleeing the City of Destruction alone with his fingers in his ears—the story 
continues by emphasizing the importance of friendship and, in Part II, the way that the church is 
on pilgrimage together. In Part II, the church on pilgrimage can only go as fast as its slowest 
members.26  
Printing itself did not break up ecclesial bible reading or make diversity in ecclesial 
interpretation a problem. That linguistic and ecclesial inflexibility came about, as argued in 
Chapter 1, through the combined traumas of the sociological disintegration of communities and 
the defensive philosophical reaction to the approaching apex of modernistic ideology in the late 
1800’s and early 1900’s. Continuing from that time into our own, ecclesial communities have 
generally become transient collections of strangers. Because reading the bible together well takes 
time, practice, and charity, the Evangelical path of imbibing scripture has generally taken the 
paths of less resistance, which are the pulpit and individual devotions. Lacking communal bible 
reading and interpretation, though, impoverishes the community because, first, avoiding 
communal reading allows charity to again drop out of the equation and, second, it does not 
enable the church to be open to the resources of the priesthood of all believers. It should be, as 
Paul says of the church, “the whole body, joined and knit together by what every joint supplies, 
… [that] causes growth of the body for the edifying of itself in love.”27  
The final way that Evangelicals are becoming biblically impoverished, relatively 
speaking, is in the overall downward trend in actually reading the Bible, especially among the 
younger generation.28 In my seven years teaching at a university that served primarily 
Evangelical and Pentecostal young people, I discovered that no biblical knowledge on the part of 
the students could be assumed. For most of the students, the scriptures were not just a foreign 
  
336 
country morally, as Brian Brock highlights,29 but the scriptures were also a country in which the 
students had not really traveled at all. It may be that the Evangelical call to reengage with the 
world has been pursued vigorously, but without the parallel practice of engaging the world 
through the lenses of the scriptures. It may be that the uglier sides of a modernistic-leaning 
Evangelicalism (i.e., moral arrogance, epistemological hubris, political tribalism) have provoked 
an overreaction that rejects not just the uncharitable use of the bible but also the focus on the 
bible itself.30 It may be also, in combination with the other factors, that the success of the 
Evangelical culture industry that first began picking up steam in the 1970s has absorbed the 
Evangelical time and interest that used to be devoted to the scriptures. Who has time for reading 
Malachi when they are in the middle of a Christian Romance novel, setting the kids up with 
Veggie Tales, and keeping up with the latest albums in Christian music? In most of American 
history, even the unbelievers and the marginally committed had enough knowledge of biblical 
language and metaphors that the allusions to scriptural figures in sermons, political discourse, 
and interpersonal communication could be readily understood.31 Now, however, such allusions 
would not be readily or widely understood even in Evangelical churches, especially among the 
younger generation. To open the possibility of hearing God through the reading of the scriptures, 
Evangelicals have to at least read the scriptures.    
Different aspects of this practical problem have been recognized and addressed by 
Stephen Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, Brian Brock, and—a key figure for these scholars—
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Both Brock and Fowl and Jones approach bible reading and interpretation 
from the disciplinary perspective of ethics, and both attempt to bring back together the estranged 
disciplines of biblical studies and Christian ethics through a communal return to the scriptures 
themselves.  
  
337 
Fowl and Jones on Moral Distance. Fowl and Jones argue that though historical 
distance between the biblical authors and current interpreters is a real and important 
interpretational challenge, “our complicity in sin leaves us captive to destructive patterns of life 
[which] … undermines our ability to read Scripture well.”32 That is, our interpretation problem is 
fundamentally moral, and that morality is shaped by our “interpretive interests,” which we learn 
in ecclesial communities of scripture reading and practice.33 There is no morally or theologically 
pure spot from which to extract a comprehensive exegesis of the scriptures, so we must, together, 
“learn to read the Scriptures ‘over-against ourselves’ rather than simply ‘for ourselves.’”34 This 
practice of self-interrogation through scriptures requires, in culturally “Christian” domains, 
“separate spaces where we can instruct and form each other to be disciples and wise readers.”35 
That is, following Alasdair MacIntyre, Fowl and Jones argue for clearly demarcated 
communities of tradition that require “commitment and concentration,”36 though they also argue 
strongly for systematically listening to the cultural “outsider” to forestall the tendency of reading 
communities to close in on themselves. In line with their argument about our lack of moral 
objectivity in interpretation, Fowl and Jones identify Jesus, speaking through Scripture, as the 
first of the outsiders to whom we need to be open, though they give little guidance as to how this 
is to be done in ecclesial bible reading. Impressively, they say that “the goal of seeing Scripture 
as an outsider is the maintenance of interpretive humility and openness to hearing the voice of 
Scripture afresh.”37  
However, they continue listing outsiders without reference to hierarchies of importance, 
emphasizing instead the language work necessary to “translate” the perspectives between real 
“others” and ourselves so that a Gadamerian fusion of horizons can take place.38 These others 
include the non-Messianic Jewish community and the “alien” voices of secular readers of 
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scripture.39 Under “outsiders in our midst” to which we should listen, they draw lines of 
connection between the history of racism in the South African church and the early precedent of 
including Gentiles in the church with the current situation of homosexuals and Christian 
communities. “On this (and other) issue(s),” they say, “we have needed to embody the 
conversational openness and discernment characteristic of the conference in Jerusalem in Acts 
15” that formally opened the Christian church to non-Jews.40  
It is this undiscriminating openness to all that separate Fowl and Jones from Augustine 
and from Evangelicalism. Fowl and Jones cite Augustine appropriately against the interpretive 
hubris of modernist theologies and linguistic essentialism.41 However, their emphasis on human 
historicality and moral failure leads them subtly, and perhaps unknowingly, to prioritize the 
current temporal and cultural fusion of ethical horizons in the interpretation of scripture. 
Ironically, they do this while noting how modernistic interpreters trumpet “the” interpretation in 
isolation from the longer tradition of Christian interpretation. In their discussion of the 
homosexual as an outsider in the church’s midst, for example, they seem to give more weight in 
interpretation to those outsiders than to the voice of the longer tradition of interpretation, and it is 
unclear how they envision the church reacting if the outsider voice of Jesus and the outsider 
voice of the homosexual confessor lead to different readings of the scripture. Here is where an 
Augustinian emphasis on participation would be essential to the Evangelical tradition, whose 
own stand on the issue of the morality of homosexuality has not been helped by its modernistic 
textual militancy. The issue is not merely the texts on these questions, but as Fowl and Jones 
note, the charity and truth in the hearts of the interpreters. However, when we ask the question of 
possible moral distortions of good reading, why would we give the moral high ground to the 
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current cultural climate (e.g., that all exclusion on moral grounds is bad) instead of to the longer 
tradition of interpretation of these texts?  
The point here is not to present an argument about this particular moral issue, but to 
clarify by example what I see as a problem with the “way forward” described by Fowl and 
Jones.42 Augustine’s insistence on participating with God in eternal truths through the 
provocation of the scriptures and within the boundaries of the church’s rule of faith provides a 
picture of communal scripture reading that is able not only to listen to the truth of God that is 
spoken by “outsiders” but also to resist the distortions of the scriptures that are always 
threatening from inside or outside the Christian tradition. Thus, though the recommendations of 
Fowl and Jones for ecclesial bible reading that is both traditioned and open to correction from 
outsiders is Augustinian in many ways, it does not provide a robust theoretical or practical door 
to participation with God. For Evangelicals to shift from their own problematic hermeneutical 
modernism to something more ethical and true, a more faithful “way forward” is needed, one 
whose underlying ethical direction is really from God and not merely from the ethical 
sensibilities of the current age.  
The bias of Fowl and Jones can also be seen in their criticism of Bonhoeffer’s act of 
resistance to the Nazi regime, as compared with their commendation of Bonhoeffer’s theology of 
bible reading up to that point.43 We will examine Bonhoeffer’s theory and practice of bible 
reading more further on, but for now, it is important to point out that Bonhoeffer argues for the 
reading of scripture “against ourselves” (i.e., in a non-utilitarian way), together, as a way to 
witness to the risen Christ’s preeminence over the values and practices of the current age.44 Fowl 
and Jones quote Bonhoeffer’s instructions to his seminarians: “grounded in the Scripture, we 
learn to speak to God in the language which God has spoken to us.”45 Fowl and Jones suggest, 
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however, that under the pressure of the increasing darkness of the Nazi regime, Bonhoeffer 
compromised, privileging his “reading of the world” over his previous pacifistic “reading of the 
Word.”46 Brock disagrees with Fowl and Jones on this point, arguing from a perspective on 
Bonhoeffer’s ethics informed by Bonhoeffer’s writings on the Psalms. Brock notes the 
“anthropocentric” nature of the communitarian reading of Fowl and Jones and argues that 
Bonhoeffer’s scriptural ethics were performed through a robust place for the “Spirit’s work,”47 a 
place for the Holy Spirit in our reading of scripture that can provide real moral content, not just a 
formal process or ethical principles. Brock captures this idea in Bonhoeffer’s description of 
scriptural ethics as “a way.”48 It is a path with a real beginning (creation) and a real ending (the 
eschaton), but this narrative structure still requires that we listen to and participate in the voice of 
God through the scriptures every step along the way.49 Bonhoeffer’s pacifism may have been a 
good position to take through much of his path, for example, but if God speaks through the 
scriptures to take non-pacifistic action at another step along the path, that divine word becomes 
the scriptural ethical response. An allergy to the moral “content” of Bonhoeffer’s scriptural 
mandates and the preference for “process” demonstrated by Fowl and Jones50 show that their 
recommended practices of communal bible reading are not sufficiently participatory to fit with 
either Augustine’s hermeneutics or the Evangelical tradition.    
Brian Brock on Singing the Psalms. Brock develops his own perspective on bible 
reading as a Spirit-informed ethical “way” by examining exegesis of the Psalms in Augustine, 
Luther, and Bonhoeffer. According to Brock, all these exegetes were formed in their theory and 
practice of bible reading through individual and corporate meditation on (i.e., “singing of”) the 
Psalms. Using these historical exemplars, Brock seeks to explain a middle way between 
modernistic “objective” approaches to ethics and hermeneutics and communitarian approaches 
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such as demonstrated by Fowl and Jones. To Brock, scripture reading is to be communal, but 
dependent on God’s “presence” rather than method.51 The communal response to the historical 
moment through the reading of scripture cannot be done through a specific method but through 
“a theologically attuned ear.”52 Here, we will examine Brock’s basic argument through his 
appropriation of Augustine and Bonhoeffer.  
Brock follows the contours of much of Augustine scholarship in arguing that Augustine’s 
progressive immersion in scripture modified, undercut, and replaced the neo-Platonic and Stoic 
metaphors in which he had written in his early work.53 Brock embeds Augustine’s writings on 
the scriptures within the Christian community’s praxis: 
We begin to see anew the basic texts that founded a tradition not by asking what these 
texts are, or what they tell us, but in joining a reading tradition by practicing reading that 
is attentive, moral, and communal. We enter a tradition not by grasping its theoretical 
underpinnings but by learning its ethos and the skills that make it function.54  
That people learn to read the scriptures in community, not through theory or method, might 
resonate with the basic tenets of communitarians, but Brock rightly brings in Augustine’s much 
broader concept of the scripture-reading community that includes God and the whole of the 
community of the faithful throughout history (i.e., the “city of God”)55. In this way, Brock 
approaches the dynamic of participation without explicitly naming it or discussing it. He explains 
Augustine’s participatory scripture reading through the metaphor of “praise”:  
Augustine does not understand this metaphysics in terms of complete or systematic 
knowledge, but as a conceptualization of truth that orients our action … Here knowledge 
is not the possession of human actors but a quality of living and desiring in which 
knowledge is built by remaining in the reciprocal gaze of human and divine vision. … 
  
342 
Augustine’s conclusion is that life within this reciprocal gaze is characterized by and 
sustained in the singing of praises.56 
This “reciprocal gaze” does not start from a historically embedded “self” (Brock’s critique of 
Taylor) but is initiated by the God who creates and sustains. God’s creational work in us 
provides a starting place, and his continued grace to us through his presence in the scriptures 
provides our steps of understanding and obedience along the way.  
Learning to read the scriptures in community, in this aspect, means learning to read the 
scriptures with God. “Augustine discovers that the Psalms give humanity words and thus a self 
within God’s life as we participate in taking them up.”57 Recognizing that our reading of the 
scriptures is always dependent on God’s sustaining of the reading self,58 Augustine replaces the 
goal of comprehensive knowledge of scripture, of God, or of self with the participatory response 
of praise for the gifts of understanding God is currently giving. “It is not [the] words we 
construct but words that we are given that orient us in moral space, in claiming and reshaping our 
self-identifications, our desires, and our sense of the beautiful.”59  
On this level, then, scripture reading is done in community with God when we recognize 
the contingency of our reading self and express that knowledge through praise, rather than fear or 
angst. Brock’s reading of Augustine, here, not only parallels my earlier description of 
Augustine’s theory of participation (through creational memory and the voice of the Holy Spirit) 
but also describes the practical outworking of that faithful scripture reading in the attitudes of the 
community. Reading the scriptures with God in an attitude of praise is an attitude that the 
Evangelical community needs to recapture.  
Brock also explains how Augustine’s practices of reading the Old Testament and New 
Testament (and the historical books and the Psalms) in tandem provides each current ecclesial 
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community the “grammar” of its own story with God. “Grounded in certain biblical images and 
metaphors,” Augustine “guide[s] the ethic of the church of his day [in City of God] by showing 
Christians how they are in a story that frames their moral transformation as they learn about and 
pursue their telos.”60 Brock’s argument is that the whole community of Old Testament saints, 
Christ, and the church can be seen in their unity through the dialogic “grammar” especially 
evident in the Psalms.61 According to Brock, Augustine does not flatten the narratives of 
scripture into so many mere symbols of Christ, but preserves the historical veracity of the 
accounts while reading them also as returns and “elaborations” of the kind of thing that God does 
with his people again and again through history62—the “grammar” of God’s active singing of 
history that repeats key elements of its “melody” with minor variations.63  
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac and Stephen’s martyrdom, in this reading, are not just 
pointers to the sacrifice of Christ, though they are that, too. “God is always putting to death and 
raising up”64—that is one of the key elements in God’s figural grammar. Reading the scriptures 
together in the current community is thus a practice of discerning the narrative rationality of the 
current community’s story from the real scriptural elements in the larger and broader 
community’s story. This discernment, in Brock’s reading, operates through the external stories of 
the scriptural narratives in tension with the internal dynamics of the Psalms.65 The scriptures are 
our larger community’s stories (i.e., stories of the “city of God”), which demonstrate through 
repetition the figural grammatical moves that are available for our story, now. As Brock says, 
“Scripture prepares believers to discern God’s particular interventions in human affairs. These 
divine interventions have a describable grammar but cannot be humanly performed, only seen 
and cooperated with or not looked for and hence not seen.”66    
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Thus, Brock reads Augustine as connecting past “ecclesial” actions and events (the 
“ecclesia” of the broader city of God) with current ecclesial actions and events through a figural 
grammar that cannot be narrowed to one interpretation or merely decided on by a current 
interpreting community. Instead, the right figural reading must be “seen and cooperated with” by 
the community, a conclusion that I argue should be read more explicitly through the lens of 
Augustinian participation. In contrast to the historical traditionedness of communitarian textual 
interpretation, as intimated by MacIntyre and Taylor among others, Brock follows Augustine in 
seeing the ecclesial community as one that can be continually renewed in its faithful responses 
through seeing and hearing how God is applying scriptural figures to them, now.67 And “what 
brings that community of praisers together so that they may ‘stay on the path’” is not method nor 
merely embeddedness in a tradition but rather God “bestowing his presence on us.”68  
So, Brock has shown us how the ecclesial community is led by God’s voice to follow the 
right element of figural grammar inherited from scriptural narrative and Psalmic dialogue, a 
perspective which frames the community’s shared bible reading. Related to this, Brock comes 
even closer to participatory themes through his exposition of bible reading as the communal 
activity of the totus Christus, powered by the scriptures as “Christ’s heart.”69 We have already 
come across Augustine’s totus Christus concept and the importance to him of “whole and part” 
in interpretation. Christians are really, not metaphorically,70 part of the whole which is the body 
of Christ, and thus the scriptural descriptions and mandates written about and for the whole 
church (including its Head, Christ) are potentially applicable to each part. Key is the application 
that since all the canon speaks about Christ, it also speaks about his body (the Church), and can 
potentially speak to any particular analogical part of that Christ-body (a local congregation). 
Kimberly Baker quotes Augustine at length on this two-way identification between Christ (the 
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Head) and the church (the body)—note especially the downward and upward participatory 
language in what follows: 
But in fact he who deigned to assume the form of a slave, and within that form to clothe 
us with himself, he who did not disdain to take us up into himself, did not disdain either 
to transfigure us into himself, and to speak in our words, so that we in our turn might 
speak in his. … Facing death, then, because of what he had from us, he was afraid, not in 
himself but in us. When he said that his soul was sorrowful to the point of death, we all 
unquestionably said it with him. Without him, we are nothing, but in him we too are 
Christ. Why? Because the whole Christ consists of Head and body. The Head is he who is 
the savior of his body, he who has already ascended into heaven; but the body is the 
Church, toiling on earth.71 
Because as the “body of Christ” “we too are Christ,” then Christ’s cry from the Psalms while on 
the cross was also our cry and, in another example, God’s voice from heaven—“this is my 
beloved son … hear him!”72—can also be God’s voice to the world about the Christian ecclesial 
community.  
Brock examines Augustine’s totus Christus from the “Christological and ecclesiological 
hermeneutics of the Psalms,” identifying three levels of interpreting Old Testament prophecy in 
Augustine’s work on the Psalms.73 There is, first, the past historical referent of an OT prophecy 
and, second, the future referent of an earthly dominion at the eschaton. Third, though, Brock 
quotes Augustine that  
these words apply appropriately to the whole people of God who belong to the Heavenly 
Jerusalem: both to those who were concealed during the time of the old covenant, before 
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the revelation of the new, and to those who, after the revelation of the new covenant, are 
clearly revealed as belonging to Christ.74  
Thus, while acknowledging both past historical and future eschatological reference, Augustine 
saw also the whole of the scriptures referring to the whole of the body of Christ, pre-cross, 
Christ, and post-cross. This “Israel-Jesus-church interpretive schema … serves to link and 
intertwine the testaments [and] … yields a single account of the present community of faith and 
the authors of Scripture.”75 Brock points out that the centerpiece of this identification between 
past ecclesial communities, present ones, and Christ is the scriptures themselves, which 
Augustine called “Christ’s heart”:  
Thus, to meditate on the Bible is to meditate on the heart of the divine Word. This is why 
he can say that each part of Scripture is not necessarily about Christ directly; but, as the 
plow is to its blade, each part serves to reveal Scripture’s main theme, which is Christ.76  
It is not enough that this scripture exist in text alone, however, but rather, “specific forms of 
speaking are essential in maintaining” both the individual believer and the confessing community 
“in the path of blessedness.”77 Thus, “the church is … a sung reality expressing a God-given 
desire for God,”78 not a pragmatic articulation of a framework of meaning, a la Taylor, but a 
practice of submission to “the hopes God has for us”79 through attentiveness to the narrative 
grammar of scripture. Because “only the praising church will endure,” Brock synthesizes from 
Augustine’s approach to the scriptures that “the central act of the church is not a mode of living 
that those outside the church also do, such as moral deliberation or pedagogy, but it is a mode of 
resonating with the reality of God’s work”80 through the confessional work of praise. 
While Brock’s description of Augustine’s hermeneutic supports my participatory reading, 
his lack of explicit attention to the metaphor of participation forces him into some unhelpful 
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distinctions. First, Brock posits too strong of a turn from the Augustine of On Christian Doctrine 
(supposedly still in the thrall of neo-Platonic and rhetorical theory) and the more scriptural 
Augustine of the Narrations on the Psalms and City of God.81 Strangely, Brock does not follow 
up on the implications of the facts that the fourth (and most classically “rhetorical”) book of On 
Christian Doctrine was written after his scriptural turn and that this was one of his works to 
which Augustine made no corrections in his Retractions.82 While it is true that Augustine’s 
thought did evolve through continuing growth in the scriptures—and through a sequence of 
doctrinal controversies—Augustine did not abandon anything from his rhetorical and 
philosophical training that was useful but rather repurposed and synthesized the truths of the 
pagan tradition for the church. As we have seen, Augustinian participation looks for truth from 
creational memory—in Christians or pagans—as well as from the Spirit’s voice through the 
scriptures. Understanding Augustine’s account of participation would have kept Brock from 
dividing Augustine’s thought with an unhelpfully bold line.  
Brock also makes an unhelpful distinction between the “material” nature of Augustine’s 
totus Christus and Luther’s more existential approach.83 “Augustine’s totus Christus is not best 
described as a mystical union,” Brock says, “but as a real and material forepresence of God’s 
renewal of all things in Christ”84—an echo of the Greco-Roman focus on the telos of the polis.85 
Brock seems to be separating Augustine’s material metaphors from his mystical metaphors, his 
general “theory of meaning” from his submission to the particularities of the scriptures,86 and his 
general theory of “social groupings” from his ecclesiology.87 However, attention to Augustinian 
participation would provide a different way to relate these pairs of concepts. As Augustine 
continually emphasized to his own congregation, participation in Christ spiritually is part and 
parcel with loving actions toward his body materially;88 our submission to the scriptures, while 
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primary, is meant to spur us on to seek their meaning from the Inner Teacher; and both ecclesial 
and non-ecclesial social groupings participate in both earthly and spiritual voices. If there is a 
distinction between Augustine’s material and mystical elements, it is between God’s voice 
available through creational memory and his voice of the Holy Spirit spoken to and through the 
church, primarily through his “material” voice in the scriptures.  
These quibbles aside, though, Brock has done an admirable job of bringing Augustine’s 
hermeneutical theory to bear on the active shared reading of the scriptures in the ecclesial 
community in order to discern the particular “way” the community should hear and obey God. 
His work on Bonhoeffer is also helpful, which we will examine next in conjunction with 
Bonhoeffer’s own work and some of the attention it has garnered in scholarly circles.  
Bonhoeffer’s Reading in Community. Augustine and Bonhoeffer lived in similarly 
troubled times and both provided philosophy of communication resources for their church’s 
approach to scripture. Augustine provided the church with the conceptual resources at the turn of 
the 4th century to be able to negotiate the boundary between using the scriptures as a tool of 
domination and being comforted by them in a socially precarious time.89 He showed the church 
newly triumphant how to continue to read the scriptures as strangers and pilgrims, listening to 
the Inner Teacher’s application of scriptural figures to put God’s sons and daughters to the 
question, to deliver them over and over again to death,90 and to set their hope on a future 
resurrection.   
 Bonhoeffer was “thrown” into the acme of Western civilization, the highly educated elite 
of Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century,91 and he witnessed first-hand what Max 
Horkheimer called “the eclipse of reason”92 that followed from that high point of modernism. 
Working through the troubles endemic to his Lutheran church, he had to fight simultaneously 
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“idealism” and the threatening backdrop of frank materialism, both of which had been part of his 
own intellectual formation. It was when he went to Rome that Bonhoeffer “discovered the 
church,”93 awakening to the larger body that Augustine had called the city of God;94 it was 
through the influence of Barth that Bonhoeffer “discovered the Bible,”95 awakening to the power 
of God’s voice to his church through scripture; and it was through Bonhoeffer’s interaction with 
lay American Evangelicals in New York that he discovered the call of community and of 
discipleship founded on the presence of the real Christ.96 He had previously written his two 
academic dissertations in theology, but he says that “For the first time I discovered the Bible. … 
I had often preached, I had seen a great deal of the Church, and talked and preached about it—
but I had not yet become a Christian.”97  
After his discovery of the Bible, and while the specter of Hitler loomed, Bonhoeffer 
began to insist that “Jesus Christ, the risen Christ, is present in the word, in the sacrament, and in 
the community.”98 As expressions of the one risen Christ, these three things are interrelated, and 
Bonhoeffer wrote especially about the way the scriptural word and the community together 
manifested Christ in the world. “For history Scripture is only a source, for pneumatology it is 
testimony,” Bonhoeffer said,99 which is to say that the scriptures are to be read through the Spirit 
in the presence of others in order to witness not only to one another in the church but also to the 
watching world. What Bonhoeffer wrote about how the church should return to the scriptures 
was in line with how he himself came under the scriptures, which parallels Augustine’s similar 
realization and process of submission to the scriptures.  
Has it not become terrifyingly clear again and again, in everything that we have said here 
to one another, that we are no longer obedient to the Bible? We are more fond of our own 
thoughts than of the thoughts of the Bible. We no longer read the Bible seriously, we no 
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longer read it against ourselves, but for ourselves. … [W]e must read the Bible in quite a 
different way, until we find ourselves again.100  
Bonhoeffer is not just talking here about personal bible reading, but also the reading practices of 
the community together. “The Bible,” he says, “is nothing but the book upon which the Church 
stands.”101  
He frames the way the church needs to read the bible as Christological and 
eschatological—a narrative whose primary figure is Christ and whose whole will only be clear 
from the end. He says “the Scriptures need to be read and proclaimed wholly from the viewpoint 
of the end. … The Church of Christ bears witness to the end of all things. It lives from the end, it 
thinks from the end, it acts from the end, it proclaims its message from the end.”102 The ground 
of our understanding of the scriptures and the ground of our understanding of ourselves as the 
church community, therefore, is not settled and comprehensive but is a matter of listening to 
Christ anew in the scriptures, a confession of that truth in “each and every historical situation,”103 
and a persistence on pilgrimage toward that endpoint that we cannot ourselves produce. “You 
who have lost the Church,” Bonhoeffer preaches, “let us return to Holy Writ, let us go forth and 
seek the Church together. … Church, remain a church! … Confess, confess, confess.”104  
Reading the scriptures together, then, was to Bonhoeffer the way to confess, and thus 
live, the church’s own identity as Christ in each historical moment. Because Christ’s real 
presence lives in his Word (his scriptures as faithfully confessed) and lives in his church (his 
people who confess and obey his voice), the church and the scriptures continually confront and 
reinfuse each another with the presence of Christ. Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the real presence of 
Christ through active confession of and obedience to the scriptures prevents biblical 
hermeneutics from becoming merely a reflection of community biases or an exposition of the 
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text that has no relevance to the community. Listening to the voice of Christ while reading the 
scriptures confessionally together points the church toward an interpretation that is not 
“objective” or “subjective” but a spiritual praxis.  
In his Life Together, Bonhoeffer argued for scriptural reading that had both a private, 
individual aspect and a public, communal aspect. Alone, we are “silent” before the Word, which 
enables us to hear God’s voice speaking from the scripture we have read. This silent time alone 
with the Word is not a “mystical desire to get beyond the Word” but rather a listening 
attentiveness “because the Word is still speaking and living and dwelling within us.”105 After 
being alone with the Word, though, it is essential that we come together in community for the 
purpose of testimony and shared life as the real body of Christ on earth. Bonhoeffer recognized 
the dangers to ecclesial hermeneutics from both the flight into the aggregate (an overreliance on 
a social group as the ground)106 and from the flight into the individual (a rejection of Christ’s 
communal call). “We recognize, then,” he says, “that only as we stand within the community can 
we be alone, and only those who are alone can live in the community. Both belong together.”107 
This attention to divine discourse in its dual aspects of the individual and the ecclesial 
community parallels what we have seen in Augustine’s participatory thought in De Trinitate, 
where the Inner Teacher can lead us through inward dialogue to wisdom, but where it is also 
essential to bring those treasures to the common storehouse of ecclesial memory, where the 
shared voice of God brings joy, confirmation, and the possibility of shared action. That is, both 
Bonhoeffer and Augustine reserve a fundamental place for individual scripture reading, but also 
insist that shared testimony from the scriptures cannot be replaced by that individual mode, or at 
least not except for brief periods.108  
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Bonhoeffer also, like Augustine, wrote about a structure of life together in the scriptures, 
a type of monasticism that attempted to leave space for the real presence of Christ to be a 
necessary component. That is, in contrast to monastic practices that are comprehensive and 
controllable enough to function without the infusion of the divine voice in scriptures, Augustine 
and Bonhoeffer’s communal hermeneutic practices could only guide their adherents to listening, 
not deliver a set hermeneutical method.109 As Dale L. Sullivan argues, Bonhoeffer’s critiques of 
monasticism need to be read in the light of both his continuing rejection of idealism and his 
progressive move from abstract theology to pastoral work with the scriptures in real 
communities.110 Bonhoeffer argued for the centrality of church community—with mutual 
confession, shared action, and shared liturgy similar to monasticism—but a community that 
depends constantly on God’s presence because it is perilously “in the midst of enemies.”111 By 
contrast, a monasticism structured to obtain safety, control, or individual accolades cuts itself off 
from reading the scriptures submissively and blocks its ability to hear God’s voice.   
I would argue that Bonhoeffer’s hermeneutics was, practically speaking, participatory in 
the same vein as what this project has been proposing. However, Brock criticizes Bonhoeffer for 
having an insufficient pneumatology,112 and it is certain that Augustine’s more detailed 
exposition of how participation in the scriptures works individually and communally can provide 
further conceptual resources for Bonhoeffer’s practical and compelling metaphor of scriptural 
interpretation as “a way.”  
Liturgical Praxis 
What we have seen in the last section is how some recent scholars have attempted to 
bring the academic questions of biblical hermeneutics back down into real arenas of community 
practice. The resulting theoretical-practical frameworks are all somewhat Augustinian, though 
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not enough so to take advantage of Augustine’s broad range of philosophy of communication 
resources, which I thematized earlier as the following:  
1. Interpretation Participates in God through Language, Will, and Narrative 
2. Interpretation Elevates the Scriptures as Eternal/Temporal Medium   
3. Interpretation Privileges Communal Charity over Comprehensive Knowledge 
4. Interpretation is Individual AND Communal Embodied Praxis  
Fowl and Jones helpfully join Augustine in pointing out the primacy of the moral lens in 
reading the scriptures, for good or ill, but then make morality merely a function of the historical 
progress of the scriptural tradition (i.e., Augustine’s 3 and 4). Brock goes a long way toward 
reintroducing Augustine’s hermeneutic in fresh language that says yes to the reality of biblical 
history, yes to its eschatological fulfillment, and yes to its potential fulfillment in the current 
ecclesial manifestation of the totus Christus (i.e., Augustine’s 2-4). However, without explicitly 
seconding Augustine’s notion of participation, Brock’s excellent work on Psalmic exegesis is 
missing the conceptual centerpiece that would be needed in an Evangelical philosophy of 
communication. Bonhoeffer is the closest in spirit to Augustine, with a parallel process of 
submission to the scriptures, a parallel shift from individual philosophy to communal praxis, and 
addressing parallel uncertainties in the historical moment in which the church had to find its 
scriptural voice. However, Bonhoeffer was not able, in the short time he had, to put all of these 
themes together in an explicitly participatory alternative to the modernism in which he lived and 
breathed. What I have argued in this project is that Augustine’s philosophy of communication 
should be important to Evangelicals not merely for its breadth, attentiveness to the scriptures, 
and piety but also because it provides a helpfully “other” approach to the cosmos—a 
participatory approach—that can serve as an antidote to the philosophical poisons of modernism 
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that Evangelicals, and most other recent hermeneutical scholars, still carry about in their social 
bodies.  
However, it is one thing to argue that we should read the scriptures “over against 
ourselves,” or with a “theologically attuned ear,” and another thing to explain to a current 
congregation what this looks like. Moving down the ladder of abstraction ever closer to a 
concrete proposal for Evangelical hermeneutics, we will look briefly in this section at the more 
concrete proposals for liturgies and ecclesial habits that constitute the Evangelical community’s 
response to its felt needs for a hermeneutic more responsive to community and spirituality. 
Specifically, we will look at the New Monastic movement, one of the strands of the Evangelical 
missional movement113 which has attempted to follow the cues of MacIntyre and Bonhoeffer to 
create a radical contrast to normal Evangelical liturgy and community.  
By taking on the metaphor of “monasticism,” the New Monastics point toward both 
positive comparisons with historical monastic commitments and the role of critique always 
implicit in monastic organization. Taking their cue from the longer philosophical tradition of 
otium, the early Christian church’s outliers responded to the growing worldliness of Christianity 
by moving into different kinds of monastic life,114 from the idiosyncratic mystical monasticism 
of the Desert Fathers to the highly communal and regimented Benedictines to the wandering 
reformational orders of the Franciscans and the Dominicans. Since the Protestant reformation, 
Protestant denominations have also experienced their own implicit critiques from outliers, but 
following the Protestant pattern of separation, Protestant outliers are manifested in new, separate 
denominations rather than monastic restorations.  
As the culture of individualism has gained ground in the “social imaginary” through the 
period of modernity, these new denominations have been formed with less organizational 
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emphasis on shared communal identity and more emphasis on the “morality of individual 
choice,” especially in the incubator of religious individualism, the United States.115 In a 
paradoxical turn, however, the postmodern (or hypermodern) moment has given new conceptual 
life to the vocabulary of protest available to Protestant ecclesial outliers, pushing them more 
toward “traditionally” Catholic themes of sacrament, liturgy, embodiment, and committed 
community.116 Though there have been a number of Protestant monastic moves in the past 
century, this paper focuses on the New Monastic movement that was formally initiated at an 
ecumenical conference in Durham, North Carolina, in 2004.  
This movement and its philosophy is well-documented by Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove’s 
many works,117 but comprehensive sketch of its principles can be found in the book that came 
out of the 2004 conference, School(s) for Conversion: 12 Marks of a New Monasticism.118 In that 
book, Jonathan R. Wilson makes very clear that the conceptual starting point for the movement 
was MacIntyre’s work After Virtue, whose influential diagnosis of the fragmentation of Western 
society concludes with the following language:  
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which 
civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages 
which are already upon us. … We are waiting not for Godot, but for another—doubtless 
very different—St. Benedict.119  
School(s) for Conversion and other seminal texts give us some common themes for how New 
Monasticism attempts to build these “local forms of community.” The organizational practices 
New Monasticism aspires to are meant to exhibit both continuity with the history of the Christian 
faith (not separatism) and self-conscious separation for the purpose of embodied witness. 
Concerned with the ways (Protestant) Christianity has become indistinguishable from American 
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capitalist culture, New Monasticism is explained as “the only way for the church to recover 
faithful living [and] for the church to disentangle its life from the culture.”120 Therefore, many of 
its identifying organizational principles are themselves critiques of the Christian culture status 
quo. Quoting Muldoon, Carter summarizes this theme thus: 
The common feature is that new monasticism seeks to share with these other movements 
a radical discipleship, in the sense of eschewing participation in the structural/social sins 
endemic in contemporary American life: not only racism, but also individualism, 
economic disparity, and participation in war-making.121 
Some of these principles are organized around economic themes, such as “Relocation to 
abandoned places of empire” (a call to physically disentangle the church from locational loyalty 
to prosperity), “Sharing economic resources” with each other (a call to question the ground of 
personal property), “Hospitality to the Stranger” (a call to question the ground of self-interest 
and tribalism), and “Support of our local economies” (a call to ecological and economic 
communalism).122  
Others are organized around structured rejection of individualism, such as “Nurturing 
Common Life,” “Geographical Proximity to Community Members,” and “Humble Submission 
to…the Church.” Principles/marks focused on specific communal communication patterns deal 
with peacemaking internal to the group (Mark 11), racial reconciliation and diversity within 
groups and communities (Mark 4), integration of married and celibate members (Mark 8), and 
sequential socialization along the lines of the “old novitiate” (Mark 6). The remaining mark is 
the only one focused on the individual spiritual life, under the sign of a “disciplined 
contemplative life.”123  
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These marks are existential responses to the felt need for community and the felt worry 
over America’s sociological drift toward tribalism,124 but they are also conceptual responses to 
MacIntyre’s thought, as repackaged by Jonathan R. Wilson (Wilson-Hartgrove’s father-in-law) 
into a call for the church. In a way that resonates with an Augustinian philosophy of 
communication, Wilson wrote about New Monasticism as a way to recover the gospel narrative, 
holistically across vocations, in local practices that are disciplined and theologically reflective, 
recovering both “right belief and right practice.”125 This focus on the gospel narrative providing 
the broad context for life, denying a strong sacred/secular division, resonates with Augustine’s 
narratively grounded hermeneutics, as do Wilson’s emphasis on the limitations of our knowledge 
and his goal of communal embodied praxis. Wilson’s extension of the “disciplined life” to both 
communal belief and communal practice, with the end being the “faithful life and witness of the 
church,” also corresponds with the disciplined, end-oriented ecclesial practice advocated by 
Augustine.126  
This discipline and emphasis on communal commitment in New Monasticism draws 
explicitly from St. Benedict’s principle of “stability.”127 Stated as a contrasting principle over 
against the wider Evangelical church, Jason Mahn and Grace Koloczek emphasize the 
importance of stability to New Monasticism as a way to combat the tendencies in Evangelicalism 
toward “church renewal” or youth movement fads.128 The New Monastics believe that it is 
important to read “over against” the individualism, capitalism, and faddishness of both the 
current culture and the church, and that any headway with such a hermeneutic must be made 
through holistic community, stable commitment, and shared local praxis in the gospel narrative.  
The purpose of this project is not, of course, to describe every aspect of New 
Monasticism, but rather to examine its holistic communal praxis as a model of lived biblical 
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hermeneutics in the Evangelical sphere. What conceptual models and practices are already at 
work in the broader Evangelical community, with which an Augustinian biblical hermeneutic 
might interact? This is an especially pertinent question since Bonhoeffer, who also called for a 
return to some form of monasticism, is one of the heroes of the New Monastic movement, and 
we have already seen the significant overlap between Bonhoeffer’s hermeneutic and the contours 
of the one I have synthesized from Augustine.  
Unfortunately, new monasticism is open to the criticism that it constitutes not a 
constructive but rather a negative reactionary response using critical class concepts based more 
in historical materialism than in revelation. Moreover, it seems to fall prey to the Nietzschean 
critique of Christian leadership that Jean Bethke Elshtain warned against: “There is a rather 
bizarre form of self-pride associated with this little-ness—something along the lines of ‘Look at 
how abject and apologetic I am, and I will spend the rest of my life trying to make up in a tiny 
way for the horrific sins of my forebears.’”129 Elshtain maintains that Bonhoeffer, one of the 
proclaimed forefathers of the new monastic movement, promoted confession in community, but 
rejected this form of cultural abjectness as a refusal to lead from the strength of the Christian 
confession.130 Additionally, D. A. Carson, a central Evangelical scholar, has asked why, of all H. 
Richard Niebuhr’s categories of relationship to culture, new monasticism is located in only 
“Christ against culture,” including Christ against the traditional churches.131 Can healthy biblical 
hermeneutics be built on top of a merely reactionary stance to sins of the current historical 
moment?  
 New Monastic movements can be described as not scripture-centered but “idealistic” in 
the negative sense given by Bonhoeffer: “One who wants more than what Christ has established 
does not want Christian brotherhood. He is looking for some extraordinary social experience … 
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Christian brotherhood is not an ideal, but a divine reality … a spiritual and not a psychic 
reality.”132 Observers of new monastic communities note that, despite their attention to 
commitment, they are “essentially unstable” and usually “short-lived,” partly because the 
idealistic principles around which they form are not formative enough to withstand the 
“magnifying” effect of community on unchanged individualistic aspects of culture and always-
present sins and weaknesses.133  
Conversely, the New Monastic movement is notable for its silence on the scriptures. 
While certainly not repudiating the scriptures, the dogmatic assertions of New Monastics bypass 
traditional Evangelical statements about specific doctrines and about the scriptures. Instead, their 
identifying “Marks” go straight to issues of social justice and the characteristics and goals of 
community. But can the higher goals of new monastic communities survive without an anchor in 
the traditional Evangelical focus on the scriptures? While Augustine and Bonhoeffer both had 
spiritual journeys whose landmarks were markedly scriptural, and who enjoined pursuit of the 
scriptures as foundational for social justice and ecclesial relations, New Monasticism lays no 
such foundation. They do use scripture (and some local communities more robustly than others), 
but the scriptures are not defended or even mentioned as part of their picture of healthy ecclesial 
identity. Therefore, while New Monasticism has been putting into practice a MacIntyrian return 
to tradition as a critique of modernist ecclesiology, they have not addressed the place of the 
scriptures and the specific approach to biblical hermeneutics that undergirds their communitarian 
ethos. Since New Monasticism is a subset of Evangelicalism, this lacuna makes it more difficult 
to carry out their professed desire to both learn from and critique the status quo church.134 While 
ordinary Evangelical churchgoers have been challenged and inspired, to some degree, by New 
Monasticism,135 the key question for Evangelical identity has gone unanswered: how does the 
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holistic communal commitment of New Monastic groups deal with the authority and 
interpretation of the scriptures?  
This is a question that highlights the need for an Augustinian philosophy of 
communication, which can address the felt need for ecclesial community and for the conceptual 
framework that brings together language, will, and the communal narrative. Like the New 
Monastics, Augustine was impatient with those who preferred to talk about ideas instead of to act 
charitably for social justice,136 but unlike New Monastics, Augustine was persistent in finding 
language to explain how biblical hermeneutics undergirds action and was insistent on the 
centrality of the scriptures themselves. At the crux of Augustine’s thought on the intersection of 
hermeneutics, liturgy, and the body are his writings on habit.  
As many authors point out, the return to communal habits in religious communities such 
as those in New Monasticism is partly a reaction to the historical moment of late modern 
capitalism, in which the meaning-giving cultural and religious practices of the past have not only 
been weakened by the motivating undercurrent of market capitalism but have even been replaced 
by cultural liturgies created for the propagation of capital production.137 The mall has replaced 
the church; dinner and a movie has more social pull than a gathering for the Lord’s Supper. 
Therefore, as James K. A. Smith emphasizes and Augustine would agree with, we are already in 
the grip of powerful habits, whether we know it or not. Smith, while not part of the New 
Monastic movement, has done a good job of articulating a conceptual connection between 
biblical hermeneutics and embodied communal praxis. However, while Smith and others rightly 
reject the intellectualization and individualization of Christian spirituality, they unhelpfully move 
the overemphasis to the body, pulling from secular philosophical traditions to create an idea of 
religious habit that is embodied and social, but not necessarily spiritual or scriptural.138  
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In an Aristotelian frame—such as employed by MacIntyre, Wilson, and the subsequent 
New Monastic movement—habits are developed within the moral horizon of a particular 
community through attentiveness to the standards of the community, a practical wisdom 
(phronesis) of discerning the good, the bad, and the indifferent in any given situation.139 Thus 
habit is practiced within a particular community, inscribed in the body as a “second nature,” 
accumulated over time through ethical decisions, and possessed by the person, to his glory or 
shame.140 As Smith points out, our interpretations are also executed within the framework of our 
habits. What an ecclesial community can actually interpret in the scriptures, and thus obey, is 
constrained by its expectations of what the scriptures say, expectations which are formed by the 
community’s habitual practice. These habits that we exercise together in communal 
interpretation of and action on the scriptures are one of what Smith calls “liturgies,” which is for 
him a general philosophical category that describes sacred or secular cultural habits.141  
Augustine began his Christian life with an understanding of habit very similar to the 
Aristotelian one, courtesy of Cicero, but progressively modified it in response to his 
controversies and in line with his Pauline scriptural turn.142 In his early philosophical writings, 
Augustine was attempting to take the received goods of his Roman education, including the 
concepts of habit and phronesis/wisdom, and find out how to re-validate them within the 
Christian faith, especially with regard to the question of sin. As Carlisle notes, one of the 
enduring ethical questions that is bound up with habit is how habitual or deterministic aspects of 
human life fit with freedom and responsibility.143 In Smith’s use of the term “liturgy,” how do 
we, together, make our liturgies, and how do our liturgies make us.  
At the beginning, Augustine pegged habit as the self-forged chains of the body that 
makes virtuous living difficult—it is not the body that is evil, contra the Manicheans, but rather 
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the habits of sin which we have inscribed in the body by past action. That is, our habitual sins in 
the periods of our lives before law and under law still give us a struggle in our period after the 
law (under grace), to be fully broken only in the final period of the redemption. The route to 
victory over past habits, into more spiritual habits, was still prudence, but as Augustine was 
forced to reckon more with Paul’s doctrine of sin and the “carnal prudence/phronesis” of 
philosophy as critiqued by the scriptures, he shifted his emphasis to put sin in the body even 
before habit and to lift grace over phronesis as the remedy. Accordingly, Augustine writes in 
Contra Faustus:  
But as that snow melts by heat and ceases to be snow in order to warm up, in the same 
way this carnal prudence, i.e., the habit of acting carnally—when our mind will be 
enlightened and when God submits the whole person to himself, along the precepts of the 
divine Law, he shall turn the bad habit of the soul into a good habit.144  
Gerd Van Riel writes in Augustinian Studies that Augustine turned the classical virtue of 
prudence/phronesis “into a vice.”145 This is putting the matter rather too strongly, but what Van 
Riel smartly puts a finger on is Augustine’s recognition that classical versions of habit and virtue 
can be oriented by their particular communities in better or worse ways. And because Augustine 
argued that all human communities, including the church, are at best mixtures of elements of the 
city of God and the city of the world, classical phronesis itself can lead to not only moral but also 
amoral or even immoral action. Our liturgies, which guide our scriptural interpretations, come 
from mixed stock—both individuals and traditions that are heterogenous in will, language, and 
ethics. What’s more, even the accumulation of good habits, if framed as a personal achievement, 
can turn a seemingly good application of classical phronesis into its opposite, a habitual 
accumulation of soul-killing spiritual pride.146 As Lewis Mudge discusses at length, church 
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communities do not develop in isolation from these larger cultural forces, but are “porous” 
societies: “Effectively or not, with better or worse outcomes, congregations engender certain 
ways of seeing life just by being the kinds of communities they are.”147 Like Bellah, Mudge 
notes the felt inadequacy of the current state of communication philosophy in the American 
Protestant tradition. An ecclesial community engaging in biblical hermeneutics, therefore, does 
so in the context of lived habit of thought and action that can never, of itself, mature into 
something that can be identified as an unequivocal good. It requires grace, or in our central 
Augustinian metaphor, participation through the scriptures, in order to move the habitual 
framework (thought and action) into a more sanctified direction.  
Giving this much weight to habit in communal practice and interpretation has not set well 
with moderns. Hegel saw habit as “ambiguous,” both restrictive and freeing.148 By regulating so 
much of our life beneath the threshold of conscious thought—a phenomenon which could be 
good or bad—he believed our critical faculties might be freed up to pursue other, higher 
endeavors.149 Without a reference point external to humanity, however, modern philosophers 
were stuck in this tension between habits manipulating the machine-like body for good and 
habits as the sworn enemy of the freedom of the soul. 
 Calling for a return to the monastery, though with a radical focus on the individual, 
Kierkegaard believed that “Luther’s ‘affirmation of ordinary life’ and denial of a special status to 
the monk produced a leveling down and not a leveling up.”150 However, Kierkegaard, similar to 
Luther, called for a life of continual striving, a “repeated leap” into the grace of God. This 
doctrine colored his perspective on monastic life to make it a setting for a serial set of 
experiences with God rather than “a progressive improvement in virtue” or hermeneutic wisdom. 
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Habit was banished to the realm of the body, a temptation towards inauthenticity and, in 
Kierkegaard’s Existentialist descendants, a “cover for ‘bad faith.’”151  
Influenced by Kierkegaard, but also in textual dialogue with Heidegger and Nietzsche, 
Bonhoeffer sought to understand habit in the church in a way that was responsive to “the story of 
the faith, the historical moment, and the possibility of revelation in the form of the temporal 
presence of Christ.”152 O’Gorman argues that it was in dialogue with Heidegger’s thought that 
Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran, Kierkegaardian distaste for the importance of communal habits was 
moderated, leading him to argue for the importance of dependence on the other, engagement 
with the world, and communicative responsibility for the future generations of one’s tradition.153 
As we have seen, these themes were emphasized even more strongly in Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. However, true to Bonhoeffer’s Augustinian and Lutheran roots, he criticized any 
sort of monastic habits that led to first- and second-class spiritual citizens in the Kingdom of 
God. Difference in habit can too easily lead to an individual leaning on works-righteousness and 
a monastic group falling into the sin of spiritual pride.154 In this, New Monastics have made a 
valiant effort to offer critique and embody difference without positing special status for their 
members.   
Liturgies have also become an ambiguous inheritance for Evangelical ecclesial 
communities that have sunk deep roots in the Romantic stream of individual artistic expression. 
Novelty in interpretation and personal uniqueness in these groups is held in dialectical tension 
with the shared vision and sensibilities that unify these boutique congregations. Lynne Baab and 
Carolyn Kelly, writing about such Emergent church reappropriation of visual arts as a way to 
navigate “unity and diversity” in congregations, are perhaps an example of this overly optimistic 
vision of dialogic unity built up from individual artistic expressions.155 Liturgies can be built, of 
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course, but one of the central marks of success in so doing is that you find yourself acting in 
harmony with a group without self-conscious attention to the process and without recognition of 
individual persons.  
Bellah’s distinction between families with “elaborated codes” and those with “condensed 
codes” is helpful here to think about the difference between a church family that tries to be self-
reflexive about everything and the church family that sees no need to talk about or explain 
anything that they do (“this is just the way we do things”). Groups with “elaborated codes” 
expect questioning, critique, and attention to personal feelings. Groups with condensed codes 
operate more according to roles and hierarchical positions, but are relatively untroubled by 
personal “feelings and abstract principles.”156 While New Monastic and Emergent Evangelical 
groups acknowledge the need for traditions and commitment, they have been criticized for 
accessing that tradition according to the elaborated code of individual aesthetic experience, 
picking and choosing liturgical bits from the tradition in order to maintain a contrast with the 
Evangelical status quo.157 However, as part of the Protestant tradition, a fully condensed code 
would not be appropriate for an Evangelical liturgy that would house a participatory scriptural 
hermeneutic. A return to communal life in the scriptures as a venue for participation in God’s 
narrative would allow Evangelicals to develop condensed liturgies that guide interpretation and 
practice according to the narrative of the gospel but that also leave structural openings for the 
divine voice to question, criticize, or otherwise direct them to a new praxis. As we will see from 
the description of early church liturgy in I Corinthians 14 below, the good order of a settled 
(condensed) set of practices and expectations is not incompatible with the in-breaking 
(elaboration) of revelation from the divine voice. Both of these are necessary in the Evangelical 
scriptural hermeneutic proposed here.  
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If New Monastics, and other Evangelical renewal communities, pay more close attention 
to this wisdom of living communal habit through participatory dialogue in the scriptures, as 
described by Augustine and Bonhoeffer, they may yet provide a model and witness for the 
Evangelical tradition.  
Both Augustine and Bonhoeffer described monastic-like communities that featured 
shared participatory interpretation of the scriptures, modeling and writing about a realistic liturgy 
that pairs habitual reading of the word and communal service with openness to God’s voice 
infusing and directing that interpretation and practice. Bonhoeffer’s early academic work on the 
sociology of the church, The Communion of Saints, was sharpened through praxis into his later 
monastic guidebook for laypeople, Life Together. And Augustine’s monasticism and 
ecclesiology both speak of the significance of his understanding of scriptural communal 
habits.158 In addition, it can be seen from Bonhoeffer’s long-term dialogue with Augustine, 
pivoting on the influence of his dissertation advisor and on the Augustine course he took while 
writing The Communion of the Saints, that the similarities between the two of them have not only 
the indirect connections of the Lutheran tradition but also the direct connections of theological 
engagement. In fact, “Bonhoeffer’s basic axiom that ... the church is Christ existing as 
community represents in significant ways a recovery and restatement of Augustine’s contention 
that in the church we encounter the whole Christ ... consisting of both head and body.”159 
Sullivan argues that Bonhoeffer’s years of practice of semi-monastic community 
separating Communion and Life Together demonstrates that the latter is the theory of the former 
informed by action. Both Bonhoeffer and Augustine lived for some time in monastic-type 
communities that they created, Augustine for more than half his life.160 In doing so, both 
Augustine and Bonhoeffer distanced themselves from forms of monasticism that withdraw from 
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the world and the larger church.161 Both of them made a point of critiquing the idealism that 
destroys true Christian community by asking of merely human liturgies what can only be 
dispensed by God’s participation. Bonhoeffer did so by flatly rejecting “psychological 
community … based on Utopian desire and unmediated fellowship” and seeking instead 
“spiritual community … based on recognition of reality and relationships mediated by Christ.”162 
Augustine, after an early flirtation with the idea of perfect exegesis and a perfect godly 
society,163 spent decades undoing the damage of the ideal of a perfect Christian (against 
Pelagius) and the ideal of a perfect church (Against the Donatists), and for good measure, he 
wrote The City of God to detail the admixture of the godly and the worldly city in every age until 
the eschaton.  
Further, as we have seen, Augustine and Bonhoeffer emphasized in their liturgies a 
communal meditation on the Word, specifically communal praying, reading, and singing the 
Psalms.164 Within that communal habit of meditation, both of them emphasized the dialogic 
nature of interaction with the scriptures—dialogic with the strangeness of the text, with the 
various perspectives and questions of the human community, and with the mediating Spirit of 
Christ.165 This can be seen in Augustine’s Narrations in Psalms by his statement that “what 
[people] sing is all a piece with their minds and hearts … [and] God has willed to grant human 
beings the ability to sing with understanding.” That is, as McCarthy explains at length, the 
communal performance of the scriptures is a legitimate form of communal exegesis that does not 
separate identification and affect from cognition, but joins them under the banner of caritas.166 
Likewise, Bonhoeffer pictured the communal habit of scripture reading as “holy, divine reality. 
We are uprooted from our own existence and are taken back to the holy history of God on earth,” 
which enables Christ’s body to participate with the mind of Christ and take that participation into 
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the challenges of the world now and here.167 Though New Monastic and Emergent communities 
are right to desire liturgies that engage the body and the emotions, not just arid intellect, such 
ends can only be gained by participation with God through attention and submission to the 
scriptures He has given. Like language in Augustine’s philosophy of communication, aesthetic 
worship practices, beautiful architecture, and bits of well-loved traditional liturgies are, in 
themselves, empty vessels. They cannot be used to build a tower to God. But once the presence 
of God is there through participatory attention to what He has set before our eyes—His Son, his 
gospel, and their historical diversification in the scriptures—any or all of these other worship 
practices may become pointing liturgies to the inward and upward revelation of God.  
Both Augustine and Bonhoeffer emphasized also the importance of work and of regular 
hours set for work, reading, prayer, etc.168 This work included, for both of their communities, 
engagement with the real problems of the world, problems that kept anyone in their communities 
from believing they had everything figured out already. Both the training in the scriptures and 
the service to the church and the world were, for both sets of communities, intended to be a 
training ground for leaders who would go out and do likewise in other areas of the church and 
world.169 
Both of them, while noting the importance of personal choice, saw choice in the context 
of a narrative being spoken by God.170 More than a narrative of a religious tradition, it is a 
constellation with a few bright stars of certitude and much darkness in which the community 
must listen for the step that is right by God in a particular time and place.171 Both of them 
understood the Christian life to be basically social, dependent on confession in both senses, and 
these steps of faith to be socially discerned.172 And finally, both of them saw the physical body 
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as important in the regulation of the habits of the community, an importance grounded in the 
Incarnation.173  
What is meant by “re-embodying the scriptures,” from both Bonhoeffer and Augustine, is 
that when the faithful gather and speak the scriptures together, they together identify with Christ 
as the divine author of the scriptures and thus, in that event, become the body of Christ with one 
mind. McCarthy’s exposition of Augustine on this point is worth quoting at length: 
As Augustine’s own understanding of the Incarnation deepens, the biblical sign itself 
does not so much point to as it embodies the signifying reality … Those who perform the 
“text,” in other words, become its living subject. Yet, the subject is reconstituted in the 
communal inquiry reflected in his sermons. Augustine never renounces his position as 
bishop, of course, but he minimizes it as biblical inquiry becomes a collaborative 
venture.174  
That is, as we will see more below in my synthetic proposition, a participatory hermeneutic must 
be structured to invite realistic collaboration of the priesthood of all believers. However, there is 
also more to re-embodying the scriptures than just the momentary event; the monastic rule of 
continual practice in performing this embodiment together brings us to the theological 
importance of action, of praxis, in the individual and social body.  
In the social body, regular shared practices and interpretations produce communal 
interaction patterns of mutual responsibility in the context of a communally shared language, 
communal memory, and a shared space of discovery that grounds communal action in the 
historical moment. How regular? By one estimate, Augustine’s community made its way through 
the singing of all the Psalms every few weeks,175 and Bonhoeffer’s community was similarly 
oriented toward the “vicarious prayer of Christ” represented by the Psalms.176  
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This form of habit is not merely programmatic, but promotes interaction patterns that 
address the needs of the community in the moment, ready to “listen” and “allow ourselves to be 
interrupted by God.”177 It is, in Bellah’s terms, a communal habit that produces “meaning” 
through a “condensed code,” but a meaning that is also open to the “elaborated code” of God re-
vivifying His Word through the kairotic intersection of this community, this time, and this 
historical moment.178 “The Law of the Lord creates space for human action,” as Brock says of 
Bonhoeffer’s thought, “because it provides a form within which humans may live, in making it 
possible to prepare to hear the Creator’s voice … a form through which God guides human 
action.” Bonhoeffer’s ethics of the “way” is focused on learning to hear the next step, not 
knowing the further horizon. Bonhoeffer’s “judgement aims not at discerning the ‘absolute good 
act,’ but only the next step in a path of obedience, a path whose end is clear while the middle 
distance is not. Only so is Christian hermeneutics a journey of faith and hope, and not of 
sight.”179 McCarthy’s take on Augustine puts him in the same camp:  
Central to [Augustine’s] understanding of Christian worship is a reciprocal relationship 
between God, who addresses his people in the Bible, and the community of faith, who 
speaks in return. ... the divine word constitutes a kind of ongoing conversation that 
ennobles and transforms the partner over time. … Revelation lay somewhere between the 
fixity of the written word and its quality as appeal, as a site of dialogue with the 
congregation that voiced the word.180 
With Gadamer, there is a disclosure of being through engagement with the scriptural text, but it 
can be a disclosure that is not merely the fusion of textual and traditional horizons in the 
temporal plane but also the intervening eternal horizon of the divine voice, whose timing, 
volume, and scope are not controlled or limited by the human temporal liturgy. What McCarthy 
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and Brock point out to us from Augustine and Bonhoeffer is that any such hermeneutic is a work 
of the whole body of Christ, a shared practice of reading, listening, recognizing the voice of God, 
and action. This hermeneutic phronesis is a community event, for which the Evangelical 
community needs the real, not imagined, God.181 
Beyond the event and its long-term repercussions on the ecclesial body, this kind of 
communal scriptural practice is also inscribed in the individual’s body. From participation in 
Christ through the communal body and its habitual confession, the memory of the real body of 
Christ is inscribed on the individual body through the memory of the scriptures that had been 
communally “quickened” in the past. Because they were training people to move into distant 
positions of Christian leadership, Bonhoeffer and Augustine knew this memory of the “real body 
of Christ”—a history and liturgy of shared interpretive praxis—would be more important for 
discipleship than the mere written words in letters and treatises.182  
An Augustinian “liturgy” of participatory scriptural hermeneutics would, then, seek to 
instill habits of communal “inhabiting” readings of scripture, reading together as the joint voice 
of Christ and acting toward each other and toward the world, in that historical moment, 
according to what Christ discloses in that reading. This communal habit of speaking the 
scriptures themselves would allow members (still living in the world) to be continually 
confronted with the strangeness of the Word (and the world), to be continually humbled by the 
community’s multiplicity of possibilities of meaning, and to be challenged with the real demands 
of caritas disclosed within and outside each particular ecclesial group.  
While hermeneutic philosophers like Gadamer and Ricoeur might applaud parts of this 
description, their insistence on a forward movement of truth that precludes dogma does not fit 
with Augustine, Bonhoeffer, or the larger Evangelical community. Their hermeneutical 
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philosophies have been useful against the modern pretensions of anthropocentric knowledge and 
control but, despite awareness of the irony of their position, their dogmatic insistence on 
questioning is also “oracular” in an anthropocentric way.183 As we have seen, they argue that the 
church community must develop a constantly self-reflective critical stance towards its liturgies, a 
persistent return to critique which still prefers emancipatory critical ideals to the possibility of 
revelation.184 To them, truth has to change continually, ontologically, because the historical 
moment with which the scriptures are fused has to change continually.  
The explicit answer of Augustine and the implicit answer of Bonhoeffer is that truths 
recur in temporality from the realm of eternity, as mediated through the figures of the scriptures 
and manifested by the divine voice to his listening communal body. The responsibility to 
question a particular habitual interpretation or change a particular habitual aspect of the church’s 
liturgy is not one that is on the shoulders of the human leaders primarily. The initiative for 
questioning human liturgies belongs to God, though it is mediated through communal attention 
to God through the scriptures. God’s voice participating in human ecclesial narratives through 
the scriptures is the one that speaks “a new song” and brings about “a new thing.”185 Without 
participation, hermeneutics can only negotiate the spectrum between conservative habit and self-
reflexive critique according to the political structures of a particular tradition, controlling whose 
interpretations matter, who gets to speak when, which texts are featured, and which are buried. 
That is, without returning to an Augustinian participatory framework, Evangelical hermeneutics 
can in the final analysis only be about power, which is where Worthen leaves it in her 
unflattering history of Evangelical tensions in biblical interpretation.186   
Charismatic Impact on Evangelical Hermeneutics   
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It may seem naïve to argue for an embodied, multi-level hermeneutic of the scriptures 
that is keyed on participating in God’s current word to the ecclesial body of Christ, even though 
such concepts have experienced a resurgence in both scholarly attention and on-the-ground 
missional movements, both seeking more holistic Evangelical spirituality. The question of 
application is important to philosophy of communication, but it still seems daunting. How do we 
bring the theological concept of participation, from scholars such as Hans Boersma, into the 
“way” of encountering scripture, such as proposed by Brock, within a concrete and committed 
ecclesial community, whose members are to obey and praise more than to seek a comprehensive 
understanding? And how can this strange neo-Augustinian biblical hermeneutic not only have 
some impact but also even restore key Evangelical identity markers such as gospel-centered 
ecumenism, the priesthood of all believers, and a shared life in the scriptures that allows them to 
experience positive leading, not just safety from enemies behind the gates of orthodoxy? While 
there are many challenges to reconnecting Evangelicalism with this hermeneutic, I believe the 
groundwork of practice has already been laid by the influence of the Charismatic movement on 
Evangelicalism.  
In an Augustinian philosophy of communication, the concepts and experiences delivered 
in a particular historical moment are to be received as gifts and faithfully put to work. It is 
entirely appropriate to ask, “God, what are you teaching us by foregrounding this scripture 
and/or this experience?” To revisit the scriptural paradigm used by Fowl and Jones, we can 
examine this receptive attitude in the first big hermeneutical conundrum of the early church—
whether to allow gentiles to enter the church (as gentiles).187 The council at Jerusalem considered 
the scriptures, the spiritual experience of gentile conversion parallel to the council’s own 
experience, and the larger context of the gospel. This discussion didn’t just happen, though, as an 
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academic exercise in theology. St. Peter had been prepared by a dream and by a divine word to 
go to the gentile Cornelius’s house.188 Everything in this event had contradicted Peter’s habitual 
way of thinking about the audience for the gospel, and entering a gentile’s house violated Peter’s 
cultural habits, but the divine “elaborated” discourse came as a gift to open up the closed 
hermeneutic cycle regarding the gentiles, bringing the eternal Word into temporality as a “new” 
gift for that particular historical moment and opening up a number of heretofore unseeable 
scriptures.  
Since the 1970s, the limited and somewhat isolated vein of traditional Pentecostalism has 
done something similar to open Evangelicals’ eyes to the frankly spiritual nature of the faith, 
exploding onto the scene in a movement that has saturated parts of almost all denominations. 
This movement, normally designated the “Charismatic” movement, has even been a factor in 
creating several new Evangelical ecclesial denominations. Coming as a gift of both new 
experiences and new conceptual resources to the larger world of Christianity, the Charismatic 
movement can be seen as a conceptual-experiential doorway for Evangelicals to reappropriate 
participatory scriptural hermeneutics.  
Even before the Charismatic movement emerged, theologian Leslie Newbigin wrote 
about divine provision of metaphors through the “three streams” of Christianity: the “continuity” 
and sacramentalism of Roman Catholicism, the “centrality of the scriptures” and proclamation of 
the Protestants, and the “present action of the Spirit in the church through the gifts” in 
Pentecostalism.189 Since that time, the fairly stiff social boundary between Pentecostalism and 
other traditions, including Evangelicalism, has become permeable and, in some cases, perforated. 
This permeability is especially visible in “Third Wave” Charismatics, who fuse charismatic gifts 
and practices with their own “mainline evangelical” identities. One of the key spokesmen of 
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Third Wavers, C. Peter Wagner, explains it thus: “I see in the 80’s an opening of the straightline 
evangelicals and other Christians to the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit that the Pentecostals 
and charismatics have experienced, but without becoming either charismatic or Pentecostal.”190 
What this means for Evangelicals in particular is that their focus on the scriptures and 
gospel-centered missions, their central identity markers,191 does not have to be threatened by the 
return of a participatory spirituality and hermeneutics but can rather be strengthened and restored 
by it. In the ecumenism of gospel-centered mission, this openness to participatory spirituality has 
already been recognized by Evangelicals as already the current state of events, which needs to be 
nurtured.192 Synan notes Billy Graham’s participation in the 1987 Pentecostal/Charismatic New 
Orleans Congress on missions and reports on the undercurrent of influence that made such a 
high-profile Evangelical appearance make sense:  
The coming together of evangelicals and charismatics in the 1980’s presaged other 
changes in American church life. Although little had been said by mainline church 
mission boards, Pentecostalism had long since swept into their mission fields. Southern 
Baptists whispered the rumor that an estimated 75 percent of their third-world 
missionaries had spoken in tongues in the various “renovation” and charismatic 
movements during the 1970’s. Large numbers of Methodist, Presbyterian, Anglican, and 
Lutheran missionaries had become practicing Pentecostals in the field—a fact they did 
not broadcast back home.193  
Evangelicals have also been challenged by the extraordinary success and ubiquity of 
phenomenologically Pentecostal/charismatic missions movements worldwide. As Dave Barrett 
said as far back as 1988,  
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With Pentecostals/charismatics now active in 80% of the world’s largest metropolises, all 
in process of actively implementing networking and cooperation with Great Commission 
Christians of all confessions, a new era in world mission would clearly appear to have got 
under way.194 
This activity in the 1980’s can be supplemented with data from the turn of the recent century, 
where the number of global pentecostal/charismatic members crossed the 500 million mark.195 In 
1995, this group already constituted 23.9% of all world Christians and was larger than all other 
Protestant denominations together,196 quite a rate of growth for a movement that started with 40 
people only a century before.197 As discussed earlier in this project, the Pentecostal/Charismatic 
experience has spoken more directly than the purely conceptual message of the West to a number 
of indigenous populations that had not yet lost their participatory worldview, which is why 
Synans’s analysis includes the well-populated categories of “quasi-” and “indigenous 
Pentecostals.” These are groups which have had minimal contact with Western missionaries and 
are not under the oversight of any Western denomination.198 Some of these indigenous 
charismatic groups have even sprung up through the gospel message of (at the time) non-
charismatic Evangelical missionaries.199  
The point of these numbers is, first, that Evangelicals have not ignored and should not 
ignore the major move toward participatory metaphors as represented by the worldwide 
phenomenon of the Pentecostal/Charismatic movement. This renewal of participation may have 
returned to the West as a blessing from its obedience in taking the gospel to all peoples, as 
Christians were commissioned to do, or it may just be a divine gift of both conceptual and 
experiential riches in order to renew the church in the West.  
  
377 
The second point, though, is that Evangelicals should consider how participatory 
spiritualities have to be grappled with not only on the mission field but also in the way we 
approach our biblical hermeneutics back home. Evangelicals, like many in the modernist milieu 
generally, are experts at segmentation, even when calls to holism resonate with them 
emotionally. We are able to segment our personal and ecclesial approach to the bible into 
“devotions” and “exegesis,” as early Methodists (before splitting from the Anglicans) had to 
divide their church meetings into “experience meetings” and the authoritative Anglican 
service.200 The on-the-ground experiences and participatory approaches of 
pentecostal/charismatic “liturgy” challenge Evangelicals, in particular, to bring their scientific 
exegesis and their spirituality back together. While there are undoubtedly several Pentecostal and 
charismatic theologians whose conceptual resources could help Evangelicals return to a 
participatory scriptural hermeneutic, I have been arguing in this project that Augustine provides a 
better dialogue partner because of the thoroughness of his engagement with scriptural 
hermeneutics, with participation, and with ecclesiology—and because he is arguably writing 
from a time before the stream of Christianity divided into “three streams” in the first place.  
Synthesis: Participatory Hermeneutical Praxis 
So what might an Augustinian synthesis look like in practice in our historical moment? 
Following the Augustinian theme of interpretation as individual and communal embodied 
praxis, it would be important for the ecclesial community to keep both scriptural interpretation 
close to its application and individual interpretation and application in dialogue with the 
community. By keeping interpretation close to application, I do not mean to recommend the 
sometime practice of some pastors to avoid doctrine in favor of practical tips for personal 
“lifehacking.” To Augustine, the doctrine of God was eminently practical because it produced 
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inward humility and upward praise, which was to be applied both individually and 
corporately.201  
A good example of a close interpretation-application dynamic can be found in the 
Evangelical church-planting manual written by George Patterson and Richard Scoggins. They 
rightly point out that Western Christians tend to equate quantity of knowledge with spirituality, 
whereas the scriptures portray depth of obedience to what little we know as the measure of 
spirituality. Patterson and Scoggins teach that each congregation should be taught a scriptural 
concept, but that before the leaders move on to any other teaching, the congregation should show 
that it has incorporated that first teaching into its liturgical life. A teaching on hospitality, for 
example, must be fully understood by being agreed with and practiced. Stacking up knowledge 
without obedience, say Patterson and Scoggins, is dangerous to true spirituality.202 Though 
Augustine would not withhold the words of the scriptures from a congregation that is not yet 
obedient,203 he does share in this more recent perspective on knowledge without obedience, 
constantly warning his own congregation to apply what he is teaching and often confessing his 
own fear for himself because of his own level of knowledge.204 Patterson and Scoggins’s 
examples of praxis in local congregations can therefore give us some concrete steps for 
Evangelical hermeneutics.  
By also highlighting the importance of bringing individual application of the scriptures 
under the purview of the community, I am not suggesting an authoritarian system of checks and 
permissions, such as was the downfall of the 1970’s Shepherding Movement, a discipling 
structure that attempted to address perceived shortcomings in charismatic doctrine and 
practice.205 On the contrary, following the philosophy of Augustine (and Bonhoeffer), I argue 
that there is an irreducible place for the individual before God, and the individual’s participatory 
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interpretation is foundational, though not incontestable. Every individual coming to an ecclesial 
meeting should be prepared to listen to the scripture and to the Spirit for him/herself, but as 
Augustine modeled and taught, God’s goal for speaking to that individual interpreter is not 
merely to give him/her knowledge and direction but, even more, to contribute to and confirm 
through the individual what is necessary for the growth of the whole body.206  
The individual’s interpretation might need to be corrected in dialogue with the 
community, it might need to be added as a true but supplementary interpretation to the 
storehouse of the community, it might be true but not tending towards charity in a particular 
ecclesial situation, or it might be the interpretation given by the voice of God for the whole 
community to be able to grow in charity in that particular historical situation. The only way to 
know which of these ways a particular individual interpretation of scripture is to be characterized 
would be to bring it into communal dialogue, where ecclesial leaders referee the hermeneutic 
dialogue while keeping their ears open to the voice and presence of God. The apostle Paul 
actually describes this form of liturgy in I Corinthians 14:  
But if all prophesy, and an unbeliever or an uninformed person comes in, he is convinced 
by all, he is convicted by all. And thus the secrets of his heart are revealed; and so, falling 
down on his face, he will worship God and report that God is truly among you. 
 How is it then, brethren? Whenever you come together, each of you has a psalm, has 
a teaching, has a tongue, has a revelation, has an interpretation. Let all things be done for 
edification. If anyone speaks in a tongue, let there be two or at the most three, each in 
turn, and let one interpret. But if there is no interpreter, let him keep silent in church, and 
let him speak to himself and to God. Let two or three prophets speak, and let the others 
judge. But if anything is revealed to another who sits by, let the first keep silent. For you 
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can all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be encouraged. And the 
spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. For God is not the author of confusion 
but of peace, as in all the churches of the saints.207 
We see, first, that the precondition for participatory ecclesial liturgy is that “God is truly among 
you.” The presence of God then manifests in the manifold verbal ministry of all the believers. 
What sort of normal liturgical practice serves as the springboard for this kind of revelatory 
ministry is not hard to infer from Paul’s directions to Timothy: “Till I come, give attention to 
reading, to exhortation, to doctrine.”208 However, what we see here is that the gathering of the 
Christians to worship together through communal verbal ministry did not center on inviolate 
individual exegesis of a univocal text, but it was instead both participating in the spiritual realm 
and developing through communal judgment as the body of Christ. There was not to be 
“confusion” but rather order, “as in all the churches of the saints,” but this liturgical approach to 
ecclesial interpretation and ministry was to be ordered without being controlled, spontaneous 
without being chaotic or self-aggrandizing. This, of course, has resonance with Augustine’s 
argument for dialogic sharing of multiple valid interpretations as a sharing in the bounty of 
God’s provision, the criterion of charity enabling the community to hear the Word of the Lord 
(whether encouraging, rebuking, or directing) from the revelatory offerings of the whole 
community.  
This picture of a scriptural participatory hermeneutic would thus, according to Augustine, 
privilege communal charity over comprehensive knowledge, which is not to say nothing is 
known, but that nothing is yet known to the degree it might be.209 What might this look like in 
Evangelical ecclesial hermeneutics? Here, we come to a slight problem in the context of current 
Evangelical liturgies that focus on the ministry of the preacher alone. L. Roger Owens is limited 
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in this regard because his target of application for participatory liturgy is the sermon itself.210 
While I do not deny the sermon as an important site of participatory liturgy—and the sermon is 
an unmistakable part of the Evangelical and longer Christian traditions—the sermon cannot serve 
as the primary venue for a renewed biblical hermeneutic in Evangelicalism. The sermon 
demands proclamation from a hermeneut who has read the scriptures with ears open to the divine 
voice, but it does not encourage public dialogue or shared listening in the reading of Scripture.  
While it does not necessarily follow that comprehensive knowledge is the goal or product 
of proclamation, it does follow that charity in scriptural interpretation is more difficult. The one 
sitting in the pew may have a different reading of the sermonic text—a better one, a worse one, 
or just a different one—but the sermon venue is not traditionally open to questions, comparisons, 
or corrections.211 I have myself taken up preachers’ occasional invitations to participate in the 
sermon: in one instance, hearing the invitation and seeing the preacher struggling with his text, I 
held up my hand for the last half hour of the sermon to indicate my willingness to participate. 
However, the implicit rules of the sermon liturgy were too strong to allow for shared listening 
and shared work in the text. The scriptures themselves portray both sermonic venues and 
congregational participatory venues,212 but the shared work of hermeneutic ministry and action is 
the side of that coin largely missing in Evangelical liturgy currently. To put this in an 
Augustinian frame, though Augustine was a proponent and practitioner of the participatory 
sermon,213 he was also a proponent of shared life in the scriptures that we have discussed under 
the metaphor “monasticism.”  
Augustine’s implicit sermonic liturgy (as fitting his North African culture and time) was 
naturally much more participatory, and thus in line with Owen’s suggestions for that venue.214 
Augustine adjusted his sermons according to the understanding and response of his audience, his 
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content being shaped in the moment by his interpretation of his audience and of the divine voice 
in the moment. Even as a bishop, he had less structural authority over the people than we tend to 
think in hindsight,215 and thus he depended on the shared work of communication in the sermon, 
which also means a shared work of charity. 
However, Augustine’s description and practice of monasticism is where we see his desire 
to set in the heart of the Christian church the shared life in the scriptures. Augustine was careful 
to avoid setting up an innate hierarchy between those who could enter his communal life and 
those who could not, and salvation could be found in Christ’s Church whether inside or outside 
monastic life.216 However, those who could commit themselves to his scripturally based 
community life would serve the larger church as a living prototype and encouragement on their 
shared road in the gospel. Tarsicius J. Van Bavel goes so far as to say, “We could characterize 
the Rule of Augustine as a call to the evangelical equality of all people.”217 Not only was 
Augustine’s monastic thought ecclesiastically egalitarian but it was also not “ascetic,” it had 
“few concrete regulations and detailed laws,” and it was explicitly scriptural.218  
Augustine’s goal was not to build an institutional superstructure on top of the scriptures, 
but rather to use his few scriptural rules as a liturgy to help Christians point one another to God 
through the scriptures. Starting from the foundational “ideal of the Jerusalem community from 
Acts 4:31,” Augustine’s monasticism was focused on shared life in the scriptures. Van Bavel 
summarizes that  
In these references to the Scriptures Augustine’s own vision and spirituality come to 
light, for the biblical ideas which he emphasizes are the cherished sources from which he 
himself lives. It is precisely this biblical and evangelic foundation which forms the 
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permanent structure of the Rule: it guarantees the Rule’s value throughout changing times 
and cultures.219 
This monastic rule where “love and community” are the overarching principles220 emphasizes the 
sharing of material resources,221 individual and communal prayer,222 daily shared reading of the 
scriptures at meals,223 a flexible but similar standard of life,224 shared accountability for one 
another’s temptations, sins, and treatments,225 a shared aim to do everything for “the service of 
the community” rather than the individual,226 a shared commitment to conflict resolution,227 a 
shared commitment to godly relationships between authorities and subordinates,228 and a shared 
commitment to stir up desire for the participatory life of this community and praise for its 
actualization, a stirring up through regular shared return to the Rule and the scriptures.229  
I argue that the general orientation of Augustine’s scriptural Rule, in tandem with his 
lived practice of this form of community life, provides both the appropriate attitude and some 
specific directions for Evangelicals who want to institute a venue for shared charitable 
interpretation of the scriptures. As mentioned above, New Monastics have broken some ground 
in their area of praxis, but in their philosophical resources for monasticism they have skipped 
over Augustine and in their foundational structure they have skipped over the scriptures.  
In general, though, when an ecclesial community is attempting to share life and resources 
(in non-legalistic ways) while also sharing the hermeneutic burden in the scriptures, it becomes 
easier for the community to see scriptural interpretation in terms of their shared life, and each 
individual interpretation is regularly humbled by the shared hermeneutic activity. Because the 
commitment to charitable life together is primary, the group is driven to listen together to each 
other and to the divine voice. What this looks like in the vexing instance of interpretational 
disagreement, in my experience, is the “shelving” of a particular hermeneutical question at the 
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end of the service, with a mutual exhortation to prayer and study over the week and a renewed 
commitment to finding the most charitable interpretation for this scripture in the community’s 
current situation. Because, as Evangelicals, all parties in this disagreement love truth, the 
discovery of the charitable answer cannot be a rejection of grammatical and historical evidence 
or of key doctrines, but, as people aware of their need to participate in the divine direction for the 
community, all parties are willing to submit to whichever truth God identifies as most needful in 
the moment. In one particular hermeneutic question, what my wife and I realized is that, though 
our position on a specific question was more technically correct, the direction the church leaders 
were taking with a specific passage was charitable and needful for the church’s current situation. 
Our part in that charity would be to hold our interpretation for its appropriate time.  
It is only possible to hold an interpretation for its appropriate time, though, if the 
scriptures are deeper than a textual object on the flat plane of temporality, which is where both 
the grammatical-historical hermeneutics of modernism and the historicality of philosophical 
hermeneutics ultimately leave it. An Augustinian hermeneutic opens up the depth of the 
scriptures through their special status as a linguistic medium between eternity and temporality 
which is actualized through spiritual participation in God. What might this look like in an 
Evangelical ecclesial venue where, as enjoined above, the hermeneutical burden is shared among 
the priesthood of all believers?  
What should be clear at the outset is that, where the interpretation depends on the divine 
will and voice, there is no controllable “method” in the modern sense of the term. There cannot 
even be a willed decision by the ecclesial community always to be “open” or “self-reflexive” in 
their spirituality since, as Augustine highlights, our wills are neither constant nor fully pure. 
What’s more, once the voice of God through scripture has been manifested to an ecclesial 
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community that was open enough to receive it, any further hermeneutical openness on that 
particular point would be disobedience, not faithfulness. The tenuous nature of our grasp and 
practice of scriptural eternal truths pushed Augustine to continuous prayer and confession of his 
need for God’s help,230 as it has similarly pushed other Christians to prayer in their scripture-
centered lives.  
Where the hermeneutical task is only to extract the propositional content of scripture 
through the tools of historical, grammatical, and form exegesis, the hermeneut would rightly 
prioritize academic study. Where such a task is only to open the congregation to a fusion of the 
text’s past tradition and the group’s current historical situation, the hermeneut would pay 
attention to his tradition, to the relevant contours of the current culture, and to the group’s 
attitude of openness. However, where the hermeneutical task is to hear the voice of God in 
scripture (at whatever time God wills to give it) despite or through the noise of personal, 
traditional, and cultural habits of belief and practice—for the purpose of meeting a historical 
moment that is often unknown—the hermeneut would naturally spend time in the scriptures 
themselves and in prayer with other listeners. Academic study of biblical contexts, of the 
tradition, and of the current historical moment are not precluded, but they do take a back seat to 
the primary importance of spending time together in the scriptures themselves as the Word of 
God.   
When a community is engaged together in reading the scriptures, praying for divine 
illumination in them (in Evangelical parlance, “waiting on the Lord”), and practicing some level 
of communal life together, something happens in the community’s phenomenological 
experience. Different scriptural figures, narratives, and phrases emerge and take hold of the 
ecclesial community’s “social imaginary,” giving meaning and direction for the group or the 
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individual. According to a participatory reading of this phenomenon, this is the divine voice 
speaking through his word the eternal truths that pertain to a particular part of his body at a 
particular moment on the historical plane. The scriptures are conceived as the narrative of Christ 
spoken from eternity into diverse figures and mandates in time, and because Christ, his Word, 
the totus Christus comprised of the Christians of all ages, and (analogically) each particular 
ecclesial gathering are all identified together, the diverse figures and narratives of scripture can 
also be directed by the Holy Spirit to each congregation, listening together with attentiveness to 
scripture and the divine voice. “For all things are yours,” Paul says, “whether … the world or life 
or death, or things present or things to come—all are yours. And you are Christ’s, and Christ is 
God’s.”231  
Just as Jesus could point to himself in scriptural past history—as Jonah in the fish, or as 
Moses’ serpent on the pole232—and could point to himself in the church’s future history—“if 
they persecuted me, they will persecute you”; “Saul, why are you persecuting me?”233—the 
ecclesial body of Christ now has available to its self-understanding and obedience the conceptual 
resources of all the scriptures through the mediating figure of Christ and the mediating narrative 
of his gospel. This means both that “all the promises of God in [Christ] are Yes, and in Him 
Amen,”234 because “whatever things were written before were written for our learning, that we 
through the patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope,”235 and that “these 
[scriptural narratives] became our examples, to the intent that we should not lust after evil things 
as they also lusted … and [should] not become idolaters as were some of them.”236 With 
Augustine, the participating church dares not lift itself above the scriptures but must rather listen 
and tremble before the comforts and warnings and directives that come through them from the 
divine voice, taking seriously God’s promise to speak through his Word.237   
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To discern which particular part of this expansive scriptural “social imaginary” is 
applicable, therefore, the church needs to hear from God, together, in the temporal and embodied 
events of their coming together as the church. As we saw in I Corinthians 14, this requirement of 
the presence of God for the full functioning of the hermeneutics of his people is a key part of 
some early church “liturgy,” or congregational practice. It is also a constant theme throughout 
the scriptures. One of Augustine’s key scriptural themes was Amos 8:11, the warning to the 
people of Israel of a “famine of hearing the words of the Lord,”238 which parallels the description 
of scriptural judgment (e.g., “and the word of the Lord was rare in those days; there was no 
widespread revelation”239) and is the converse of the descriptions of scriptural blessings (e.g., 
“Your words were found, and I ate them, and your word was to me the joy and rejoicing of my 
heart”240).  
Paul wrote about the kingdom of God not being in word only but in power,241 and he 
specifically identified the gathering of the church as the place where Christ’s power would be 
present to give judgment on different ecclesial situations,242 just as had happened earlier when 
the presence of God in the church cost Ananias and Sapphira their lives.243 While the pouring out 
of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost gets the most attention, the scriptures attest that, just like in the 
Old Testament,244 the church was continually in need of the renewed presence of God to be able 
to interpret and to speak its interpretation boldly. One such instance is recorded in Acts 4, and 
sets the stage for the communal sharing of life and goods that Augustine used as the foundation 
for his monastic thought: “And when they had prayed, the place where they were assembled 
together was shaken; and they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and they spoke the word of 
God with boldness.”245 Here is where we see that the recent Charismatic impact on 
Evangelicalism may be interpreted as a divine gift of a philosophy of communication, one that 
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insists on the irreducible need to hear from God. While this form of spirituality might seem 
“foolishness” to the sacred or secular scholar steeped in a flat univocal modernity, its basic 
contours of the interpenetration of spiritual and material worlds through different forms of sacred 
mediums was the ground on which most of the history of Christianity, and most global Christian 
traditions now, have functioned. What Evangelicals, with Augustine, can bring back to the table 
is obedience to the command and tradition of attention to the scriptures as the medium of God’s 
eternal word.  
As we have seen in I Corinthians 14 above, there is no unilateral interpretation by one 
gifted Christian of a univocal text, but the interpretation comes, rather, as a participatory gift of 
the Spirit through the charitable dialogue and discernment of “two or three witnesses,” overseen 
by the elders whose authority comes from their own phronesis in this kind of charitable and 
attentive hermeneutics. In an ecclesial gathering, sharing life, obedience, and scriptural 
interpretation together through prayerful and charitable dialogue as shepherded within the 
Christological narrative can enable not just participatory openness to divine speech in the 
scriptures but also, at God’s pleasure, participatory reception of that eternal word for this 
community, now. In this way, Evangelical ecclesial gatherings can be understood after the 
pattern of the Emmaus experience: 
So it was, while they conversed and reasoned, that Jesus Himself drew near and went 
with them. But their eyes were restrained, so that they did not know Him. … Then He 
said to them, “O foolish ones, and slow of heart to believe in all that the prophets have 
spoken! Ought not the Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into His glory?” 
And beginning at Moses and all the Prophets, He expounded to them in all the Scriptures 
the things concerning Himself. … Now it came to pass, as He sat at the table with them, 
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that He took bread, blessed and broke it, and gave it to them. Then their eyes were 
opened and they knew Him; and He vanished from their sight. And they said to one 
another, “Did not our heart burn within us while He talked with us on the road, and while 
He opened the Scriptures to us?”246 
While the sermon service will not and should not be removed from Evangelical liturgies, a 
communal scripture reading service should be practiced that is accorded equal or greater value, 
one that gives participants a reason and outlet for their own scripture reading and that provides 
training for the ecclesial community together in listening for and waiting on God while listening 
to and charitably waiting with others. This kind of participatory Augustinian hermeneutic—
individual and communal, textual and embodied, questioning but submissive to Spirit’s voice in 
scripture—provides the philosophy of communication resources to restore an Evangelical church 
torn by modernism and, through its renewal in the Word, to witness to the city of God in this 
historical moment. 
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